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Thesis:
This thesis focuses on the evolving legal dynamic between the European Community and the
World Trade Organisation in the area of Agriculture.
The WTO's Agreement on Agriculture does not exist in isolation, but interacts with many of the
balance of the Annex 1A agreements, which are attached to the Agreement Establishing the WTO.
In addition the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the agreement on Trade
Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) both have their part to play in the global
trade of agricultural commodities. The provisions of these agreements and their associated dispute
settlement rulings are having an increasingly profound impact on the EC's Common Agricultural
Policy, and its allied policy areas, such as the Common Customs Policy, its Generalised System of
Preferences, and its Development Policy relationships, in particular with the Afro-Caribbean-
Pacific countries. The nexus between these two evolving legal jurisdictions, is mediated through
the EC's Common Commercial Policy, with this relationship having been subject of its own line
of jurisprudence at the ECJ. Each of these factors in the dynamic between these two levels of
governance on the legal framework dealing with agriculture are examined in turn, with the
relationship to date being critically analysed, with potential developments for the future being
forecasted.
The reaction of the EC to this external force, with the adoption of the concept of the
multifunctionality of EC agriculture, which has been added to an equally legally challenging
concept of sustainability, has resulted in the development of Pillar II of the CAP, which presages
the emergence of a new EC Rural Policy. A number of the emerging ideas from within the EC
which might be applied to such a new EC Rural Policy are also examined. To the extent that the
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synergy between these two legal systems dealing with agriculture are affected by allied policy
considerations, such as health and consumer affairs, competition law and environmental standards,
these other areas are also discussed.
The thesis has as its focus agricultural commodities generally, which are the subject matter of the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, (therein classified as HS 1-24, less fish and fish products), but
where the thesis does focus on specific commodities, these are agricultural commodities of the
temperate regions of the EC.
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1. Introduction
The definition of Agriculture being used for the purposes of this thesis is
that used in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1. In line with Annex
1,1.i, issues pertaining to fish and fish products will therefore not form part of
the discussions in this thesis.
The issue of Agriculture, and the legal basis for controlling the rural use of
agriculture, merits in depth examination. Agriculture is increasingly becoming a
bone of contention in international trade disputes, as evidenced by the fact that
the whole of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade under the Uruguay
round of negotiations was held up pending the resolution of the Agricultural
trading issues between the three main negotiating parties at the international
17
level, the EC, the USA and the Cairns group,1 which resolution was eventually
reached at Blair House in November 1992. Conflicting issues of feeding an
increasing global population, at a reasonable price, while maintaining our
respective bio-diversities, local ecosystems and rural populations, are continuing
issues of debate. Differences in social priorities in different areas around the
world will influence the development of international debates, in this
increasingly globalised world, and it is for this purpose that I intend to examine
the legal structure of Agricultural policy at two levels, and to examine the
interaction between the two. I have chosen the EC agricultural policy and the
WTO agricultural provisions for this purpose.
The European Economic Community (EEC), now known as the European
Community (EC), (founded pursuant to the Treaty of Rome 19572) is a
supranational entity, considered by lawyers to be sui generis, which is given
legal status by Article 281.4 Member States' competence to act has, to the extent
set out in the EC Treaty, as amended, been transferred to the EC,5 with European
law being supreme to conflicting national law.6 Individuals have a right of
recourse to their national courts in order to enforce European law against fellow
citizens or their own governments.7 The EC Treaty also involved the signing
over by the member states to the supranational organisation the exclusive right to
1
1. Argentina, 2. Australia, 3. Brazil, 4. Canada, 5. Chile, 6. Colombia, 7. Fiji, 8. Hungary, 9.
Indonesia, 10. Malaysia, 11. New Zealand, 12. The Philippines, 13. Thailand, 14. Uruguay.
2 Otherwise known as the EC (formerly the EEC) Treaty. This treaty has been amended a number
of times by amending treaties. In this thesis I refer to the post Amsterdam version of the EC
Treaty, unless otherwise specified.
3 Weatherill S.;"The Constitutional Court", Chapter 6 in Law and Integration in the European
Union, 1995, at page 185.
4 Article 210 EC, pre Amsterdam.
5 For a discussion of this point in the context of the EC's legal relationship with the WTO see
further chapter 6.
6 See the line of ECJ case law commencing with Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 405,
[1966] CMLR 111, where the principle was recognised, and subsequently developed in Case
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- and Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittle [1970] ECR 1125 (national constitutional law), to include the protection of
recognised rights under EC law, and also potential rights not yet ruled upon by the ECJ; Case C-
213/89, R v. Secretary ofState for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-
2433.
7 All national courts and tribunals are obliged to apply European Community law; Case 106/77,
Administrazione delle Finanze delo Stato v. Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629.
18
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determine Agricultural Policy for the EC member states, with the agricultural
policy of what is currently the 25 member states of the European Union
operating a unified agricultural policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, or CAP.
Each of the member states of the EC, together with the EC, have all signed up to
the global trading agreements, GATT 1994,10 GATS11 and TRIPS.12 These are
enforced through the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which also operates the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture and its allied Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Matters (SPS Agreement). The CAP of the EC and the WTO
Agriculture agreement both have different histories, different emphases, and
differences in political underpinnings. Given the differing legal frameworks and
dynamics within the EC and the WTO, together with the differing emphasis in
policy approach at the two levels, the historical and continuing tensions in the
area of agriculture are likely to continue into the future.
The concept of sovereignty has been developed to cover the concept of
the right to govern over a territory of land. The concept of state that we have
been working with for a number of centuries evolved from the Peace of
1 o
Westphalia from which the principles of "sovereignty and autonomy"
evolved.14 The "Westphalian" model of states, and the resulting international
order is considered by some academics to have lasted from 1648 to the end of the
second world war, 1945, with the founding of the United Nations (UN). The
founding of the UN, under the United Nations Charter in 1945, is seen as the
birth of the globalisation movement, which continues apace. Low and Gleeson
are of the opinion that "the United Nations system marks a transition from a
world of national sovereign states, settling their differences by force, to one
marked increasingly international and in some instances negotiated global
8 For a discussion of this point in the context of the EC's agricultural policy see chapter 6.
9 See Articles 32 to 38 EC, (ex. Articles 38 to 46 EC).
10 The General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade 1994, which was preceded by GATT 1947.
11 General Agreement for Trade in Services.
12 Trade related issues of Intellectual Property.
13 Which brought to an end the German phase of the Thirty Years War.
14
Low, Nicholas and Gleeson, Brendan; "Justice, Society and Nature an exploration of political
ecology", Routledge 1998, at page 177.
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regimes established for specific purposes with the consent of nations".15 A key
question which they ask, which has a direct impact on the subject matter of this
thesis is "whether this negotiated order is adequate to advance the ends of
environmental and ecological justice, and, if not, what further institutional
change is needed?"16 While the focus of this thesis is agricultural law rather than
environmental law, the natural interaction between these two areas of law,
increasingly evidenced under the EC's mid-term review of agriculture17 and
espoused by the EC in the current Millennium round of negotiations at the WTO,
in its advocacy of the multifunctionaliity of agriculture, is not so clearly reflected
in the current, or even possibly, future, WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Added
to these problems are the tensions that the interaction of two very different legal
systems throw up, and the issue of the legal relationship between the EC and the
WTO in the area of agriculture becomes a complex one. It is not proposed to
examine the entirety of this relationship in depth in this thesis. What is proposed,
however, is to examine the nexus of this relationship in depth, with an
1 8
introduction being made to supporting or related issues. It should also be noted
that the increasing impact of developing and less developing country concerns
with regard to both the EC and the WTO regulatory framework in the area of
agriculture is not being covered in this thesis.
Land is not seen as being just another commodity, even in this most
consumerist of times. Land provides us with a place in which to live. It provides
us with food and water to consume. It is also responsible for recycling waste
products of human existence, and provides a place for wildlife and nature to
exist. It is increasingly being used as a recreational asset in an increasingly
urbanised society. The varying purposes for which we use land, both for the
production of tradeable commodities, and for the production of non tradeable
commodities, was referred to by Franz Fishier, the former EC Commissioner for
15 Ibid, at page 178.
16 Ibid, at page 178.
17 which is analysed in depth in chapter 8.
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Agriculture and Rural Development, as being multifunctional.19 This multi
functionality of land is increasingly posing a problem in a changing and smaller
20world. In addition to the EC concept of multifunctionality in the area of
agriculture should be added the concept of "sustainability", an international law
concept which permeates all aspects of EC law. The definition of sustainability
in common usage is that of the Brundt Land commission, which submitted that
development, in order to be sustainable, should meet "the needs of the present
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
21needs". This concept of sustainability is being promoted at UN level through
the Rio Conference,22 which approved Agenda 21,23 and the UN Commission of
Sustainable Development.
Sustainability has been written into the EC treaty, at Article 2 EC, with
environmental protection requirements being required to be integrated "into the
definition and implementation of Community policies" by virtue of Article 6 EC.
The concept of sustainability has also been written into WTO documentation,
such as the preamble of the WTO agreement,24 and the Ministerial Decision of
the 14th April 1994 which provided that it was "allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development", while still seeking to preserve and protect "the environment and
to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective
18
An introduction to the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO in these allied policy
areas will be made in chapter 8.
19 See inter alia, European Commission Info - Paper "Contribution of the European Community on
the Multifunctional Character of Agriculture", October 1999, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external/wto/document/ip2_en.pdf, accessed on the 9/8/06, at page
1.
20 OECD: Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework, 2001.
21 Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development; OECD 2001, quoting from WECD. 1987 World
Commission on Environment and Development (WECD) (1987), Our Common Future, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK
22 The Rio Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.
23 The UN Agenda for Sustainable Development in the 21st Century, available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm
24 which states that the "need to protect and preserve the environment, in a manner consistent with
countries' needs and levels of economic development".
21
needs and concerns at different levels of economic development".26 The current
Doha agenda also provides that "sustainable development should be an
97
overarching goal of the negotiation". How the two levels of governance, the EC
and the WTO, approach the issue of sustainability, and environmental standards
in general, together with the compatibility of their approaches, also merits
examination in this thesis.
While the theories underpinning international trade are undoubtedly driven
by economics, when the commodity being traded is land (outwith the scope of
this thesis), or the commodities which are grown on the land, then pure economic
theory can fail to provide all of the answers. Daly and Cobb state that land is a
very peculiar commodity, quoting from John Stuart Mill's Principles ofPolitical
Economy; "No man made the land. It is the original inheritance of the whole
98
species. Its appropriation is wholly a question of general expediency". The
same may be said for land as the place of production of agricultural
commodities. It may, therefore, no longer be expedient to treat either land or the
harvest from the land as mere commodities, substitutable for capital, given the
rate that mankind is exploiting its natural resources in this anthropocentric
"western" society. Daly and Cobb are of the opinion that "economics as a
9Q
discipline floats free from the physical world". The EC's CAP is grappling with
this complexity, and is making some early tentative steps to resolving the issue in
OA
its mid-term review provisions. International trade in agricultural products is
also a nexus where economics meets the physical world, and where the
conflicting paradigms of trade, social sciences (of rural areas), and ecology must
25 Decision of 14 April 1994, Ministers meeting on the occasion of signing the Final Act
embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral Trade negotiations at Marrakech on 5
April 1994.
26
Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Press/ TE 014, 14 November
1996, http://www.wto.org.
27 Clarke, John; WTO: Now the Hard Work Really Begins, INTTLR 2002, 8(2), 39-52, at page 41.
28
Daly, Herman E. & Cobb, John B. Jr "For the Common Good: redirecting the economy toward
community, the environment, and a sustainable future"; Beacon Press, 1994, at page 105.
29 Ibid, at page 99.
30 of which more in chapter 8.
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be reconciled. Quoting from Ely and Wehrwein, Daly and Cobb go on to say
that "land policies must be based upon the operation of nature's laws as well as
upon the economic drives of man". This also is the challenge for Agricultural
lawyers, the CAP, and the WTO regulatory framework for agricultural
commodities.
2. Introduction to Regionalism - with specific reference to the EC
Regionalism is very much a 20th century phenomenon, with the "erosion
of the Westphalian nation-state system and the growth of interdependence and
"globalisation".33 While it is possible to find a definition of a region as "a limited
number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree
of mutual interdependence",34 "new regionalism" is perceived by political
scientists as being "still in search of theory".35 Whatever its theoretical
underpinnings, lawyers have to deal with regionalism as a reality, aware that the
two global trends which form the backdrop of this thesis, regionalisation and
globalisation, have an interdependent relationship. This reflexive relationship
will be examined in depth in chapters 7 and 9.
Global regionalism has developed in waves, with the European
Community, the European Coal and Steel community36 and Euratom forming the
first wave of regionalism. The success of what is now the European Union (EU)
has encouraged the development of other regional organisations throughout the
31
Ely, Richard T., and Wehrwein, George S.; Land economics, Macmillan, 1940, more recently
published by Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964. (No ISBN number), at page 25.
2
Op. cit. footnote no. 28, at page 99.
33
Hettne, Bjorn and Soderbaum, Fredrik, Goteborg University; "Theorizing the Rise of
Regionness", conference paper presented at the CSGR 3rd Annual conference, After the Global
Crises: What next for Regionalism, Scarman House, University ofWarwick, 16-18 September 99,
at page 4.
34 Ibid, at page 10.
35 Ibid, at page 19.
36
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, April 18, 1951.
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world, such as NAFTA and ASEAN, with the increasing confidence of states
operating within regional organisations leading to "the trend to formal
OQ
regionalisation" being "accelerated markedly". The success of such regional
agreements has resulted in "approaches and techniques which have subsequently
found application in the multilateral trading system",40 the larger and more
ambitious World Trade Organisation in 1994.41
The EC is considered unique in the world legal order as few regional
organisations have chosen to develop the supranational legal structure of the EC,
or even to aim at the level of integration of policy developed at the EC/EU level.
The EC policy areas are varied, to include trade42 and competition policy,43 and
the European Single Currency,44 but also issues such as the now developing
public health policy,45 Economic and Social Cohesion,46 Social Policy47 and the
40
Environment. Any disputes arising are dealt with, either at a national level, by
the national court structure, or at a community level, by the permanent European
Court of Justice (ECJ),49 or the Court of First Instance (CFT),50 depending on the
subject matter in question, or the nature of the litigation.
3. Introduction to Globalisation - with specific reference to the
WTO
37 The North Atlantic Free Trade Association in 1992.
38 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, established in 1967.
39
Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System: Synergy and Divergence, OECD,
1995, executive summary at page 13.
40 Ibid at page 14.
41
Pursuant to the Uruguay Round of GATT.
42 Article 113 EC.
43 Article 81 and 82 EC, (Article 85 and 86 EC pre Amsterdam).
44 Articles 98 to 115 EC.
45 Article 152 EC, (Article 129 EC pre Amsterdam).
46 Articles 158 to 162 EC, (Articles 130a to 130d EC pre Amsterdam).
47 Articles 136 to 145 EC, (Articles 117 to 122 EC pre Amsterdam).
48 Articles 174 to 176 EC, (Articles 130r to Article 130t EC pre Amsterdam).
49 Articles 220 to 245 EC, (Articles 164 to Articles 188 EC pre Amsterdam).
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The concept of globalisation as it is commonly understood is the process
where by the world is undergoing "ever intensifying interconnectedness and
interdependence",51 so that for some theorists "it is becoming less relevant to
speak of separate national economies, or separate national jurisdictions founded
upon principles."52 This has resulted in the "spatial and temporal compression of
the world",53 but where it is not uniformly "compressed" but "greater or lesser
distorted".54 It should be noted that under the "realist" view of international
relations theory, it is recognised that it is states that form the building blocks of
both the EC and the WTO.55 The current nature of globalisation is one where
"western capitalism has become the world economy", at the expense of other
models.56
The inter world war period saw major changes in international economic
conditions, with the "GATT and Bretton Woods institutions" being seen as
"reactions to the experience" of those who had survived the turbulent years of the
1930s and the second world war,57 which all led to the recognition of the need to
change the legal structure in which international trading regimes were to operate.
The principles of treaty law that had existed "during the preceding seven
centuries" no longer seemed to operate, and the gold standard was discarded.58
Some of the principles still inform legal provisions today, such as "the principles
of reciprocity;
a) the principle of equal treatment between foreigners and nationals;
50 See Article 237 EC, (Article 180 EC pre Amsterdam), for the limits of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance.
51
Axford, Barrie; "The Global System; Economics, Politics and Culture", Polity Press, 1995, at
page 27.
52 Ibid, at page 27.
53
Hatsuse, Riuhei, Kolb University; "Historical Globalisation and Asian Implications", conference
paper presented at the CSGR 3r Annual Conference After the Global Crises: What next for
Regionalism?, Scarman House, University ofWarwick, 16 to 18 September 1999, at page 4.
54 Ibid, at page 5.
55
Op. cit. footnote no. 51, at page 27.
56
Op. cit. footnote no. 53, at page 4.
57
Mclntyre, Owen; Commentary on Canny and Hunt by Mclntyre in Parry, Geraint, Qureshi, Asif
and Steiner, Hillel (eds), The Legal and Moral Aspects of International Trade. Freedom and trade:
Volume III, Routledge, 1998, at page 53.
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b) the most-favoured-nation principle;
c) the open-door principle;
d) (as a counterpart to a), b) c), in highly developed forms of co-operation))
the principle of preferential treatment
e) the principle of fair treatment;
f) a minimum standard for those cases where the other principles cannot be
applied."59
One of the original legal documents in the field of globalisation is the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974,60 which was the "first
attempt to lay down the legal principles of a new international economic order,
... with a declaration and a program of action, which contained "policy
objectives rather than legal principles".61
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade owes its origins to the
"series of bilateralisms of the 1930s" and the "Anglo-American wartime planning
for peace" and "subsequent multilateral negotiations" of the mid 1940's.62 These
gave rise to the Havana Charter, which was to set up the International Trade
Organisation, of which the GATT agreement was to form part. This was to be
complimented by agreements on "restrictive trade practices, investment,
commodities and the like",63 however these complimenting provisions did not
come into effect due to the failure of the US Congress to ratify them, as GATT
1947 continued as a standalone agreement on a "provisional basis".64 This
situation was unfortunate as the Havana Charter had recognised the flaws of a
market based on the principles of free trade only, and had contained "detailed
58
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stipulations" in order to control markets "to some extent by commodity
agreements",65 and to prevent the formation of international cartels.66
GATT 1947 was developed over a number of multi-lateral rounds,
culminating in the Uruguay round, which commenced with the Punta del Este
declaration of September 1986, and closed with the signing of the final texts in
Marrakech, Morocco in April 1994, which resulted, inter alia, in GATT 1994.
This agreement entered into force on the 1st January 1995. Other matters dealt
with in the Uruguay round, and which resulted in multi-lateral agreements
included the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the
Agreement on Trade related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (TRIPS),
and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The Millennium round has recently
reopened negotiations, pursuant to Article 20 GATT.67 However, until a new
agreement is concluded, which will be, from previous experience, after lengthy
negotiations taking many years, GATT 1994 continues to be the key document
for discussion. GATT 1994 expressly provides that it is "legally distinct" from
zro
GATT 1947. It provides, in allied agreements, for the setting up of the World
Trade Organisation, and its dispute resolution system.69
The WTO operates a multi-lateral trading system "based on a non-
70
intrusive, non-discriminatory, national treatment approach", with member state
governments being free to maintain "divergent national policies".71 GATT has
79
been perceived as suffering from a lack of dynamism, particularly with regard
to the national treatment of matters such as environmental and labour standards,
65
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which are recognised to create significant barriers to trade, and which will be
relevant to the examination of Agricultural issues.
Of relevance to this thesis is the observation by the OECD73 that GATT
is under pressure to move from the traditional "trade" policy to a more intrusive
"integration" model currently utilised by the EC.74 This observation emphasises
the differences between the legal structure of the two regimes, with the EC
integration process, which covers a wider range of policy areas, requiring the
transfer of competence to legislate to the supranational legal entity. This transfer
of competence, where the national policies of member states are constantly open
75
to challenge, would be considered a bridge too far for many of the current
members of the WTO. The problems of the governance processes of the EC
would pale into insignificance in comparison with developments in this area by
the WTO. Particular problems include the development of a definition of labour
standards and environmental standards that would satisfy both advanced and
developing countries. The possibility of the harmonisation of environmental
measures which would produce viable regulations are seen to be "a long way off'
at not only the WTO, but also the OECD and the UN.76 This a particular problem
for agricultural law.
4. The changing nature of the EC and the GATT/WTO legal
jurisdictions
The legal documents which set up GATT 1947, GATT 1994, the WTO as an
international organisation, and the EC77 as an international legal entity,78 are
unquestionably international treaties between states, signed by states, and
"ratified according to the internal constitutional arrangements of the Member
73
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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75 Ibid, at page 48.
76 Ibid, at page 43.
77 The EU has not been granted legal personality by its treaties, and as Agriculture is dealt with by
the EC pillar this thesis will focus on EC law.
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Countries"79 before coming into force. Perhaps the only exception to this
statement is the fact that the EC, utilising the legal personality conferred upon it
by Article 281 of its own founding treaty, the Treaty of Rome, as amended, and
Article 310 EC, which gives it authority to "conclude with one or more States or
international organisation" agreements, in pursuant of the EC's own objectives,
signed up to the 1994 WTO and GATT agreements.80 Leaving aside the
accession of this regional integration organisation to the GATT/WTO structure
in 1994, the construct of both the WTO and the EC both derive their original
legitimacy from the principles of public international law. How the GATT/WTO
legal structure, particularly after 1994, and the EC/EU legal structure developed
subsequent to their inception merits, however, further examination.
The fact that the WTO legal structure is embedded in the public
international law framework was recognised by the Appellate Body of the WTO,
• 81
in the US - Gasoline case, when they "made it clear that the WTO Agreement
could not be read in clinical isolation from public international law".82 Public
international law was referred to by Hart as resembling "that simple form of
social structure, consisting only of primary rules of obligations, which, when we
find it among societies of individuals, we are accustomed to contrast with a
OQ
developed legal system". While the base structure of public international law
may be problematic, this area of law has been developing apace since Hart was
writing in 1961, given that the current international legal structure has been
78 Article 281 EC.
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84dictated largely by the nature of todays global society, and global society has
been changing rapidly with the development in travel and telecommunication
facilities. The international or global community is increasingly becoming
85
interdependent "particularly in economic matters", requiring the legal
jurisdiction of public international law to facilitate the development of
globalisation and regionalisation.
Having accepted the need to develop the legal jurisdiction of public
international law, the sources of laws in this jurisdiction needs to be examined, in
order not to treat the WTO as an organisation operating in a legal vacuum. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice provides an "authoritative statement
of the sources of international law".86 Article 38(1) of the ICJ statute provides
that the Court is to apply "the following sources of law to any dispute submitted
for settlement:
i) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognised by the contesting states;
ii) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
iii) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; and
iv) the judicial decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
law."87
Primary sources of law are to be the international conventions, legal customs and
general principles, with the judicial sources and legal writings to be regarded "as
88evidence of a material source of law in one of the other three forms".
Evidence of the use by the WTO of international law principles in its own
89
case law can be seen in the Appellate Body's findings in the US-Shrimp case. It
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was also recognised that the "interpretation of a treaty" is an evolving matter, as
an un-amended "treaty can be affected by subsequent development in
international law, including, arguably, new customs, general principles of law
and Treaties".90 The Poultry91 case went on to say that under Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention92 a subsequent bi-lateral agreement could be used to interpret
"the Scheduled obligations of the WTO Members in dispute".93
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also provides
interpretative tools in determining the relationship between the WTO treaties and
other international law treaties, given the WTO finding in the US-Gasoline case94
that WTO law is part of the public international law framework. All states are
"expected to comply with their international obligations in good faith",95 in
compliance with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.96 This is of particular
relevance to the contents of this particular thesis, given the possible interaction
between the EC and WTO Agricultural provisions with the Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (MEAs), which are currently coming to prominence
Q7
in both legal and political circles, but also in the public conscience.
Three of the main principles in this area in determining a hierarchy
between different international treaties are;
89
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2. Treaty clauses, which provide cross references from one treaty to another,
should be followed. This situation is regulated by Article 30.2 of the Vienna
• 98
Convention,
2. The rule of "lex posterior derogat priori", whereby a later law will overrule all
or part of a prior law with which it is in conflict," and
3. Lex specialis derogat generali, which while this rule does not emanate from
the Vienna convention, "it has been recognised and applied in a number of cases
by the ICJ and is recognised by the doctrine."100
Public international law interacts with the laws of member states depending on
the internal constitutional order of each member state. Three theories apply,
monism, dualism and harmonisation.101 Which of these legal orders the European
Community operates vis a vis its relation to its international legal obligations will
be examined in detail in chapter 6.
In contrast to the legal jurisdiction in which the WTO operates, the EC has
managed, from its origins as regional integration association (RIA) founded on
international treaties legitimised by the principles of public international law, to
etch out for itself a totally new legal jurisdiction which is regarded by legal
academics as being sui generis. The EC, or as it was then known, the EEC, was,
like the WTO is now, recognised as having a "status.... subject, more or less, to
i r\o
public international law". There was no claim at the time for the EC to be "a
self sufficient legal order, separate from the international agreements that bound
the Member States."103 That position changed thanks to the judicial activism of
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and with the complicity of the national
courts of the member states.
98 Article 30.2 of the Vienna Convention provides that "When a treaty specifies that it is subject to,
or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of
that other treaty prevail".
99
For the full detail on this rule, see Articles 30.3, 44, and 59.1 of the Vienna Convention, which
should all be read together.
100
Op. cit. footnote no. 82, at page 1092.
101
Op. cit. footnote no. 84, at page 33.
102
Eleftheriadis, Pavlos; "Aspects of European Constitutionalism"; ECR 1996 21(1), 32-42, at
page 34.
103 Ibid, at page 34.
32
Early case law of the ECJ104 classified European law as a "new order of
international law", separate from "both Member state law and international
law",105 however this reference to international law disappeared from later
judgments.106 The ECJ was faced with incomplete provisions in the Treaty of
Rome dealing with the enforceability of EEC law, with the only "relevant treaty
provision"107 being the then Article 189 EEC. The ECJ developed, through a
substantial body of law, the corpus of EC law, to include the fundamental
principles of supremacy108 and direct effect,109 and the concept of a state being
liable to an individual for the non-implementation of a community obligation.110
An important factor in the development of EC law is that "not only member
states, but also individuals, have been recognised as directly subject to" EC
law.111 The ECJ's activist approach to EC law has been supported by "the
112 113
courts of at least some member states".
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The approach of the ECJ to viewing the EEC Treaty "as the highest source
of law" was seen to be a "revolutionary change" to the European legal order.114
The direction of the case law is considered to be leading to the "making of a
constitution for Europe".115 The body of EC law has now developed to the extent
that its applicability and dynamic now operate "irrespective of the international
agreements that founded the original Community".116 This new legal order now
places the EC Treaty higher than the constitutions of the EC's Member States,117
thereby limiting the "sovereign rights" of EC Member States,118 to the extent that
they continue to engage in the EC legal construct.
A consensus has yet to be achieved on the theorising of the "division of
attributions"119 between the different levels of governance within the EC. One
view is that of Laurence W. Gormley, who has classified the policies of the EC
• 120 121
into two groups, the principle aims and objectives of the EC, and
"horizontal and flanking policies", which is any other policy referred to in the
122treaties. On the basis of this theory the horizontal or flanking policies are
subject to the principle of subsidiarity,123 which was introduced into the EC
Treaty by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.124 A competing theory in this area is the
occupied field theory. This theory operates on the basis of the "doctrine of pre¬
emption",125 a concept of American origin, by which a legal area is "transformed
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from concurrent jurisdiction to an area of exclusive competence for the
federation".126
Under the occupied field theory subsidiarity operates to "rationaliz[e] the
management of public affairs"127 between the different levels of governance
within the EC. How exactly this theory of occupied field operates has led to
differing views, with Toth holding the opinion that "where the Community has
legislated in a particular area it acquired pre-emptive rights over the whole
128 129field". Others view the "exclusive powers of the Community" in a much
more limited field, with pre-emption only operating "in a narrow way to allow
the Community to acquire exclusive competence only in the specific area
covered by the EC legislation",130 and does not permit "the Community to lay
claim over the whole area of policy".131 The concept of subsidiarity will be
referred to in chapter 3, but analysed in depth in chapter 6.
5. The legal characteristics of the EC - Agricultural Provision
The CAP of the EC developed against the backdrop of the perception that
"farmers had a special role in society", particularly given the scarcity of food
1 39
during and after the Second World War. The six originating member states of
the EEC were "far from self-sufficient in foodstuffs", and there was perceived to
126 Ibid, at page 69.
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be "no justification for the unilateral opening up of markets"133 at that period in
history. The Spaak report of April 1956 advocated special treatment for
agriculture,134 in comparison to other activities, on account of the need for food
for human life, social stability of rural society, and the climatic and other natural
factors which are outwith human control, which affected farming more than
other economic activities.135 In addition, regional disparities became another
factor in dealing with the agricultural industry in a different manner to other
economic activities.136 The Stresa Conference of 1958 emphasised the social
stability of rural areas and the need to reinforce the family farm.
The provisions of the Treaty of Rome derived from a compromise
between existing national interests of the six member states.137 The intention was
to increase productivity, to stabilise markets and to guarantee a reasonable
income for farmers, and reasonable prices for consumers.138 It was strongly
influenced by President Roosevelt's New Deal policy of the pre-war years.139
The next stage in the development of the CAP was the Mansholt plan.
Commissioner Mansholt, in March 1968 proposed the restructuring of the CAP
in accordance with the policy paper "Agriculture 1980".140 Ths plan "envisaged a
reduction in the number of persons engaged in agriculture" through taking land
133
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out of production, and there "creation of larger, more economic farms".141 This
resulted in a long standing stand off between the Council and the Commission,
which led, in 1971 to large scale protests organised by the farmers'
organisations, COPA and COGECA, in Brussels, which lead to rioting, serious
damage to property, and one death. The Mansholt plan was finally accepted in
1972,142 kut thiS period epitomises the problems encountered when attempts are
made to restructure or refocus the Common Agricultural Policy, in light of its
originating basic tools.
The basic tools of the CAP included;
1. Target prices, being the prices that farmers should obtain on the open market;
2. Intervention Prices, being the prices at which intervention agencies would buy
surplus produce. This was subsequently modified to include "quality standards
and other regulations" concerning what would be bought into intervention,143
3. Threshold prices at the frontier, being the lowest possible price that goods
would be bought into the community, the difference between world market
prices and threshold prices being adjusted by way of variable import levies
imposed by the EEC;144
4. Export subsidies, which would be payments made by the EEC on goods being
sold out of the Community onto the world market, to allow for the differential
between world prices, and the internal EEC price for that produce. In the
unlikely event that world prices were higher than Community prices, then an
export tax would be chargeable on the export of the agricultural produce.145 The
main principles of the Common Agricultural Policy became "the common
market, financial solidarity and Community preference",146 with supposedly
uniform prices for commodities throughout the EC. The CAP has in more recent
141 McMahon J.: Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, Pearson Education Limited, 2000, at
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years, particularly under the recent mid-term review,147 been evolving into a two-
pillar structure, with the second pillar contributing to a new European Rural
Policy.
6. The legal characteristics of the WTO - Agricultural Provision
A complex historical and political background, which will be dealt with in
detail in chapter 4, formed the backdrop to the development ofGATT 1947,
which eventually had little impact on agricultural commodities, leading to the
need for a separate agreement dealing with agricultural commodities. It was,
therefore, only at the Uruguay round, which led, inter alia, to the Agreement on
Agriculture, that Agricultural issues came centre stage in GATT negotiations,
with Agriculture being one of the more highly contentious issues in the
negotiations that led to the agreement of the final treaty texts.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, as with the GATT agreement, is
based on the MFN and NT principles. Its focus is on encouraging and
strengthening the reform process of domestic agricultural regimes, with a view to
reducing or eliminating distortions in the global market in the area of agricultural
commodities. As many of the domestic regimes around the world, in particular
those of the USA and the EC, have a highly distortive effect on trade in
agricultural commodities, the WTO Agreement in Agriculture adopts an interim
position with regard to the dismantlement of certain support mechanisms for the
farming community. In no way does the agricultural agreement attempt, at this
stage, to align the trade in agricultural commodities with that of non-agricultural
commodities. That eventual target may take many successors to the current WTO
Agreement on Agriculture to establish. The current agreement does go some way
to addressing the distortions which arose from the particular political, economic
and legal framework which resulted in the differentiation of agricultural
147 of which more in chapter 8.
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commodities from non-agricultural commodities, which will be discussed in
detail in chapter 4.
Under the current WTO framework, agreements relevant to the global trade and
support for production of agricultural commodities include;
2. The Agreement on Agriculture
3. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(S&P Agreements),
4. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
5. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies
Agreement)
6. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (DSU), all part of the final texts of the 1994 GATT Uruguay round.148
These were eventually signed in Marrakech, Morocco, in April 1994, and came
into force on the 1st January 1995.
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture focused on four areas:
1. Internal Support,
2. Export Subsidies,
3. Market Access, and
4. Food Security (to encourage stockpiling instead of trade protection, to achieve
food security objectives).
While all of these issues have had an effect on the Common Agricultural Policy
of the European Union, it is perhaps the internal support measures that have had
the greatest, and most direct, impact in the short term.
7. Differing trajectories and different paradigms for the two levels
of governance
148 All of these agreements are covered in various chapters of this thesis.
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(The following discussion is based on the views of Jens Ladefoged
Mortensen.)149
The governance of globalisation occurs within "a complex network of
interconnected sites" in which "private and public actors bargain". Of the vast
economic and political space which is envisioned in the word "governance" only
"certain aspects" of this space are subject to "formal governance". At an
institutional level, globalisation is fragmented between institutions, amongst
them the IMF, the ILO, the World Bank and the WTO. The WTO is perceived by
some as being the "only existing site of global economic governance which
seems to have the potential for genuine rule-based governance of globalisation,"
although on the basis of its current construction, "it remains incomplete". As
stated earlier, the WTO has evolved from GATT 1947, which developed, after
the failure to ratify the Havana Charter, which was to bring about the
International Trade Organisation, an "international trade organisation without
any legal personality based upon a provisional agreement, provisionally staffed",
and which was "funded on an ad hoc basis". Despite such a flawed institutional
underpinning GATT 1947 developed, from the original model of
intergovernmental negotiations, to an increasing codification of the GATT
dispute settlement rules and procedures in stages, over time, which culminated in
the 1994 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Over time, law, which was relegated to the sidelines, and in some cases
ignored, in favour of politics and diplomacy, increasingly came to the fore within
the GATT framework. The increasing legalisation of the GATT was reflected in
1983 with the opening of the GATT legal office, with the objective of improving
"expertise, quality, credibility and confidence in panel findings", to the extent
that it is now recognised that knowledge, complimented with legal norms "have
become bargaining assets in the WTO". This was followed by the opening of the
149
Mortensen, Jens Ladefoged; The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of
Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity, E.L.J. 2000, 6(2), 176-204, from page
176 et seq.
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"independent legal advisory centre in Geneva" after the Seattle meeting, which
remains "entirely voluntarily funded" by WTO member states. There is,
however, a danger to lawyers in assuming that the WTO is now based
exclusively on legal precepts, as the "rule of law has not meant the end of
politics", but rather the WTO operates on the twin pillars of law and politics,
with the interaction of the "legalisation of trade politics" and the "politics of
judicialisation" being seen as the basis for future WTO research into the
interaction of the "WTO legal system and the WTO bargaining processes".
Although the WTO is being increasingly legalised, and is undoubtedly a
more rule based system than the GATT, it is still seen to be highly flawed from a
legal governance point of view. The WTO is seen as a weak enforcer, a weak
monitor and a weak legitimiser, which suffers from a lack of resourcing150 and a
"lack of institutional autonomy". Ladefoged Mortensen has called for a "more
complex legal system" for the purpose of regulating global market integration.
As "globalisation cannot be regulated by institutions of a classic,
intergovernmental nature", but needs rather to be regulated by "institutions that
are of an ultra national or semi-federal kind".151 This echoes the observation of
the OECD,152 that the GATT puts us under pressure to move from the traditional
"trade" policy" to a more "integration" model used by the EC. In addition,
Ladefoged Mortensen has observed that the WTO relies on too few governments
1
"which possess adequate institutional resources" in tackling complex trade
issues. If the WTO documents are to become a "proto-constitution"154 this
imbalance needs to be redressed.
7.1 Governance of the EC
150 "The WTO budged is only about 1.7% of the combined budged for the six international
economic organisations", Ibid, at page 197.
151
Op. cit. footnote no. 149, at page 190.
152
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, at page 46.
153
Op. cit. footnote no. 149, at page 203.
154 Ibid, at page 203.
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Like the WTO, the governance structure of the EU comprises the treaties,
the case law, and in the case of the EC, the secondary legislation, which is quite
substantial, together known as the acquis communataire. The institutions of the
EC and EU are much more numerous,155 and varied, than that of the
WTO/GATT structure.156 The EU, uniquely, has the "most densely
institutionalised network of international regimes and organisations in the
world".157 As stated by Mancini, in no other international organisation is there
such "law-making and judicial powers" given,158 with law being seen as a "basic
instrument and a central symbol of European integration".159
The EC is perceived as being a community of law, with law being seen as
both the hard law, of the Treaties, regulations, directives, decisions, and case law
of the ECJ and the CFT, and also, soft law, amongst other things, political
agreements, declarations, charters, recommendations and opinion.160 The law of
the EC is described as being supranational, benefiting from the principles of
supremacy and direct effect, developed by the ECJ in its more activist mode,
"over the strong objections of several Member State executives",161 with the law
of the other two pillars of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and
Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters162 being seen as more
intergovernmental in nature, and more subject to the dilution of legal norms by
politics than occurs in the EC pillar.
155
"By the early 1990s, the annual regulatory output of the European Community was greater than
that of most individual states and 75-80 per cent of national legislation was subject to prior
consultation with the European Commission". Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbeth, Blank, Kermit,
European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance,
J.Com.Mar.St.1996, 34(1), 341-378, page 334, footnote no. 1.
156 Friis, Lykke, Murphy, Anna, The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe:
Governance and Boundaries, J.Com.Mar.St. 1999, 37 (2), 211-232, at page 214 et seq.
157
Risse-Kappen, Thomas; Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and
Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union. J.Com.Mar.St. 1996, 34 (1), 53-80, at
page 59.
158
Op. cit. footnote no. 115, at page 595.
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Snyder, Francis G., The effectiveness of European Community Law: institutions, processes,
tools and techniques, M.L.R. 1993, 56(1), 19-54, at page 19.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 156, at page 216
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Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbeth, Blank, Kermit, European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-level Governance, J.Com.Mar.St. 1996, 34(1), 341-378, at page 371.
162 The Post Amsterdam version of the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar.
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Governance in the EC started with what has been labelled the "Monnet
Method",163 which focused on national elites, with little involvement for popular
vote, thereby giving rise to what is now referred to the democratic deficit within
the EC structure, and the governance crises which are perceived as existing
within the EC, and which are addressed by the Commission white paper,
"European Governance; A White Paper",164 and the Laeken Declaration on The
Future of the European Union.165 The European Parliament has progressively
benefited from a development in its role of decision making, under the Single
European Act and under the Maastricht Treaty, with the development of co¬
operation166 and co-decision procedures,167 which has "transformed the
legislative process from a simple Council-dominated process into a complex
balancing act between the Council, Parliament and Commission", with these two
procedures, since the Maastricht Treaty, now applying "to the bulk of EC
legislation.168
In addition to the balancing act between these three legislative
institutions, the ancillary committees of the Economic and Social Committee169
and the Committee of the Regions170 also operate in the governance process in a
consultative capacity, with the European Central Bank and the European System
of Central Banks, exercising their unique role with regard to the European
Currency, the Euro, under Articles 105 to 124 EC. In addition, in recent years,
171
reinforced by the development of the principle of subsidiarity and its
enshrinement into the EC treaty in Article 5, "sub-national actors" have become
163
Carter, Caitrfona and Scott, Andrew, Legitimacy and Governance Beyond the European Nation
State: Conceptualising Governance in the European Union, E.L. J. 1998, 4(4), 429-447, at page
434.
164 Brussels, 25.7.2001, COM (2001) 428.
165 Laeken, 15 December 01, SN 273/01
166 Article 6 SEA, now Article 252 EC post Amsterdam.
'67 Article 251 EC post Amsterdam.
168
Op. cit. footnote no. 161, at page 364.
169 Articles 257 to 262 EC post Amsterdam.
170 Articles 263 to 265 EC post Amsterdam.
171 Which has its origins as far back as Aristotle, but more recently has been espoused, inter alia,
in the Papal Encyclical of Pope Pius XI, "Quadragesimo Anno," of the 15th May 1931.
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players in the EC governance structure, both from regionalised, and now more
recently, from "more centralised Member States".172 The interaction between the
supranational, national and sub-national level of governance within the EC,
resulting in "horizontal and vertical linkages among state and sub-state actors"173
varies considerably from one member state to another. EC requirements for sub-
national bodies with which to interact has even lead to to the creation of
structures within some states in order to fulfil the requirement of EC Regional
policy,174 and the funding mechanisms of the ERDF,175 to consult with sub-
national actors.
This whole system is reinforced by ECJ case law developing "directly
binding legal authority and supremacy" indicating that the EC "is becoming a
constitutional regime",176 and provides a much more highly legalised, active, and
coherent governance structure than the WTO/GATT regime. While the EC
recognised the need to change and to reinforce its governance regime, as set out
177
in the white paper, the EC and the WTO governance structure, both relevant to
the discussion of Agriculture law, vary considerably. This difference between the
two levels of governance will have an impact on the future developments of law
at these two levels of governance, an issue which will be revisited in chapter 7.
8. Conclusion
In this introductory chapter I have attempted to identify some of the
threads which will be woven together to develop this thesis. I highlighted the fact
that the concept of land has been limited by conventional economic thinking.
172
Op. cit. footnote no. 161, from 341 et seq.
173
Op. cit. footnote no. 157, at page 60.
174 Founded on the basis ofRegulation 724/75 [1975] OJ L 73/8.
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European Regional Development Fund, which originated from Article 8, Regulation (EEC) No.
4256/88, OJ L 374, page 25.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 161, at page 369.
177 Brussels, 25.7.2001, COM (2001) 428.
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The expediency referred to by John Stuart Mill178 has limited the development of
models on land, land values and land use, which limitations are now causing
problems in dealing with a multifunctional concept of land. Daly and Cobb argue
that economics, which is a highly influential force on the nature and tenor of law,
fails to factor into economic theories all of the properties of "land", thereby
giving it a distorted, or stunted view of "land". These differing views, would,
inter alia, influence in different ways the use and exploitation of natural
exhaustible resources. Society however now requires the consideration of the
social dimensions of commercial and corporate law, as evidenced in the
corporate governance debates. It also requires the development of a modified
theory of land and of production from and use of land, in order to accommodate
both the "economic drives of man" and the "operation of nature's laws",179 and
the concepts of sustainability and multifunctionality.
The development of globalisation, relying on the western capitalism
model, at the expense of other models180 and regionalisation was also examined
in some depth, recognising the 20th century phenomenon of the "erosion of the
Westphalian nation state",181 and the interdependent relationship between
regionalisation and globalisation. The locating of the WTO within the public
international law jurisdiction, and the EC in a sui iuris legal jurisdiction brings
with it possible conflicts for the legal interaction between the two organisations.
The two organisations are subject to different legal forces, and their trade
policies, and agricultural policies, are tempered to quite different extents, by
other policies, such as environmental or labour issues. The governance models of
the two organisations also differ quite dramatically, with the WTO being
perceived as suffering from a lack of dynamism,182 being limited by the
provisions of the GATT and allied treaties. In contrast the EC, while being
178 John Stuart Mill's Principles ofPolitical Economy, referred to in " For the Common Good:
redirecting the economy toward community, the environment, and a sustainable future"; Herman
E. Daly & John B. Cobb, Jr., Beacon Press, 1994, at page 105.
179
Op. cit. footnote no. 28, at page 99.
180
Op. cit. footnote no. 53, at page 4.
181
Op. cit. footnote no. 33, at page 4.
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required to operate within the parameters of the EC treaty, operates a much more
active governance structure, with an elaborate balancing of powers between a
number of institutions, and an active development of secondary law, and case
law of the ECJ and the Court of First instance. The fact that only member states
are subject, at a public international level, to the provisions of the GATT/WTO
treaty texts, and that individuals, both natural and corporate, in addition to
member states, are subject to EC law, with EC law forming part of national law,
adds a very important dimension to the interaction, or "autonomous, linked
games" of Coleman and Tangerman,183 between the EC and the WTO in the area
of Agriculture.
When the international trade principles are juxtaposed against the EC
principles the enormity of the task of ensuring the smooth interaction between
the two legal systems is maintained as their relationship develops over time. The
international trade principles operated by the WTO on a quasi-legal, quasi-
political basis of "equal treatment between foreigners and nationals, the most¬
favoured-nation principle, the open-door principle, the principle of preferential
1 84
treatment, the principle of fair treatment", appear to be written in a different
language to that of the EC. The "principal characteristics" of the EC, as stated by
Dagtoglou, are "the specific, independent Community institutions, the fact that
individuals, alongside the Member States" are subject to EC law, "the direct
effect of certain rules of Community law, the primacy of Community law over
national laws, including constitutional law even the constitutional protection of
individual rights", allied to the creation of "obligatory procedures" in dealing
with the ECJ, and the binding effect of the decisions of the ECJ, in addition to
182
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, at page 52.
183 William D. Coleman and Stefan Tangermann; The 1992 CAP Reform, the Uruguay Round and
the commission: Conceptualizing Linked Policy Games, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.
37, No. 3 pp. 385-405.
184Op. cit. footnote no. 58, at page 16, quoting from G. Erler, Grrundprobleme des internaionalen
Wirtschaftsrech's (Gottingen, 1956).
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the principle of "Community liability for unlawful conduct of its institutions or
servants."185
In addition to the major differences in the governance and the type of law
operated by the EC and the WTO, the perspective of these two organisations on
the issue of Agriculture also differs quite markedly. The Punta del Este186
declaration states as one of the objectives of the Uruguay round texts the
"increasing (of discipline) on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other
measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade".187 The emphasis of
the CAP is coming from one which emphasised the social stability of rural
188
areas, and ongoing controlled markets within the EC, as reflected in the
second pillar of the CAP and the evolving European Rural policy.
The Millennium round has reopened negotiations pursuant to Article 20 of
GATT. The lengthy stand-offs between the United States, the European Union
and the Cairns group could be back. The Doha declaration states that the long-
term objective is to "establish a fair and market-oriented trading system through
1 RQ
a programme of fundamental reform". The current negotiations, which have
already overshot their original target completion date of the 1st of January 2005,
are still ongoing, with little substantive progress, of which more in chapter 8. The
negotiating parties have as their target substantial reductions in hindrances to
market access, together with "reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms
of ..domestic support" together with "substantial reductions for supports that
distort trade".190 The EC, for its part, is coming to the negotiation table with the
concept of multifunctionality,191 which it intends to promote on a global level.192
185
Op. cit. footnote no. 106, at page 40.
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September 1986.
187 Schott, Jeffrey J. assisted by Buurman, Johanna W., The Uruguay Round: an Assessment,
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 1994, at page 44.
188 Streasa Conference 1958.
189 At point 13, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/minOl e/mindecl e.htm, (accessed on the 11,1
August 06)
190 Ibid, at point 13.
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The current situation poses many problems. It will be interesting to see if the
Millennium round of Agricultural negotiations will be in a position to provide
any solutions.
192
Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on: the 'Proposals for Council Regulations (EC)
concerning the reform of the common agricultural policy': ' Council Regulation (EC) on the
financing of the common agricultural policy';' Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation
(EEC) No 1766/92 on the common organization of the market of cereals and repealing Regulation
(EEC) No 2731/75 fixing standard qualities for common wheat, rye, barley, maize and durum
wheat'; 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing a support system for producers of certain arable
crops'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on the common organization of the market in beef and veal';
'Council Regulation (EC) on the common organization of the market in milk and milk products';
'Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy
in the milk and milk products sector'; 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing common rules for
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48






3. Before and after the EEC Treaty
4. The Common Organisations and the Mac Sharry reforms generally
4.1 The MacSharry Reforms
5.1999 Reforms
6. The Mid-term review
7. Conclusions
1. Introduction
The importance of the CAP as an EC policy is reflected in the fact that,
although forestry is increasing in importance in various member states, agriculture
utilises over 80% of the territory of the European Union,1 and is the major
consumer of European Community resources. The EC definition of agriculture is
broader than that being used in this dissertation. Article 32 EC provides that
"agricultural products", to which the CAP applies, includes "products of the soil,
of stockfarming and of fisheries and products of first stage processing directly
relating to these products". The actual list of agricultural products, as recognised
by the CAP, is set out in Annex 1 of the EC Treaty.3 As stated at the beginning of
1 The Cork Declaration; November 1996, http://www.europa.eu.int.
2 Ex. Article 38 EC.
3 Article 32.3 EC.
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chapter 1, the definition of agriculture being used for the purposes of this thesis is
that used in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 1,4
National agricultural policies of the member states of the EU have for
many years been subject to the provisions of the Common Agricultural Policy of
the EC. This policy has both internal (to the EC) and external, in the context of
global trade in agricultural products, implications. How "common" the
agricultural policy has been over the years since its inception, has been a matter of
debate. What is undisputed that the emphasis of the CAP has changed with time,
with the initial emphasis being on financial support for agricultural product
production, through intervention mechanisms, to now an increasing emphasis on
producer support allied with rural development, with an EC Rural policy currently
being devised,5 of which more in chapter 8. These changes have been strongly
influenced by the EC's legal relationship with the WTO, which will be the focus
of this thesis.
The origin of the CAP in 1957, in the wake of World War II, when food
security was uppermost in the minds of the drafters of the Treaty of Rome, is
partly the cause of some of the anachronistic elements of the policy. There was an
"inability to agree on the most appropriate mechanism for European co-operation
in agriculture" leading up to the Spaak Report, which was reflected in the "Treaty
of Rome provisions on agriculture".6 This ambiguity has now been overlayed by
4 In line with Annex 1,1.i. I am not therefore going to be examining issues pertaining to fish and
fish products. However, EC documentation dealing with numbers involved in agricultural
activities will probably contain figures relevant to the fisheries sector. I do not intend to conduct
an investigation into the figures in order to establish which proportion of EC Agricultural figures
relate to the narrower definition of agriculture being used in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
Annex 1. One such figure would be the size of the European population directly affected by the
CAP, either in agriculture, or in upstream or downstream industries, estimated by Frans Fishier in
1997 (Fishier, Franz; Forces for change in the European Union, ABARE Conference 1997,
Canberra, Australia, http://www.europa.eu.int) as being approximately 8 million people.
5 The Agricultural Situation in the European Union 2000 Report, Brussels, 11.02.2002, COM
(2002) 67 final and Agenda 2000. Http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/104000.htm.
6
McMahon, Joseph A.; Law of the Common Agricultural Policy; Pearson Education, 2000, at
page 2.
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the shift in emphasis from a prices policy to a structural policy,7 and towards the
evolving Rural policy, with the current incarnation of the CAP, even after the
mid-term review, still exhibiting underlying tensions between the pre-existing
agricultural legislation and the more "recent conservation legislation".8
The original ambiguity in the drafting of the CAP, allied with the
trenchant political opposition to reform of the CAP over the years, leaves us today
with a policy area much in need of reform. The CAP suffers from the added
complexity of diversity of geography, climatology and agronomy, together with
the influence of the strength of the non-agricultural economic activity of a
particular member state, the population density of the particular agricultural area,
such as in the sub-arctic, and its proximity to urban centres, which would, if
present, provide a ready market for the higher value agricultural commodities of
fresh fruit and vegetables. Not only are the objectives of the CAP often
conflicting, and the preference for the prioritisation of one CAP objective over
another reflecting the position of the various social partners at the negotiation
table, but also the mix of agricultural activity is also quite diverse from one
member state to another, and from one region of a member state to another.
The development of the CAP can been seen as evolving from both the
internal and external pressures on the CAP to reform. The 1980's generated
expensive side effects of the butter mountains and wine lakes, while the CAP, by
1988, had grown to account for over half of the EC Budget, with the estimation
that the CAP cost 160 ECU to benefit a farmer by 100 ECU,9 resulting in serious
inefficiencies also proving highly contentious, accounting for a very large volume
of case law before the ECJ. The then anticipated accession of the central and
eastern European countries to the EC, and from the need to accommodate the
international trade agreements entered into by the EC on behalf of its member
7
Ibid, at page 120.
8 Howarth, William and Rodgers, Christopher P. (eds); Agriculture, Conservation and Land Use:
Law and Policy Issues for Rural Areas, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1993, at page 2.
9 National Consumer Council, The Future of the CAP: The NCC's Conclusions and
Recommendations, Consumers and the Common Agriculture Policy (1988), NCC.
states under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in 1994, also acted as an
important driver. The WTO negotiations have reopened, with the Millennium
Round, which has been alluded to in chapter 1, and which will be examined in
further depth in chapter 4, and in later chapters of this thesis. The EC response to
these negotiations, which is the subject matter of this chapter, has resulted in the
development of the concept of "multifunctionality", in conjunction with the more
developed term of "sustainability". The term "sustainability" is being written into
many policy documents. This term has achieved international recognition, with
the definition used by the Brundtland commission10 widely accepted. How well
the position of the EC stands up to the negotiation process of the Millennium
round has still to be established, as the WTO agricultural negotiations are still
ongoing at the time of writing. The Common Agricultural Policy has, however,




The European Community first used the term "multifunctionality" in the
Cork Declaration of 1996,11 however "its origins can be found in Directive
19 1 "3
286/75 on Mountain and Hill farming in less favoured areas". As Delgado et
el. have pointed out, this directive "established the need" to subsidise non¬
competitive agriculture in the interest of "maintaining the territorial balance",14
10
OECD; Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development; OECD 2001, at page 9, quoting from
WECD. 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development (WECD) (1987), Our
Common Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
11
Op. cit. footnote no. 1.
12 Council Directive 75/268/EEC of 28 April 1975 on mountain and hill farming and farming in
certain less- favoured areas, Official Journal L 128, 19/05/1975 p. 1
13 del Mar Delgado, Ma, Ramos, Eduardo, Gallardo, Rosa and Ramos, Fernando;
Multifunctionality and rural development: a necessary convergence, at page 19, Ch 2 in Guido van
Huylenbroeck and Guy Durant (Eds.) multifunctional Agriculture A New Paradigm for European
Agriculture and Rural Development, Ashgate, Aldershot 2003, at page 28.
14 Ibid at page 28.
52
with this directive establishing for the first time the "willingness of (EC) society
to pay for sustaining areas which otherwise would undergo both swift and
generalised economic, social and environmental deterioration".15
The European Community's views ofmultifunctionality are still at a
policy stage, and have yet to be written into legal texts,16 however its concept,
along with that of sustainability, is being strongly supported by the EC in light of
the current round ofWTO Agricultural talks.17 It is the Agricultural directorate's
view that the issue ofmultifunctionality in agriculture encompasses the issues of
"safe and high quality goods", the protection of the environment, the saving of
"finite resources", the preservation of rural landscapes,18 and the contribution that
agriculture makes to the "socio-economic development of rural areas including
the generation of employment opportunities".19 The European Commission is of
the view that the "multifunctional character of agriculture" is a "key issue to be
15 Ibid, at page 28.
16
Although the policy seems to be reflected in the drafting of Council Regulation (EC) No.
1782/2003, OJ L 270/1, dealing with the single farm payment under the mid-term review.
17 "It is essential that the sustainability and multifunctionality principles underpin - and become
the norm in - future world agricultural trade negotiations." Opinion of the Committee of the
Regions on: the 'Proposals for Council Regulations (EC) concerning the reform of the common
agricultural policy':' Council Regulation (EC) on the financing of the common agricultural
policy';' Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 on the common
organisation of the market of cereals and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2731/75 fixing standard
qualities for common wheat, rye, barley, maize and durum wheat'; 'Council Regulation (EC)
establishing a support system for producers of certain arable crops'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on
the common organisation of the market in beef and veal'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on the
common organisation of the market in milk and milk products'; 'Council Regulation (EC)
amending Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk
products sector'; 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing common rules for direct support schemes
under the common agricultural policy';' Council Regulation (EC) on support for rural
development from the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)' CdR
273/98 fin, Official Journal C 93, 06/04/1999 p. 1.
18 Reference has been made to the European Landscape Convention, adopted by the Council of
Europe's Committee of Ministers on 19 July 2000, was signed on 20 October 2000 by 18 countries
during a Ministerial Conference in Florence, by the European Commission in the EU: COM(2001)
31, Celex No. 501DC0031, European Union Preparatory Acts, Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions On the sixth environment action programme of the European
Community 'Environment 2010: Our future, Our choice' - The Sixth Environment Action
Programme/* COM/2001/0031 final */, Managing the countryside.
19
Info-Paper, Agriculture: Process of analysis and Information Exchange of the WTO;
Contribution of the European Community on the Multifunctional Character of Agriculture,
October 1999, at http://www.europa.eu.int. at page 1.
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addressed in the WTO context". The EC recognised that agriculture provides
"services" which are "mainly of a public good character".21 The importance of
landscape includes "stone walls, terraces, trees and farm woodlands and
archaeological features" which contribute to the "cultural landscape".22 The
specific character of land as a commodity is recognised when the Commission
states that unused land does "not automatically revert to its original wild state",
and "continued usage" in a well adjusted way is a prerequisite for maintaining its
• 93
environmental value. The cross-compliance requirements of the single farm
payment, introduced in the mid-term review of the CAP,24 would appear to
address a number of these issues, of which more in chapter 8.
During the pre-mid-term review debates in the European Community, it
was perceived that there was a tendency to "under provide" the public service
element of agricultural production, as the producers of these services were "often
not or not sufficiently rewarded by the market".25 The requiring of farmers to
produce the "environmental benefits from land use" by virtue of the mere
ownership of land could be considered an "infringement of private property
rights", thus necessitating the carrot approach, of encouraging the provision of
96
these services through a reward mechanism. As stated by the Committee of the
Regions, "farmers must be ready to observe basic environmental standards
without compensation", however, if a "higher level of environmental service" is
20 Ibid, at page 1.
21 Ibid, at page 1.
22 Ibid, at page 2.
23 Ibid, at page 2.
24 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29th September 2003 establishing common rules for
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support
schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No. 2019/93, (EC) No. 1452/2001, (EC)
No. 1453/2001, (EC) No. 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No. 1254/1999,
(EC) No. 1673/2000, (EEC) No. 2358/71 and (EC) No. 2529/2001, OJ 2003, L 270/1.
25 Ibid.
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being provided, then farmers should be "remunerated by appropriate agri-
97
environmental measures".
It should be noted at this point that multifunctionaity as a concept, has had
a "long tradition in both the U.S. and other countries", with the "non-food outputs
of agriculture" representing "legitimate domestic policy objectives" in the view of
the U.S. Department of Agriculture,28 with non-food objectives being referred to
as "externalities" by economists.29 A problem arises, however, with the economic
measurement of these "externalities" of agricultural production, as the "non-
market benefits or costs are usually not known", with "cost effective rankings"
are used as a substitute for measurement.30 The view of USDA on these
externalities is that "most non-food outputs can be produced independently of
agriculture" and that a "range of policy instruments and private actions are
o 1
available" to achieve the required agricultural externalities.
This philosophy of the EC with regard to the future of agriculture within
the EC, was reflected in Agenda 2000. Emphasis continued, however, to be put on
production; the Commission recognising that this was leading, to continuing
in
pressure on landscape and its related bio-diversity," which is of great importance
in the more fragile eco-system areas. The Commission had recognised that "a
landscape can be regarded as a system comprising a specific geology, land use,
natural and built features, flora and fauna, watercourses and climate," to which
27
Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the "Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions on Directions towards sustainable agriculture" OJ C 156, 6/6/2000, page 40.
28
Bothman, Mary, Cooper, Joseph, Mullarkey, Daniel Normile, Mary Anne, Skuly, David Vogel,
Stephen and Young; Edwin; The Use and Abuse of Multifunctionality, Economic Research
Service/ USDA, November 1999, (http://
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/WTO/PDF/multifuncl 119.pdf accessed on the 8th August 06),
at page 22.
29 Ibid, at page 9.
30 Ibid, at page 10.
31 Ibid, at page 22.
32 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Directions towards sustainable
agriculture (1999/C 173/02 EC C173/2 Official Journal of the European Communities 19.6.1999.
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"should be added habitation patterns and socio-economic factors."33 There was a
fear in European agricultural circles that the production model of agriculture will
result in the abandonment of the land by large numbers of marginal farmers to the
extent that "scrub and forest encroach and the open landscape will disappear,"34
which would not be easily recoverable. European Environmental policy, for its
part, dealt with some of the issues of sustainability in agriculture, with its
directives on Habitats and Wild Birds,35 with the Habitats directive setting up
"special areas of conservation" (SPAs) which have been vigorously defended by
the ECJ in the case Commission v. Germany (Leybucht Dykes),36 when it made it
clear that "general economic and recreational interests" do not allow for removal
or destruction of SPA land.37 The social issues of underlying agricultural reform
are beginning to receive a specific focus within the agricultural directorate with
the development of a European rural policy.38 The concern with these issues is
reflected in the requirements of the cross compliance requirements under the mid¬
term review (of the Agenda 2000 reforms)39 of which more in chapter 8. The mid¬
term review itself,40 with its regional and national differentiation options, allied
with the concept ofmultifunctionaity, "opens up" "scope for variations across and
within countries",41 reflecting the "'spill back' pressures within a mature sector
for the re-nationalisation to member states of elements of agricultural policy", as
discussed by Greer 42
33 Ibid
34 Ibid.
35 Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the Conservation ofWild Birds OJ 1979, L 103 1979 and
Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and ofWild Fauna and
Flora, OJ 1992, L 206, p. 7.
36 Case 57/89 Commission v. Germany (Leybucht Dykes) [1989] ECR 2849.
37 Ibid, at paragraph 22.
38 under Directorate E of the Agricultural Directorate general.
39
McMahon, Joseph A: The Common Agricultural Policy: From Quantity to Quality? NILQ, Vol.
53, No. 1, at page 9.
40 Of which more in chapter 8 of this thesis.
41
Greer, Alan; Agricultural policy in Europe, Manchester University Press, 2005, at page 66
42
Ibid, at page 3.
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The understanding of the necessary focus of a multifunctional agriculture
differs from one EC member state to another, with different areas focusing on
different elements of the wide range of potential "social concerns relating to the
maintenance of the fabric of rural areas and the protection of the environment".43
The concept of multifunctionality, allied with the mid-term review therefore leads
to "variety across States",44 with "plenty of room for special and territorial
variation",45 with countries, to date, such as the UK and the Netherlands taking a
much broader approach to the issue of "rural society" than countries such as
Ireland and Greece, which still maintain an agriculture production focus.46 This
therefore necessitates the development of "policies and programmes that are
flexible", rather than a policy based on commonality.47 This is reflected in the
cross-compliance requirements and single farm payments introduced under the
recent mid-term review of Agenda 2000, which will be discussed in chapter 8.
How broadly exactly the term "multifunctionality" can be drawn is
however an issue, with some authors wondering whether "ethical views on food
production" can be made relevant to the debate. Blanford and Fulponi have
pointed out that the asymmetry in "information between the buyer and seller"
concerning animal welfare principles is "a specific type of market failure",49
leading to a "dysfunction in the market".50 Whether an EC concept of the
multifunctionality of agriculture could be expanded to encompass animal welfare
principles will be an issue for the WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade,
an agreement which will be discussed in chapter 8.
" Ibid, at page 2
44 Ibid, at page 2
45 Ibid at page 3.
46 Ibid, at page 2.
47 Ibid, at page 66.
48
Blanford, David and Fulponi, Linda; Emerging public concerns in agriculture: domestic policies
and international trade commitments; European Review of Agricultural Economics Vo. 26(3)
(1999) pp. 409-424, at page 410.
49 Ibid, at page 414.
50 Ibid, at page 414.
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The issue of the market failure for the public good services of a
multifunctional agriculture also brings into its parameters the evolving rural
policy of the EC, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/9951 to the extent
that it contributes to the social, economic and environmental aspects of rural
society. Whether there will always be market failure for these aspects of
agricultural activity can however be challenged when a comparison is made with
recent developments in environmental law and policy. The development of the
integrated product policy under the EC's Sixth Environmental Action Programme
which will be discussed in chapter 8, could perhaps indicate one possible route for
development of a multifunctional agriculture. In addition the development of the
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme, also discussed further in
chapter 8, could perhaps indicate a second possible route for development of a
truly multifunctional CAP, addressing some of the issues of market failure for
public good outputs for agricultural activities. While both of these latter
developments are currently focused on non-agricultural aspects of the EC's
Environmental policy, there is a possibility that these schemes, or the principles
underlying these schemes, could be extended to agricultural activities, addressing
some of the issues of the market failure for the public good aspects of the
multifunctionality of agriculture. All of this puts pressure on the land-economics
nexus referred to in chapter 1, and which will be discussed further in chapter 8.
International agreement will however have an impact on the development
of the EC's concept of multifunctionality, particularly as they are seen as posing
"an impediment to addressing social concerns" in their focus on "freer
agricultural trade".53 The issue of how international trade documents should
reflect the concept of multifunctionality has been addressed by the OECD.
51 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 OJ L. 106, 26/6/1999, p. 80.
52 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ 1 275/32.
53 Ibid, at page 410.
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2.2 OECD multifunctionality
Multifunctionality as a concept has been examined by the OECD in their
paper "Multifunctionality: towards an analytical framework".54 The OECD is of
the opinion that the term multifunctionality "is not well defined" and is "prone to
different interpretations".55 They identify two concepts of multifunctionality, the
normative concept ofmultifunctionality, and the positive concept of
multifunctionality. The normative concept is to view "multifunctionality in terms
ofmultiple roles assigned to agriculture", with multifunctionality being "not
merely a characteristic of the production process", but being a "value in itself",
with the maintenance of the "multifunctional activity" being a policy objective in
itself.56 This approach to multifunctionality is rejected by the OECD as being
unacceptable. The approach to multifunctionality adopted and examined by the
OECD is what they term the "positive" concept of multifunctionality".
The positive concept views multifunctionality as being a "characteristic
of" any economic activity, but it is particularly prevalent in the agricultural and
forestry industries. This concept examined the "multiple, interconnected outputs
or effects". These effects can be either positive or negative, intended or
57
otherwise. These outputs are classified as commodity and non-commodity
outputs. Under this model both land and labour are regarded as inputs, with the
"role of biological processes in production, the close relationship with the
environment, and the impact on the rural economy" all being relevant issues.58
The non-commodity outputs are deemed to "exhibit the characteristics of
externalities or public goods", a market for which either does not exist, or
54 OECD: Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework, Agriculture and Food, OECD,
2001.
55 Ibid, at page 9.
56 Ibid, at page 14.
57 Ibid, at page 14.
58 Ibid, at page 33.
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"functions poorly".59 An issue arises as to whether the approach should be to
develop a market in public goods, or to protect public goods from market
exploitation. The OECD asks whether alternative strategies for farming, or the
adoption of other technologies could "decouple", or alter the degree of "jointness
between commodity and non-commodity outputs", and if a market could be
created for the provision of the "non-commodity outputs", which could operate
separately from the existing commodity outputs of farming.60 The inclusion of
issues of "rural employment and food security" in the OECD discussion on
multifunctionality was highly controversial, and the taking into consideration of
these issues may again become a problem in WTO discussions on the issue of
multifunctionality. This decoupling of payments advocated by the OECD, and
required under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,61 is reflected, to a certain
extent, in the mid-term review redrafting of the CAP.
It is recognised by the OECD report that multifunctionality may have
"different effects" in countries with different levels of development, however the
OECD is of the opinion that their analytical framework should be operable in all
countries. The OECD warn that the use of the concept of "multifunctionality
could have domestic or international equity, or income distribution
f\9
implications", and these "direct and indirect costs of international spillover
effects" need to be taken into account when utilising the concept of
multifunctionality in designing Agricultural policies.63 To what extent these
collateral consequences will arise from the mid-term review redrafting of the CAP
has yet to be established.
59 Ibid, at page 13.
60 Ibid, at page 15.
61 which will be analysed in depth in chapter 4.
62
Op cit. footnote no.30, at page 22.
63 Ibid, at page 15.
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3. Before and after the EEC Treaty
The original design of the Common Agricultural Policy has led to the
current discourse on multifunctionality of European agriculture. The design of the
CAP was in the hands of the six original member states of the European Coal and
Steel Community. It is important to remember that in the negotiating states, in
1957, the date of signing of the Treaty of Rome, "just over sixteen million people
were employed in agriculture in the signatory countries",64 this accounted for "23
per cent of the total working population".65 None of the original member states
had less that 10 per cent of their population in agriculture, while the UK, a non-
signatory, who has since membership of the EEC had problems with the operation
and structure of the CAP, had under four percent of its population engaged in
agriculture.66 The prevailing model of Agricultural trade in the soon to be EEC
member states was that of protectionism.
The Spaak Committee reported to the Council of the ECSC in 1956, and
the ECSC Council "instructed a new committee to draft a treaty for a common
fCl
market". The drafting committee of the ECSC Council, under the guidance of its
rapporteur Pierre Uri,68 and using the Spaak report as a guide, made its report in
early 1957. The report of the committee was heavily influenced by the political
persuasions of the member states in the final drafting of the Treaty of Rome.
While reduction of internal tariffs, together with the rules of competition were the
general principles to be adopted for manufactured goods, in the area of agriculture
the "achievement of a common market for agricultural products was closely
64 Neville-Rolfe, Edmund; The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community, European
Centre for Political Studies, May 1984, at page 33.
65 Ibid, at page 33.
66 Ibid, at page 33.
67 Ibid, at page 190.
68 Ibid, at page 190 et seq. Pierre Uri was to feature in later agricultural debates, when he
suggested to the horror of all but a few that there should be a substantial reduction in support
prices. The severity of the reaction to Uri's suggestion resulted in extreme caution to reform
proposals of the CAP in the following years.
61
linked with that of the customs union," with the treaty setting out the timetable for
its achievement.69 How the objectives were to be achieved was "left very largely
to the discretion of the Community's institutions". The social and structural
elements of the CAP, which were to come to the fore in later years, were at the
inception of the CAP "were scarcely defined at all".70
The Spaak report saw that Agriculture would benefit from a common
market as much as the industrial sector. It however advocated special treatment
• 71for agriculture, based on a price policy, given its unique concerns. In particular
Agricultural production suffered from the fragmentation of the production process
amongst family farms, instability in production due to natural causes, "inelasticity
of demand" for many products, and the wide divergences in prices between
member states, together with the perceived need of governments to support
agriculture, "and the diversity of forms which this took" ,72 It was perceived that
there would be a need to transfer sovereignty to the supra-national entity, that this
transfer would have to be gradual, with the focus on specific products. With
regard to relations with third countries, the Spaak report's view was that "as far as
possible external protection should be confined to duties and anti-dumping
measures".74 The Stresa Conference, which followed in 1958, also emphasised the
need for social stability in rural areas, and the need to reinforce the family farm.
The original objectives of CAP75 have of themselves been described as
lf\
being multifunctional, with Article 33 EC objectives, in particular, varying from
that of increasing agricultural productivity, the stabilisation of markets, the
assurance of availability of supplies, to the contrasting objectives of ensuring that
69 Article 37 ex. Article 43 EC.
70
Op. cit. footnote no. 64, at page 191.
71
Moehler, Rolf; The role of agriculture in the economy and society; paper presented at the
Seminar on Beliefs and Values Underlying Agricultural Policies, Lake Balaton, Hungary,
September 19-23, 1996, http://www.fao.org/docrepAV7440E/w7440e03.htm at 25/1/02. at page 2.
72
Op. cit. footnote no. 64, at page 191.
73 Ibid, at page 193.
74 Ibid, at page 192.
75 Article 33 EC, ex. Article 39 EC.
76
Op. cit footnote no. 17.
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supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. There is also a requirement for a
fair standard of living for the agricultural community, by "increasing the
individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture". No "hierarchy of
objectives" between these provisions were provided in the treaty, with McMahon
stating that these objectives "are both conflicting and not capable of
reconciliation".77 The ECJ's view, as epitomised in Balkan case,78 has been that
there was a need for a balancing act to be maintained between the competing
demands of what is now Article 33.1 EC, with the need for "permanent
harmonisation made necessary by any conflict between these aims taken
individually", and if necessary, "allow one of them temporary priority in order to
satisfy the demands of the economic factors or conditions in view of which their
decisions are made".79 McMahon points out that the Balkan formula conflicts
with the provisions of Article 2 of Regulation 26/62, which requires all of the
objectives of the CAP be met for an exemption from competition law provisions
80 81
to apply. The Balkan formula was developed on in Crispoltoni II, with
reference to the latitude given to institutions in interpreting the Balkan formula in
the Behla Miihle case.82 In Crispoltoni II the ECJ stated "that harmonisation must
preclude the isolation of any one of those objectives in such a way as to render
impossible the realisation of other objectives".83
The provisions of the EEC Treaty on Agriculture have been highly
84
influential on other policy areas of the EC, with the agrimonetary system
77
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, at page 12.
78 Case 5/73 Balkan [1973] ECR 1091.
79
Op. cit. footnote no. 39 at page 12, quoting from Case 5/73 Balkan [1973] ECR 1091, at
paragraph 24.
0
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, at page 12.
81 Joined cases C-l33/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93; Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and
Natale and Pontillo v Donatab Sri; ECR 1994 page 1-4863 .
82 Cases 114,116 and 119-20/76 Behla-Muhle [1977] ECR 1211.
83
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, quoting from Joined cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93;
Crispoltoni v Fattoria Autonoma Tabacchi and Natale and Pontillo v Donatab Sri; ECR 1994
page 1-4863 at paragraph no. 31.
84 The agrimonetary was originally set up in 1962, but its current incarnation came into force on
the 1st of January 1993, by virtue of Council Regulation 3813/92, and Commission Regulation
3819/92, OJ. L 387, 31/12/92, p. 17.
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originally designed to meet the needs of the CAP having, indirectly, led to the
now single European Currency. The operation of the CAP itself however,
operates at times in a different manner from other EC provisions. While it benefits
from the principles of supremacy and direct effect, the "provisions of the Chapter
relating to rules on competition shall apply to production of and trade in
or
agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Council". The well
developed provisions in Title VI, to include Articles 81 and 82, well known to EC
lawyers through the years as Articles 85 and 86 EC, do not necessarily apply to
agricultural products. On the contrary, where a common organisation of a
particular agricultural commodity is set up under Article 34 EC86 its operation
may in fact be the antithesis of competition rules, in particular the "compulsory
co-ordination of the various national market organisations" pursuant to Article
on
34.1.b EC. This situation is regulated by Regulation 26/62, which remains law
in the post- mid-term review of the EC agricultural legal structure. Under this
regulation the current Article 82,88 which deal with abuse of a dominant position,
applies to all agricultural agreements. Article 81, on agreements between
undertakings and concerted practices, does not apply to "such of the agreements,
decisions and practices, as form an integral part of a national market organisation
or are necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in" Article 33 EC,
pursuant to Article 2.1 of Regulation 26/62. The exact extent of this exemption
was the subject matter of litigation in the early years of the EC. The situation was
OQ
eventually resolved in the Suiker Unie case, where it was held that "for an
agreement to come within the scope of the exception it must promote all of the
objectives of the CAP, not just some of them".90 A modified version of EC state
aids91 provisions apply to agricultural activities pursuant to Article 4 of
85 Article 36 EC, ex. Article 42 EC.
86 Ex. Article 40 EC.
87 OL L. 30, 20/4/1962, p. 993.
88
Formerly Article 86 EC.
89 Case 40/73, Cooperatieve Vereniging Suiker Unie UA v. Commission of the European
Communities, also known as: European Sugar Cartel, and Case 49/73, Re Suiker Unie v.
Commission of the European Communities [1975] ECR 1993, [1976] 1 CMLR 295.
90
Op. cit. footnote no. 6, at page 16.
91 Articles 87 to 89, ex Article 92 to 94.
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Regulation 26/62.92 If a state aid falls outside the provisions of Article 4 then the
normal rules on state aids apply. If the provision falls within Article 4 then the
provisions of the common organisation of the market will take precedence over
QO
the state aid issue. What state aids are permissible have altered with the reform
of the CAP through the years, and will be discussed later in this chapter, with a
further discussion of EC Competition law, together with its state aids provisions
being provided, in the context of their interaction with relevant WTO provisions,
in chapter 7; an analysis of how competition law impacts on the new rural
development provisions is given in chapter 8.
The Mansholt Plan,94 of Commissioner Mansholt, followed in March
1968, which proposed restructuring the CAP in accordance with the policy paper
"Agriculture 1980". The Plan sought to reduce the number of people employed in
agriculture and to encourage the formation of larger, more efficient units of
agricultural production. In the allied Memorandum on the Reform of Agriculture
in the European Economic Community of December 1968, the Commission
sought to deal with two problems which had arisen: emerging surpluses and the
falling back of income growth in agriculture compared with the rest of the
economy.95 A very hostile reaction from the EEC's agricultural community
ensued arising from the proposals for the reduction of arable areas and cow herds,
particularly in 1971, with serious rioting in Brussels. The Mansholt plan, which
was finally accepted in 1972,96 operated as the beginning of a structural policy at
Community level.97
92 Article 4 ofRegulation 26/62 provides that "the provisions of Article 93 (1) and of the first
sentence of Article 93 (3) of the Treaty shall apply to aids granted for production of or trade in the
products listed in Annex II to the Treaty."
3 As per Case 177/78, McCarron v. The Irish Pigs and Bacon Commission [1979] ECR 2161, p.
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96 Voloanen, Risto; Secretary General of COPA and COGECA DIS (01) 04, Speech in AGRO-
FOOD 2001; 7.2.2001; Tampre, Finland
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Op. cit. footnote no. 95, at page 5.
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The drafting of the Mansholt Plan reflects the perception of agriculture
current at that time. It was then perceived that there was a need to increase
production, in order to "counterbalance the increased requirement resulting from
QO
the growth of the population" and to raise the standard of living of the
agricultural population, which was seen as being "sociologically of extreme
importance for each country".99 The agricultural population was seen as being
strategic, being required to "make a great contribution"100 in the development of
post-war Europe, with Western Europe having at the time "a large import
requirement of the most important items of food for man and beast".101
The then existing situation of high protectionism in each of the EEC
member states of their agricultural sector had to be overcome. While surpluses
were arising in some countries, the general picture was of under supply of
109
commodities, with "extreme" protectionism hampering inter-community trade.
Inter-community measures were therefore seen as being essential, in order to
develop specialisation in production. True free trade, it was felt, could not be
1 fH
"entirely realised in agriculture", given the strategic need ofmany countries to
have "a certain agricultural production capacity available under all
circumstances",104 thereby anticipating over-supply of commodities in all but the
most adverse climatic and other natural circumstances.
The Mansholt plan, at the time, recognised that "a uniform European price
level"105 was not then possible, however it was felt that it "would be possible to
determine at what price, or between what price limits the products of the various
countries could be interchanged",106 with an emphasis on "no production power"
98
History of European Integration Site: The Mansholt Plan, Leiden University Historical Institute
at http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/historv/rtg/resl/Mansholt.html, accessed the 10.12.01, at page 1.
99 Ibid, at page 3.
100 Ibid, at page 1.
101 Ibid, at page 1.
102 Ibid, at page 2.
103 Ibid, at page 3.
104 Ibid, at page 3.
105 Ibid, at page 4.
106 Ibid, at page 4.
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being left unutilised"107 and the obtaining of the "highest possible
i rjo
achievements". The acceptance of agricultural products from third countries
into the community was to be "fixed by mutual agreement" ensuring that "these
imports" could "only be admitted under a co-ordinated scheme".109 It was
recognised that there would be a need for "temporary stockpiling, to prevent
disturbances", owing to weather and "fluctuations in agricultural production".110
Expenditure (and income) from this operation was to be "charged to and be for
the benefit of a European Agricultural Fund".111
The national protection measures were to be transferred to European
control, with the protective measures to be reduced gradually, with a view to
eliminating the intra-community protection measures, while ensuring a
"reasonable livelihood" for "workers and employers of any well-managed
119
European farm". Measures taken by certain member states to protect vital
113national interests must be "subjected to the approval of a European organ". A
European Board of Agriculture and Food (EBAF) was to be set up, to operate on
the basis of an ordinary majority vote, and be answerable to the Council of
Ministers, and to take instructions from them. On agricultural matters the Council
ofMinisters was to take decisions on the basis of qualified majority voting, with
individual member states being in a position to "raise objection to any particular
measure or decision of the EBAF with the Council ofMinisters".114 If a qualified
majority vote could not be obtained then the EBAF would have to revise its
measure or decision. Recourse to "a juridical authority" was also advocated in
"such controversies".115 In practice the EBAF was not set up, but agriculture
became the only policy area where the Council was not assisted by the Committee
107 Ibid, at page 4.
108 Ibid, at page 4.
109 Ibid, at page 4.
110 Ibid, at page 4.
111 Ibid, at page 4.
112 Ibid, at page 3.
113 Ibid, at page 3.
114 Ibid, at page 5.
115 Ibid, at page 5.
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of Permanent Representatives (COEPER),116 but by the Special Committee on
Agriculture,117 comprised of senior agricultural officials.118 The CAP has since
occupied much of the time of the European Court of Justice, and a very large
proportion of EC funds.
4. The Common organisations and the Mac Sharry reforms generally
Article 34 EC119 provides for the setting up of common organisations of
agricultural markets. Three possible forms were provided for; 1. one based on the
common rules on competition, 2. One based on compulsory co-ordination of the
various national market organisations, and 3. A European market organisation.
The superstructure of CAP was to be based on a three pillar structure,120 one of
191
"community preference, common prices and common financing". The first
pillar, community preference, was based on Article 44.2,122 which has now been
repealed by the Amsterdam Treaty. How effective the second pillar of common
prices had operated, is questionable.123 The third option of a European Common
Market association proved to be very popular, with a large number having been
set up.124 These organisations resulted in the centralisation of policy with respect
116 COREPER would be involved if the matter overlapped with non agricultural policy areas.
117 The Special Committee on Agriculture was set up on 1960. See JO 1960 1217.
118
Op. cit. footnote no.6, at page 39.
119
Ex. Article 40 EC.
120 McMahon is of the opinion that in later years a fourth pillar of co-responsibility was added. See
Joseph A. McMahon, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, Pearson Education, 2000, p. 166.
121
Op. cit. footnote no. 64, at page 2.
122 Article 44.2 "Minimum prices shall neither cause a reduction of the trade existing between
Member States when this Treaty enters into force or form an obstacle to progressive expansion of
this trade. Minimum prices shall not be applied so as to form an obstacle to the development of a
natural preference between Member States."
123
Op. cit. footnote no. 64, at page 370 et seq.
124 Prior to the mid-term review of the CAP there were 22 common market organisations and a
number of other arrangements:
Cereals Council Regulation 1766/92 (OJ L No. 181/21);
Pig Meat Council Regulation 2759/75 (OJ L No.282/1);
Eggs Council Regulation 2771/75 (OJ L. No.282/49);
Poultry Council Regulation 2775/75 (OJ L No.282/77);
Fruit and Vegetable Council Regulation 1035/72 (OJ L No.l 18/1);
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to each product covered. National organisations were effectively replaced by
Common organisations, with national organisations only being permitted to
operate to the extent that they do not conflict with Common organisations.125
Market organisations could have been grouped and classified according to the
extent and degree, or the absence, ofmarket support. This support depended on
the economic importance, or lack of same, of the relevant commodity to the
Community. Products with the greater economic importance had the most
developed, rigid and protective regulations, especially where the income related
thereto is important in relation to farming income as a whole. Products with
relatively less economic importance were treated more flexibly, while products of
little economic significance to the Community as a whole, but which were
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SPECIAL MEASURES (re production aids)
Peas and Beans Council Regulation
Linseed Council Regulation
Soya beans, rape seed,
colza seed and sunflower seed Council Regulation
24/12/1991, p. 17);
Silkworms Council Regulation
125 Case 36/70 Getreide Import [1970] ECR 1107.
126 Melchor, Michael; European Perspectives: 30 years of Community Law, Commission of the
European Communities, 1983, at page 443.
822/87 (OJ L No.84/1);
804/68 (OJ L No.148/13);
805/68 (OJL No. 148/24);
1418/76 (OJL No. 166/1);
136/66 (OJL No. 1966/3025);
1785/81 (OJL No. 177/4);
234/68 (OJ L No.55/1);
516/77 (OJL 73/1);
2075/92 (OJLNo.215/70):
1696/71 (OJL No. 175/1);
1673/2000 (OJ L 193, 29/7/2000,
603/95 (OJ L 63, 21/3/95, p.l);
235871 (OJ L No.246/1);
3013/89 (OJ L 289, 7/10/89, p.l);
101/76 (OJ L No.289, 7/10/89,
404/93 (OJ L No.47, 25/2/93,
827/68 (OJL No. 151,30/6/68,
1431/82 (OJL No. 162/28);
569/76 (OJ L No.67/29);
3766/91 (OJ L No.356,
845/72 (OJL No. 100/1).
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197
Financial support of agricultural products emanated from one of three funds,
198
the European Development Fund, the European Investment Bank, or more
19Q
commonly, from the Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund.
Historically, the basic regulation on financing of the Common Agricultural
Policy was Council Regulation 729/70,130 which confirmed the European
Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund, which was established by Council
1 O 1
Regulation 25/62. This fund was separated into two sections:
1. Guarantee spending, originally without, but now subject to budget limits, and
is sometimes applied on a co-financing basis;
2. Guidance operations, mainly used for investment projects, but limited to
specific amounts.
The Guarantee section was subdivided into two;
1. Export refunds,
2. Interventions intended to stabilise agricultural markets, to include all
internal market measures under the common market organisations. These included
first category interventions, i.e. amounts per weight. These were nearly all aids or
premiums, and were totally financed by the community. Second category
interventions included purchasing and storage operations. This expenditure was
usually expressed in the form of a price. As these products may have later been
sold the expenditure is the sale price less the purchase price and processing and
1 ^9
storage price. The EAGGF was the main instrument for providing stability and
support for agriculture in the Community, and for financing the structural changes
deemed necessary to improve the agriculture sector. This fund was specifically
charged with aiding structural improvement in agriculture, reducing surpluses by
127
Andrews, Sanley; Agriculture and the Common Market, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State U.P. 1973,
ISBN 0813800307, at page 79.
128 This fund is more commonly used for development projects in third countries.





Barents, Rene; The agricultural law of the EC: an inquiry into the administrative law of the
European Community in the field of agriculture, Deventer: Kluwer, 1994, ISBN 9065448675, at
page 366 et seq.
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subsidising exports to 3rd countries, and intervening in local markets by purchase
when the price ofproducts fell below the support level. The framework for
funding until the mid-term review was pursuant to Regulation 1260/1999,133
which will be discussed further later in this chapter, with an analysis of the post-
mid-term review situation to follow towards the end of this chapter.
4.1 The Mac Sharry Reforms.
The European Commission itself described changes in the CAP during the
Mac Sharry reforms, as an effort to "separate more clearly two aspects of
agricultural policy; that of economic efficiency, and that of social and
environmental measures."134 This approach was to be further developed by the
1999 reforms, and refined in the mid-term review of the CAP. Earlier moves in
this direction were the Less Favoured Areas initiative in 1975,135 and the
Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA) programmes,136 which together
137
constituted, in 1993, approximately 1% of the total UK agricultural budget.
The main effects of the 1992 "Mac Sharry" CAP reforms were;138
1. a reduction of intervention prices,139 thus making the agricultural sector more,
though as yet not fully, exposed, to the cold winds of the market place, and,
2. the introduction of new direct payments, to include compensation through
direct area payments,140 subject to 15% rotational set-aside (in 1993 non-
133 OJ 1999 L161/1.
134 EC Agricultural Policy for the 21st Century, European Economy: European Commission
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Reports and Studies No.4 1994, at page
2.
135 Directive on Mountain and Hill Farming in certain Less Favoured Areas, 75/268, OJ 1975,
L128/18 (19 May 1975).
136 Council Regulation 797/85 on Improving the Efficiency of Agricultural Structures, Official
Journal, 28, L93 (30 March 1985) 1-18.
137 Wathern P.; "Less Favoured and Environmentally Sensitive areas : a European dimension to
the rural environment", chapter 9 in Howarth, William and Rodgers, Christopher P. (eds);
Agriculture, Conservation and Land Use: Law and Policy Issues for Rural Areas, University of
Wales Press, Cardiff, 1993, at page 187, quoting from "Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food, Agriculture in the UK" 1988, HMSO, 1989.
138
Op. cit. footnote no. 134 at page 18 et. seq.
139 1/3 reduction in the cereal intervention price, 15% reduction in Beef, and the elimination of
price support for oilseeds and protein crops.
71
rotational set aside, at 18 or 21%, was introduced on an optional basis) for arable
crops grown by all except small farmers, and an increase in the male bovine and
suckler (beef) cow premiums subject to individual limits per holding and to
regional reference herds sizes.141
The most novel aspects of the 1992 reforms were the "accompanying
measures", which for the most part were 50% funded (75% funded in Objective 1
regions) from the CAP budget. These "accompanying measures" were a myriad of
provisions to include substantial funding of schemes to develop the disadvantaged
areas of the European Union. Europe had been divided into objective areas under
Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No. 4256/88,142 with funding for the resulting
Regional policy being found under the European Regional Development Fund
(ERDF),143 the European Social Fund, the Guidance Section of the EAGGF,144
and the Cohesion Fund.145 The LEADER programme started at this time,146 which
was soon followed by LEADER II,147 and later LEADER+, with a view to
developing a "Rural Europe".148 The Regional Policy structure was altered during
140 based on historical base areas and regional yields.
141 There were also extra "extensification" headage premiums if a producer reduced the stocking
rate below 1.4 LU per fodder hectare.
142
Objective 1; regions whose development is lagging behind; Objective 2; industrial regions in
decline; Objective 3; combating long term unemployment; Objective 4; adapting workers to
industrial change; Objective 5(a); agricultural structures in all regions; (Objective 5a provisions
are often called "horizontal structural measures", as the entire Community is eligible. These
provisions are exclusively financed by the EAGGF Guidance Section. Funding varied.), Objective
5b; rural development in certain limited areas; and Objective 6; Nordic regions, following the
accession of the new member states.
143
Currently operating under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, laying down general
provisions on the structural funds, OJ L 213, 13 August 1999.
144
In the fisheries sector, the Fisheries Guidance fund was also available.
145 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/99, laying down general provisions on the structural funds,
OJL 213, 13 August 1999.
146 The original LEADER scheme was instigated pursuant to Article 8 Reg. (EEC) No 4256/88, OJ
L 374, 31/12/88, p. 25, DGVI Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy.
147 whose objectives were 1. to ensure that support for exemplary local initiatives involving local
development continues from Leader; 2. to support operations that are innovative, suitable as a
model and transferable, and that illustrate the new directions that rural development may take; 3.
to encourage the exchange of experiences and the transfer for know-how through a European rural
development network; 4. to encourage transnational co-operation projects developed by the local
bodies in rural areas which reflect their solidarity. See http://www.rural-europe.aeidl.be/.
148 See further http://www.rural-europe.aeidl.be/.
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the 1999 reforms149 when it was amended to cover three objective areas150 and
four community initiatives.151 Pre-accession agricultural and rural development
schemes, for central and eastern European countries were covered by
152
SAPARD, which provides structural adjustment of agricultural sectors in rural
areas, in addition to the more mainstream PHARE scheme, which deals with
infrastructure investment generally, and the ISPA153 scheme, which deals with
environmental and transport structures.154 These were used by the then accession
countries to assist in reforming the domestic agricultural structures prior to
membership of the EU, and participation in the CAP.
Agri-development schemes were also developed under the Mac Sharry
reforms, with the objective of encouraging more extensive, as opposed to
intensive, means of production and to encourage the use of land for "natural
resource protection and public leisure", which included the "Community aid
scheme for agricultural production methods compatible with the requirements of
the protection of the environment and the maintenance of the countryside".155
This scheme had many objectives, amongst them the reduction of the polluting
effects of agriculture, the extensification of farming, the general improvement of
the environment, the encouragement of the upkeep of abandoned farmlands and
woodlands, the long term set-aside of land for environmental purposes, the
encouragement of public access to land for leisure activities, and finally, the
149
Op. cit. footnote no. 145.
150
Objective 1; Development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging
behind, on the basis that their per capita GDP was less than 75% of the Community average,
(135.0 Billion Euro), Objective 2, Economic and social conversion of areas facing structural
difficulties (22.5 Billion Euro), and Objective 3; Adaptation and modernisation of national
policies and systems of education and training and employment (24.05 Billion Euro).
51
Interreg III, covering cross-border, transitional and inter-regional co-operation, Urban,
regeneration of urban areas in crisis, Leader+ rural development by local action groups, and Equal,
to cover transnational co-operation to fight against discrimination and inequality in access to
work; Article 20.1 1260/1999.
152
Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development.
153 Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession, which operates like the EC's Cohesion
fund for existing EC member states.




education and training of farmers so as to enable them to comply with the above
requirements.
A scheme of aid for forestry investment and management, to include a
scheme of compensation for income loss for up to 20 years, which included the
"Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture",156 was introduced
contemporaneously. This latter scheme had as its objective the conversion of
agricultural land to forestry. It did not, however, include the growth of Christmas
trees, which had become a popular pursuit in some Member States. A system of
1 S7
protection against forest fires was also introduced.
The ageing population of farmers throughout the European Union had also
been recognised as an obstacle to the preparation of the farming community for
globalisation influences of the then anticipated WTO Agreement on Agriculture
of 1994, and any subsequent developments. The encouragement of the transfer of
farms to the next generation had been seen as a primary objective, with various
1 CO
forms of compensation for early retirement being introduced. These included
lump sum or annual payments, for farmers and farm workers over 55, together
with aid for young farmers generally,159 aid in vocational training,160 and other
forms of further education.161 Measures to cover the management costs of young
156
Regulation No 2080/92, of 30/6/92, OJ L 215 of 30/7/92, and Regulation No 1054/94 of 5/5/94,
OJ L 115 of 6/5/94, which organises financial control.
157
Regulation No 2158/92 of 23.7.92 (OJ L 217 of 31/7/92), Regulation No 1170/93 of 13/5/1993
(OJ L 118 of 4/5/93), Regulation No 804/94 of 11/4/1994 (OJ L 93 of 12/4/94).
158
Regulation No 2079/92 of 30/6/92, OJ L215 of 30/7/1992.
159
"Objective 5a: aid for young farmers". The purpose of this aid for the takeover of pre-existing
movable and immovable assets, during the course of setting up of a young farmer. 25,000 young
farmers benefit each year. Total available aid ECU 30,000 (all member states except the UK and
the Netherlands).
160 Used for courses to set up young people in agricultural holdings Max ECU 10,500 per person,
of which ECU 4,000 for courses on the environment, forestry and reorientation of production, and
granted only once in a lifetime. (All member stated except UK have introduced national
implementation measures).
161 Article 28 of Regulation No 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6/8/91) amended by Regulation
3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31/12/93) and Regulation 2843/ 94 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94).
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162farmers during the first five years of operation were also covered where the
level of aid could have been quite high. This approach would be echoed in the
later 1999 reforms, pursuant to Agenda 2000.
Special provisions had also been allowed for the particular difficulties
facing farmers in mountainous regions, hill farms and less favoured areas. Two
types of aid were applicable in these areas; 1. compensation for permanent natural
handicaps, and 2. joint investment aid. New management tools were also
provided for under these provisions, and aid for accounting on agricultural
holdings164 had also been provided.165 General upgrading of market managing
mechanisms166 in pursuit of the reform of the CAP had been grouped in the
Objective 5a category of the Structural Fund budget, and primarily concerned the
improvement of production conditions, processing and marketing of agricultural
and forestry products.
Investment aid in agricultural holdings167 was also available, where
funding in general could have amounted to 25% of the cost of improving
competitiveness of a holding, in the context of rational and sustainable
development of agricultural production while protecting the income of farmers.
These payments rose to 50% in disadvantaged areas of Spain and Italy, and up to
162
Objective 5a: launching aid for mutual aid, replacement and management services. Articles 14
to 16 of Regulation No 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91) amended by Regulation 3669/93
(OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and Regulation 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94).
163 Directive 75/268/EEC of 28/4/75 (OJ L 128 of 19.5.75), Article 17 to 20 of Regulation No
2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91) amended by Regulation No 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218
of 6.8.91) amended by Regulations 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of
25.11.94).
164 Article 13 ofRegulation No 2328/91 of 15/7/91 OL J 218 of 6/8/91) amended by Regulation
No. 2843/91 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94).
165 Aid can vary from 700 to 1500 ECU. All Member States except Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK have adopted national implementing provisions.
166
Regulation No 2085 of the 20/7/93 amending Regulation No 4256/88 on the implementation
provisions of Regulation 2052/88 with regard to the European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section, OJ L 193, p. 44. Regulation No 1282/94 of 2/6/94
laying down the rates of Community co-funding for certain measures of Objective 5a, OJ L 140, p.
14.
167 Articles 5 to 9, 11 and 12 of Regulation No 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91) amended
by Regulations 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94.
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75% in Objective 1 areas. This funding was not limited to full time farmers.
Funding could have included:
1. the construction of farm buildings,
2. the relocation of farm buildings when this is done in public interest,
3. land improvement operations,
4. environmental protection and improvement,
5. and on condition that this aid is granted in compliance with the general rules of
competition.168
Not only was the production of agricultural produce the concern of the
European Union, so also was the processing and marketing of that produce,169
with the objective being to relieve the intervention agencies. Marketing of
produce was recognised as being of primary importance,170 with the creation of a
system to encourage the formation of producer groups and their unions.171 Aid
could have varied from 2 to 5% of value of market production, to a maximum of
ECU 120,000.
Adding value to agricultural produce was seen as a way of increasing farm
incomes through the market either through the encouragement of the growth of
organic produce,172 by creating conditions of fair competition, or through the new
168 The UK ceased operating this scheme in 1995.
169
Regulation No 866/90 of 29/3/90 (OJ L 91 of 6/4/90) amended by Regulation 3669/93 (OJ L
388 of 31/12/93) and Regulation 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94). (This regulation replaces
Regulation No 355/77 which concerned the Community aid scheme for investments in the field of
processing and marketing agricultural and fisheries products).70
Objective 5a: launching aid for producer groups for marketing agricultural products; countries
partaking in this scheme are Belgium, France, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal.
171
Regulation No 1360/78 of 19/6/78 (OJ L 166 of 23.6.78) amended by Council Regulation
1760/87, OJ L 167, p. 1, Council Regulation 3875/88, OJ L 346 of 15.12.88), Regulation 3808/89,
(OJ L 370 of 20.12.89) Regulation 3763/91, (OJ L 356 of 24.12.91), Regulation 698/93 (OJ L 74
of 27.3.93), Regulation 3669/93, (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93). In addition specific systems have been
set up for the sector of fruit and vegetables, (Regulation No 1035/72 of 18/5/72 OJ L 118 of
20/5/72), for cotton (Regulation No 389/82 of 15.12.82 OJ L 51 of 23/2/82) and for hops
(Regulation No. 1696/71 of 26/7/91 OJ L 175 of 4/8/71).
172
Regulation No 2092/91 of 24/6/91 (OJ L 198 of 22/7/91) amended by Regulation 94/92 (OJ L
11 of 17/1/92), Regulation 1535/92 (OJ L 162 of 16/6/92), Regulation 2083/92 (OJ L 208 of
24/7/92), Regulation 3457/92 (OJ L 350 of 1/12/92), Regulation 3713/92 (OJ L 378 of 23/12/92),
Regulation 2608/93 (OJ L 239 of 24/9/93), Regulation 468/94 (OJ L 59 of 3/3/94), Regulation
1468/94 (OJ L 159 of 28/6/94), Regulation 2381/91 (OJ L 255 of 1/10/94), Regulation 529/95 (OJ
76
Community system of the designation of origin and geographical indication,173 (of
which more in chapters 8 and 9) or the Community system for the protection of
agri-food products benefiting from a certificate of specific character.174 Public
agencies and private bodies were targeted under Article 8 of the EAGGF
Guidance Section.173 This funding was designed to facilitate "pilot projects and
demonstration projects relating to the adjustment of agricultural structure and the
promotion of rural development".176
With the European Community pouring all this money into agricultural
schemes it was concerned that national initiatives would not unbalance its finely
tuned aid package, and restrictions on national aid for investment in agricultural
177
holdings has also been provided for. The informing of the European Citizen
and the co-ordination of the various European rural initiatives was to be carried
1 TO
out by "European Rural Information and Promotion Carrefours". Processing
and marketing structures were also encouraged and funded,179 to encourage the
development of new and higher quality products, to include organic products.
L 54 of 10/3/95), Regulation 1201/95 (OJ L 119 of 30/5/95), Regulation 1202/95 (OJ L 119 of
30/5/95), Regulation 1935/95, (OJ L 185 of 5/8/95). A list of bodies providing certification for the
purpose of organic production is published in the OJ (OJ C 284 of October 1993).173
Regulation No 2081/92 of 14/7/92 (OJ L 208 of 24/7/92), Regulation No 1848/93 of 9/7/93 (OJ
L 168 of 10/7/93), Decision No 53/93 of 21/12/92 (OJ L 13 of 21/1/93), Decision No 437/94 of
14/6/94 (OJ C 273 of 9/10/93). Communication from the Commission (OJ C273 of 9/10/93),
completed by Regulation No 2037/93, OJ L. 185, 28/7/93, p. 5.
174
Regulation No 2082/92 of 14/7/92 Relating to certificates of specific character of agricultural
products and foodstuffs amended by Regulation 1848/93, OJ L 169, 10/7/93, at page 35, and
Regulation 2515/94, OJ L275, 26/10/94, p. 1.
175 Article 8 of Regulation No 2085/93 of 20/7/93 amending Regulation no 4256/88 (OJ L 193 of
31/7/93). Article 8 regards the application of Regulation No 2052/88 (relating to the missions of
the EAGGF Guidance Section), Article 3 paragraph 3 sub-section 2 and Article 5 paragraph 2
point 3 OJ L 185 of 15/7/88.
76
Community contributions may be up to 75% of the cost of the project for Objective 1 regions
and 50% for the other regions.
177 Article 12 ofRegulation No 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6/8/91) amended by Regulations
3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25.11.94).
178 Established following the Communication of the Commission of the European Communities,
"The Future of Rural Society", published in 1988 (COM(88)5012 Final), implemented following
Communication SEC(89)1717 final of 13/10/89 relating to the guidelines of rural development
actions.
179
Op. cit. footnote no. 169.
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This financing was aimed at persons or bodies who were ultimately responsible
for the financing of and investment in these schemes.180
5.1999 reforms
The CAP underwent further reform pursuant to Agenda 2000,181 which
was a Commission proposal of July 1997, which was adopted by the Berlin
European Council in March 1999. Agenda 2000 had as its aim, in line with
undertakings given in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and with the view to
the subsequent WTO agricultural negotiations, the reduction of "guaranteed
prices", which were to be compensated by an increase in direct support to
farmers".182 This was to be complimented by measures to promote the "adaptation
of rural areas in so far as these are related to farming activities and their
• 18^
conversion" together with the creation of "a comprehensive and consistent rural
development policy".184 It could be argued that the CAP, allied with the Regional
policy, and the operation of the LEADER and LEADER II schemes had already
made efforts in this direction, however, Agenda 2000 had repositioned these
activities to the fore, within the overall CAP strategy. In addition to redesigning
the CAP into a two pillar structure, Agenda 2000 emphasised the need for "action
i oc
on the environment" to "be substantially reinforced", thereby furthering the
180
eligible investments:
1. the construction and acquisition of immovable property with the exception of land purchase
2. new machinery and equipment, including computer software and programmes
3. general costs (architects' , consultants fees, feasibility studies) up to a ceiling of 12% of the
cost referred to in the last two items.
generally speaking, the investment must concern Annex 2 products or fishery products.
EU Contribution: The financial contribution from the EAGGF guidance Section may not exceed
50% of the eligible costs in the regions covered by objective 1 and 30% in other regions. Aid
generally takes the form of capital grants. All member states have introduced implementing
legislation.
181
AGENDA 2000 http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/104000.htm, 1997, Cat. CB-CO
97-379-EN.C.
182
European Parliament Briefing No. 27; Agriculture and Enlargement, DOC EN/EV/360/360464.
183 AGENDA 2000; the future of European Agriculture: Explanatory Memorandum, European
Commission, 1997, CH-87-98-001-EC-C, at page 13.
184 Ibid, at page 3.
185 Ibid, at page 3.
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move from a prices policy to a structural policy earlier referred to in this chapter.
Food quality and safety were also made a priority, with the overall objective of
Agenda 2000 being to develop a competitive, sustainable and multi-functional
agriculture for the EU.186
Future agricultural legislation was to be simplified, consolidated, and
made available to the public on the internet.187 For example, rural development
i oo
provisions were consolidated into a single regulatory framework from "the
previous nine regulations".189 Simplifications also resulted from the "reduction to
three of the number of objectives for structural measures".190 Other
simplifications resulted from the "Small Farmers' Scheme" payments structure.191
In line with this process of simplification, the horizontal regulations on import
and export licences were consolidated into Commission Regulation (EC) No.
1291/2000,192 which included much simplification of the rules, which had been
1 QO
called for in Agenda 2000- the future for European Agriculture. This was to be
accompanied by new "Community Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural
sector",194 which were complimented by the EC's own regulations; Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1259/1999 of 17 May 1999 establishing common rules for
direct support schemes under the Common Agricultural Policy,195 and Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1244/2001 of 19 June 2001, amending Regulation
186 Ibid, at page 5.
187
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Simplification of
Agricultural Legislation, Brussels, 29.01.2001 COM (2001) 48 Final, at page 1 et seq.
188 Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 on support for rural development from the European
Agricultural guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and repealing certain
Regulations OJ L 160, 26/6/99, p.80; Commission Regulation (EC) No 1750/1999 of 23 July 1999
laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999 on
support for rural development from the EAGGF, OJ L 214, 13/8/99. p. 31; Commission
Regulation (EC) No 2603/1999 of 9 December 1999 laying down rules for the transition to the
rural development support provided for by Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999, OJ L 316,
10/12/1999, p. 26.
189
Op. cit. footnote no. 187, at page 3.
190 Ibid, at page 3.
191 Ibid, at page 4.
192 OJ L. 152, 24/6/2000, page. 1.
193
Op. cit. footnote no. 183 at page 2.
194 OJ C 28, 1.1.2000, p.2; OJ C 232, 12.8.2000, p.19.
195 OJ L. 160, 26/6/1999, page 113.
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1259/1999 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the
common agricultural policy, for farmers receiving small amounts of money.196
The guidelines on state aids, which came into force on the 1st January,
2000, provided that certain state aids would be approved subject to certain
conditions. These approved state aids included investment aid for farms,197 with
higher level of aids being available for "investments linked to the conservation of
traditional landscapes, for the relocation of farm buildings in the public interest or
for the improvement of the environment, animal welfare or hygiene".198 Aid was
approved for "investment in the processing and marketing of agricultural
products",199 as were state aids to support agri-environmental undertakings.200 Aid
901
was also approved to compensate for less-favoured areas, to help young
909
farmers start up, to assist in early retirement schemes, or to reduce production,
processing or marketing capacity. Also included was aid to help producer groups
start up, to compensate for loss arising from natural disasters, adverse weather
conditions or disease, or aid towards insurance against these risks, or aid to
improve marketing of goods, or the genetic quality of livestock, or aid for "the
outermost regions and the Aegean islands."203 Specifically, Article 33 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999204 provided support for the promotion and
adaptation and development of rural areas, to include "land improvement,
reparcelling, setting-up of farm relief and farm management services", the
marketing of quality agricultural products, the provision of basic services to rural
areas, "renovation and development of villages and protection and conservation of
the rural heritage", the "diversification of agricultural activities and activities
close to agriculture to provide multiple activities or alternative incomes", and "the
OJ L 1973, 27.6.2001, page.l, second recital.
197
Op. cit. footnote no. 51, at Article 4.
198
Op. cit. footnote no. 5, at paragraph 78.
199 Ibid.
200
Op. cit. footnote no. 51, at Article 22.
201 Introduced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 OJ L. 106, 26/6/1999, p.80, Article 22.
202 Ibid at Article 8.
203
Op. cit. footnote no. 5, at paragraph 78.
204
Op. cit. footnote no. 51.
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encouragement of tourist and craft activities".205 Common rules for direct support
schemes set out in 1999,206 were amended in 2001.207 The Structural funds had
been dealt with by Regulation 1260/1999,208 which had provided that Objective 1
funding was to be covered by the ERDF, the ESF, the EAGGF Guidance section
and, where appropriate, the FIFG,209 Objective 2 funding from the ERDF and the
910
ESF, and Objective 3 from the ESF. The financing of the four community
initiatives was also provided for in Regulation 1260/1999. INTERREG and
URBAN were both to be financed by the ERDF, Leader was to be financed by the
EAGGF Guidance Section, and EQUAL by the ESF.211
The reduction in guaranteed prices aspect of the reform was reflected in
the reduction of the intervention price for cereals by 20% in 2000, with direct aid
to farmers on the basis of production increased from ECU 54 per tonne to ECU 65
212
per tonne. In the Beef and veal common organisation, support was to be
reduced by 30% in three equal phases, with the then existing intervention system
being replaced by a private storage system. In like manner, the intervention prices
for butter and skimmed milk powder was reduced by 15% in four phases, with
on
similar provision being made for other agricultural products.
206 Council Regulation (EC) No 1259/1999 of 17 May 1999 establishing common rules for direct
support schemes under the common agricultural policy. Official Journal L 160, 26/06/1999 p. 113.
207 Council Regulation (EC) No 1244/2001 of 19 June 2001 amending Regulation (EC) No
1259/1999 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural
policy, Official Journal L 173, 27/06/2001 p. 1.
~08
Op. cit. footnote no. 145.
209 The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, which is to "contribute to structural actions in
the fisheries sector Objective 1 regions in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No
1263/1999 June 1999 on the financial instrument for fisheries guidance" Article 2.3 Regulation
1260/1999.
210 Article 2.2 Regulation 1260/1999.
211 Recital no. 38 of Regulation 1260/1999.
212
Op. cit. footnote no. 5, at paragraph 74.
213 Ibid, at paragraph 24 et seq.
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6. The Mid-term review
The recent mid-term review of the CAP, arising from "a seemingly
innocuous commitment in the Berlin agreement" has resulted in "the most far-
reaching policy reforms since 1992",214 which should act as an important
milestone for the CAP and for the Community.215 These reforms have been
implemented by Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003,216 which resulted in the
introduction of the single farm payment (SEP) being substituted for many of the
existing premia under the various common market organisations as and from
January 2005, of which more discussion in chapter 8. In addition a number of
common organisations were reformed, to include dried fodder,217 milk and milk
products,218 with additional reform provisions dealing with the milk quota,219
220 221
cereals, and rice. Further reforms in Mediterranean products were instigated
214
Op. cit. footnote no. 41, at page 112.
215
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, at page 19.
216
Op. cit. footnote no. 24.
217 Council Regulation (EC) No 1786/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of
the market in dried fodder, which was subsequently amended by the Acts concerning the accession
to the EU of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of
Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic
of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, 01.05.2004 Official Journal L 236 of
23.09.2003.
218 Council Regulation (EC) No 1255/1999 of 17 May 1999 on the common organisation of the
market in milk and milk products, OJ L 160 of 26.6.1999, which has since been amended by
Regulation (EC) No 1040/2000, OJ L 118 of 17.5.2000, Regulation (EC) No 1526/2000, OJ L
142, p. 35, Regulation (EC) No 1670/2000, OJ L 193, p. 10, Regulation (EC) No 509/2002, OJ L
79 of 22.3.2002, Acts concerning the Accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia,
the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of
Hungary, the Republic ofMalta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the
Republic of Slovakia to the EU, OJ L 236 of 23.9.2003, Regulation (EC) No 1787/2003, OJ L 270
of 29.9.2003, Regulation (EC) No 186/2004, OJ L 29 of 3.2.2004. These provisions were
supported by extensive implementation measures, covering export refunds, refund rates, minimum
prices, selling prices, and maximum amounts.
19 Council Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 of 29 September 2003 establishing a levy in the milk
and milk products sector, OJ L 270 of 21.10.2003, which is supplemented by Commission
Regulation (EC) No 595/2004 of 30 March 2004 laying down detailed rules for applying Council
Regulation (EC) No 1788/2003 establishing a levy in the milk and milk products sector (repealing
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1392/2001), OJ L 94 of 31.3.2004.
220 Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003, on the common organisation of the market in cereals,
Official Journal, L 270 of 21.10.2003, and supplemented by Commission Regulation (EC) No
2237/2003 of 23 December 2003 laying down detailed rales for the application of certain support
schemes provided for in Title IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common
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in 2004. For cereals, in addition to reform of the common organisation,
pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003223 together with provisions
providing for the implementation of provisions to meet the requirements of the
newly reformed common organisation,224 specific provisions were also made
dealing with the particular situation of specific accession countries. New
995
provision on food aid and set-aside were also provided for, with revised area
99 f\
aid provisions for cereals also being provided for.
rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain
support schemes for farmers, OJ L 339 of 24.12.2003.
221 Council Regulation (EC) No 1785/2003 of 29 September 2003, on the common organisation of
the market in rice, Official Journal, L 270 of 21.10.2003, and supplemented by Commission
Regulation (EC) No 2237/2003 of 23 December 2003 laying down detailed rules for the
application of certain support schemes provided for in Title IV of Council Regulation (EC) No
1782/2003 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural
policy and establishing certain support schemes for farmers, OJ L 339 of 24.12.2003.
22
to cover olive oil and table olives, hops, tobacco and cotton.
223 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market in cereals, OJ L 270 of
21.10.2003.
224 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2305/2003 of 29 December 2003 opening and providing for
the administration of a Community tariff quota for imports of barley from third countries, OJ L
342 of 30.12.2003, Commission Regulation (EC) No 1342/2003 of 28 July 2003 laying down
special detailed rules for the application of the system of import and export licences for cereals
and rice, OJ L 189 of 29.7.2003. Commission Regulation (EC) No 500/2003 of 19 March 2003 on
the periods for which certain cereal and rice products may remain under customs control
arrangements for the advance payment of refunds, OJ L 74 of 20.3.2003. Commission Regulation
(EC) No 2377/2002 of 27 December 2002 opening and providing for the administration of a
Community tariff quota for malting barley from third countries and derogating from Council
Regulation (EC) No 1766/92 OJ L 358 of 31.12.2002. Last amended by Regulation (EC) No
626/2003, OJ L 90 of 8.4.2003. Extended by Regulation (EC) No 1112/2003, OJ L 158 of
27.6.2003. Commission Regulation (EC) No 2375/2002 of 27 December 2002 opening and
providing for the administration of Community tariff quotas for common wheat of a quality other
than high quality from third countries and derogating from Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92,
OJ L 358 of 31.12.2002. Last amended by Regulation (EC) No 532/2003, OJ 26.3.2003. Extended
by Regulation (EC) No 1111/2003, OJ L 158 of 27.6.2003. Commission Regulation (EC) No
2133/2001 of 30 October 2001 opening and providing for the administration of certain
Community tariff quotas and tariff ceilings in the cereals sector and repealing Regulations (EC)
No 1897/94, (EC) No 306/96, (EC) No 1827/96, (EC) No 1970/96, (EC) No 1405/97, (EC) No
1406/97, (EC) No 2492/98, (EC) No 2809/98 and (EC) No 778/1999, OJ L 287 of 31.10.2001.
Commission Regulation (EC) No 824/2000 of 19 April 2000 establishing procedures for the
taking-over of cereals by intervention agencies and laying down methods of analysis for
determining the quality of cereals, OJ L 100 of 20.4.2000, most recently amended by Regulation
(EC) No 336/2003, OJ L 49 of 22.2.2003. Commission Regulation (EC) No 2461/1999 of 19
November 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No
1251/1999 as regards the use of land set aside for the production of raw materials for the
manufacture within the Community of products not primarily intended for human or animal
consumption, OJ L 299 of 20.11.1999. Last amended by Regulation (EC) No 345/2002, OJ L 55
of 26.2.2002.
225 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1647/2002 of 16 September 2002 on the supply of cereals as
food aid, OJ L 249 of 17.9.2002. Commission Regulation (EC) No 2298/2001 of 26 November
83
7. An examination of the Cereals Common Market from before the
Mac Sharry reforms to after the mid-term review
An example of one of the more developed market organisations is that of
Cereals,227 which was set up against the backdrop of the International Wheat
Agreement. Its objective was to have a single price system for cereals for the
community, but maintaining a flexibility to vary target prices, intervention prices
and threshold prices a number of times a month, if necessary.229 In the market for
9 or*
cereals a target price, and threshold price and intervention price were set for "a
standard quality" of each cereal.231 How these prices were used differs between
the regulations. A threshold price was also provided for under both the 1975 and
1992 regulations. Under the 1992 regulation the one threshold price was fixed for
all cereals,232 reflecting the inter-changebility of cereals from the point of view of
the farmer, with the c.i.f. price continuing to be based on the Rotterdam prices,
"on the basis of the most favourable purchasing opportunities on the world
900
market". A levy was then imposed on imported cereals, equal to the threshold
2001 laying down detailed rules for the export of products supplied as food aid, OJ L 308 of
27.11.2001.
226 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2316/1999 of 22 October 1999 laying down detailed rules for
the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 establishing a support system for
producers of certain arable crops, OJ L 280 of 30.10.1999. Last amended by Regulation (EC) No
206/2004, OJ LI 34 of 6.2.2004.
227 Pre Mac Sharry reforms Regulation No. 2727/75, [1975] OJ L No.281/1, which consolidated
and updated the previous regulations, but which was repealed and replaced by Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals, OJ. L.
181, 1.7.92, page 21. The exact products covered by this regulation are set out in Article 1 of both
regulations. The 1992 regulation operates in conjunction with Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/92 on
assistance for arable farmers, OJ L 280, 24/07/92, p. 34, Article 1.2 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No. 1766/92.
. 228 See further annex 2.
229 Article 6 Regulation 2727/75, and Article 3.4 and Article 6 of Council Regulation (EEC) No.
1766/92.
230
Being common wheat, durum wheat, barley, maize, sorghum and rye.
231 Article 3 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92.
232 Article 3.2 Regulation 1766/92.
233 Article 10.2 Regulation 1766/92, and Article 13 and 14 of Regulation 2727/75.
84
9^4
price less the c.i.f. price. In addition to the payment of the levy, all imports into
the EC, as with all exports from the EC, required a licence. Under Annex I of
Council Regulation (EC) No 3290/94,236 which was enacted in order to implement
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture Article 3.2 of Council Regulation (EEC) No.
1766/92 was deleted, thereby bringing to an end the regime of threshold prices in
the cereals sector within the EC. An examination of the EC's rules on the import
and export of agricultural produce, and the impact of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, and allied WTO agreements, will be made in Chapter 3, with the
EC's WTO commitment being discussed in depth in chapter 4 and subsequent
chapters.
The 1992 cereals' regulation was accompanied by Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1765/92,237 which established a support system for producers of
certain arable crops, on the basis of both rotational and non-rotational set aside.
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/92 has since been repealed and replaced by
Council Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999.238 Council Regulation 1251/1999
provided a support mechanism for producers of certain arable crops. It provided
in recital no. 7 that "reform of the support scheme has to take into account the
international obligations of the community", namely the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture obligations.
The reform of the cereals organisation under the mid-term review was
conducted pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003,239 against the
234 Article 10.1 Regulation 1766/92, with the exception of Rye, which had its own calculations.
235 Article 12 Regulation 2727/75 and Article 9 Regulation 1766/92.
236 Council Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the adjustments and
transitional arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to implement the agreements
concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Official Journal L 349,
31/12/1994 p. 105
237 OJ. L. 181, 1/7/1992, page 12.
238 Council Regulation (EC) No 1251/1999 of 17 May 1999 establishing a support system for
producers of certain arable crops, Official Journal L 160, 26/06/1999 p. 1
39 Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003, on the common organisation of the market in cereals,
Official Journal, L 270 of 21.10.2003, and supplemented by Commission Regulation (EC) No
2237/2003 of 23 December 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of certain support
schemes provided for in Title IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common
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back drop ofCouncil Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003,240 the main mid-term
review provisions. For those regions who have not fully decoupled payments,
Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003 re-sets an intervention price for cereals,
with the exception of rye,241 which is no longer covered, under its chapter II
internal market provisions. The regulation then goes on to provide for "a trading
949
market at the external frontiers of the Community" for cereals, with import and
export licences, export refunds, import duties, tariff quotas and emergency
safeguard measures continuing to form part of the post-mid-term version of the
EC cereals common organisation. All of these provisions are to maintain
compliance with the EC's commitments under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, of which more in chapter 4 of this thesis.
The current WTO Agreement on Agriculture, pursuant to the Uruguay
round of negotiations, provides for green box exemptions243 and blue box
exclusions,244 which EC CAP provisions are increasingly mirroring. The Green
box provisions permit245 "payments under environmental and regional assistance
programmes".246 Payments under Green Box provisions, must be "generally
available to producers within the region"247 and can not be "related to, or based
940
on, the type or volume of production", with the "size of the payment being
"limited to the extra costs or loss of income involved in complying" with
government programmes,249 thereby limiting the effectiveness of developing
green box payments as steering mechanisms in the development of more
rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain
support schemes for farmers, OJ L 339 of 24.12.2003.
240
Op. cit. footnote no. 24.
241 Recital 5 of Council Regulation 1784/2003 states that rye is to be excluded as there had been a
large accumulation of intervention stocks of rye under the previous regime.
242 Recital 8 of Council Regulation 1784/2003
243 Article 6.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Annex 2.
244 Article 6 Agreement on Agriculture.
245
Agreement on Agriculture, Articles 2.2-2.13.
246
Kennedy, Kevin C.; Reforming Farm Trade in the Next Round ofWTO Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, (2001) Journal of World Trade 35(6): 1061-1079,
247 Rude, James; Under the Green Box; the WTO and Farm Subsidies, (2001) Journal ofWorld
Trade 35(5); 1015-1033, at page 1027.
248
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, paragraph 6
249
Op. cit footnote no. 247, at page 1027.
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sustainable agricultural practices.250 The provisions of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4 of this thesis, with the WTO
panel and appellate panel decisions relevant to agriculture being examined in
Chapter 5. The interaction of the WTO provisions affecting agriculture, in
particular the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and the EC's CAP provisions will
be examined in further depth in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis, with the
development of the new rural policy of the EC being discussed in chapters 9 and
10.
8. Conclusion
As can be seen from the developments outlined in this chapter, the
emphasis of the CAP has changed over the years, with the move from a highly
protectionist model to a more market orientated one being the cause of many
political crises along the way. The EC's CAP continues to cause controversy, and
will undoubtedly continue to do so until such time as agricultural commodities are
no longer differentiated from non-agricultural commodities in either the EC's
internal market structure, or in the EC's relationship with the rest of the world.
Much progress has however already been made in reforming the CAP, with
community preference, the first pillar of the CAP, having been repealed by the
Amsterdam treaty, and the decoupling of EC payments from production currently
being phased in under the recent mid-term review of the CAP. Focusing on
cereals, the original target and threshold prices in cereals are now gone, with "the
intervention price, on the other hand (being) the only element of the original price
structure to survive" 251 the various reforms, with prices still being guaranteed to
producers for regions of the EC not yet implementing the fully decoupled
payments under the single farm payment scheme. The CAP has developed over
the years, from financial support for production, to intervention, to the current
250 Ibid, at page 1031.
251 Usher, John; EC Agricultural Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, at page 84.
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252
emphasis, the restructuring of agricultural production in the EC, with a
developing emphasis on producer support and rural development under the
252
current two pillar structure of the CAP. This shift is not as yet complete, and
the CAP still suffers from tensions emanating from the original "multifunctional"
drafting of its treaty provisions. On the external trade front, "import levies have
disappeared, being replaced by customs duties",254 a simplified structure of import
and export licences, export refunds, import duties and tariff quotas, together with
emergency safeguard measures still exist.
The two terms, "sustainability", as defined by the Brundtland
commission,255 and "multifunctionality", which still lack an agreed definition,
with the OECD's positive concept of multifunctionality most likely to achieve
international recognition,256 are coming to the fore in CAP policy discussions, and
are being strongly supported, along with the Commission's policy document
Agenda 2000257 package of reforms,258 by the EC and the current round of WTO
negotiations.259 European farmers are also adjusting to the "multifunctionality"
debate, recognising that they "can serve the cause of conservation, and achieve
income of themselves, by making it their business to provide environmental
services to the public."260 These developments are recognised not only in EC
261 •
documentation but also in the ideas behind the mid-term-review's requirements
for obtaining the single farm payment and the accompanying cross compliance
262
requirements. These changes are however been driven by the need to meet the
EC's legal obligations under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which will be
252
Op. cit. footnote no. 6, at page 120.
253
Op. cit. footnote no. 5, at paragraph 76 et seq.
254
Op. cit. footnote no. 251, at page 84.
255
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 9.
256
Op. cit. footnote no. 54, at page 14.
257 issued on the 16th July 1997.
258
Op. cit. footnote no. 181.
259
Op. cit. footnote no. 17.
260
Gregory, M.; "The Implementation of Agricultural Diversification", in Howarth, William and
Rodgers, Christopher P. (eds); Agriculture, Conservation and Land Use: Law and Policy Issues for
Rural Areas, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, 1993, at page 31.
261
Op. cit. footnote no. 19, at page 3.
262 Which are discussed in depth in chapter 8.
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discussed in depth in chapter 4, together with the case law of panel and appellate
rulings of its dispute settlement system, which will be covered in chapter 5, with
the impact of the interaction of the WTO legal system on the EC legal system in
the context of agriculture, not only impacting on the law dealing with trade in
agricultural commodities and agricultural support, but also in supporting areas of
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Before progressing on to examine the content and operation of the WTO
Agreement in agriculture, and in order better to understand the context and
operation of the CAP, it is best to take some time out to have an overview of the
various provisions which have an impact on the trade into and out of the EC in
agricultural commodities. The EC's CAP interacts with the outside world through
the EC's Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and its Article 133 EC. In this
chapter the operation of the CCP, together with the agricultural aspects of the
CCP will be examined. In addition, the operation of the Common Customs Code
(CCC) in the context of agricultural commodities has had an impact on the reality
of the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO in the area of agriculture.
Allied to the customs code and its various procedures are a number of supporting
measures, which the WTO disciplines either have or will have an impact upon.
These include the valuation of goods for customs purposes, rules of origin, tariff
and non-tariff barriers, import protection, and anti-dumping and export subsidies.
While export credit insurance is not currently regulated at the WTO level, it is
subject to OECD disciplines, thereby interacting with the export refund and
currency discourse. All of these are examined in this chapter, from the perspective
of trade in agricultural commodities. Also of relevance are the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary provisions of the EC, which have counterpart provisions in the
WTO agreements, together with the EC mechanism of charging for health
inspections. This chapter concludes by examining the major exceptions to the
usual external trade rules which the EC currently operates, and which, each of
them in their own right, pose problems for the EC-WTO legal relationship. These
agreements, namely the Generalised System of Preferences, the current Cotonou
agreement and the emerging Euro-Mediterranean agreements are also covered,
leading to the conclusion of this chapter.
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2. The Common Commercial Policy
The fulcrum through which the EC's Common Agricultural Policy
interacts with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture is the EC's Common
Commercial Policy (CCP). The CCP is also the mechanism which permitted the
EC to accede to the Uruguay Round Final Act and the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organisation, in 1994. Article 133 (ex. Article 113) EC forms the
1 2
lynch pin of the CCP, also known as the "external economic policy". Not only
was the article renumbered by the Amsterdam Treaty, but, reflecting the concerns
that resulted in the ECJ's ruling in Opinion 1/94,3 on the EC's legal capacity to
accede to the totality of the WTO agreements, in particular the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), a new provision, Article 133.5 was added to
deal with the EC's capacity to engage with these issues, albeit on a unanimous
vote from the Council, and after consultation with the European Parliament. With
the coming into force of the Nice Treaty4 a new Article 133 was inserted into the
EC treaty, which, inter alia, further refined the Amsterdam amendment. The
Amsterdam change was described by the Commission as not being "an extension
of the existing CCP provisions, but merely a codification of the current position"
and case law to date.5 Said "current position" is discussed further in chapter 6.
The Nice changes could, however, be deemed to be an extension of the Article
133 competence. This article was originally complemented by Article 116 EC,6
1 Article 131 (ex Article 110) EC to Article 134 (ex Article 115) EC.
2
Cremona, Marise: EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and
Interpretation with Interconnected Legal Orders, The EC, the WTO and the NAFTA; in Weiler
J.H.H.(Ed.) Towards a Common Law of International Trade, Oxford University Press, 2000, at
page 8.
Opinion 1/94 (re WTO Agreement) [1994] ECR1-5267.
4
Signed 26th February 2001, in force from the 1st February 2003.
5
Op. Cit. footnote no. 2, at page 8.
6 Ex Article 116 EEC "From the end of the transitional period onwards; Member States shall, in
respect of all matters of particular interest to the common market, proceed within the framework
of international organisations of an economic character only by common action. To this end, the
Commission shall submit to the Council, which shall act by a qualified majority, proposals
concerning the scope and implementation of such common action. During the transitional period,
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now repealed, and is currently complemented by Article 19(1) EU. As its
provisions are currently drafted, Article 133 gives "an unusual amount of
discretion"8 to the "Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, and after
consulting the European Parliament"9 as to the development and expansion of the
Common Commercial Policy, to include "both the form and the content" of this
policy.10 A further development of Article 133 was made in the proposed EU
constitution, of which more in chapter 8.
On the topic of agriculture, the ECJ, in Opinion 1/9411 found that given
that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture's objective was to "establish, on a
worldwide basis".... "a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system" that
the appropriate article in the EC treaty giving the Commission competence to
conclude the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture was Article 113 EC, now
renumbered Article 133 EC. This was despite the fact that compliance with the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture necessitated internal regulation
pursuant to Article 43 EC, now renumbered Article 37 EC.12 The extent as to how
far the pre-Amsterdam version of Article 133 EC extended was a major issue in
Opinion 1/94, which was entitled Re the Uruguay Round Treaty Texts, and dealt
with the competence of the EC, in its own right, to accede to the Uruguay Round
agreements.
2.1 Opinion 1/94
It has been observed that the "creation of the WTO" has led to a
development of the dynamic, and the "broadening and deepening of international
Member States shall consult each other for the purpose of concerting the action they take and
adopting as far as possible a uniform attitude.
7
ex Article J.9 EU
8
Op. Cit. footnote no. 2, at page 6.
9 Article 133.5 EC.
10
Op. Cit. footnote no.2, at page 6.
11
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at paragraph VIII.
12
At paragraph 29 of the report of the ECJ's Opinion.
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trade and economic relations" requiring the EC to engage in "debates and
initiatives which go far beyond traditional tariff negotiations".13 Opinion 1/94,14
together with Opinion 2/9415 which deals with the relationship between the EC
and the Council of Europe in the area of Human Rights, have, with their exercise
of "judicial restraint" in "working out the constitutional implications of
submission to an external legal order", exhibited the use of subsidiarity as a
guiding principle of the Court's interpretative power.16 EC competence was held,
in Opinion 1/94 not to extend to cover the totality of the GATS and TRIPs
agreements, the ECJ thereby "not only recognizing the sensitivity of Member
States in relation to the specific subject matter under discussion" but also
"confirming the locus of the political power to alter Treaty obligations".17 This
has resulted in the need for co-operation between the member states of the EC and
the EC itself, both when negotiating and when implementing these mixed
i o
agreements. The impact of these two agreements in the area of agriculture will
be examined in chapters 8 and 9.
The aforementioned doctrine of subsidiarity19 permeates EC law. Not only
is it provided for by Article 5 EC, but is also addressed in protocol no. 7 of the
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Amsterdam Treaty. The concept of subsidiary, with its "occupied field
theory",21 whereby if the Community has legislated, "it acquires pre-emptive
rights over the whole"22 of that field, has been juxtaposed by academics against a
more limited pre-emption, whereby the Community only acquires "exclusive
competence only in the specific area covered by the EC legislation", and not over
the whole area of policy.
13
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 6.
14
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at para. 14.
15
Opinion 2/94 (re ECHR) [1996] ECR 1-1759; [1996] 2 CMLR 265
16
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 28.
17 Ibid, at page 13.
18 Ibid, at page 25 et seq.
19 referred to in chapter 1, and dealt with in more detail in chapter 6.
20 Which came into force on the 1st ofMay 99.
21
Espoused by Toth A. "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty" (1992) 29
CMLRev. 1079.
22
Burns, Tom: Subsidiarity: Principle and Practice, (1995) SLT 67, at page 69.
23 Ibid, at page 69.
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The issue of subsidiarity is relevant, and a "major aspect of Article 133 is
the exclusivity of the powers it grants to the Community"24 as it is the Council,
after consulting with the European Parliament, which decides "when and whether
to move external competence in the fields of services and intellectual property
into exclusivity". The ECJ in Opinion 1/94 referred to "the exclusive
competence conferred on the community" pursuant to Article 133 EC, with regard
to the CCP.26 Despite the ECJ's finding in Opinion 1/9427 that only "in so far as
rules have been established at (an) internal level does the external competence of
the Community become exclusive", as pointed out by Marise Cremona "the
Community's CCP powers have been held to be exclusive even where they have
not (yet) been fully exercised, any Member State action in the meantime requiring
oo
specific authorization". This situation is reflected in the WTO case of European
29Communities - Customs Classification ofCertain Computer Equipment, also
known as the LAN case. In this case the United States "tried to bring a complaint
against Ireland and the United Kingdom (while agreeing to bring a complaint
against the EC as well)".30 As can be seen above, the report, the conclusions and
recommendations referred only to the EC. The case concerned the customs
classifications utilised by the Irish and British authorities. The Appellate Body
noted that the "EC constitutes a customs union and that the "export market" is the
European Communities, not an individual Member State".31 This approach has
been bolstered by the European Commission's view in the areas of shared
competence, such as GATS and TRIPs, that "in the absence of any division of
competences between the EU and its Member States, the EU bears international
24
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 21.
25 Ibid, at page 21.
26 Ibid, at page 21.
27
Op. cit. footnote no. 3 at paragraph XIV.
28
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 23.
29
European Communities - Customs Classification ofCertain Computer Equipment Report of the
Appellate Body of 5 June 1998 (AB -1998-2, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R,
WT/DS68/AB/R, p. 39).
30
Rosas, Allan; Joinder of Parties and Third Party Intervention in WTO Dispute Settlement, Ch. 6
in Weiss, Friedl, (ed.) Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the
practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals, Cameron May, London, 2000, at page 81.
31 Ibid, at page 81.
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responsibility for the fulfilment of the entire GATS and TRIPS agreements," and
therefore should always be named as a defendant in a WTO case against an
individual member state of the EC. This is also reflected in the internal case law
of the EC, in the opinion of AG Tesauro in Hermes,33 and appears now to be
reflected in EC practice with regard to the WTO.34 The actual impact of the WTO
agreements on the internal legal structure of the EC will be examined in depth in
chapter 6.
The role of the Council, after consulting with the European Parliament, in
deciding how to develop external competences, may however be subject to further
35checks and balances, as evidenced in the FAO fisheries agreement case, a non-
WTO mixed agreement. The subject matter of this case was an arrangement
between the EC and its member states, which was reached by way of agreement
of the 19th December 1991 between the Council and Commission, "regarding
preparation for FAO meetings, statements and voting". In this case the
Commission brought an action against the Council, challenging the Council's
decision, through COEPER, to permit member states of the EC a free vote on the
FAO fisheries agreement. It was held by the ECJ at paragraph 50 of the judgment,
that "by concluding that the draft Agreement concerned an issue whose thrust did
not lie in an area within the exclusive competence of the Community and
accordingly giving the Member States the right to vote for the adoption of that
draft, the Council acted in breach of section 2.3 of the Arrangement which it was
required to observe." It would appear therefore that the exclusive competence of
the Council is subject to the provisions of the EC treaty, and the role of the
European Commission as "guardian of the treaties".
The exact delimitation of the EC's Common Commercial Policy under
Article 133 EC, post Amsterdam, pre-Nice, with the use of the "technique of
32 Ibid, at page 82.
33 Case C-53/96 Hermes International - FHTMarketing Choice BV, [1998] ECR 1-3603.
34
Op. Cit. footnote no. 2, at page 24.
35 Case C-25/94 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Union
(FAO - Fishery agreement) [1996] ECR 1-1469.
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delegation of the decision to a future Council of Ministers",36 was in need of
clarification. The same situation pertains with regard to the post-Nice situation.
This arises from the drafting of the Article 133 EC provisions, and the possibility
of their future extension with the article not "specifying on what basis that
decision should be made, or indeed whether a newly extended commercial policy
should possess all the characteristics (such as exclusivity) of the existing
policy."37 This continues to be the case post-Nice regarding intellectual property
provisions, pursuant to Article 133.7 EC, and to the non-Article 133.6 GATS
matters. In addition a horizontal agreement has yet to be agreed to deal with the
areas of competence to be shared between the EC and its member states in the
areas of services and intellectual property; however, in the interim it would appear
that some version of the occupied field theory would apply.
3. Agricultural Aspects of the Common Commercial Policy
Long before the emergence of the World Trade Organisation the
interaction of the internal commercial policy of the EC and the Common
oo
.
Agricultural Policy was examined in the Ramel Cases in 1977. In that case it
was held at paragraph 19 of the judgment that "the objectives of free movement
and of the common agricultural policy should not be set one against the other nor
in order of precedence but on the contrary combined and the principle of free
movement should prevail save when the special requirements of the agricultural
sector call for adaptations." This would reflect the provisions of the then Article
38(2) EC, now Article 32(2) EC, which provides that "save as otherwise provided
in Articles 33 to 38, the rules laid down for the establishment of the common
market" namely in this case Article 133 ex Article 113 EC, "shall apply to
agricultural products".
36
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 33.
37 Ibid, at page 32.
38 Joined Cases 80 and 81/77, Societe Les Commissionnaires Reunis SARL v Receveur des
douanes SARL. Lesfds de Henri Ramel v Receveur des douanes. [1978] ECR 927.
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The operation of the common organisation exceptions to the common
commercial policy provisions was explained by the ECJ in Ramel on the basis
that "many mechanisms of the organization of the market, such as price fixing and
intervention systems, by organizing and regulating trade involve limitations on
free movement and such limitations are not therefore of a temporary nature or
justified by exceptional circumstances but are characteristic of the common
agricultural policy".39 Therefore the interference of the free movement provisions
imposed by the Community in pursuance of a common organisation would be
"acceptable" despite the fact that "they interfere with the free flow of goods
between Member States and distort competition in the Common Market".40
Therefore to the extent that the internal Common Agricultural Policy treaty
provisions do not expressly require a distortion of the application of the Common
Commercial Policy's application to trade within the EC in Agricultural goods,
then trade in agricultural goods within the EC is to be determined by Article 133
ex Article 113 EC. Equally, under the doctrine of parallel powers, as developed
earlier, and as dealt with in Opinion 1/94, then the EC under Article 133 EC has
exclusive competence to negotiate externally on international trade in agricultural
goods. This issue was dealt with in paragraphs 29 to 33 of Opinion 1/94, when the
ECJ expressed the opinion that, despite the fact that the then Article 43, now
Article 37, had been held in the case ofEC Commission v. EC Council,41 as being
the appropriate legal basis for not only "intra-community trade but also when they
originate from non-member states",42 that the signing of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture fell into a different category. As the WTO document intended to
"establish on a worldwide basis" a fair and marked-orientated agricultural trading
39 At paragraph 18 of the judgment.
40
McMahon, J.: Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, Pearson Education, 2000, at page 10.
41 Case 131/87, E.C. Commission v. EC Council [1989] 1 ECR 3764, [1991] 1 CMLR 780, para.
27.
42
Op. cit. footnote no.3, at paragraph 29 of the ECJ's Opinion.
98
system"" then the appropriate EC legal basis for signing the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture was the then Article 113, now 133 EC.43
The impact of this decision has already had a profound effect on the EC's
Common Agricultural Policy, as has been seen in Chapter 2, and will continue to
have a profound effect on the development of the CAP into the future. Of
particular relevance to this chapter is the impact of the WTO agreement on the
import levies which used to be imposed on agricultural goods being imported into
the EC. These no longer exist. As was found by the ECJ in Neumann v.
Haupzollamt Hof44 import levies, despite their similarities to customs duties, had
to be distinguished from them.45 Import levies had been calculated, together with
their related, but less utilised, export levies, ("imposed so as to prevent
Community producers taking advantage of higher world prices"),46 on the basis
of, as in the case of cereals, the threshold price fixed for Rotterdam. This was
pursuant to Article 10 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92,47 with special
arrangements being made for malt under Article 11 of that regulation. The import
levy was calculated on the basis of the "threshold price minus the c.i.f. price" at
Rotterdam, for all cereals. The threshold price was calculated, in the case of
cereals, on the basis that the selling price for the imported product at Duisburg, on
the Rhur, would be the same as the target price for that particular commodity set
for that CAP accounting period.49
43 Ibid, at paragraph 29 of the ECJ's Opinion, quoting from the preamble to the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture.
44 Case 17/67, Neumann v. Haupzollamt Hof[ 1967] ECR 441.
45
Usher, John A.; The Common Agricultural Policy and Commercial Policy, in M. Maresceau
(ed.) the European Community's Commercial Policy after 1992: the Legal dimension, Dordrecht;
Boston: M.Nijhoff, 1993, at pages 135-156, at page 148.
46 Ibid, at page 142.
47 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organization of the
market in cereals, Official Journal L 181, 01/07/1992 p. 21.
48
Op. cit. footnote no. 45, at page 141.
49 Ibid, at page 140.
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The above provisions were subsequently amended by Council Regulation
(EC) No. 3290/94,50 which was enacted to lay down the "transitional measures
required in the agricultural sector in order to implement the agreements concluded
during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations". 1 Part II of Annex I
of this 1994 regulation provided that "the terms 'levy' and 'levies' shall be
replaced by 'duty' and 'duties' respectively". Against this backdrop, the newly
substituted Article 10 provided that unless provided otherwise, then "the rates of
duty in the Common Customs Tariff shall apply" to specified customs
classifications of cereals, following the harmonised system of the World Customs
Organisation, of which more later. The new Article 10 then went on to provide
that an import duty could be applied, which should be "equal to the intervention
price valid for such products on importation and increased by 55%, minus the
c.i.f. import price applicable to the consignment in question." However that
import duty could "not exceed the rate of duty in the Common Customs Tariff'.
Under the recent mid-term review, Council Regulation (EC) No.
1784/2003,52 the aforementioned Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92,53
(together with its amendments) was repealed. 4 The pre-existing system of import
and export licences continues,55 with "rates of import duty in the Common
Customs Tariff' to apply.56 The regime in operation under Article 10 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3290/9457 is replicated in Article 10 of Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1784/2003,58 again for cereals covered by specific customs
classification codes, with "representative c.i.f. import prices" to be "established
50 Council Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the adjustments and transitional
arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to implement the agreements concluded
during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Official Journal L 349, 31/12/1994 p.
105.
51 Article 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94.
52 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of
the market in cereals, OJ. L 270, 21/10/2003, p. 78.
53
Op. cit. footnote no. 47.
54 under Article 30 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
55 Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
56 Article 10.1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
57
Op. cit. footnote no. 50.
58
Op. cit. footnote no. 52.
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on a regular basis" for those cereals. Additional import duties may also be payable
under Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/200359 should there be a
need to "prevent or counteract adverse effects" within the Community, however
these can only be for "imports made at a price below the level notified by the
Community to the World Trade Organisation ("the trigger price") may be subject
to an additional import duty".60
Two further agriculturally relevant WTO agreements were also addressed
by Opinion 1/94, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS), and the Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
The ECJ held that the SPS agreement could be concluded "on the basis of Article
133 alone",61 and that the TBT agreement also fell "within the ambit of the
ft9
Common Commercial Policy". An analysis of the operation of the SPS
agreement will be made in chapter 4, with both the SPS and TBT agreement being
discussed further in chapter 8.
4. Common Customs Code
The EC, in its Common Customs Tariff now "follows closely the structure
of the Harmonised System",63 of the World Customs Organisation, (WCO),64 as
do many other countries around the world. The WCO comprises 166 members
and is based in Brussels. The WCO, known before 1994 as the Customs Co¬
operation Council,65 operated the Common Customs Code (CCC). The CCC was
set up under the International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonisation of Customs Procedures was first signed in Kyoto on the 18th May
59 Ibid.
60 Article 11.2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
61
Op. cit. footnote no. 3. at paragraph 31.
62 Ibid, at paragraph 33.
63
Snyder, Francis: Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and EU law, Ch. 1
in Snyder, Francis (ed.); Regional and global Regulation of International Trade Hart Publishing,
Oxford - Portland Oregon 2002-11-27, at page 24 at footnote no. 129.
64 http://www.wcoomd.org
65 Founded in 1952.
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1973, and entered into force on the 25th September 1974. It has recently been
updated pursuant to the 1999 revised Convention. While only countries can
become members of the International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonisation of Customs Procedures 1973, as all the member states of the EC
have signed this convention, the ECJ took the view in the case ofNederlandse
Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnze66 that "the Community
67has replaced the Member States in commitments arising from the Convention",
with either the member state holding the Presidency of the EC, or the Commission
representing the EC at WCO meetings. The WCO operates within four objectives:
the drafting and promotion of new agreements on customs and customs co¬
operation; ensuring, as best as possible, outside a rigid legal framework, uniform
interpretation of WCO documentation, namely the Convention establishing a
Customs Co-operation Council,68 the International Convention on the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System,69 and the Valuation
70
Convention; the provision of a conciliation system for disputing parties; all
complemented by the provision of "information and advice to governments in this
field of activity".71
The Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS)72
operated by the WCO, entered into force, within the EC, pursuant to Council
Decision 87/369/EEC73 on the 1st January 1988, and is used by its member states,
the EC and the WTO for the classification of commodities. Amendments to the
66 Case 38/75 Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen f 1975] ECR
1439.
67
Op. cit. footnote no. 63, at page 24.
68 Convention establishing a Customs Co-operation Council Cmd 9232 (15 December 1950), in
force 4 November 1952, 157 UNTS 129; TIAS 7063).
69 International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and coding System, done
at Brussels on 14 June 1983, and the Protocol thereto, done at Brussels on 24 June 1986 (OJ 1987
L198 L198/3), 1035 UNTS 3, KAV 2260.
70 Convention on the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes, Cnd 9233 (15 December 1950),
in force 28 July 1953, 171 UNTS 305.
71
Op. cit. footnote no. 63, at page 25.
72 International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System,
Official Journal L 198, 20/07/1987 p. 3.
73 Council Decision 87/369/EEC concerning the conclusion of the International Convention on the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and of the Protocol of Amendment
thereto, Official Journal L 198, 20/07/1987 p. 1.
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Harmonised System Nomenclature should be effective from 1st January 2007.74
As stated at the beginning of chapter 1, the subject matter of this thesis is
"processed and semi-processed agricultural and primary products in Chapters 1-
24 of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature75 (BTN)",76 being the products referred to
in Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture as HS Chapters 1 -24 less fish
and fish products, (plus specific named commodities).
5. Valuations for customs purposes
Customs duties can be either calculated and imposed on specific items, or
they, more normally, are calculated on an ad valorem basis. As it is the
responsibility of the customs authorities of the various Member States to value
goods for customs purposes,77 with the creation of the Common Customs Code it
was necessary to develop a unified system for the calculation of the valuation of
goods for customs purposes. International legal provisions have, from the outset
of the Common Customs Code, had a great impact on the EC's policy on
valuation for customs purposes.78 Article VII of GATT 1947, now part of GATT
1994 provided global rules for the valuation of goods, which provides that
7Q
valuation is to be based on the "actual value" of the goods. The provisions of
GATT 1947, together with the attached interpretative notes, were incorporated
into the law of the Member Sates of the EC by way of the Brussels Convention on
Q(\
the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes. There remained, however, a
problem with the definition of valuation for customs purposes within the customs
union, with a "Community statement of the principles of valuation" still being
74 World Customs Organisation website http://www.wcoomd.org.
75 The BTN was set out in the Nomenclature Convention of Brussels of the 15 December 1950,
adopted into EC law by way of Council Regulation 950/68 of 28 June 1968 [1968] OJ Spec Ed (I)
275, together with the Annex attached thereto.
76 McMahon, Joseph M.; "Agricultural Trade, Protectionism and the Problems of Development"
Leicester University Press, 1992, at page 159.
77
Lyons: EC Customs Law, Oxford University Press 2001, ISBN 0-19-876492-8, at page 243.
78 Ibid, at page 243 et seq.
79 Article VII.2(b) GATT 1947 and 1994.
80
Signed on the 15 December 1950 and in force on 25 July 1953.
103
o i o9
required. Regulation (EEC) No. 803/1968 addressed this issue, by providing a
OQ
definition for "normal price" of goods.
The concept of "normal price" was replaced by the concept of "transaction
value" after the Tokyo round ofGATT negotiations. The transaction cost is the
"price actually paid or payable for the goods" on the assumption that the price is
oc
deemed to have "been agreed between and independent seller and buyer". The
effect of this change is to shift the burden of proof from the importer to customs
and excise, should they wish to challenge the price declared as having been paid.
Following the case of Malt GmbH v. HauptzollamtDusseldorf6 the cost of
acquisition of certificates of authenticity, where applicable, is to "be regarded as
an integral part of the price paid or payable for the goods", and is to be included
87
in the calculation of the customs value of the goods in question. Other ancillary
costs which are to be added to the transaction value of goods for the purpose of
calculating the customs value of goods, are set out in Article 32 of the Common
Customs Code88 of the World Customs Organisation, as discussed earlier in this
chapter. The Common Customs Code also sets down "a list of successive rules"
for secondary valuations methods to be used "where the transaction value
between the exporter and the importer cannot be established" or be accepted by
the Customs officials.89 The issue of currency fluctuations is addressed by way of
Council Regulation 2913/92,90 which provides that the rate of exchange is to be
81
Op. cit. footnote no. 77, at page 244.
82
Regulation (EEC) No. 803/1968, of 27 June 1968 [1968] OJ L 148/6.
83
Op. cit. footnote no. 77, at page 244.
84
Regulation (EEC) 803/68 was repealed, with "transaction value" being introduced into
Community law by Council Regulation (EEC) 1224/80, 28 May 1980 [1980] OJ L 134/1. This
was subsequently amended by the introduction of the Community Customs Code. See further
Lyons: EC Customs Law, Oxford University Press 2001, at page 245.
85 Case C-422/00 Capespan International pic v Commissioners ofCustoms & Excise, [2003] ECR
1-597, at paragraph 9 of the judgment.
86 Case C-219/88 Malt GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Dussseldorf[ 1990] ECR 1-1481, at paragraph 13 of
the judgment.
87
Snyder, Francis; International trade and Customs Law of the European Union, Butterworths,
1998, at page 55.
88 Ibid, at page 56, footnote no. 18.
89 Ibid, at page 63.
90 Council Regulation 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ L 302, 19/10/1992
p. 1, at Art 35.
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that published by the competent authorities of the country "other than that of the
Member State where the valuation is made", which in principle will be the "rate
recorded on the second-last Wednesday of a month and published on that or the
following day",91 with exceptions being provided for exchange rate fluctuations in
99
excess of 5% in any particular week.
Under the pre Tokyo round procedure in the area of agricultural
commodities, the "normal price" was calculated, by way of a reference price, for
example, in the case of fruit and vegetables, pursuant to Commission Regulation
(EEC) No. 2118/74.93 The actual reference price was reset for each agricultural
marketing year, and had, as one of is objectives, the protection of commodities
covered by EC common market organisations, ensuring that duty would be levied
on "products of a certain origin where the average price of all imports of that
product was lower than a specific reference price".94 As stated in the Capespan
case,95 the reference price system "was called into question by the signature" of
the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, and the coming into being of the WTO.
Following the adoption of the Common Customs Code a separate procedure for
perishable goods96 can be requested by the declarant under Article 36(2) of
97
Council Regulation 2913/92. This procedure, pursuant to Commission
90
Regulation 2545/93, requires a unit value per each 100 kg net, "to be expressed
in the currencies of the Member States",99 with "the unit values .. established by
the Commission on alternate Tuesdays on the basis of the weighed average of the
average free at-frontier unit price, not cleared through customs".100
91 As per Commission Regulation 2454/93 Art 169(1), OJ 11.10.93 L253/1.
92
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 67.
93
Regulation (EEC) No. 2118/74 of the Commission of 9th August 1974 laying down detailed
rules for the application of the system of reference prices for fruit and vegetables, OJ L 20,
10,08/1974, p. 20.
94
Op. cit. footnote no. 85, at paragraph 12 of the judgment.
95 Ibid, at paragraph 14.
96 Classified under Annex 26 to Commission Regulation 2454/93, OJ 11.10.93, L 253/1.
97
Op. cit. footnote no. 90.
98 Commission Regulation 2545/93 Art 173 (1), OJ 11.10.93 L253/1. See also Commission
Regulation 919/98 OJ 30.4. 98 L 128/51.
99
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 68.
100 Ibid, at page 68.
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A separate system operates for perishable fruit and vegetables, (given that
any dispute as to valuation might extend beyond their short shelf life). A new
entry price mechanism for fruit and vegetables is now set out in Article 5(1) of
Regulation No. 3223/94,101 with the new regulations dealing with the post-
Uruguay Round CAP agricultural provisions being provided for in Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94.102 Under Commission Regulation (EC) No
1 rn
3223/94 member states are required to report back to the European
Commission the "average representative prices of the products imported from
third countries" on a particular day, on a particular market,104 or in the alternative,
"where no prices for the representative markets are available, significant prices
for imported products recorded on other markets" together with "the total
quantities relating to" said prices. These prices are to be calculated with the costs
of freight and insurance deducted, (Article 2.2) and reductions of 9% being made
"to take account of the "wholesaler's trade margin" together with a reduction of an
"amount equal to ECU 0,6 per 100 kilograms" to cover handling and market taxes
and charges."105 On the basis of these figures returned by member states to the
Commission, the Commission, pursuant to Article 4 of the regulation is to fix for
"each working day and for each origin, a standard import value equal to the
weighted average of the representative prices" returned by the member states,
"less a standard amount of ECU 5/100 kg and the ad valorem customs duties". It
is these figures which will be used to determine the valuation for customs
purposes of perishable products being imported into the EC from third countries.
101 Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the
application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables, Official Journal L 337, 24/12/1994
p. 66, "as amended by Annex XIII of Council Regulation (EC) No 3290/94 of 22 December 1994
on the adjustments and transitional arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to
implement the agreements concluded during the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations
(OJ 1994 L 349, p. 105, hereinafter .the amended basic regulation')." Case C-422/00. Capespan
International pic v Commissioners of Customs & Excise [2003] ECR 1-159.
102
Op. cit. footnote no. 50.
103 Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94 of 21 December 1994 on detailed rules for the
application of the import arrangements for fruit and vegetables, Official Journal L 337, 24/12/1994
p. 66.
04 Article 2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94.
105 Article 2.3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94.
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In the absence of a standard import value, then the "average of standard import
values in force for that product" will be applied.106
6. Rules of Origin
The issue of rules of origin remained the main unharmonised provision
after the coming into force of the Tokyo Round's Customs Valuation Code in
1979 and the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding System of the then named customs Co-operation Council
(now known as the World Customs Organisation) in 1988,107 referred to above.
This has resulted in rules of origin being the only part of the current customs
legislation originally drafted by the EC, and not influenced by outside bodies or
organisations. Guidelines were provided in the CCC convention dealing with
Rules of Origin, however it did not regulate this particular matter. This lack of a
standard "rule of origin" system is of particular relevance to the EC, which "is one
108
of the most enthusiastic users of .... Free-trade areas and customs unions", with
the EC operating different systems in its variety of agreements, ranging from its
Lome/Cotonou relations to its GSP and Euro-Med relations.109 Rules ofOrigin
break up into distinct groups, preferential and non-preferential rules of origin. The
non-preferential rules of origin "are commonly understood to apply to most
favoured nation (MEN) trade"110 and are now regulated by the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Rules of Origin, to which is annexed,111 a Common Declaration
with Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin. The legal status of this declaration,
106 Article 4.3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 3223/94.
107
Inama, Stefano; A Comparative Analysis of the Generalized System of Preferences and Non-
Preferential Rules ofOrigin in the Light of the Uruguay Round Agreement; Is it a Possible
Avenue for Harmonization or Further Differentiation? J.W.T. 1995, 29(1), 77-111, at page 77.
108 Driessen, Bart and Graafsma, Folkert; "The EC's Wonderland; an Overview of the Pan-
European Harmonised Origin Protocols, J.W.T. 1999, 33(4), 19-45, at page 19.
109 Ibid, at page 19.
110
Op. cit. footnote no. 107, at page 177 et seq.
111
Annex II to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin.
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which deals with rules of origin in the case of the GSP scheme, or in free trade
agreements, is not clear.112
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin for non-preferential
trade reads as a document reflecting work in progress. It provides clarity as to
• 1 1 ^
when non-preferential rules of origin are to be applied, and provisions for their
application during a transition period during which clearer rules on "rules of
origin" are to be determined. A Committee on Rules of Origin is set up within the
WTO structure, under Article 4.1 of the Agreement, which, assisted by a WTO
Technical Committee on Rules of Origin, (Article 4.2) working with the then
Customs Co-operation Council, (now known as the World Customs
Organisation), is to draft new WTO regulations for non-preferential "Rules of
Origin". This is an "ambitious agenda" for the World Customs Organisation, "to
elaborate a harmonized set of non-preferential rules of origin based on the process
criterion" set against years of varied practice throughout the world.114 The
UNCTAD, for its part, has, with few results, through its Special Committee on
Preferences, "been discussing possible harmonisation of GSP rules of origin for
almost twenty years".115 Agreement on non-preferential rules of origin could lead
to further developments in the preferential rules of origin debate. For its part the
EC has legislated for non-preferential rules of origin in Regulation 2913/92,116
(very much replicating its 1968 provisions)117 which deals with the EC's Common
Customs Code. This code "defines the non-preferential origin of goods for the
112
Op. cit. footnote no. 107, at page 78.
113 Article 1.2, when read in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the Agreement on Rules of Origin
provides that "Rules of origin (covered by this agreement)... shall include all rules of origin used
in non-preferential commercial policy instruments, such as in the application of: most-favoured-
nation treatment under Articles I, II, HI, XI of GATT 1994; anti-dumping and countervailing
duties under Article VI of GATT 1994; safeguard measures under Article XIX ofGATT 1994;
origin marking requirements under Article IX of GATT 1994; and any discriminatory quantitative
restrictions or tariff quotas. They shall also include rules of origin used for government
procurement and trade statistics."
114
Op. cit. footnote no. 107, at page 81.
115 Ibid, at page 80.
116
Op. cit. footnote no. 90.
117
Regulation (EEC) No 802/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on the common definition of the
concept of the origin of goods, Official Journal L 148, 28/06/1968 p. 1, with Articles 23 and 24 of
the 1992 legislating almost replicating the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of the 1968 legislation.
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purposes of" the application of the EC's customs tariff,118 with "the Community's
rules on non-preferential origin" following closely those set out in the WTO
Agreement on the Rules of Origin.119 While preferential rules of origin differ
1 90
from scheme to scheme, the concept of preferential measures is set out in
Article 20(3)(d) and (e)121 of Council Regulation 2913/92.122 A distinction is also
made between "goods wholly obtained in one country" and goods whose origin
"involved more than one country".123
Within the EC the issue ofmulti-origin goods (known as "goods whose
production involved more than one country"124), allied with the issue of regional
cumulation for Rules of Origin, differs considerably between the non-preferential
rules of origin, and, for example, the EC's regulation of its Generalised System of
Preferences, with the system operating for the GSP being stricter than that being
applied for MFN states. Both schemes are provided for in Commission Regulation
2454/93,125 which was adopted in order to implement the Community Customs
Code,126 which is contained in Regulation 2913/92.127 The EC, following
international guidance, deems goods, under the non-preferential rules, to originate
from the country where they underwent their last substantial working or
i oo
processing. For goods under the preferential rules of origin, as in the GSP
scheme, the EC requires goods to change their tariff heading classification in their
118
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 22.
119 Ibid, at page 22, footnote no. 3.
120
Cotonou., EFTA, etc. of which more later in this chapter.
121
Article 20.3. Council Regulation 2913/92; "The Customs Tariff of the European Communities
shall comprise:
(d) the preferential tariff measures contained in agreements which the Community has concluded
with certain countries or groups of countries and which provide for the granting of preferential
tariff treatment
(e) preferential tariff measures adopted unilaterally by the Community in respect of certain
countries, groups of countries or territories".
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Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 22, footnote no. 3.
123 Ibid, at page 22.
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Op. cit footnote no. 90 at Article 24.
125 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs
Code, Official Journal L 253, 11/10/1993 p. 1.
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country of last processing, in order to be deemed to have come from that
country.129 While the preferential text is technical and explicit, in adopting the
process criterion, the non-preferential test is generally considered to permit "a
certain degree of discretion in the hands of the EC institution which is
interpreting this provision.130 This discretion was challenged in the case of
101
Directeur des Douanes et des Droits Indirects v. Cousin and Others, which was
litigated pursuant to Commission Regulations 802/68 and 749/78. Here Egyptian
yarn was being imported into Germany, and was being subjected to dyeing,
gassing and mercerising before being further exported to other EC Member
States. The Commission had provided that such processing was not sufficient to
confer a new origin on the goods by way of Commission Regulation 749/78,
despite the fact that cloth subjected to similar processing, under different
regulations, did obtain a new origin. The ECJ held, at paragraph 21 of its
judgment that it appeared "contradictory and discriminatory" to "provide
substantially more severe criteria for the determination of the origin of cotton
yarn" than for the determination of origin of cloths and fabrics, and as a
consequence, that the classification of processing of cotton yarn by way of
132
"dyeing, gassing and mercerising" as not granting a new origin, was invalid.
Regional cumulation provisions for preferential rules also distinguish
preferential and non-preferential rules of origin, as there is no provision for
regional cumulation in the non-preferential rules of origin, and goods must
originate "within a single country". In the preferential schemes, the EC has
established "special rules on regional cumulation for specific regional
groupings",134 such as ASEAN135 or CACM.136 In these cases, "products
129 Ibid, at page 83.
130 Ibid, at page 84.
131 Case 162/82 Directeur des Douanes et des Droits Indirects v. Cousin and Others, [1983] ECR
1101.
132 At paragraph 22 of the Judgment.
133
Op. cit. footnote no. 107, at page 97.
134
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 35.
135 Association of South - East Asian Nations.
136 Central American Common Market.
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originating" from one country in a regional group "and used in further
manufacture in another country of the group must be treated as if they originated
in the country of further manufacture".137 This will happen only if certain
conditions are met.138 Some preferential schemes are offered full regional
cumulation, others, such as the EC's GSP are only offered "partial" regional
cumulation. Full regional cumulation is granted to the ACP countries under the
Lome / Cotonou agreements.139 The variety of practices existing in the area of
"rules of origin" as a whole is such that, as Inama has stated "the "neutral"
concept of origin is long gone: today's rules of origin are used as, or simply are,
instruments of commercial policy".140 The role of the WTO's Committee on the
Rules of Origin, operating, through the WTO's Technical Committee on Rules of
Origin, with the World Customs Organisation, will have to resolve the many
complexities of regulation in this area, initially, as set out in the WTO Agreement
on Rules of Origin, for non-preferential rules of origin, but also, in the absence of
some developments at UNCTAD on GSP rules of origin, some way down the
line, also on preferential rules of origin. Of some consolation to the readers of this
thesis is the fact that agricultural products are normally raw materials, or materials
at the first state of processing, which for practical purposes, do not normally give
rise to complex questions as to origin. Any agricultural product which has
undergone substantial processing has normally ceased to be an agricultural
product, and has changed its HS classification.
7. Tariff and non-tariff barriers
Reflecting the development of the Common Agricultural Policy generally
through its various reforms,141 with the move from levies to duties to the common
137
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 35 et seq.
138 As set out in Article 72a(2) of Commission Regulation 2454/93, as amended.
139
Op. cit. footnote no. 107, at page 98, footnote no. 39.
140 Ibid, at page 109.
141
As discussed in chapter 2, and under the heading of "Agricultural Aspects of the Common
Commercial Policy" in this chapter.
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customs tariff, so too has the position of tariffs and non-tariff barriers been
altering over this time period. The developing position of tariffs and non-tariff
barriers has reflected the developments from the internal price structure in the
common market for cereals in 1975,142 with its elaborate price structure based on
target prices, fixed for Duisberg in the Rhiir, the uniform intervention price, and
their accompanying threshold price, which continued to operate in the post 1992
reforms, pursuant to Council Regulation 1766/92,143 to the post-mid-term review
situation pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003.144 The threshold
price, which operated as a non-tariff barrier, was also fixed "for the port of
Rotterdam" and operated as the "minimum price at which the relevant goods"
could enter the Community.145 The threshold price was calculated "not from the
intervention price but from the higher target price" thereby disadvantaging third
country importers even further within the EC market,146 with a difference between
these two prices, the target price and the intervention price, including "an clement
to allow for the cost of transport between Rotterdam and Duisburg".147 Pursuant
14R
to the 1992 regulation the threshold price was no longer linked to a
geographical locus, but was "fixed by Council Regulation 1766/92 so as to be
reduced by fixed amounts over a three year period".149 Subsequent to the recent
mid-term review restructuring of the CAP, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1782/2003,150 the new cereals common organisation provisions, as set out in
142
Pre Mac Sharry reforms Regulation No. 2727/75, [1975] OJ L No.281/1, which consolidated
and updated the previous regulations, but which was repealed and replaced by Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the market in cereals, OJ. L.
181, 1.7.92, page 21. The exact products covered by this regulation are set out in Article 1 of both
regulations. The 1992 regulation operates in conjunction with Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/92 on
assistance for arable farmers, Article 1.2 of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92.
143
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144 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29th September 2003 establishing common rules for
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support
schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No. 2019/93, (EC) No. 1452/2001, (EC)
No. 1453/2001, (EC) No. 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No. 1254/1999,
(EC) No. 1673/2000, (EEC) No. 2358/71 and (EC) No. 2529/2001, OJ L 270/1.
145 Usher, John; EC Agricultural Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, at page 81.
146 Ibid, at page 81.
147 Ibid, at page 81.
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Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003,151 still makes use of tariff quotas,152
with supporting legislative provisions providing further details of how the tariff
153
quotas are to operate.
Non-tariff measures restricting market access have however ceased to be
important for the protection of the CAP from external effects, with the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture's requirement for the tarrification of non-tariff barriers
under the agreement's market access commitments.154 This reflects the fact that
"the fundamental aim of the Agreement on Agriculture" is to require the
conversion by WTO member states of "permitted restrictions into customs duties"
with a view to achieving greater compatibility and transparency between WTO
member states, and then to subject those, now much more quantifiable customs
duties, to reductions.155 This development is reflected in a change in focus from
import levies, to duties, to the common customs tariff, through the evolving
legislative framework for cereals.156 Tariffs, in the guise of import duties still
151
Op. cit. footnote no. 52, and supplemented by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2237/2003 of
23 December 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of certain support schemes
provided for in Title IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common rules for
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support
schemes for farmers, OJ L 339 of 24.12.2003.
152 At Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003, replacing Article 12 of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94.
153 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2305/2003 of 29 December 2003 opening and providing for
the administration of a Community tariff quota for imports of barley from third countries, OJ L
342 of 30.12.2003, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2377/2002 of 27 December 2002 opening
and providing for the administration of a Community tariff quota for malting barley from third
countries and derogating from Council Regulation (EC) No 1766/92 OJ L 358 of 31.12.2002. Last
amended by Regulation (EC) No 626/2003, OJ L 90 of 8.4.2003. Extended by Regulation (EC) No
1112/2003, OJ L 158 of 27.6.2003, Commission Regulation (EC) No 2375/2002 of 27 December
2002 opening and providing for the administration of Community tariff quotas for common wheat
of a quality other than high quality from third countries and derogating from Council Regulation
(EEC) No 1766/92, OJ L 358 of 31.12.2002. Last amended by Regulation (EC) No 532/2003, OJ
26.3.2003. Extended by Regulation (EC) No 1111/2003, OJ L 158 of 27.6.2003. Commission
Regulation (EC) No 2133/2001 of 30 October 2001 opening and providing for the administration
of certain Community tariff quotas and tariff ceilings in the cereals sector and repealing
Regulations (EC) No 1897/94, (EC) No 306/96, (EC) No 1827/96, (EC) No 1970/96, (EC) No
1405/97, (EC) No 1406/97, (EC) No 2492/98, (EC) No 2809/98 and (EC) No 778/1999, OJ L 287
of 31.10.2001.
154 This will be discussed further in chapter 4.
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From Council Regulation (EEC) No 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of
the market in cereals, Official Journal L 181, 01/07/1992 p. 21, through Council Regulation (EC)
No 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the adjustments and transitional arrangements required in
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operate in the post mid-term review era, but import duties have been relegated to
a safeguard measure, and one which must be operated and maintained in a WTO
Agreement on Agriculture compliant fashion.
8. Import Protection post Uruguay
Given that for goods generally, under the Uruguay Round treaty texts,
there is an Agreement on Safeguards, it is no surprise that the WTO Agreement
157
on Agriculture also contains special safeguard provisions in Article 5. Import
protection provisions therefore continue in existence in the post Uruguay
agricultural provisions, and for cereals, these provisions are written into Articles
11 of both Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94158 and Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1784/2003.159 Article 11 of the 1994 regulation makes more specific
reference to Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture, than does Article 11 of
the 2003 regulation. This might be accounted for as a successor to the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture was, in 2003, then under discussion since 2000,
pursuant to Article 20 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Given
this distinction in drafting, many of the provisions of the two Articles 11 are the
same, and at times identical. The additional import duty, referred to under the
"Agricultural Aspects of the Common Agricultural Policy" heading in this
chapter, being calculated on the basis of "representative c.i.f. import prices",160
can be imposed "in order to prevent or counteract adverse effects on the market of
the Community" if "conditions to be determined by the Commission" are
fulfilled.161 This "additional import duty" would be in addition to the import duty
the agriculture sector in order to implement the agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations, Official Journal L 349, 31/12/1994 p. 105, to the current Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003 of 29 September 2003 on the common organisation of the market
in cereals, OJ. L 270, 21/10/2003, p. 78.
157 Of which more in chapter 4.
158
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159
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160 Article 10.3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
161 Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
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imposed on the goods in accordance with the Common Customs Tariff, calculated
in accordance with Article 10 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003. These
additional payments will become payable if imports of the particular cereal at
below a trigger price, which is "the level notified by the Community to the World
Trade Organisation", or if the volume of the cereals imported excees a "trigger
volume".162
9. Anti-dumping and Export Subsidies
Annexed to the Uruguay Round Final Act, in Annex 1, are two
agreements, the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, dealing with antidumping provisions, and
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. While these provisions
might initially appear to have a limited effect on agricultural trade by virtue of the
provisions of Article 21 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which provides
that "the provisions ofGATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in
Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this
Agreement",163 some discussion is however merited. In addition the Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 3.1, interacts with the
Agreement on Agriculture, Article 8,164 as discussed under the following heading
in this chapter, "Export Subsidies". Despite the fact that the Agreement on
Agriculture contains it its own provisions which affect the impact of the general
provisions on anti-dumping, countervailing measures, and export subsidies on
global agricultural trade, under its market access and its own special safeguard
162 Article 11.2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
163 Article 21 Agreement on Agriculture: "1. The provisions ofGATT 1994 and of other
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the
provisions of this Agreement. 2. The Annexes to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part
of this Agreement."
164 Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which provides "Each Member undertakes not to
provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the
commitments as specified in that Member's Schedule".
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provisions,165 the issue of the impact of the expiration of the peace clause,
contained in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture,166 might well bring the
antidumping provisions, and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, along with the balance of the Annex IA Uruguay round agreements,
into play for agricultural trade.
The EC's commitments under the WTO anti-dumping agreement and the
subsidies and countervailing measures provisions were implemented into EC law
by Council Regulation 384/96 as amended,167 and Council Regulation 2026/97,168
as amended, respectively. Prior to the Uruguay Round texts the EC had
maintained one scheme for both anti-dumping and countervailing duties. While
anti-dumping measures are intended to address the issue of "distortive effects
which dumping practices by firms established in third countries in the community
market", and countervailing measures are intended to address the issue of the
distortive effects within the Community market of "unfair foreign government
subsidisation",169 the two new schemes do however overlap at times, with the
main differences between the two being "respective rules on the calculation of the
170
dumping margin and the countervailable subsidy margin".
Currently operating for non-agricultural commodities, under the anti¬
dumping provisions of Council Regulation 384/96, the export price is to be the
"price actually paid or payable for the product when sold for export" on leaving
the exporting country.171 This Regulation provides that in the event that there is
165 As discussed in chapter 4.
166 Discussed later in this part, and referred to further in chapter 4, and analysed in depth, in the
context of the synergy of EC and WTO provisions in the area of agriculture, in chapter 7.
167 Council Regulation 384/96, OJ 6.3.96 L56/1, as amended, by Council Regulation 2331/96, OJ
6.12.96 L317/1, and Council regulation 905/98, OH 30.4.98, OJ 30.4.98, L128/18, replacing
Council Regulation 3283/94 L349/1, 31.21.94 L349/1, as amended by Council Regulation
1251/95, OJ 2.6.95 L122/1, Snyder, Francis; International Trade Law and Customs Law of the
European Union, Butterworths, 1998, at page 212.
168 See Council Regulation 2026/97, OJ 21/10.97 L288/1, replacing Council Regulation 3284/94,
OJ 31.12.94 L349/22, as amended by Council Regulation 1252/95, OJ 2.6.95 L122/2.
169
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170 Ibid, at page 212.
171 Article 2.8. Council Regulation No. 384/96 of 22 December 1995, OJ L 56, 06/03/1996 p.l.
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either no export price, or an export price which may be distorted, then pursuant to
Article 2(9) of the Regulation, the export price is then to be calculated "on the
basis of the price at which the imported products are first resold to an independent
buyer, or, if the products are not resold to an independent buyer, or are not resold
in the condition in which they were imported, on any reasonable basis". The issue
of the distortion of export prices arose with regard to Electronic Weighting Scales
172
Originating in Singapore and the Republic ofKorea. In this case the relevant
sale was between two related companies, with consequent distortion of costs
incurred by the parties. Here the normal price for the goods was to be deduced
from the price paid by "the first independent buyer", and adjusted by the costs of
17^
the related company.
In calculating the value of goods, the EC has been operating an
"asymmetry methodology" in "comparing export price and normal value",174
which ran into problems with the WTO, and surfaced in the panel report on EC-
i n c
Anti-Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan. The EC had
assumed that all markets operated on the basis of "the ideal perfect market" which
"the Community was supposed to be", thereby punishing exporters from the non-
plural Japanese market, where "transactions between producers" and distributors
may not have been operating as if they were unconnected companies, but rather
was based on "cohesive" groups of companies covering the entire chain of sale,
17 f\
from the manufacturer to the ultimate retailer. This discrimination arose as a
consequence of the post-Tokyo practice of the EC of not allowing for adjustments
177 178
for indirect costs of domestic selling subsidiaries when netting back from the
"price paid by the first independent buyer" to the export cost from the exporting
172 OJ 1993 L263/1, also reported as Case C-6/94R Descom Scales Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v.
Council, [1994] ECR page 1-867.
173
Molyneux, Candido Garcia: Establishing the Rules of the Game: Domestic Structures and
Unfair Trade Instruments, Ch 4, in Snyder, Francis (Ed.); Regional and Global Regulation of
International Trade Hart Publishing, Oxford - Portland Oregon 2002-11-27, at page 118.
174 Ibid, at page 119.
175 EC-Anti-Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan, ASP/ 136, 8 April 1995.
176
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177 Pursuant to Art. 2(10)(c.) and (d.) of Council regulation no. 3017/79, OJ 1979 L339/1.
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country, the costs incurred further down the chain of supply in order to calculate
the notional arms length "transaction value" upon export, to be used for valuation
for customs purposes. As a consequence the "export price was established at the
ex-factory level", (with certain expenses, such as transport, insurance, handling
and specified ancillary costs permitted) "whereas the normal value included the
indirect costs" of related subsidiaries, together with their notional profit
179
margins. This approach to calculation had been challenged in the ECJ, but
1 80
upheld, the ECJ recognising that the EC operated different procedures in
181
attaining a valuation for customs purposes to the GATT. While the EC had
tried to modify its practices, the issue of valuation, and its allied anti-dumping
182issues proved to be highly contentious during the Uruguay Round negotiations.
9.1 Audio tapes in cassettes panel183
The panel report on in Audio Tapes in Cassettes Originating in Japan was
decided on the basis of the Tokyo anti-dumping code. Article 2 of that Code
provided that "a fair determination" was required of dumping.184 It was argued
that fairness therefore required the comparison of "like with like", which would
require that if one country's imports was to have particular adjustments to its
export price, then the domestic price with which it was being compared for the
purposes of a dumping determination would have to undergo similar
calculations.185 The EC's argument186 was that "there was no such symmetry
requirement" in the Tokyo round anti-dumping code.187 The panel's report, while
confusing, held that differences in costs and profit calculations could affect
comparability of prices, and that as the EC laws only permitted an "exhaustive list
179 Ibid, at page 120.
180 Case 204/84 Toyo Bearing v. Council [1987] ECR 1809.
181
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182 Ibid, at page 121.
183
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185 Ibid, at page 119 et seq.
186 The main point at issue in this case was the definition of dumping.
187
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of adjustment items which did not include the indirect costs of the distribution
subsidiaries" then the EC provisions were in breach of the GATT anti-dumping
code.188
9.2 Implementation of the panel report in the Community
The finding of the panel "was shock for the Community" despite the fact
1 8Q
that the Community only lost on the asymmetry argument. A number of new
provisions were introduced to the Community's regulation of valuation for
customs purposes. One provision190 recognised that there might be differing levels
of trade, and how to allow for the impact of this factor in the valuation
calculation. In particular, the Community was obliged to introduce a new Article
2(10)k which provided for differences to be made for "other factors not provided
for under subparagraphs (a)-(j)" of Article 2(10) of Council Regulation 384/96,191
if it could be shown that "they affect price comparability", showing that
"customers consistently pay different prices on the domestic market because of
• 1Q? •
the difference in such factors". These developments in the non-agricultural
sector could soon be impacting on the agricultural sector given the expiration of
Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture's peace clause.
9.3 Export Subsidies
Export subsidies, for their part, are generally regarded as "one of the most
disruptive elements in the operation of world markets",193 and it is perhaps for
that reason that they are covered by a number of articles in a number of the
188 Ibid, at page 124.
189 Ibid, at page 124.
190 The new Article 2(10)d of the regulation.
191 Council Regulation No. 384/96 (OJ 1996 L56/6), as amended by Council Regulation No.
2331/96 (OJ 1996 L317/1
192
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Chambovey, Didier; "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (article 13 of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework,
Journal of World Trade 36(2): 302-352, 2002, at page 348.
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Uruguay Round agreements. The exact relationship between these provisions,
however, merits examination. Agricultural commodities, along with other primary
commodities, are treated differently from non-primary commodities, for export
subsidies, by virtue of Article XVI.B.3 ofGATT. The WTO regulation of
subsidies for export of agricultural products is regulated, however, by two
Uruguay Round documents, the Agreement on Agriculture, under Article 8, and
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, under Article 3.1.
Added to these provisions is the potential impact of the expiration of the Article
13 peace clause.194 The test of not "more than an equitable share of world export
trade in that product", under Article XVI:3 GATT 47, must be met for export
subsidies to be permitted for agricultural goods, resulting in the consequence that
a normal price for agricultural goods on the world export market would be
regarded as a dumping price for manufactured goods. There is also, however, a
requirement, to reduce export subsidies, in line with agreed commitments,
pursuant to Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
The interrelationship between Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture
and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was
addressed by both the Panel195 and the Appellate Body196 in the Canada - Dairy
Products case. In the Panel report it was stated that the Agreement on Agriculture
does permit the use of export subsidies, but "only within the limits of the
budgetary outlay and quantity commitments levels" in the relevant Member States
WTO schedules.197 The Appellate Body adopted a similar line when it provided
that export subsidies for agricultural products had to be first examined against the
provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, and only if they did not fall within
194 Discussed later in this part, and referred to further in chapter 4, and analysed in depth, in the
context of the synergy of EC and WTO provisions in the area of agriculture, in chapter 7.
195 Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation ofMilk and the Exportation ofDairy Products.
Report of the panel, WT/DS103/R, WT/DS113/R, 17 May 1999, para. 7.20.
196 Canada - Measures affecting the Importation ofMilk and the Exportation ofDairy Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113AB/RW, 3 December 2001, para. 123.
197
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the provisions of that Agreement were they then to be addressed by Article 3.1 of
19R
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.
A question therefore arises as to the role and function of Article 13 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, and the effect of its expiration. A problem arises in the
interpretation of this provision in the context of the aforementioned provisions, to
the extent that Chambovey is of the opinion that the Article 13 provisions appear
to "be reduced to inutility", its interpretation thereby being "dissonant with the
principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties",199 with the expiry of the
peace clause of Article 13 having no effect on the pre-existing relationship
between Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 3.1 of the
Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. However, as pointed out
by Chambovey, Agricultural export subsidies, while protected from Article 3.1 of
the SCM agreement, could still be actionable under Article XVI GATT.200 As to
the expiration of Article 13 on the framework of WTO agreements affecting
agricultural commodities, and the impact of that framework on the EC CAP, see
further chapters 4 and 7 respectively.
With a view to the future, there is an agreement amongst the WTO
member states to "work toward the development of internationally agreed
disciplines" dealing with "export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance
programmes", and once such agreement is reached to "provide export credits,
export credit guarantees or insurance programmes only in conformity
therewith".201 Such an agreement at the WTO has yet to be reached, as the current
Millennium Round of negotiations is still ongoing, with little substantive
agreement emerging to date.202
198 Ibid, at page 347.
199 Ibid, at page 348.
200 Ibid at page 315.
201
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202 For a fuller discussion on the current round of WTO negotiations, see chapter 8.
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10. Export Credit insurance
In contrast to other matters dealt with in this chapter, while the GATT and
WTO agreements appear to have little impact on the EC's export credit insurance
regimes, policy papers emanating from the OECD have been highly influential in
this area, with export credit being "of great importance in international trade" of
the EC, and seen as "a key instrument of commercial policy". Export credit
insurance can, however, have a "significant influence on competition at the
international level"204 and should the current efforts to develop a Competition
code within the WTO framework come to pass, it is to be anticipated that export
credit insurance will become subject to WTO regulation in the future. Internal EC
competition law and state aid rules may also come into play should any such
scheme be found to be discriminatory.205
EC regulation of member states' schemes of export credit insurance
regulation originated from a 1960's Policy Co-ordination Group, which led to
906
"co-ordination of credit insurance policies, guarantees and financial credits"
pursuant to Council Decision 73/391/EEC,207 with Community norms in this area
specified in Annex I to the decision. The OECD published "Arrangements on
908
Guidelines for officially supported Export Credits", which were adopted by the
EEC Council, in 1978, pursuant to Council Decision ofApril 1978209. This
document was an "informal arrangement" which the Council deemed at the time
unwise to publish, but which subsequently appeared in and adopted and published
203
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204 Ibid, at page 174.
205 Ibid, at page 174.
206 Ibid, at page 175.
207 Council Decision 73/391, OJ 17.12.73 L347/1, amended by Council Decision 76/641, OJ
16.8.76 L223/25 and by the Accession Treaty of Spain and Portugal of 1985.
208 See further OECD; "The Export Credit Financing Systems in OECD Member Countries", 4lh
ed.. May 1990.
209 This "was an informal arrangement" and this document never obtained an OJ reference as the
"Council deemed its publication to be unwise". See further Op. cit footnote no. 83, at page 177.
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consolidated text in 1992, as practices had come to be more predictable and
formalised, with the provisions of the 1978 Decision "extended for an indefinite
period".210 The OECD had further elaborated its position on the specific issue of
tied aid and export credits when it published new rules on the topic in 1996.211
The current EC provision is now reflected in the Council Directive 98/29/EC on
the "harmonizing the main provisions concerning export credit insurance for
919
transactions with medium and long term cover". This Directive is again based
on OECD documentation, and deals with export credit insurance for goods or
services being exported from EC member states, "in so far as this support is
provided directly or indirectly for the account of, or with the support of one or
213
more Member Sates, involving a total risk period of two years or more". The
Directive covers support provided "directly or indirectly" for the export of goods
or services, "involving a total risk period of two years or more", but does not
apply for "cover for bid, advance payment, performance and retention bonds",214
with the provisions of the Directive not only regulating the market in this area, but
also implying terms into such regulated export credit contracts.
11. Export refunds
The Common Agricultural Policy had been set up with the system of
export refunds and export levies being integral to the operation of the common
91 c
organisations, rather than being part of the Community Customs Code. This
was clarified in the case of Kriiger GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg - Jonas,216
which confirmed that "one of the purposes of the Guarantee Section of the
EAGGF'217 was the financing of refunds on exports of agricultural commodities
210
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212 Council Directive 98/29, OJ 19.5.98 L148/22.
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O 1 o
to third countries, pursuant to Council Regulation 729/70. The issue of export
910
refunds has been a bone of contention between the EC and its trading partners.
Payment of an export refund was made when the Community price for an
agricultural commodity covered by a common organisation was higher than the
open market price for the same commodity. The difference between the world
market price and the Community price, which arose from the intervention system
operated by the EC, was recovered as an export refund by the exporter from the
990 991
EC. Less frequently used, but also operable, were export levies, which
operated when the Community price for a particular commodity was lower than
the open market price. Here the Community charged a levy on the difference, in
an effort to "discourage Community producers and traders from exporting
products" which were in short supply within the Community.222 Export refunds
are usually claimed "after the completion of customs export formalities" and "on
proof that the product had reached its destination" or had "left the geographical
territory of the Community",223 with no refund being made for goods which had
not reached their destination in marketable quality, or if they were supposed to be
fit for human consumption, if there were unfit.
The EC's export refund mechanism has been classified, along with "sale
for export of surplus intervention stocks at a price lower than the domestic
price",224 as an export subsidy in GATT and WTO documentation. While some
commentators have argued that export subsidies were "accepted in principle" as
99c
being GATT compliant during the Dillon round of negotiations, Article XVI
GATT 1947 required its Contracting Parties to "seek to avoid the use of subsidies
on the export of primary produce", recognising that the granting of an export
218 Council Regulation 729/70 Art l(2)(a), OJ L94/13.
219
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subsidy "of any product may have harmful effects for other contracting parties,
both importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal
commercial interests, and may hinder the achievement of the objectives of this
agreement". While export subsidies continued to be permitted, they could only be
used in a way which did not result in a "Contracting Party having more than an
equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of the
shares of the contracting parties in such trade."226 The concept of "more than an
equitable share" of the market was addressed in Article 10 of the Tokyo round's
Subsidies Code, as "any case in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a
signatory is to displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind
developments in world markets".227
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Article 9, brought new disciplines to
play in the area of export subsides, requiring their reduction, but not as yet their
998
elimination. Changes were made in the EC's export refund mechanism as a
result of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, as reflected in Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94,229 with the current provisions for cereals in the post
9Qf)
mid-term review era being set out in Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
901
Advance fixing of export refunds, fixed according to destination, is now the
general rule, set subject to the obtaining of an export licence,232 with the level of
refund to be "adjusted in line with the level of the monthly increases applicable to
the intervention price".233 An exception has been made for food aid,234 as defined
by Article 10(4) of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 235
226 Article XVI (3) GATT 1947.
227
Op. cit. footnote no. 145, at page 75.
228 Ibid, at page 75.
229
Op. cit. footnote no. 50.
230
Op. cit. footnote no. 52.
231 Article 13.3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
232
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 289 et seq.
233 Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
234 Under Article 14.4 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1784/2003.
235
Op. cit. footnote no. 87, at page 289.
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12. Euro/non-euro currency
In order to complete the picture with regard to the payments of inter alia,
the current duties, subsidies and single farm payments, together with their
precursor payments, discussed earlier in this chapter, together with the payments
discussed in chapter 2 to include the payment of current intervention prices, it is
worth discussing briefly the EC's monetary and supporting structure. Prior to the
launch of the Euro, in order to centrally regulate any of the markets in agricultural
produce, in the absence of a common currency in Member States, regard had to be
had to the different currencies in the Member States, and their constant
fluctuations. An "agrimonetary" system was therefore invented. This was
originally set up in 1962, and prior to the coming into force of the Euro, it was
governed by virtue of Council Regulation 3813/92, and Commission
Regulation 3819/92 as amended. With the coming into force of the Euro pursuant
to Council Regulation (EC) No. 974/98237 it was felt that the pre-Euro
238
agrimonetary system was "incompatible with the introduction of the Euro", so a
new mechanism was implemented pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No.
2799/98, with the pre-euro agrimonetary system provisions being repealed.239
The EC's agrimonetary system had originally been based on the European
Community's Unit of Account (UA), which was subsequently replaced by the
ECU, or European Currency Unit, which in turn has given way to the Euro.
During the period of the EC's Unit of Account, the rate of exchange between the
Unit of Account and the national currency, the "representative" rate, became
236 Council Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92 of 28 December 1992 on the unit of account and the
conversion rates to be applied for the purposes of the common agricultural policy, Official Journal
L 387, 31/12/1992 p. 1.
237 Council Regulation (EC) No 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the introduction of the euro, Official
Journal L 139, 11/05/1998 p. 1.
238 Council Regulation (EC) No 2799/98 of 15 December 1998 establishing agrimonetary
arrangements for the euro, Official Journal L 349, 24/12/1998 p. 1.
239 Ibid.
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known as the Green rate.240 With respect to Great Britain this, subsequent to
accession, became known as the Green Pound, and in Ireland, the Green Punt.
The UA was originally tied to the gold value of the US dollar,241 but, with the
949
collapse of the fixed exchange rates in 1971, it was re-valued against an
average of specified European Currencies, "Joint Float" countries. It was soon
discovered, however, that while national governments were prepared to devalue
their national currencies, they were not prepared to devalue their green currency
accordingly, as this would have an adverse affect on the potential income of their
farmers. As a result the Community was obliged to introduce Monetary
Compensatory Amounts (MCA's) in order to avoid a possible distortion in the
market. The calculation of green currencies as a result got more and more
complicated, resulting in growing distortions in the market operating against the
interests of poorer countries in favour of wealthier countries. MCA's operated as
levies against exports of produce from the devalued currency country, and as
subsidies against its imports. They operated in the reverse in non-devalued
94*3
countries. All of these factors had an impact on the implementation of the
"common price policy" in agriculture, and the "development of common
organisations based on prices" within the CAP.244 The system ofMCAs was
considered unsatisfactory and from 1989 onwards, after a "conscious effort" to
dismantle MCA's very little reliance was made on MCAs'.245 MCA's were
eventually eliminated in the 1992 agrimonetary reforms.
A new agrimonetary system was introduced in 1992, coming into force on
the 1st of January 1993, pursuant to Council Regulation 3813/92 and Commission
Regulation 3819/92 as amended. Green rates continued in existence, but for
2411 Marsh and Swanney; Agriculture and the European Community, Allen and Unwin [for the]
University Association for Contemporary European Studies, London, 1980, at page 31.
241
Op. cit footnote no. 145, at page 113.
242 Ibid, at page 113.
243 Melchor, Michael; European Perspectives: 30 years of Community Law, Commission of the
European Communities, 1983.
244
Op. cit. footnote no. 145, at page 113.
245 Ibid, at page 114.
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countries with currencies outside the narrow ERM246 band (when it existed) the
green rates shadowed their market rates, never being allowed to deviate more than
2% from them. The green rate, therefore, matched the current currency rate, and
could be re-valued as often as the national currency. Currencies within the narrow
band (of 2.5%) were only moved with re-alignment. Towards the end of this
EMU period the narrow band for currency fluctuation had, in practice, ceased to
operate.
In the post Euro environment the law of agrimonetary arrangements is
contained in Council Regulation 2799/98, as subsequently amended,247 and
applied by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2808/98,248 being provided for
pursuant to Commission Regulation (EC) No. 807/1999.249 The upshot of these
changes is that the problems of the agrimonetary system have now "largely
disappeared with the introduction of the Euro",250 with all monetary amounts
being fixed and administered in Euro. For non-Eurozone member states, the
businesses and individuals located in the non-Eurozone areas of the EU continue
to have to face exchange rate risks, unless protected by the provisions of Council
oci
Regulation 2800/98, which provides "general transitional arrangements where
the conversion rate or exchange rate for the Euro on 1 January 1999 represented




247 For fishery payments pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 2801/98 of 14 December 1998
amending Regulation (EC) No 45/98 fixing, for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks, the
total allowable catches for 1998 and certain conditions under which they may be fished, Official
Journal L 349, 24/12/1998 p. 10.
248 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2808/98 of 22 December 1998 laying down detailed rules for
the application of the agrimonetary system for the euro in agriculture, Official Journal L 349,
24/12/1998 p. 36.
249 Commission Regulation (EC) No 807/1999 of 16 April 1999 providing for transitional
measures for the financing of inspections and controls in accordance with Directive 85/73/EEC
following the introduction of the euro, Official Journal L 102, 17/04/1999 p. 68.
250
Op. cit. footnote no. 145, at page 124.
251 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2813/98 of 22 December 1998 laying down detailed rules for
applying the transitional measures for the introduction of the euro to the common agricultural
policy, Official Journal L 349, 24/12/1998 p. 48.
252
Op. cit. footnote no. 145, at page 124.
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13. SPS provisions of the EC
Complementing the above examined monetary structures which operate at
the EC's external frontier is a further requirement for the importation of goods
generally, and agricultural goods in particular, into the EC market, the EC's
sanitary and phyto-sanitary provisions. The EC's Sanitary and Phytosanitary
OCT
(SPS) measures, as reflected in a Council Decision of 22 December 1994 are
subject to the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (the SPS Agreement),254 which is contained in Annex 1A of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation. This latter Agreement, for
its part, will be examined in detail in chapter 4, with this part of this chapter
briefly introducing the EC's SPS regulatory framework.
Prior to the coming into force of the WTO SPS Agreement the EC had
adopted the International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls
of Goods,255 which dealt with both veterinary and phytosanitary inspections.256
These provisions have since been superseded by the post -WTO Council
Directives 2000/29/EC257 and 2002/89/EC258 for the protection of plants and plant
products. Council Directive 2000/29/EC259 "sets out the Community plant health
regime" with allied "phytosanitary conditions, procedures and formalities to
which plants and plant products are" to be subjected, either when moving around
253 Council Decision 94/800/EC concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community,
as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round
multilateral negotiations (1986- 1994), Official Journal L 336, 23/12/1994 p. 1.
254 http://www.wto.org, and also published at OJ L 336, 23.12.1994 at page 40.
255 Geneva, 21st October 1982, available at http://www.unece.org.
256 Official Journal L 126, 12/05/1984 p. 3.
257 Council Directive 2002/89/EC of 28 November 2002 amending Directive 2000/29/EC on
protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or
plant products and against their spread within the Community Official Journal L 355, 30/12/2002
p. 45.
Ibid.
259 Which has been subject to various amendments.
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the internal market, or when being introduced into the EC.260 Under the EC
regime phytosanitary procedures have to be completed prior to obtaining customs
clearance, with a mechanism in place for plant material to be accompanied by
phytosanitary certificates issued by member states according to the standards set
out in the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) of the UN's Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO).261 It is recognised in Council Directive
2002/89/EC that there is a requirement under Article 4 of the WTO's SPS
Agreement that "the Community must recognise, under certain conditions, the
equivalence of phytosanitary measures of other parties to that Agreement",2 2
with the procedures for such recognition to be those set out in Council Directive
2002/89/EC.
The provisions for inspections of animals and animal products are more
disparate. Commission Decision No. 98/140/EC263 provides an overarching
framework for on the spot checks by Commission veterinary inspectors in third
countries, in collaboration with the veterinary experts of EC member states.
Article 2 of this Decision provides that the Commission "shall establish a general
programme of checks", which was submitted to the EC's Standing Veterinary
Committee for "an exchange of views." Article 1 of the Decision provides that the
provisions of this Decision "shall apply without prejudice to the provisions of any
agreement on sanitary measures applicable to trade in live animals and animal
products reached between the European Community and third countries".
260 Council Directive 2002/89/EC of 28 November 2002 amending Directive 2000/29/EC on
protective measures against the introduction into the Community of organisms harmful to plants or
plant products and against their spread within the Community Official Journal L 355, 30/12/2002
p. 45, at recital 1.
61
http://www.fao.org.
262 At recital no. 13.
263 Commission Decision 98/140/EC of the 4 February 1998 laying down certain detailed rules
concerning on-the-spot checks carried out in the veterinary field by Commission experts in third
countries, Official Journal L 38, 12/02/1998 p. 14.
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The pre-existing Commission Decision 86/474/EEC264 covering on-the-
spot inspections of bovine animals and swine and fresh meat continues to apply.
This is now to be complemented by European Parliament and Council Directive
2003/99/EC265 which was passed to "ensure that zoonoses, zoonotic agents and
related antimicrobial resistance are properly monitored" and that "food-borne
outbreaks receive proper epidemiological investigation".266 In addition Council
Directive 93/119/EC,267 deals with the protection of "animals at the time of
slaughter or killings". Council Decision No. 98/140/EC recognises the
requirement in Article 8 and Annex c, paragraph 1(d) of the WTO SPS
Agreement for confidentiality in the "operation of control, inspection and
approval procedures.... in a way that legitimate commercial interests are
protected". These provisions are complemented by Council Regulation (EC) No
1308/1999,268 which deals with maximum residue limits of veterinary medicinal
products in foodstuffs of animal origin. Of relevance in this area would also be
Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002,269 which set out the "general principles and
requirements of food law", and established the European Food Safety Authority.
The drafting and interpretation of EC SPS provisions, to the extent that
they address issues of risk assessment and risk management have already, and
will increasingly in the future, become subject to WTO recognition or otherwise
of the precautionary principle. The issue of the operation of the precautionary
principle within the EC jurisdiction was addressed in the Pfizer Animal Health SA
264 Commission Decision 86/474/EEC of 11 September 1986 on the implementation of the on-the-
spot inspections to be carried out in respect of the importation of bovine animals and swine and
fresh meat from non-member countries, Official Journal L 279, 30/09/1986 p. 55.
265 Directive 2003/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 November 2003 on
the monitoring of zoonoses and zoonotic agents, amending Council Decision 90/424/EEC and
repealing Council Directive 92/117/EEC, Official Journal L 325, 12/12/2003 p. 31.
25 At Article 1 of European Parliament and Council Directive2003/99/EC.
267 Council Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of
slaughter or killing, Official Journal L 340, 31/12/1993 p. 21, as amended.
268 Council Regulation (EC) No 1308/1999 amending Regulation (EC) 2377/90 laying down a
Community procedure for the establishment ofmaximum residue limits of veterinary medicinal
products in foodstuffs of animal origin, OJ. L 156, 23/6/1999, page 1.
~69
Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January
2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing the European
Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food safety, Official Journal L
31, 01/02/2002 p. 1, as amended.
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270
case. Here the CFI found that given that the risk in that case had yet to be
771
scientifically proven, and in light of the fact that "neither the Treaty nor the
777
secondary legislation" provided a definition of the precautionary principle, risk
assessment for the purposes of applying the principle must comprise a "two-fold
task" being firstly, the determination of "what level of risk is deemed
unacceptable" and secondly, the "conducting of a scientific assessment of the
777
risks". In light of this requirement the CFI held that the EC institutions
"enjoyed a broad discretion, in particular when determining the level of risk
deemed unacceptable for society". The role of the judiciary was held to be
confined to "ascertaining whether the exercise by the institutions of their
discretion in that regard is vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of powers or
774-
whether the institutions clearly exceeded the bounds of their discretion". This
approach could well be subjected to WTO panel or appellate body scrutiny given
the differing approach to the precautionary principle in WTO documentation and
jurisprudence. The WTO's SPS agreement will be introduced in chapter 4, with
the interaction of the WTO's SPS Agreement with the EC's provisions in this area
analysed in chapter 8.
14. Charges for health inspections
The issue of charges for health inspections is relevant to both intra-
community trade, and trade with third countries. The framework for regulation in
this area was set out in Council Directive 85/73,275 with the current practice being
set out in Council Directive 96/43/EC,276 as amended. The "principles governing
270 Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v. Council of the European Union, [2002] ECR page
11-3305.
271 At paragraph 113 of the judgment.
272 At paragrpah 117 of the judgment.
273 At paragraph 149 of the judgment.
274 At paragraph 169 of the judgment.
275 Council Directive 85/73/EEC of 29 January 1985 on the financing of health inspections and
controls of fresh meat and poultrymeat, Official Journal L 32, 05/02/1985 p. 14.
276 Council Directive 96/43/EC of 26 June 1996 amending and consolidating Directive 85/73/EEC
in order to ensure financing of veterinary inspections and controls on live animals and certain
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the organization of veterinary checks" for products entering from third countries
are set out in Council Directive 97/78/EC,277 as amended, with organising of
veterinary checks for live animals and certain animal products being covered by
Council Directive 91/496/EEC,278 as amended. The objective behind Council
Regulation 96/43/EC was, recognising that many of the commodities being
subject to health inspections were "covered by common organisations of the
market", and that different operators charging different fees for health checks
"can lead to deflections to trade", that there was a need for harmonisation of rules
"on the financing of such inspections and checks", with operators to make a
97Q
contribution "to the financing of such inspections and checks."
A problem arises however, where a member state wishes to implement
further health inspections than are required by EC law. The possibility of a
member state implementing, and charging for, further health inspections was
280addressed and recognised in the case of Feyrer v. Landkreis Rottal-Inn, where,
under an earlier EC health inspection charging regime, it was held that a trader
could not claim a "directly effective right to pay the fees set out in the
directive".281 It is to be anticipated that the health inspections conducted by
member states in addition to those required under EC law would be those required
under international conventions, such as the UN's International Plant Protection
282 283
Convention, as in the case of Commission v. Netherlands, as these
inspections were "not unilateral", but were measures "intended to assist in the free
animal products and amending Directives 90/675/EEC and 91/496/EEC, Official Journal L 162,
01/07/1996 p. 1.
277 Council Directive 97/78/EC of 18 December 1997 laying down the principles governing the
organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries,
Official Journal L 24, 30/01/1998 p. 9.
278 Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing the
organization of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and
amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC, Official Journal L 268,
24/09/1991 p. 56.
279
Op. cit. footnote no. 276.
280 Case C-374/97 Feyrer v.Landkreis Rottal-Inn [1999] ECR1-5153.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 145, at page 31.
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Rome, 6 December 1951; TS 16 (1954); Cmd 9077.
283 Case 89/76 Commission v. Netherlands [1977] ECR 1355.
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movement of goods".284 The same case held, however, that health inspections and
their associated charges which were "obstacles set up unilaterally" by an EC
member state would not, however, meet with ECJ favour, and would be treated as
ooc
"charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties" . Such a classification
of "charges having an effect equivalent to customs duties" would be subject to
the GATT and WTO Agreement on Agriculture provisions, and could be
incompatible with either the EC's or the individual member state's commitments
through its EC membership, under the WTO treaty texts. As pointed out by
Usher, these additional health inspection payments could be contrary to the
"requirements of the Common Commercial Policy and the Common Customs
Tariff', that "third countries should be subject to uniform treatment".286 A
solution to this situation may be found in the case of IFG Intercontinentale
9R7
Fleischhandelsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG v. Freistaat Bayern, to the effect
that "there was no risk of diversion of trade if the charge for a health inspection"
was not in excess of "the cost of the carrying out of the health inspection".288
While this approach is adopted in the post Council Directive 96/43/EC version of
OOQ
Council Directive 85/73, with member states of the EC being "authorised to
charge an amount exceeding the levels of Community fees provides that the total
fees do not exceed the actual cost of inspection",290 the issue of the profit margin
for the health inspecting contractor is not addressed, nor is the issue of whether
the additional payments when aggregated with existing customs duties, exceed
• 291
WTO commitments on the "tariff rate quota".
284
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287 Case 1/83 IFG Intercontinentale Fleischhandelsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG v. Freistaat
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15. Exceptions
The foregoing sets out the general system of import and export regulation
operated by the EC covering agricultural commodities. A number of significant
exceptions to the standard rules are however operated by the EC, and these merit
some discussion. These exemptions include the EC's generalised system of
preferences (GSP), its Lome/Cotonou agreements, and its Euro Med Agreements.
15.1. Generalised System of Preferences
The EEC member states had operated a generalised system of preferences
(GSP) for lesser developed countries (ldc) since the break up of their respective
empires. The third countries within the EEC GSP scheme usually had colonial
links with the EEC member states. These operated against a backdrop of a global
system of generalised preferences sponsored by UNCTAD292 (UNCTAD I) from
1964, whose objective was "to increase export earnings, promote industrialisation
and accelerate the rates of economic growth of developing - country
2Q-2
beneficiaries". These preferences were to be operated in favour of the Ides by
the developed countries, without any reciprocation by the lcds in favour of the
developed countries. The UNCTAD GSP built on pre-existing GSP systems
operated by most developed countries, with the exception of the United States, but
developed a new global, non-discriminatory system "to be offered to all ldcs
292 "One of the principal functions of UNCTAD was to "formulate principles and policies on
international trade and related problems of economic development" and to "make proposals for
putting the said principles and policies into effect" " General Assembly Resolution 1955 (XIX),
Proceedings of UNCTAD II, UN, New York (1968), vol. 1, report and Annexes, p. 4, quoted in
Joseph M. McMahon "Agricultural Trade, Protectionism and the Problems of Development"
Leicester University Press, 1992, at page 85.
293 Resolution 21(11), UNCTAD II, vol. 1, proceedings and report, UN, New York, (1968), page
38, quoted in McMahon, Joseph M.; "Agricultural Trade, Protectionism and the Problems of
Development" Leicester University Press, 1992, at page 147.
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without discrimination".294 These were "not to be reciprocated by the ldcs."295
This system was to operate in contradiction to the basic principle ofMFN of the
pre-existing GATT 1947. The GATT Tokyo Round addressed the issue of the
UNCTAD GSP, which, although far from perfect in its operation, was facilitated
by an Enabling Clause,296 which called for "developing countries to make
7Q7
contributions or concessions as their economies develop and improve".
UNCTAD III,298 held in 1972, called for the GSP to be extended to include
"processed and semi-processed agricultural and primary products in Chapters 1-
24 of the Brussels Tariff Nomeclature299 (BTN)".300
The EEC adopted the GSP on the 1st July 1971,301 before the GATT
waiver had been obtained. It is generally considered that the countries trading
with the EC on the basis of the GSP only are in a preferential situation to only
those countries which trade with the EC on the basis of the general provisions of
"most favoured nation" basis, which operates under the GATT. Traditionally 59
signatories to the Lome Convention were in a better position, however Lome has
now been replaced by Cotonou, of which more later in this chapter. In the non-
agricultural goods sector, even the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
294
Weston, Ann, Cable, Vincent and Hewitt, Adrian; The EEC's Generalised System of
Preferences, Evaluation and Recommendations, Overseas Development Institute, UK, 1980, at
page 5.
295 Ibid, at page 5.
296 BISD 26th Supplement (1980) p. 203, at p. 205. See further Annex 1 to this thesis. The
provisions of this Enabling Clause were echoed at the Uruguay Round declaration at BISD 33rd
Supplement (1987) pp. 19-27, at pg. 21.
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298 Resolution 77 (HI) of Proceedings of UNCTAD III, vol. 1, Proceedings, UN, New York,
(1972), pp. 85-86.
299 Further the to the Nomenclature Convention of Brussels of the 15 December 1950, adopted into
EC law by way of Council Regulation 950/68 of 28 June 1968 [1968] OJ Spec Ed (I) 275, together
with the Annex attached thereto. The Brussels Tariff Nomenclature was replaced by the
Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of the World Customs
Organisation (WCO), on the 1st January 1988, which was discussed earlier in this chapter.
300
Op. cit. footnote no. 76, at page 159.
3l),Inter alia, Reglement (CEE) n°. 309/71 du Conseil, 21 juin 1971, portant ouverture de
preferences tarifaires pour certains produuits originaires de pays en voie de developpement, O.J.
(1971) L 142.
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countries are in a better position than the GSP countries, as are the dependent
territories of the EU member states, new applicants for EU membership, and the
Maghreb and Mashreq countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and
"other Mediterranean countries with special preferential trade agreements".304 In
contrast to the Yaounde and Lome Conventions, the EC GSP is unilateral, with
"no contractual commitment" being made by either the EC or any other GSP
Of*C
donor to "maintain preferences and market access to ldcs".
Prior to the founding of the WTO the EC GSP system differentiated
between agricultural and non-agricultural exports from ldcs, and further
differentiated between "sensitive,306 semi-sensitive or non-sensitive" goods.307
The EC imposed "tariffquotas (TQs) or ceilings" to the quantity of goods
ono
imported into the EC from ldcs. These tariff quotas are the maximum amount
of that particular good to be imported into the EC as a whole, from the ldcs. A
further restriction was imposed on ldcs by way of a "butoir.., or maximum
country amount..".309 These butoirs could be set either at a very high level or a
very low level, depending on the particular country, the intention being to
"distribute the export benefits" by developing and regulating the competition
between the ldcs, so as to prevent "the highly efficient ldc exporters from filling
ceilings and TQs on their own".310 Once an ldc had reached its butoir, MFN status
would be re-imposed for the balance of its exports in that particular commodity
classification.311 Cumulation of preferences for "treatment for originating status"
312
was permitted only with a limited number of economic groupings, with EC
GSP rules disallowing Community content.313 Commodities imported from ldcs
3(13 Ibid, at page 134.
304
Op. cit. footnote no. 294, at page 25.
305 Ibid, at page 13.
306 Sensitive to the EEC's internal market.
307
Op. cit. footnote no. 294, at page 63.
308 Ibid, at page 13.
309 Ibid, at page 8.
310 Ibid, at page 8.
311 Ibid, at page 9.
312
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313
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outwith the GSP commodity classifications remained on MFN status. The whole
system benefited from the protection of a general safeguard clause, with the EC
retaining the right "to suspend tariff preferences if they are deemed to be causing
serious disruption of the domestic market".314 The whole system operated "on the
basis of documentation and not of good faith"315 and involved considerable
bureaucracy.
Agricultural product coverage was much more limited than that for non-
^ 1 ft
agricultural products, with, initially only 145 products covered, which was
subsequently expanded to 300 products covered, with "less than a third of these..
[being] granted duty - free entry"; the balance benefiting from limited tariff
reductions.317 The approach of the GSP system for processed and semi-processed
products "was based on the negative list philosophy" with all products included,
unless specifically excluded, while GSP for agricultural goods and processed
agricultural goods was "based on the positive list philosophy".318 It is generally
felt that the GSP scheme is "marginal as far as the agricultural sector is
concerned," in particular as none of the products covered in the GSP "are likely to
cause any disturbance to" CAP products.319
The EC's GSP system did not have a "high utilisation rate" in comparison
with the GSP scheme operated by non EC countries,320 partly as a result of the
"most restrictive of all of the Community's many different origin rules", with
originally, no allowing of any bilateral cumulation, and the zero tolerance of
"small amounts ofmaterial originating from third Sates." The GATT's
Luetwiler Report322 took a poor view of GSP systems generally, stating that the
314 Ibid, at page 9.
315 Ibid, at page 9.
316
Op. cit. footnote no. 76, at page 133.
317
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318
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3'9 Ibid, at page 139.
32(1 Ibid, at page 134.
321
Peers, Steve; Reform of the European Community's Generalized System of Preferences, J.W.T.
1995 29(6) 79-96, at page 83 et seq.
322 Trade Policies for a Better Future: Proposals for Action, GATT, Geneva (1985), p. 44.
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"special treatment in the GATT Rules" was of "limited value", while "far greater
emphasis should be placed" on the full integration of developing countries into
the trading system "with all the appropriate rights and responsibilities that this
entails".323
15.1.1 Post WTO - GSP system of the EC
Unlike the pre-WTO system, where GSP schemes operated differently for
094
"industrial products, textiles, ECSC products and agricultural products" the
post - WTO EC GSP325 is based on two regulations, one dealing with industrial
QO/T TOT
goods, and the other with agricultural goods. The differentiation for
agricultural products arises from the objective of the GSP to industrialised
developing countries, and from the protectionist nature of the EC Common
Agricultural Policy.328 The main intention of the changes to the EC GSP was the
toq tto
"complete abolition of tariff quotas and tariff ceilings", with the regulation
creating a structure of four levels of tariff reductions.331 The Council retained the
ability to re-impose MFN tariffs "in exceptional circumstances" under Article 14,
Regulation 3281/94.332 More Southern African products were included while
323
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29(4)97-124, at page 119.
325
Relying on Article 133, ex. Article 133 EC.
326 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3281/94, 19 December 1994, applying a four-year scheme of
generalised tariff preferences (1995 to 1988) in respect of certain industrial products originating in
developing countries, tariff preferences (1995 to 1998) in respect of certain industrial products
originating in developing countries, O.J. (1994) L348/1, corrigendum of 12 April 1995 in OJ.
(1995) L 82/29.
327 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3282/94, 19 December 1994, extending into 1995 the application
of regulations (EEC) No. 3833/90, (EEC) NO. 3835/90 and (EEC) No. 3900/91 applying
generalised tariff preferences in respect of certain agricultural products originating in developing
countries. OJ. (1994) L 348/57.
328
Op. cit. footnote no. 324, at page 119.
329
Op. cit. footnote no. 321, at page 85.
330 Article 2, Regulation 3281/94, referring to Annex 1, parts 1-4. Some products were excluded
from receiving any benefits at all under Article 1(2), Regulation 3281/94, referring to Annex IX.
These products included a number of primary products, as well as certain glue, leather, steel,
aluminium and lead products, and some other metals. Op. cit. footnote no. 332, at page 86.
331
15, 30, 65 and 100 percent.
332
Op. cit. footnote no. 321, at page 87.
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partial graduation, out of the GSP system, back to the general MFN system, was
introduced for wealthier developing countries.
One of the other main changes to the EC GSP is the change to the EC
GSP's rules of origin. While the rules remain substantially the same for the
poorest states, amendments to the EC's Common Custom's Code334 resulted in, in
addition to "donor-country" cumulation being permitted in limited regional
groupings, a "general tolerance for all third-country materials" of up to a
maximum of 5% of ex-works value being introduced, with textiles and clothing
excluded from this rule.335 A new Management Committee for EC GSP day to
day issues was also set up.336
At the time of reform proposals (1990) a document issued from Vice-
President Manuel Marin, which became to be known as the Marin
Memorandum. This document suggested a scheme for extending the general
GSP benefits for specific countries, which met particular requirements. These
requirements included complying with a social clause, for an ldc to comply with
333 Ibid, at page 88.
334 The EC's Common Customs Code was set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12
October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, Official Journal L 302, 19/10/1992 p. 1,
and implemented by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down
provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the
Community Customs Code, Official Journal L 253, 11/10/1993 p. 1 The amendment allowing for
donor country cumulation was set out in Article 72 of Regulation 2454/93, which was added by
Regulation 3254/94, Commission Regulation (EC) No 3254/94 of 19 December 1994 amending
Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community customs code, Official Journal L 346,
31/12/1994 p. 1, which provides, inter aha, at Article 72 1. "Notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 69, non-originating materials may be used in the manufacture of a given product, provided
their total value does not exceed 5 % of the ex-works price of the final product and subject to the
conditions laid down in Note 3.4 in Annex 14.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to products falling within Chapters 50 to 63 of the Harmonized
System."
335
Op. cit. footnote no. 321, at page 90.
336 Articles 17-19, Regulation 3281/94.
337 Memorandum from Mr Marin to the Commission, Integration of developing countries into the
international trading system: Role of the GSP and other co-operation instruments, 1995-2004,
unpublished. See further OP cit. footnote no. 335, at page 100.
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the provisions of Conventions no. 87 and 98' of the International Labour
Organization, (ILO) an environmental clause, requiring compliance with the
criteria of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) criteria, and a drugs provision, for countries,
such as those in the Andean Pact and the Central American countries, who wanted
"help in the fight against drugs".340 These provisions were brought in, for both
agricultural goods and non-agricultural goods by Council Regulation 1154/98,341
and was further elaborated on in Council Regulation 2820/98342.343 The regulation
currently in force for all goods except armaments, is Council Regulation (EC) No.
2501/2001,344 as amended. The benefits obtained by the beneficiaries of the EC's
GSP provision, in the absence of a "GATT GSP code, with World Trade
Organisation dispute settlement", currently unlikely, are however, somewhat
dubious, as Peers points out, that these benefits may come "with a price".345
15.2. Lome/Cotonou
The relationship between the EC and the Afro Caribbean Pacific (ACP)
States,346 is now governed by the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. This was preceded
338 C87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 Date of
adoption:09:07:1948 http://www.ilo.org.
339 C98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 Date of
adoption:01:07:1949http://www.ilo.org.
340
Op. cit. footnote no. 324, at page 108.
341 Council Regulation (EC) No 1154/98 of 25 May 1998 applying the special incentive
arrangements concerning labour rights and environmental protection provided for in Articles 7
and 8 of Regulations (EC) No 3281/94 and (EC) No 1256/96 applying multiannual schemes of
generalised tariff preferences in respect of certain industrial and agricultural products originating
in developing countries Official Journal L 160, 04/06/1998 p. 1.
342 Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 December 1998 applying a multiannual scheme of
generalised tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2001, Official Journal L
357, 30/12/1998 p. 1.
343
Op. cit. footnote no. 324, at page 207 et seq.
344 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001 of 10 December 2001 applying a scheme of
generalised tariff preferences for the period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004,
31/12/2001, OJ L346/1.
345
Op. cit. footnote no. 321, at page 93.
346 Now 77 countries.
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by four Lome Conventions347 and two Yaounde Conventions,348 the developing
countries being then referred to as the Association of African States and
Madagascar (AASM). The Yaounde convention originated from the original part
IV of the EEC Treaty, in particular the original Article 136 EEC,349 which was re-
enforced in "the Joint Declaration of Intent ofApril 1963," which was repeated in
Protocol 22 of the UK Act of Accession to the EEC.350 Part IV of the EEC
oc 1
#
Treaty was inserted at the "insistence of the French delegation" as a condition
for participating in the EEC. At the time the colonies of the originating member
states of the EEC were gaining independence. The then part IV of the EEC treaty
was intended to facilitate trading relations between these new and emerging
countries and their former colonial powers. The intention was progressively to
abolish customs duties, and to prohibit quantitative restrictions on trade between
the EEC and the Yaounde convention states, pursuant to the then Articles 131-135
EEC, Articles 182 to 187 EC post Amsterdam.352 The initial association period
between the EEC and what were to become the AASM states ended with the
achievement of political independence353 and the signing of the first Yaounde
convention. The legal basis for this agreement was Article 133 EC, (ex. Article
113 EC), but since then has been developed pursuant to Articles 177 (ex. Article
130u) to 181 (ex Article 130u) EC, which deal with development co-operation.
The EC's Development Policy had been held, by the ECJ, as being a non-
347 1995, 1979, 1984 and 1989.
348 1963 and 1969.
349 The original version of Article 136 EEC provided; "For an initial period of five years after the
entry into force of this Treaty, the details of and procedure for the association of the countries and
territories with the Community shall be determined by an Implementing Convention annexed to
this Treaty". A subsequent version of Article 136 EC, formerly Article 136a EEC, and now (post
Amsterdam) Article 118 EC, deals with the EC's relationship with Greenland, providing that "The
provisions of Articles 182 to 187 shall apply to Greenland, subject to the specific provisions for
Greenland set out in the protocol on the special arrangements for Greenland, annexed to this
Treaty."
350 McMahon J. "The Renegotiation of Lome: inventing the future? (1989) 14 ELRev. 140, at page
140.
351 Entitled "Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories," formerly Articles 131 to 136
EC, renumbered Articles 182 to 188 EC, post Amsterdam.
352
Op. cit. footnote no. 350, at page 143 et seq.
353 Ibid at page 141.
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exclusive competence of the EC,354 as is the relationship between the EC and the
ACP states.355 In both the Commission v. Council356 and in Opinion ]/94?51 the
occupied field theory came into play. In these cases the ECJ stated that the EC
had competence to legislate in the area of development policy, and when the EC
had so legislated then the member states of the EC could not legislate contrary to
any EC provisions.
The conclusion of the Yaounde convention coincided with the
development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which had an impact on
the Yaounde provisions for agricultural products. Initially only rice importation
from the AASM countries was affected, but by Yaounde II in 1969358 agricultural
imports were gaining greater preference in accessing the EEC market than non-
Yaounde countries359 but were otherwise encountering barriers set up to protect
the CAP. Free trade prevailed for industrial products from 1957, however the
position regarding agricultural imports weakened with regard to "the level of
preference given"360 over a period of time.361 When the UK joined the EEC in
1973 it brought its traditional trading relations with its former colonies into the
AASM framework, the new group of new and emerging countries being now
referred to as the Afro-Caribbean-Pacific Countries (ACP),362 with the treaties
now being referred to as the Lome Conventions. While the ACP countries were
given preferences greater than the GSP countries, these preferences were
weakening with time, with the progressive liberation of trade under GATT 1947,
and the MEN concessions under GATT.
354 Joined Cases C-181/91 and C-248/91 Parliament v. Council and Commission [1993] ECR I-
3685 (the Bangladesh case).
355 Case C-316/91 Parliament v. Council [1994] ECR 1-625 (the EDF case).
356 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263 (the ERTA case).
357
Op. cit. footnote no. 3.
358 Art. 2(2) Yaunde II J.O. 1970 L 282/2.
359
Op. cit. footnote no.352, at page 141.
360 Ibid, at page 141.
361
By virtue of Article "(2) of the convention, agricultural products were excluded from the
general trade obligation of abolishing customs duties, quantitative restrictions and all measures




In addition, unlike the GSP system, whose focus, as referred to above, is
the industrialisation of developing countries, and whose drafting was affected by a
protectionist approach to the developing CAP,363 with limited agricultural product
coverage,364 and different GSP schemes for agricultural and non-agricultural
products,365 the Lome conventions were more agricultural in orientation. While
GSP countries were developing their industrial commodity preferences, the ACP
countries exported "hardly any manufactures",366 made greater use of their more
liberal preferences for agricultural products.367
The issue of whether the Yaounde and Lome preferences were GATT
compatible has been an issue "since the beginning of the development co¬
operation".368 This issue came to the fore with regard to the commodity of
bananas. Lome IV, which "guarantees., duty-free imports into the Community
subject to certain reserves" used to protect the CAP, has attached to it a Banana
o/:Q
Protocol, which guaranteed "a market for ACP states' bananas", with a
■270 071
Common Organisation of the Market in Bananas being set up. These
provisions were highly controversial, and culminated, within the EC, in the ECJ
077
case of Commission v. Council with the German, Belgian and Dutch
governments challenging this provision on the basis that it breached GATT 1947
rules. The ECJ in this case373 confirmed that GATT 1947 was an "integral part of
the Community's legal order," with the ECJ being competent to interpret the
provisions of GATT. However, the ECJ also held that GATT could not be "a
363
Op. cit. footnote no. 324, at page 119 et seq.
364
Op. cit. footnote no. 76, at page 133.
365
Op. cit. footnote no. 324, at page 105 et seq.
366
Op. cit. footnote no. 294, at page 27.
367
Op. cit. footnote no. 76, at page 180.
368
Op. cit. footnote no. 352, at page 144.
369 Ibid, at page 143.
370 The Common Organization of the Market in Bananas Council Regulation no. 404/93 of 13 Feb.
1993 on the Common Organization of the Market in Bananas, OJ 1993 L 47/1, at page 403.
371
Everling U; Will Europe slip on Bananas? The Bananas judgment of the Court of Justice and
National Courts, C.M.L. Rev. 1996, 33(3), 401-437, at page 403.
372 Case 45/86, Commission v. Council [1987] ECR 1493.
373 See Chapter 6 for a further discussion of this case.
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374criterion for the examination of the legality of community acts". These
375
particular provisions were subsequently challenged at the WTO level, in the
context of EC's common organisation in bananas,376 which had been introduced
in 1993.377 The EC was found,378 in its operation of the Lome agreement, to be in
breach ofGATT provisions.379 The WTO finding380 eventually led to the
redrafting of the ACP relationship, which resulted in the Cotonou Agreement of
2000.
The agreement currently in force is the aforementioned Cotonou
Agreement. This agreement is based on a five pillar framework, to include, a
political dimension, participation, focus on poverty reduction, financial co¬
operation, with funding from the European Development Fund and the European
Investment Bank, and of relevance to this thesis, a new framework for economic
and trade co-operation. The Cotonou Agreement, unlike its predecessors, has been
drafted so that its trade provisions are fully in conformity with the WTO
provisions. It should be noted that the Cotonou Agreement has still had to obtain
the protection of an additional temporary conditional waiver, from the WTO, of
the provisions of Article 1,1 GATT,381 which deals with the "most favoured
nation" principle until the 31st December 2007 pursuant to a ministerial decision
at the Doha Conference.382 The potential impact of the expiration of said waiver,
in the absence of its renewal, has yet to be established.
374
Op. cit. footnote no. 371, at page 421.
375
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas,
complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (WT/DS 27).
376 Pursuant to Council Regulation 404/93, OJ 1993 L47/1.
377
Op. cit. footnote no. 145, at page 72.
378
By the Appellate Body, confirming the Panel's view, in European Communities - Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997.
379 Mentioned again in chapter 5, but discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
380 For a fuller discussion of the case law in this area see further Chapter 5.
381 Which deals with Most Favoured Nation Treatment.
382
European Communities — The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Decision of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN (01)/15, Ministerial Conference fourth Session Doha, 9-14 November 2001.
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15.3. Euro Med Agreements
The Euro-Mediterranean programme was set up pursuant to the Barcelona
Declaration,383 which provided as its aim to "progressively (create) a zone of
peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean". The objective was to establish
a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) through meshing bi-lateral
agreements between the EC and the countries of the Maghreb and the
Mashreq.386 This Euro-Mediterranean partnership continues to be under
construction, and comprises three separate partnership areas, one based on politics
and security, integrating with pillar II EU, in the establishment of a common area
of peace and stability, one based on an economic and financial partnership, of
interest to this thesis, and thirdly, a partnership based on social, cultural and
human affairs. Financing under these agreements is pursuant to the MEDA
financing initiatives, which comprises grants, risk capital and interest rate
subsidies, with lending from the European Investment Bank (EIB).388 The whole
package includes intellectual property and competition law provisions.
oon
The Barcelona Declaration" has its origins in numerous pre-existing co¬
operation initiatives, dealing with financial or technical measures, which were
383
Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27th and 28th November 1995.
384 To include agreements with Tunisia (July 1995), Israel (November 1995), Morocco (February
1995), the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (February 1997) and Jordan (April 1997), and the
Customs Union signed with Turkey (March 6 1995).
385 Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria.
386
Originally to include; Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Syria, Palestinian
Authority, although it should be noted, of course, that Cyprus and Malta have since become full
members of the EU.
387 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany
(MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, Official Journal L 189, 30/07/1996 p. 1
388 Communication by Vice President Marin to the Commission, "Implementing MEDA 1996-197
Reportwhich was submitted by the European Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council pursuant to Article 15(1) of Council Regulation no 1488/96 (MEDA).
389 Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27th and 28th November
1995.
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primarily developmental in nature.390 While some of these continue in existence,
they are, for the most part, being phased out and being replaced by the MEDA
391 392
financing initiatives, under a new administrative structure. The MEDA
Programme is mostly made up of grants as well as risk capital and interest rate
subsidies, and is supplemented by substantial lending by the European Investment
Bank (the EIB). While earlier relations with the Euro-Mediterranean partners
were, on occasion, treated as being sometimes developmental in nature and
sometimes trade related,393 the current proposals in this area now go "beyond the
framework of development co-operation and are destined to apply to countries
which cannot be classified as developing countries".394 Reliance must now be
made exclusively on Article 308 EC, and what is now known as the Trade
395
Directorate of the Commission, formerly DG1B.
390 Pre existing laws include Council Regulation (EEC) No 1762/92 on the implementation of the
protocols on financial and technical co-operation concluded by the Community with
Mediterranean non-member countries, OJ L 181, 01/07/1992 p. 1, Council Regulation (EEC) no
1763/92 concerning financial co-operation in respect of all Mediterranean non-member countries
for measures whose scope extended beyond the scope of a single country, OJ L 181, 01/07/1992 p.
5, Council Regulation (EC) no 1734/94 on financial and technical co-operation with the Occupied
Territories Official Journal L 182, 16/07/1994 p. 4, and proposal Com (94) 289 final for a Council
Regulation in the field of employment creation and support to small and micro-enterprises in the
Maghreb countries, OJ C 214, 04/08/1994 p. 26
391 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1488/96 on financial and technical measures to accompany
(MEDA) the reform of economic and social structures in the framework of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, which is accompanied by Proposal for a Council Decision concerning
the adoption of the guidelines for MEDA indicative programmes (COM (96) 441 final.
392 Communication by Vice President Marin to the Commission, "Implementing MEDA 1996-1997
Report"-, http://www.euromed.net, and COM (98) 524, which was submitted by the European
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council pursuant to Article 15(1) of Council
Regulation no 1488/96 (MEDA), with reference to Council Regulation (EC) no 1488/96 of
23.7.96 on financial and technical measures to accompany (MEDA) the reform of economic and
social stmctures in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. This regulation appears
in OJ 1996 L 189/1, and entered into force on the 2 August 1996. The report goes on to state that
from the 1st of January 1997, MEDA replaces the pre existing bilateral financial protocols
including the regulations on horizontal co-operation (Regulation 1763/92/EEC) co-operation with
the Occupied Territories (regulation 1734/94/EEC) and structural adjustment (Regulation
1762/92/EEC)."
393 with the development provisions falling under the Development Co-operation Articles 177 to
181, of the EC Treaty (post Amsterdam), as inserted by Article G (38) TEU.
394
Proposal for a Regulation on financial and technical measures to support the reform of
economic and social stmctures in Mediterranean non-member countries and territories, OJ C 232,
6.9.1995, COM (95) 204.
395 Rather than the Development Directorate at DG VIII.
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The Euro-Mediterranean agreements hold out no prospect of membership
of the EC/EU,396 but rather the EC hopes to improve the wealth and stability
(economic and political) of its southern borders, in order to "progressively
(create) a zone of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean". The
Committee of the Regions injects a note of realism into this highly idealistic
process stating that it "must be recognised that the growing interest in the
Mediterranean springs partly form the perceived risks which the steady increase
in international and domestic tensions poses for the regions stability and
398
security." In effect the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a partnership
predominately trade related, but inspired by the EU's concerns as to the security
of its borders, both from conflict and wars and from being subjected to an influx
of economic and possibly illegal migrants.
The aim of Free Trade in Goods is the most clearly thought out policy in
the partner agreements with third countries, as evidenced by the EC agreement
with Tunisia,399 one of the most developed of the Euro-Med agreements. Here the
agreement regarding duties and charges having equivalent effect for Industrial
Produce is set out in detail in Articles 6 to 14. This situation is further elaborated
on by way of Decision No 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council,400
Article 9 of which provides that "products originating in Tunisia shall be imported
into the Community free of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect
and without quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect." This
provision is to include "customs duties of a fiscal nature" under Article 13 of that
decision. Goods imported into Tunisia from the EC are to benefit from the
"progressive reduction of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect"
396 Unlike the Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries.
397
Op. cit. footnote no. 389.
398
Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the "Local Authorities and the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership" OJ C 64, 27/2/98, page 59.
399 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement with the Republic of Tunisia, OJ L 97, 30/03/1998 p. 2
400 Decision No. 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 25 October 1999 on the
implementation of the provisions on processed agricultural products laid down in Article 10 of the
Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European communities
and their Member Sates, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part
(1999/743/EC).
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over a period of five to twelve years, depending on the particular commodity.401
Agricultural goods are however treated differently, with agricultural goods
provisions to be applied to agricultural components "mutatis mutandis".402
Agricultural goods are to benefit from a gradual implementation of "greater
liberalisation of their reciprocal trade" pursuant to Article 16, with differentiation
of provisions being provided for different commodities under Article 17 of
Decision no. 1/1999. The development of the Euro-Med agreements has not,
however, been without controversy, with one case to date being the subject of
GATT dispute resolution, the Citrus case,403 of which more in chapter 5.
16. Conclusion
It must be reaffirmed at this stage that the focus of this thesis is on the
impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture on the EC Common Agricultural
Policy, this particular discourse, started in chapter 2, and to be further developed
in the fourth and subsequent chapters of the thesis. Nevertheless the areas covered
in chapter 3 form the backdrop against which this interaction between the
agricultural provisions at the WTO and the EC operates, and affects the reality of
that interaction. It is acknowledged that many of the topics covered in this chapter
could merit a PhD in themselves. However constraints of time and space have
necessitated a limited acknowledgement of these issues, and their impact on the
focus of this particular thesis. While the areas of EC law covered have already
either been strongly influenced by WTO agreements or the WTO Dispute
Settlement Procedure, not all of the relevant issues have as yet been clarified. It is
to be expected that issues such as the EC GSP and Cotonou Agreements will
continue to have an impact on the reality of global trade patterns in agricultural
commodities; the expiration of the Cotonou waiver or the continuing evolution of
401 Article 11 of Decision No. 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 25 October 1999.
402 Article 10 of Decision No. 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 25 October 1999.
403
European Communities - TariffPreferences to Citrus Products ofcertain countries in the
Mediterranean Region (request for negotiations 8th August 1980, L5012).
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the Euro-Med agreements will raise issues at the WTO again in the future. In
addition, while the issue of export credit insurance has yet to feature in a WTO
agreement, many of the other issues covered in this chapter may well be affected
by the ongoing Millennium round of negotiations at the WTO, as their relevant
GATT agreements are subject to scrutiny. The core WTO agreements dealing
with agricultural commodities, together with their history and context will be
examined in the next chapter, with the evolving body of caselaw of the WTO, and
its predecessor, GATT 47 being examined in chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture; its history and context
1. Introduction
2. GATT 1947 and its development
2.1 Kennedy Round
2.2 Tokyo Round
2.3 Preparation for the Uruguay Round
3. History of Agriculture at GATT
4. GATT 1947 and Agriculture; getting down to business
4.1 GATT Committee II
4.2 US and EEC position
4.3 The Kennedy Round (1964 to 1967)
4.4 The Tokyo Round (1973 -79)
4.5 the lead up to the Uruguay Round
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1.1 Introduction
1.2 WTO Institutional Structure
1.3 TPRM
1.4 Dispute Settlement
6. Agreement on Agriculture and SPS agreements
6.1 Market Access
6.2 Special Safeguard Provisions
6.3 Domestic Support Measures
6.4 Export Subsidy Commitments




The WTO Agreement on Agriculture is part of the Uruguay Round treaty
texts, and has to be read in conjunction with the balance of the Annex 1A
Agreements annexed to the Agreement establishing the WTO. In order to
understand why there is a WTO Agreement on Agriculture it is necessary to
understand why agricultural commodities are not considered to be adequately
covered by the more mainstream GATT 1994, and why its predecessor GATT
1947 failed to liberalise international trade in agricultural commodities to the
extent that it managed to liberalise the international trade in non-agricultural
commodities. It is for this purpose that an introduction to the political backdrop to
the evolution of the regulation of international trade in agricultural commodities
will comprise the first part of this chapter, with the second part of the chapter
introducing the actual contents of the WTO Agreement in Agriculture, and how it
interacts with its associated WTO agreements.
The development of the current WTO Agreement on Agriculture was
conducted against the continuing influence of the end of imperial colonialism,
with, in the case of the UK, the operation of imperial and later a commonwealth
preference system for agricultural products. This situation was reflected in the
1932 Ottawa agreement, "whereby Commonwealth imports to Great Britain
obtained preferential treatment".1 At a more global level, commodity agreements
reflected the dominant ethos of the principal trading partners,2 with wheat
becoming an important global commodity. The International Wheat Agreements,
ran from 1933 through to 1971,3 well into the GATT 1947 era, with the 1967
1
Kock, Karin; International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, Almqvist & Wiksell,
Stockholm, 1969, at page 1.
2
A list of the commodity agreements which existed over the years is set out in Annex 2 to this
thesis.
3 The International Wheat Agreements were in 1933, 1949, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1962, 1967 and
1971.
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International Wheat Agreement being agreed within the GATT framework. The
effect of a "huge wheat crop of 1928 and subsequent crop"4 had such a dramatic
effect on the then global economy that a World Monetary and Economic
Conference was called to address the problem. Newspaper headlines at the time
were along the lines of "Too Much Wheat: A Burden on the World Economy: Is
Planned Economy Inevitable?"5 The principle that higher payments to farmers
would result in less being produced, allied with the growing need for self-
sufficiency in wheat in the national interest during the period of food rationing
during and after the second World War, resulted in structures which involved
guaranteed sales and purchases, restrictions on productions, voluntary export
restraints, and measures to promote consumption. The thinking which developed
at the time strongly influenced the development of the EC's Common
Agricultural Policy, and the development of exceptions to GATT 1947 for
agricultural commodities, necessitating in due course, reform of the CAP, and at
the global level, the 1994 WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The wheat
agreements, in particular the 1942 agreement, with its origins at the Hot Springs
Conference of 1942, was "regarded as the prototype for post-War arrangements in
this and other fields"6; its "underlying principle was the fixing of maximum and
n
minimum prices on guaranteed transactions." Wheat, primarily produced by a
rich nations developed structures and mechanisms which were subsequently
adopted for other temperate zone agricultural products, to the detriment of the
developing and less-developed countries of the subsequent GATT/WTO
multilateral trading system, consequences that we are still living with today.
4 Kabir-ur-Rahman Khan, The Law and Organization of International Commodity Agreements,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982, at page 213.
5 Sir William Halane and R.J. Thomson, "Too Much Wheat: A Burden on the World Economy: Is
Planned Economy Inevitable?" The Times 28 March 1933, cited in Kabir-ur-Rahman Khan, The
Law and Organization of International Commodity Agreements, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The
Hague, 1982, at page 211, footnote no. 2.
6
Op. cit footnote no. 1 at page 34.
7 Ibid, at page 34.
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2. GATT 1947 and its development
The original proposal for a global trading system was contained in the ill-
fated Havana Charter. The Charter was substantially "based on" the proposals and
the main obligations of the " U.S. pre-War bilateral agreements".8 The Charter
was originally in five parts, one dealing with goods, "a section concerning
Employment and Economic Activity", a part dealing with "economic
development and reconstruction", one dealing with "restrictive business practices,
and "a section addressing inter-governmental commodity agreements".9 The last
part dealt with the "establishment and operation of" the proposed International
Trade Organisation (ITO), and the proposed mechanism for the settlement of
trade disputes at a global level.10 Only the first part, which dealt with goods,
entered into force, becoming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947.
A further attempt was made in 1958 with the agreement of documentation
in order to set up the Organisation for Trade Co-operation (OTC), which, as with
the earlier ITO proposal, never obtained US Congress ratification.11 The
formation of an institutional framework for world trade had to wait until the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which led to the
establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1994.12 In the meantime the
Interim Commission for the ITO, which operated as a body of the United Nations,
administered GATT 1947, receiving funding from the US via their general
contribution to the UN budget.13 Despite originating from a lack of institutional
8 Thomas & Meyer, The New Rules of Global Trade, A Guide to the World Trade Organization,
Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 1997, at page 3.
9 Ibid, at page 4, footnote no. 1.
10 Ibid, at page 4, footnote no. 1.
11
Op. cit. footnote no. 1 at page 78 et seq.
12 Pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
13
Op. cit. footnote no. 1 at page 80.
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structure the "GATT evolved over time, to have many of the attributes of an
international organization".14
The GATT developed from its original inception by way of a series of
rounds of negotiations,15 leading up to the Uruguay Round and the founding of
the WTO. The initial rounds focused on "achieving tariff reductions"16 with
subsequent rounds dealing with the accession of new contracting parties to GATT
1947. The Dillon Round (1960-61) had to grapple with the challenges to the
global trading system of the founding of the EEC, and its "common external
tariff'.17 By the time of the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds more substantive
outcomes were being achieved in the GATT negotiations, with the issue of less
developed countries beginning to come to the fore with the insertion of a new Part
IV: Trade and Development, to GATT 1947, which came into practice in 1965,
1 8
and legally into force in 1966.
2.1 Kennedy Round
The Kennedy Round was the first round at which developing countries
played an important role at the negotiations, pursuant to the aforementioned new
Part IV to GATT 1947. Negotiations no longer followed the traditional item-by-
item basis, but now followed a linear basis of negotiation, which helped to speed
up the process of the negotiations. Sectoral negotiations opened up in certain
commodity areas, which, while not substantively successful at the Kennedy round
stage, set a precedent which was to be followed in later rounds.19 In addition, non-
14
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 29.
15 1946 - Geneva, Switzerland (in parallel with negotiation of the Agreement); 1949 - Annecy,
France; 1950-51 - Torquay, England; 1955-56 - Geneva, Switzerland; 1960-61 - the "Dillon
Round" in Geneva, Switzerland; 1964-67 - the "Kennedy Round" in Geneva, Switzerland; and
1973-79 - the "Tokyo Round" in Geneva, Switzerland, Thomas & Meyer; The New Rules of
Global Trade, A Guide to the World Trade Organization, Carswell, Thomson Professional
Publishing, 1997, at page 5 et seq.
16
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 6.
17 Ibid, at page 6.
18
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 242.
19
Op. cit. footnote no.8, at page 6.
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tariff barrier issues were dealt with successfully for the first time during the
90
Kennedy Round, leading to a new Anti-dumping Code.
2.2 Tokyo Round
By the time that the Tokyo Round of negotiations, (1973 -79), was
launched in Japan, many tariffs had been "substantially reduced", and the issue of
non-tariff barriers to trade had come to the fore. With the exception of the
"Kennedy Round's Anti-dumping Code" it was with the Tokyo Round that GATT
shifted from "its traditional focus of tariff barriers to trade in goods" to the issues
of the new "Programme of Work" of "non-tariff and para-tariff barriers" to
91
international trade. In addition GATT's existing "safeguard" mechanism and
99
agriculture were also to be addressed in the Tokyo round.
Negotiations were delayed while the US delegates obtained a negotiating
mandate from the US Congress, but once started, agricultural negotiations quickly
came unstuck, and had to be abandoned in July 1977 in order to let the balance of
90
the negotiations enter the final phase of negotiations. Several new codes dealing
with non-tariff barriers were agreed,24 to include; a Subsidies code,25 an Anti-
9/r ^ ?o
dumping code, a Customs Valuation code, an Import Licensing code, a
Standards code,29 and a Government Procurement Code.30 Membership of these
codes was optional to GATT contracting parties, with some of the codes being
20
Agreement on Implementation ofArticle VI of the Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT,
BISD 15S/24.
21
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 8.
22 Ibid, at page 9.
23 Ibid, at page 9.
24 Ibid, at page 9.
25
Formally known as the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and
XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See BIS 26S/56.
26
Formally knows as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade See BISD 26S/171.
27
Formally known as the Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. See BISD 26S/116.
28
Formally known as the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures See BISD 26S/154.
29
Formally known as the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade See BISD 26S/8.
30
Formally known as the Agreement on Government Procurement. See BISD 26S/33.
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successful, and others not. Contrary to expectations, the Tokyo Round failed to
produce a "Safeguards code".31
Three sectoral agreements were also completed, namely the Agreement on
trade in Civil Aircraft, the International Dairy Arrangement and the Arrangement
Regarding Bovine Meat, with both the Meat and Dairy Agreements being mainly
"consultative in nature".32 In addition an enabling clause33 for developing
countries was agreed,34 in order to ensure that the developing block of countries
did not leave the negotiations. Balance of payments provisions were also agreed
together with an understanding on dispute settlement procedures.
The Tokyo Round was seen to be of limited success, as while "substantial
tariff negotiations had been negotiated"37 and new codes agreed, long term
problems remained outstanding at the conclusion of the round, particularly in the
area of textiles, agriculture, safeguards and voluntary export restraints (VERs). In
addition institutional matters remained outstanding. The shift in emphasis from
tariff barriers to non-tariff barriers, and from GATT 1947 to interpretative codes,
oq
"changed the character of GATT negotiations". Negotiations continued to be
bilateral, with agreements being subsequently multilateralized, using the MFN
principle.40 It is felt by some commentators that the shift to the use of the codes
"weakened the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity in dealings among
31
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 12.
32 Ibid, at page 12.
33 This clause permitted "special and differential treatment to developing countries
notwithstanding GATT's MFN obligations of Articles I and II, and allows developing countries to
enter into tariff reduction agreements amongst themselves without requiring strict compliance with
GATT Article XXIV"; Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 10, footnote no. 18.
34 Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, BISD 26S/203.
35 Declaration on Trade measures Taken for Balance-of -Payments Purposes, BISD 26S/205.
36 The Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance,
BISD 26S/210.
37
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 12.
38 Ibid, at page 12.
39 Robertson, David; GATT Rules for Emergency Protection, Trade Policy Research Centre, 1992,
at page 13.
40 Ibid, at page 13.
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contracting parties" under GATT.41 Use of Article XXIV, which permitted
customs unions and free trade areas, had developed to a high level by the Tokyo
Round, and it was felt by the advocates of globalisation over regionalisation that
the MFN principle was being increasingly watered down.42 In addition, the Tokyo
Round interpretative codes, unlike those of the subsequent Uruguay Round, were
not universally applied. They were "designed to lie outside the General
Agreement", and, in the absence of "a requirement that signatories have to apply
their provisions to all GATT contracting parties" distorted the MFN concept.43
2.3 Preparation for the Uruguay Round
Preparations for the Uruguay Round involved a substantial revision of the
1979 Work Programme, with the United States insisting, "in the face of extensive
reluctance from many developing countries" that trade in counterfeit goods and
trade in services be included.44 Two groups formed in the run up to the Uruguay
Round, the G9,45 which supported the concept of a new round of talks, and the
G10,46 which did not. The G9 viewpoint prevailed. Issues of continuing concern
in the run up to the Uruguay Round included "safeguards, dispute settlement,
agriculture, textiles and clothing, tariff and non-tariff barriers".47 The Leutwiler
group, which produced a report, entitled "Trade Policies for a Better Future:
Proposals for Action", in 1985, was instrumental in getting the new round of
40
negotiations off the ground. The Leutwiler Report played "a pivotal role in
41 Ibid, at page 14.
42 Ibid, at page 14.
43 Ibid, at page 14.
44
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 13.
45 Australia, Canada New Zealand and the EFTA countries of Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Sweden and Switzerland.
46
Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Yugoslavia.
47
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 13.
48 The 15 recommendations of the Leutwiler Report were;"-trade in agricultural goods and textiles
and clothing needed to be brought within basic GATT rules;
-all voluntary export restraints should be eliminated and prohibited, and the rules concerning
safeguards improved and followed; -rules concerning subsidies needed to be improved; -the
existing Tokyo Round Codes needed to be improved; -disciplines concerning customs unions and
free trade areas needed to be revised and improved; -new rules concerning trade in services should
be explored; -rules concerning dispute settlement needed to be strengthened; -a new and
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moving the process forward" and most of its recommendations "found their way
onto the Uruguay Round's negotiating agenda".49 The final Uruguay Round texts
were eventually signed, after highly tortured negotiations, in Marrakech,
Morocco, April 1994, and duly entered into force on the 1st January 1995, with
countries committing themselves to re-launching trade negotiations by the year
2000.50
3. History of Agriculture at GATT
The USA emerged from World War II with the Second War Powers Act
of 1942 still in place. This piece of legislation operated quotas on imports of
agricultural goods into the US, together with "domestic programmes ....for
certain fats, oils and rice, primarily as measures to aid in the distribution of
products that were in short supply, or to assist in the orderly liquidation of
temporary government-owned surpluses."51 Section 2252 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 dealt with quantitative imports of commodities such as
"cotton, wheat and wheat flour," which were receiving support within the US.53
Support and protection for farming had become the norm in industrialised
countries due to the "heavy fall in agricultural world market prices during the
inter-war period".54 This support typically ranged from the purchase by
government agencies of surplus produce, compulsory restrictions on production,
permanent Ministerial-level body needed to be established; and -a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations should be launched to address these outstanding issues". Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at
page 14.
9
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 14.
50 Article 20 of the GATT texts confirms that one year after the end of the implementation of the
GATT 1995 negotiations are to restart on the next GATT/WTO agreement. The implementation
period, as defined in Article 1(f) is the six year period commencing in the year 1995 except that,
for the purposes of Article 13, it means the nine year period commencing in 1995.
51
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 162.
52 For the text of section 22 of the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, See Annex 3 to this
thesis.
53
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 162.
54 Ibid, at page 160.
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together with "quantitative import regulations" and export subsidies.55 In addition
direct payments were made to farmers, to differing extents in different countries,
in order to protect them from the "fall in world market prices".56
The inter-War provisions, despite having been modified for the period
during the second World War, were still in place during the negotiating period
leading up to the agreement ofGATT 1947 and the ill fated Havana Charter.
When it became clear that GATT 1947 was to be the only part of the agreed
documents to come into operation, the Contracting Parties decided that when
members signed the agreement, that they could "make a reservation for existing
legislation", and that they should endeavour to ensure that national legislation was
in "complete conformity" with the provisions of the agreement as soon as
CO
possible. This provision for existing legislation became of special importance
for agricultural products.59 It had been intended that no differentiation would be
made between agricultural and industrial products, however, as none of the
negotiating countries was prepared to abandon their special support programmes
for agriculture, which in many cases, had, since the War years, become
"permanently integrated into the general economic and social policy of the
welfare state",60 it was accepted that a compromise had to be made, with Article
XI GATT, on the elimination of quantitative restrictions, together with its
agricultural exception at 2.c, being the result.
As referred to earlier in this chapter, multi-lateral global trade in
Agricultural products had traditionally been regulated by commodity
agreements.61 Commodity agreements usually were set up by commodity
55 Ibid, at page 160.
56 Ibid, at page 160.
57 Ibid, at page 160.
58 Ibid, at page 162 et seq.
59 Ibid, at page 162 et seq.
60 Ibid, at page 161.
61 UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) covers; cocoa beans, coffee, sugar,
tea, cotton and cotton yam, hard fibres and products, jute and manufactures, natural rubber, copper
and tin, bananas, beef, vegetable oils and oilseeds, timber (non-coniferous), bauxite, iron ore,
manganese ore and phospate rock.
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producers with a view to maintaining prices of the goods supplied to the market.
Only rarely were the commodity agreements the result of an agreement by both
the suppliers and the consumers of the particular product concerned. At the
London Monetary and Economic Conference of 1933, held under the aegis of the
f\9
League of Nations, the desirability of commodity agreements, which by then
had existed for some time, was questioned in anything other than the abnormal
trading circumstances then prevalent in the western world. The onset ofWorld
War II made many commodity agreements inoperable; however, with the return
of peace, commodity agreements were seen as a method of avoiding the "wide
and wild price fluctuations" of the 1930's, and were seen as having a role as
"quantitative control schemes aimed solely at increasing the price of the
commodity in question".63 It is for this reason that at the Annecy session64 of the
GATT negotiations it had been suggested that the provisions of the Havana
Charter dealing with commodity agreements65 be ratified in advance of the
balance of the Charter. Again this proposal encountered problems with the US
ratification process.66
The GATT Contracting Parties did recognise that commodity agreements
came within the competence ofGATT, and annual reports "on developments in
raw material markets" from the Chairman of the Interim Co-ordinating
Committee for International Commodity Arrangements (ICCICA) were
submitted to GATT, however GATT did not take an active part in commodity
agreements until the Kennedy Round of negotiations.68
62 Which the US attended and actively participated in, particularly to advocate the setting up of a
copper commodity agreement.
63 Raffaeli Marcelo; "Rise and Demise of Commodity Agreements", Woodhead Publishing
Limited. Cambridge, England, 1995, at page 3.
64 In 1948.
65
Chapter VI of the Havana Charter.
66
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 165.
67 Set up by the UN's Economic and Social Council in 1947.
68
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 166.
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Once GATT 1947 came into operation agricultural issues quickly came to
the fore. The US delegates to GATT were regularly questioned and reprimanded
on the state of the United States' domestic agricultural policy, while Western
European countries continued as they always had done, operating the defence that
they had balance-of-payments difficulties.69 By the mid 1950's Western Europe's
balance-of-payments situation had improved, and the domestic agricultural
policies of these GATT member states came more clearly into focus, in particular
West German agricultural policy.
The late 1950's brought a new factor to play in agricultural protectionism,
the development of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC, with Dr.
Mansholt representing the EEC at the thirteenth session of the GATT, which ran
70
from October to November 1958. The Haberler report on Agriculture was also
presented to the GATT Contracting Parties at the thirteenth session. Professor
Haberler had been asked to conduct an expert group investigation into "'past and
current international trade trends and their implications'71 with special reference
to certain factors, amongst them the widespread resort to agricultural
protection".72
Mansholt was quite critical of the Haberler report in his submission to the
GATT session, taking the view that agricultural issues could not be addressed by
"creating so-called free trade" and that what was required was a "code of
agricultural policy".74 The thirteenth session set up a number of special
committees to investigate ongoing problems,75 amongst them Committee II which
was to deal with Agricultural problems. This eventually fed into the Kennedy
69 Ibid, at page 166 et seq.
70 The Haberler Report: Trends in International Trade. A Report by a Panel of Experts. Geneva,
October 1958.
71
BISD, Sixth Suppl. 1958, p. 18.
72
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 171.
73 Ibid, at page 170.
74 Ibid, at page 170, quoting from Press Release GATT/402, October 25, 1958.
75 Committee I deal with the issue of further reductions in tariffs, Committee n, non-tariff
measures affecting and protecting agricultural production, and Committee III, the maintenance and
expansion of the export-earnings of less-developed countries. Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 86.
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Round of negotiations, (1964-67), as much of the next round of negotiations, the
Dillon Round, (1960-61), was spent dealing with the repercussions of the newly
created EEC, and its "Common External Tariff".
4. GATT 1947 and Agriculture; getting down to business
4.1 GATT Committee II
The issue of subsidies generally had arisen during the 1955 revision of
GATT, the agreement being that there would be a "gradual elimination of
subsidies on products other than primary products".76 Most contracting parties
however, held the view that their agricultural support programmes should
77
continue in existence. This reluctance to admit that domestic agricultural
provisions were the subject matter ofGATT remained a barrier to multi-lateral
trade in agricultural commodities. As a consequence the GATT Committee II,
which was set up in 1958, had a very wide remit. This included the "use of non-
tariff measures", underlying domestic agricultural policies, the "adequateness" of
GATT 1947 for the promotion of international trade in agricultural commodities,
and a "study of procedures for consultations among member countries on
70
agricultural problems as they affect trade", with the main focus of the
Committee being on agricultural protection of products produced in temperate
7Q
zones. Specific commodities given priority were "cereals, dairy products, meat,
o0
sugar, fish and vegetable oils". The report of the Committee formed the basis for
further negotiations, particularly the Kennedy Round. In addition, in 1961 the
GATT Council was authorised to set up preparatory groups for particular
o 1
commodities, two of which were set up, one for meat, and one cereals.
76
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 157.
77 Ibid, at page 158.
78 Ibid, at page 171.
79 Ibid, at page 172.
80 Ibid, at page 172.
81 Ibid, at page 176.
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4.2 US and EEC position
The United States sought, and obtained, in 1955 subject to conditions, an
unlimited, (in scope and time), waiver from import fees and quota provisions of
GATT 1947 for 21 commodity groups, to allow for its existing price-support
provisions under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933.83
Contracting parties who objected to the US exemptions retained the right to
retaliate, a provision which the Netherlands made extended use of in subsequent
years.84 The US War Powers Act 194285 expired in 1951, however the existing
import restrictions were adopted by the Defence Production Act 1950,86 section
104 of which giving the necessary powers to the Secretary of Agriculture to
impose "import controls on agricultural products", to include the powers
contained in the earlier War Powers Act. The provisions of section 104 were
clearly contrary to the provisions of GATT 1947, however they remained in force
until the 30th June 1953,87 with section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
continuing to operate to impose "restrictions of dairy products" and edible tree
oo
nuts after that date. To add insult to injury, the US enacted the Trade
Agreements Extension Act in 1951.89 This provided that "no trade agreement or
other international agreement entered into by the United States might be applied
in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of section 22 of the Agricultural
82
Applied to only nine of those commodities from 1954/5.
83 The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 "provided the basic legislative framework for the New
Deal agricultural relief programs" until its production control elements were deemed
unconstitutional in the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Butler, 297, U.S. Reports 1
(1936). This case left the "federal government's power in the fields of marketing agreements and
purchases for surplus removal" intact. Meyer, Pedersen, Thorson and Davidson, Agricultural Law,
West Publishing, Minnesota, US 1985, at pages 21 and 24 respectively.
84
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 93.
85 Which as referred to earlier in this chapter, operated quotas on the import of agricultural goods,
and organised the price support of certain commodities.
86 This act came into force on the 31st July 1951.
87
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 163.
88 Ibid, at page 163.
89 Which inter alia "prohibited granting MFN treatment to imports from countries controlled by
the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement" Leah
A. Haus: Globalizing the GATT; The Soviet Union's Successor States, Eastern Europe, and the
International Trading System, The Brookings Institute, Washington D.C.1992.
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Adjustment Act",90 Congress thereby thumbing its nose at GATT 1947. Against
the backdrop of this unhappy situation of US protectionism the Kennedy Round
of negotiations opened in 1964.
For its part the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) had come into
operation in 1963, with the final decision on the nature of the CAP being taken in
January 1966. The founding of the EEC in 1957 caused much upset amongst
advocates of the multi-lateral trading system epitomised by GATT 1947,91
however GATT managed to adjust sufficiently under the Dillon Round to
accommodate the EEC. The delay in the commencement of the CAP of the EEC
had a major impact on the Kennedy Round,92 which was contemporaneous.93
4.3 The Kennedy Round (1964 to 1967)
By the time of the Kennedy Round agricultural exports were the "most
important single export" of the United States, which was very much in favour of
liberalising global agricultural trade, as reflected in the provisions of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962. This act contradictorily retained in force section 22 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, which required Congress approval for international
• i • • 94
agreements within its remit.
While the results of the Kennedy Round were limited, they were accepted
by the US.95 The most important commodities negotiated were cereals, meat and
butter, with neither the meat nor butter negotiations being reflected in the final
texts. The negotiations on wheat led to an agreement between the Contracting
Parties to re-negotiate the International Wheat Agreement, the first entry by
90
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 162.
91 See in particular Royer, Jean, "World Trade: The Danger of regionalism", Lloyds Bank Review,
No. 66, October 1962, quoted in International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967, by Karin
Kock, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, 1969, at page 132.
92 1964-67.
93
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 127 et seq.
94 Ibid, at page 176.
95 Ibid, at page 182.
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GATT into the realm of Commodity Agreements. The International Wheat
Agreement was later dealt with at a "world-wide conference in the autumn of
1967".96
Little progress was made on the area of Agricultural protectionism at the
Kennedy Round, with the US still utilising its GATT waiver for four commodities
at its conclusion, "sugar, wheat, peanuts and dairy products".97 In addition,
despite the advocacy of the U.S. of agricultural trade liberalisation during the
GATT negotiations, immediately after the Kennedy round, the United States
introduced protection measures for dairy products, which were globally a very
sensitive product at the time. Matters therefore had not progressed much in the
lead up to the Tokyo Round.
4.4 The Tokyo Round (1973-79)
While the Tokyo Round continued the process of tariff reduction, much of
no
the emphasis of the Round was on the "rules of trade policy", with the focus
being more on technical standards, customs valuation procedures and import
licensing. Also covered were "new interpretative codes on subsides and
countervailing duties and emergency protection under Article XIX"99 together
with changes to the Anti-dumping code. It was felt however that the specific
problems of agriculture had not been addressed, despite the fact that an average
reduction in customs duties of 33% was agreed to be implemented "over a seven-
year period from 1 January 1980" for a "small number of agricultural
96 Ibid, at page 182.
97
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 71, footnote no. 32.
98
Op. cit. footnote no. 39, at page 13.
99 Ibid, at page 13.
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products".100 Two specific agricultural commodities were, however, addressed,
namely bovine meat101 and dairy products.102
4.5 The lead up to the Uruguay Round
Two major factors brought Agriculture centre stage during the Uruguay
Round of negotiations. The "Export Subsidy War" between the US and the EC,
which broke out in 1986 formed the backdrop of the Uruguay Round negotiations.
In addition, coinciding with the commencement of the Uruguay round of
negotiations the OCED was also addressing the issue of international agricultural
policies,103 under what was termed the 'Trade Mandate".104 This examined the
assistance granted to producers by various national governments under all their
various guises. These aids were termed by the OECD as "Producer Subsidy
Equivalents". The Mandate Report introduced the discussion of agricultural trade
into a new era, opening up a true international discussion of national policies. The
negotiations were not easy, and agriculture threatened to bring the whole round to
breaking point. While the unofficial power house during the GATT negotiations,
and in the early WTO, was the quad group,105 the main protagonists at the
Uruguay Round in the area of Agriculture were the United States, the European
Community, and what became known as the Cairns Group.106
In December 1991 the then GATT Director General, Arthur Dunkell
drafted a proposed final act, (the so called Dunkell draft), which was adopted
100
Delcros, Fabian; The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization; State of
Play at the Start of Negotiations, Journal of World Trade 36(2), 219-253, 2002, at page 224,
footnote no. 11.
101 Under the International Bovine Meat Agreement, which set up the International Meat Council.
GATT Treaty Texts, Booklet 8 July 1995, and the Official Journal of the European Communities,
OJ [1980] L 71/7.
102 The International Dairy Agreement, GATT Treaty Texts, Booklet 10(c), issued December
1995, which set up the International Dairy Products Council GATT Treaty Texts, Booklet 8 July
1995, and the Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ [ 1980] L 71 /11.
103 From 1982 to 1987.
104 Which was supervised jointly by the Agriculture and Trade Committees.
105 United States, European Union, Japan and Canada.
106
1. Argentina, 2. Australia, 3. Brazil, 4. Canada, 5. Chile, 6. Colombia, 7. Fiji, 8. Hungary, 9.
Indonesia, 10. Malaysia, 11. New Zealand, 12. The Philippines, 13. Thailand, 14. Uruguay.
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substantially modified at Blair House in November 1992. A subsequent French
refusal required a revamping of the Blair House accord,107 which later became the
adopted text. The final agreement between these parties, to be applied to the




and 4. Food Security (to encourage stockpiling instead of trade protection, to
achieve food security objectives).
5. Nature of WTO Legal structure and how it operates
5.1 Introduction
GATT 1994 is the key document in Annex 1 A, which deals with goods,
to which the tariff schedules of the Member States of the WTO are attached by
virtue of the Marrakesh Protocol.108 Tariff reductions for food and agricultural
products are to be made according to the reductions negotiated pursuant to the
Agreement on Agriculture.109 GATT 1994, while it relies heavily on GATT 1947,
is legally distinct from GATT 1947, as provided for in Article 11:4 of the WTO
agreement. Separate membership and ratification ofGATT 1994 is therefore
required.110 GATT 1994 is comprised of "a combination of most of the important
elements of GATT 1947 "together with "many additional 'understandings'" which
were agreed at the Uruguay Round of negotiations",111 all of which are Annex IA
documents. These are integrated into GATT 1994 by virtue of Article 1(a) GATT
1994.
107 Schott, Jeffrey J. assisted by Buurman, Johanna W., The Uruguay Round: an Assessment,
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 1994, at page 45 et seq.
108 Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.
109
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 75 et seq.
110 Ibid, at page 36.
111 Ibid, at page 52.
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The Protocol of Provisional Application, which comprised part ofGATT
1947, does not form part of GATT 1994. GATT 1947 had four main elements:
Part I, which covered Articles I and II, dealt with Most Favoured Nation (MFN),
obligations to cut tariffs, which were to be implemented without "grandfather
rights". Grandfather rights were rights contained in the "1947 Protocol of
112Provisional Application (PPA), to exempt from GATT rules legislation in a
country which preceded the signing of the GATT by the country in question".113
Part II ofGATT 1947, which covered Articles III -XXIII contained most of the
detailed obligations (which were to be implemented with a PPA exception
allowing grandfather rights). Part III of the agreement covered articles XXIV-
XXXIV, and was primarily procedural, to be fully implemented without a
grandfather rights exception. Part IV of GATT 1947, covering Articles XXXV-
XXXVIII related to special status within the GATT of developing countries.
From a legal perspective, GATT 1947 never came into force in its own
right, but operated only as a provisional agreement, on the basis of the Protocol of
Provisional Application. This protocol was signed up to by the original GATT
1947 signatories on the basis that the terms of GATT 1947 would operate only "to
the extent that it was not inconsistent with then-existing legislation".114 Any
national legislation which was inconsistent with GATT 1947 was "grandfathered"
under the Protocol for Provisional Application, for original signatories, and
"grandfathered" for acceding members, in their protocols of accession.
Grandfather rights exempted national legislation in breach of GATT 1947 from
GATT provisions. Whether an issue had been grandfathered was the subject of a
number of GATT disputes.115 These grandfather rights did not survive GATT
112
The Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) provided the long standing "provisional rules"
by which GATT 1947 was to be administered in the absence of the International Trade
Organisation, which did not come into being due to the failure to ratify the Havana Charter.
113
Evans, Phillip and Walsh, James; The EUI guide to the new GATT; The Economist
Intelligence Unit, 1994.
114
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 53, footnote no. 5.
115 Ibid, at page 53, footnote no. 5.
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1994,116 with the sole exception of the Article 3 GATT 1994 exception for US
117
cabotage regulation contained in the US Merchant Marine Act, 1920, known
also as the Jones Act.118 The issue of language is dealt with in Article 2.c GATT
1994, which provides that the GATT texts are equally authentic in the English,
French and Spanish languages.
The Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods, a very brief document
found in Annex I A, provides that; "In the event of conflict between a provision of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and a provision of another
agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organisation (referred to in the agreements in Annex 1A as the "WTO
Agreement"), the provisions of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of
the conflict". Such a situation could arise with regard to agricultural goods, when
Article XI:2 (c.) GATT 1947 and the Agreement on Agriculture are compared.
The Agreement on Agriculture would prevail such a circumstance.119
The Annex 1A agreements, along with those of the other annexes, are
190
administered by the WTO institutional mechanism. The WTO has as its
objectives, as set out in Article III of the Agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization, the facilitation of the "implementation, administration and
operation," and the furtherance of the objectives of the WTO agreement and the
Multilateral Trade Agreements. The WTO is also to provide a framework "for the
implementation, administration and operation of the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements", which are annexed to the WTO agreement in Annex 2. It also
operates as a forum for negotiations, and it administers the Dispute Settlement
116
Although it could be argued that the GATS agreement has been extensively grandfathered. See
chapter 8 for a discussion on the GATS, and its impact on the global trade in agricultural
commodities.
117 Which continues to be subject to regular WTO reporting and review.
118 Article 27 of the Merchant Marine Act 1920 "generally restricts maritime cabotage within the
US to vessels built, owned and registered in the U.S., and staffed by U.S. citizens"; Op. cit.
footnote no. 8, at page 54.
119
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 71.
120 The institutions of the WTO are set out more fully in Table II, which was obtained from the
WTO website, attached to the end this chapter.
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Understanding (DSU), which is in Annex 2 of the WTO agreement, and the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM), which is in Annex 3 of the WTO agreement.
In addition the WTO is required to co-operate, "as appropriate, with the
International Monetary Fund and with the International Bank for Reconstruction
191
and Development and its affiliated agencies". This latter role of the WTO is
reinforced by the Uruguay Round Ministerial Declaration on the Contribution of
the World Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global
199
Economic Policymaking. Co-operative agreements have since been signed by
the WTO with the IMF and the World Bank.123
5.2 WTO Institutional Structure
The WTO has a "common institutional framework",124 which comprises at
125its head, the Ministerial Conference, under which operates the General Council,
the General Council meeting as the Trade Policy Review Body, the General
Council meeting as the Dispute Settlement Body,126 and the Trade Negotiations
127Committee. The Ministerial Conference meets at least once every two years,
with both the Ministerial Conference and the General Council being empowered
to adopt interpretations of both the WTO Agreement and the multilateral trade
agreements. In the case of Annex I agreements this will be on the basis of a
recommendation of the Council "overseeing the functioning of that
Agreement".128 Adoption must achieve three-fourths majority of the relevant body
in order to succeed.129
121 Article 111:5 Agreement establishing theWorld Trade Organization.
122
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 36 at footnote no. 20.
123 Ibid, at page 36 at footnote no. 20.
124 Article 11:1 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
125 Under which operate a long list of institutions, amongst them the Council for Trade in Goods,
to which the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures are answerable.
126 Under which operates the Dispute Panels and the Appellate Body of the WTO.
127 Article IV Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation.
128 Article IX:2 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation.
129 Article IX Agreement establishing the world Trade Organisation.
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Decisions are taken at the WTO pursuant to Article IX of the Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization, which provides that the normal
process for making decisions will be by way of consensus. If consensus cannot be
reached, then a vote will be taken, with each member state having one vote, with
either the EC or its member states voting, and then the EC having as many votes
as it has members, if it is the EC which votes.130 Decisions will then be taken on
the basis of "a majority of the vote cast, unless otherwise provided in (the WTO)
Agreement or in the relevant Multilateral Trade Agreement".131 If an issue arises
under the Plurilateral Agreements then the matter is to be governed by the
provisions of those agreements.132 If members request plurilateral agreements to




Annex 3 of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation
provides for the Trade Policy Review Mechanism ("TPRM"), first provisionally
agreed to at the Montreal Mid-Term Review in 1988, and adopted at the Uruguay
Round.134 The timing of the review by the WTO's Trade Policy Review Body
1 ic
depends on the importance of the Member State in the world trade context. The
130 The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization provides that majority voting, (a
three-fourths majority) will operate in four circumstances: adoption of interpretations of the
agreements by the Ministerial Conference and/or the General Council, under Article IX:2; the
waiver of a member's obligations by the Ministerial Conference, under Article IX:3; the making of
amendments to documents, depending on the document, in the absence of consensus, by
unanimity of all Members, by a three-fourths majority or by way of a two thirds majority, Article
X; and admission of new members by the Ministerial Conference, by a two-thirds majority,
Article XII:2; and by way of a two thirds majority of the General Council, the adoption of the
budget, Article VII:3.
131 Article IX: 1 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
132
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 40.
133 Pursuant to Article 10.9 of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation.
134
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 43.
135 Countries reviewed every two years include the US, the EC (and its member states), Japan and
Canada. The next sixteen largest countries are reviewed every four years, with the balance
reviewed every six years. Least developed countries can be given extensions on a case by case
basis. Annex 3:c to the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization.
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purpose of this review is to ensure compliance with WTO regulation136 and to
develop "domestic transparency of government decision-making on trade policy
matters".137 The review is conducted on the basis of two documents, one provided
by the Member State under review in accordance with Annex 3:D, and a "report,
to be drawn up by the Secretariat on its own responsibility, based on the
information available to it and that provided by the Member State concerned".138
Upon completion of these reports a meeting is held by the Trade Policy Review
Body, at which they are discussed, and the minutes of the meeting are then
published by the WTO.139 As stated by Annex 3:A, this procedure is not "intended
to serve as a basis for the enforcement of specific obligations under the
Agreements or for dispute settlement procedures" which is reserved for the
Dispute Settlement Mechanism set up under Annex 2. In addition to the review of
individual member states, or groups of states operating a "common external
policy",140 the Trade Policy Review Body will itself review the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism within five years of "the entry into force of the Agreement
Establishing the WTO",141 and at intervals thereafter, with reports being presented
to each Ministerial Conference.
5.4 Dispute Settlement
Under GATT 1947, dispute settlement provisions were limited to Articles
XXII, consultation, and XXIII GATT, which provides for "nullification or
impairment" causes of action, the usual cause of complaint between member
states of the WTO. From these two articles the pre-WTO dispute settlement
procedure was developed. The ill-fated Havana Charter had more detailed
136 Annex 3:A.
137 Annex 3.B.
138 Annex 3:C (v)(b).
139
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 44.
140 Annex 3:C (ii).
141 Annex 3:F.
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provisions, including "the more substantive procedures, including the ability to
refer interpretative issues to the International Court of Justice".142
Dispute Settlement at the WTO is pursuant to the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, which is found in Annex II of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organisation. This sets up the Dispute Settlement Body, ("DSB")143
which is "authorized to establish dispute settlement panels, adopt reports, oversee
the implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of
concessions and other obligations"144 of the WTO multilateral agreements. It also
covers disputes between the signatories of the plurilateral agreements over matters
pertaining to those plurilateral agreements. Article 3 DSU, following the model of
the Tokyo Round Understanding, sets out the basic framework of the DSU, with
further details being filled in by Articles 4 to 16 DSU. The process utilised the
inter-related procedures of "consultations, good offices, conciliation, mediation,
arbitration, panel review, and appellate review of panel determinations".145 Article
XXIII GATT, as elaborated upon by the DSU, provides for two main causes of
action before the DSU. These are violation of GATT/WTO obligations, and non¬
violation nullification and impairment actions. Section 26 DSU provides that non¬
violation nullification and impairment actions can be taken where "there is no
specific violation of a WTO obligation", but that a member state has "adopted a
measure which, although technically consistent with its WTO obligations" has the
effect of "nullifying the benefits" of another member state.146 Some of the WTO
agreements permit non-violation nullification and impairment actions. The burden
of proof is on the pursuing party in a non-violation action, unlike the violation
claim, where it is with the defending member state. The remedy in a non-violation
case is a recommendation by a panel or an appellate body of a "mutually
142
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 308.
143 Article 2 DSU.
144
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 314.
145 Ibid, at page 315.
146 Ibid, at page 326.
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satisfactory compensation", while with a violation claim, the remedy is a
requirement by the member state to "withdraw the measure at issue".147
With regard to agricultural commodities the Agreement on Agriculture
1 A O
provides at Article 19 that the usual provisions of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism shall apply to disputes concerning Agricultural commodities. The
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) has an additional provision at Article 11 SPS. It provides that in
addition to the usual rules that if the dispute concerns a scientific or technical
issue then the panel "should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in
consultation with the parties to the dispute". In addition it is possible for a panel
to "establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the relevant
international organizations, at the request of either party to the dispute or on its
own initiative".149 The panel and appellate panel findings will be examined from
an agricultural context in Chapter 5.
Article 19 DSU provides that the panel or the Appellate Body can only
"recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with
the relevant obligation".150 A decision can then be taken by the Dispute
Settlement Body under Article 20 DSU, with surveillance of the implementation
of recommendations and rulings being conducted by the DSB under Article 21
DSU. Article 22 DSU provides for the possibility for "compensation and
suspension of concessions" to be applied by the DSB in the event that "the
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of
time". This can lead to cross-sectoral retaliation, which it is felt is "likely to
147 Ibid, at page 326.
148 Article 19 provides "The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994, as elaborated
and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding, shall apply to consultations and the
settlement of disputes under this Agreement".
149 Article 11.2 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
150
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 323.
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greatly increase the deterrent effect of the retaliation option, thus improving
overall compliance with recommendations and rulings".151
6. The Agreement on Agriculture and the SPS agreements
i M
The Agreement on Agriculture covers all agricultural products found in
1
Chapters 1 through 24 of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding
System (HS).154 The HS came into force in January 1987, and was officially
adopted by GATT155 in 1992.156 Fish and fish products are not covered by this
agreement. Article 21 of the Agreement provides, unlike other WTO agreements,
that it, the Agreement on Agriculture, will take priority over the provisions of the
1 S7
other Annex 1A agreements, and that the Agreement on Dispute Settlement
1 SR
"shall apply subject to the provisions " of the Agreement on Agriculture. The
Agreement is administered by the Committee on Agriculture under Article 17 of
the Agreement.159 The Agreement on Agriculture was phased into force over a six
year period commencing in 1995. During this period of time the Member States of
the WTO began to implement the commitments specified in the schedules
attached to the Agreement in Agriculture. These commitments are not considered
profound, but rather the starting point for further negotiations as specified in
Article 20, such further negotiations having resumed in 2000.
151 Ibid, at page 325.
152 Under Article 2 and Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
153
Together with a further 13 classifications under the HS system. See further Annex 1:1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.
15 which was negotiated under the then Customs Co-ordinating Council, now referred to as the
World Customs Council The HS was discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.
155 Geneva Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, BISD 39S/3.
156
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 75, at footnote no. 37.
157 In effect all of the other agreements except the TRIPs, and GATS. Of an examination of how
TRIPs and GATS interacts with the global trade in agricultural commodities see further chapter 8.
158
Op. cit. footnote no. 100, at page 259.
159 Article 17 Agreement on Agriculture; "A Committee on Agriculture is hereby established".
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6.1 Market Access
Market access provisions are set out in Article 4 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, and are elaborated on in the schedules of each member state which
are annexed thereto. One of the major changes to international trade in
agricultural products made by the Agreement is the requirement for tariffication
of non-tariff measures restricting market access, thereby making them more
transparent. The method of calculation of the tarrification of non-tariff measures
was conducted in accordance with the formula set out in the "Agreement on
Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments under the
Reform Process, which is (contained in Annex 3 to) Part B of the Draft Final
Act's Text on Agriculture".160 Any pre-existing market access could not be
adversely affected by the tariffication exercise.
In addition to the above, Member States were required to provide "a
certain minimum degree of market access", of "at least three percent of domestic
consumption, increasing to five percent over the implementation period".1 1
Subject to specific exemptions, there could be no new or increased tariffs imposed
on agricultural products pursuant to Article 4.2 of the agreement. The duly
tariffied non-tariff commitments, after having been subject to subsequent
multilateral negotiations during the final stages of the Uruguay round, were then
set out in the Member States commitments in their schedules annexed to the
Agreement on Agriculture, thereby producing the "tariff-rate quota".162
WTO member states are required to reduce their total tariffs by "an overall
i
simple average of 36 percent over the six years of the implementation period",
with a minimum reduction for "each tariff line of 15 percent". The equivalent
160
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 77, at footnote no. 43.
161 Ibid, at page 77.
162 Ibid, at page 77.
163 Ibid, at page 77.
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commitment for developing countries was a reduction on average of twenty four
percent, with each tariff line being reduced by a minimum of ten percent over the
six years implementation period of the Agreement on Agriculture.164 Certain
exemptions are given for both developed and developing countries under Annex 5
to the agreement.
6.2 Special Safeguard Provisions
Recognising that the changes to agricultural regimes by the Agreement on
Agriculture could result in surges in trade in individual agricultural commodities,
Article 5 of the Agreement provides for Special Safeguard Provisions (SSP) for
those commodities affected. The SSP comes in two forms, one based on volume
of goods, and the other on price. Only one of these safeguards can be applied at
any one time, and neither of the SSPs can be used in conjunction with a safeguard
action under Article XIX of GATT.165 The volume based safeguard can only last
until "the end of the year in which it has been imposed",166 and can only be
triggered if the conditions set out in Article 5.4 are met. These depend on the
market access of the product in question. If the product is only gaining less than
or equal to ten per cent of market access, then the "base trigger level shall equal
125 percent". If the product is gaining access of greater than ten percent, and less
than or equal to thirty percent, then the "base trigger level shall equal 110 per
cent". If the market access of the product is greater than thirty per cent, then the
"base trigger levels shall equal 105 per cent". Paragraph 4 of Article 5 goes on to
elaborate how the actual quantity of additional duty is to be calculated.
The second SSP measure is one based on price, as is set out in Article
5.1.b. The exercise of this special safeguard provision is to be "determined on the
basis of the c.i.f. import price of the shipment concerned expressed in terms of its
domestic currency", should that price fall "below a trigger price equal to the
164 Ibid, at page 77, at footnote no. 42.
165 Ibid, at page 78.
166 Article 5.4 Agreement on Agriculture.
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average 1986 to 1988 reference price for the product concerned".167 The actual
quantity of the additional duty to be imposed in these circumstances is to be
calculated in accordance with Article 5.5 of the Agreement.168
The SSP approach of the implementation of additional duties, as opposed
to the utilisation of quantitative restrictions, adds to the transparency of the
measures and is in line with the suggestions of the 1985 Leutwiler Report.169 The
SSPs of the Agreement on Agriculture differ considerably from the provisions of
the Agreement on Safeguards, which is also a document in Annex 1A of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. Unlike the Agreement on
Safeguards provisions, and the other sectoral specific safeguard, that of Article 6
of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the SSP does not require "an
170
importing member to prove serious injury or causation" in order to be activated,
but merely the volume of goods or price triggers outlined above. In addition
because of the short period of time in which the SSP is to operate, "until the end
171
of the year in which it has been imposed", there is no provision for provisional
measures or mid-term reviews as are provided for the ordinary safeguard
179
provisions in the Agreement on Safeguards.
167 Article 5.1.b. The reference price is further elaborated on in a footnote. This provides that; "The
reference price used to invoke the provisions of this subparagraph shall, in general, be the average
c.i.f. unit value of the product concerned, or otherwise shall be an appropriate price in terms of the
quality of the product and its stage of processing. It shall, following its initial use, be publicly
specified and available to the extent necessary to allow other Members to access the additional
duty that may be levied".
168 1. c.i.f. import price "expressed in terms of the domestic currency" - trigger price c 10% => no
additional duty is to be imposed (a.)
2. c.i.f. import price "expressed in terms of the domestic currency" - trigger price 10% c 40% =>
additional duty = 30% of the amount by which the difference exceeds 10% (b.)
3. c.i.f. import price "expressed in terms of the domestic currency" - trigger price 40% c 60% =>
additional duty = 50% of the amount by which the difference exceeds 40% + (2.).
4. c.i.f. import price "expressed in terms of the domestic currency" - trigger price 60% c: 75% =>
additional duty = 70% of the amount by which the difference exceeds 60%, + (2.) + (3.).
5. c.i.f. import price "expressed in terms of the domestic currency" - trigger price > 75% =>
additional duty = 90% of the amount by which the difference exceeds 75%, + (2.)+ (3.) + (4.).
169
Mah, Jai S.; Reflections on the Special Safeguard Provision in the Agreement on Agriculture of
the WTO Journal ofWorld Trade 33 (5): 197-204, 1999, at page 198.
170 Ibid, at page 199.
171 Article 5.4 Agreement on Agriculture.
172
Op. cit. footnote no. 169, at page 200.
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6.3 Domestic Support Measures
Another major change to the global trade in agricultural products was
effected by the commitments in Articles 3, 6 and 7 of the Agreement on
Agriculture with regard to domestic support measures. This was done by way of
calculation173 of Aggregate Measures of Support (AMS),174 together with
commitments to their reduction.175 Full details as to how each member calculated
their AMS as set out in its schedule to the agreement "are to be found in the Draft
Final Act's Text on Agriculture, Part B", which comprises the Agreement on
Modalities for the Establishment of Specific Binding Commitments Under the
Reform Programme) at paragraphs 8, 9 and 10, and in Annexes 5 and 6 to Part
B.176
The AMS adopted by the Agreement on Agriculture were based on the
OECD measurement of Producer Subsidy Equivalent. AMS are defined at Article
1 (h) "as the sum of all domestic support provided in favour of agricultural
producers, calculated as the sum of all aggregate measurements of support for
basic agricultural products, all non product specific aggregate measurements of
support and all equivalent measurements of support for agricultural products."
Article 6.4 (de minimis provisions), Article 6.5 (production limiting provisions)
and Annex 2 ("green box" provisions) to the Agreement on Agriculture all
provide exemptions to the AMS calculation on condition that they meet two
criteria. The payments must be "government, rather than consumer financed, and
i nn
they cannot be in the form of a price support to producers". Member States are
not permitted to add to those measures in existence at the date of the conclusion
1 no
of the Agreement on Agriculture, and there can equally be no increase in any
173 Pursuant to Annex 3 of the Agreement on Agriculture for Aggregate Measures of Support, and
Annex 4 for Equivalent Measures of Support.
174
Aggregate Measures of Support are defined in Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
175 As per Article 3 and 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture, and part IV of each member's schedule
attached thereto.
176
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 80, footnote no. 49.
177 Ibid, at page 81.
178 Article 3.3 Agreement on Agriculture.
180
179
particular support measure since that date. Aggregate Measures of Support are
subject to reduction commitments pursuant to "the domestic support reduction
commitments of each Member contained in Part IV of its Schedule".180
The Annex 2 exemptions are colloquially referred to as "green box"
provisions, on the basis that they tend to be environmental in nature, and are non-,
or minimally-, trade distorting. The key point about green box payments is that
they "involve a decoupling of the financial or other support being provided to the
producer from commodity prices or production levels".181 Further exemptions are
available under Annex 5 where Member States agree not to "maintain, resort to,
or revert to any measures of the kind which have even required to be converted
into ordinary customs duties" in respect of primary agricultural products, subject
to special safeguard provisions, provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5 of the
agreement. This has resulted in a refocusing of national and EC payments to
farmers towards income supplements, and away from direct production
subsidies.182 This trend can be further evidenced by the EC's CAP mid-term
review provisions, which are analysed in chapter 8.
Provisions qualifying for "green box" status, being fully decoupled
payments, were treated in a privileged manner. Article 13 of the Agreement on
Agriculture, known as the Peace Clause, provided that provisions of domestic
support that conformed fully to the provisions set out in Annex 2 to the Treaty,
are to be exempt from various provisions. They were not to be actionable for the
purposes of countervailing duties, and were also to be exempt from actions based
on Article XVI of GATT 1994, Part III of the Subsidies Agreement, and further,
(amongst other exemptions), are to be exempt from "actions based on non
violation, nullification, or impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions
accruing to another Member under Article II ofGATT 1994, in the sense of
179 Article 7 Agreement on Agriculture.
180 Article 6.1 Agreement on Agriculture.
181
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 81.
182
Op. cit. footnote no. 107, at page 49.
181
paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII of GATT 1994".183 This was an important added
protection for green box measures, and is also aimed at reducing the workload of
the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism. The Peace Clause has however, since
expired, with a discussion as to possible consequences of same being made in
chapter 7.
6.4 Export Subsidy Commitments
Export Subsidy Commitments were also made subject to reduction
commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture. An export subsidy is defined in
Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture as "subsidies contingent upon export
performance, including the export subsidies listed in Article 9 of this Agreement".
The Article 9 list includes "programmes such as direct export subsidies, internal
transport subsidies granted to export shipments, marketing subsidies, below
1 84
market price disposal programmes, and producer-financed export subsidies".
Article 8 restricts the use of export subsidies, as does Article 3.3 of the
Agreement. These provisions are reinforced by the provisions of Article 10,
which deals with prevention of circumvention of export subsidy commitments,
and Article 11, which deals with incorporated products.
Article 10 also includes that an undertaking by Member States to "work
toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines to govern the
provision of export credits, export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, and,
after agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits, export credit
guarantees or insurance programmes only in conformity therewith". This will
limit the possibility of these tools being used as a form of export subsidy. The
issue of food aid is also addressed in paragraph 4. Member States undertake only
to provide food aid "in accordance with certain agreed to principles, and to endure
183 For more details as to the exemptions granted to qualifying provisions see Article 23 of GATT
1994.
184
Op. cit. footnote 8, at page 81.
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that such aid is not, directly or indirectly, tied to commercial exports of
agricultural products."185
WTO member state export subsidy reduction commitments are found in
the draft final act. These commitments require members to "reduce export
subsides by 36 percent in monetary and budgetary terms, and by 21 percent in
1 86
volume terms". The base level for these calculations is normally that which
"existed during the 1986 to 1990 period".187 Individual Member States'
commitments are laid out in each Member's Schedule, as per Article 9(2)(a) of the
Agreement, which "sets out the maximum budgetary and volume amounts for
1 oo
every produce group for each year of the implementation period". These limits
are annual limits for export subsidies that a Member can grant. If a product was
not subsidised at the date of the Agreement, the Agreement also prevents the
1 8Q
granting of any new export subsidy on any product. Article 13 (c.) of the
Agreement on Agriculture, known as the "peace clause," provides that if a
subsidy fully conforms with the provisions of Part V of that Agreement then it is
to be protected from the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.190 As noted, however, Article 13(c) expired on the 31st
December 2003,191 bringing the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
measures into the WTO legislative framework in the context of agricultural
commodities.192
85 Ibid, at page 83.
86 Ibid, at page 82.
87 Ibid, at page 82.
88 Ibid, at page 82.
89 Ibid, at page 82.
90
Op. cit. footnote no. 100, at page 249.
91 Of which more in chapter 7.
92 See further chapter 7.
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6.5 The SPS Agreement
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement),193 also found in Annex 1A to the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organisation, is referred to in Article 14 of the
Agreement on Agriculture.194 This is an important agreement in the area of
agricultural trade, ensuring that the application to national sanitary and
phytosanitary measures, a traditional tool in international trade, can continue, in
order to "protect human, animal or plant life or health", but cannot be employed
as unjustifiable non-tariff barriers, protecting domestic production from import
competition.195 SPS measures must not, however, be used unnecessarily or
excessively for protectionist measures. The SPS Agreement does not specify SPS
measures themselves, relying rather on standards set out by the international
scientific bodies of the Codex Alimentarius Commission,196 the International
Office of Epizootics,197 and the various bodies operating within the International
1 QR
Plant Protection Convention. The SPS Agreement does however provide
"general disciplines that apply to the development and application of all
SPSMs",199 with an SPS measure being defined in its Annex A. The provisions of
the SPS Agreement may not, however, be interpreted as impairing the rights that
members may have under such other international agreements in the area,
including the right to invoke the dispute settlement provisions of other agreements
or international organizations.200 The SPS agreement also provides at paragraph 4
of Article 1 that the terms of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT
193
Initially introduced in this thesis in chapter 3, and analysed further in chapter 8.
194 Article 14 Agreement on Agriculture; "Members agree to give effect to the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures."
19
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 88.
196
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index en.isp (founded in 1963 by the Food and
Agriculture Organisation and the World Health Organisation, both UN bodies).
197 Also known as the World Organisation for Animal Health,
http://www.oie.int/eng/en index.htm.
198 https://www.ippc.int/IPP/En/default.isp. which is governed by the Interim Commission on
Phytosanitary Measures.
199
Op. cit. footnote no. 8, at page 88 et seq.
200 Ibid, at page 94.
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Agreement)201 continue to apply to matters which are not within the definition of
SPS measures. This is echoed by Article 5 of the TBT Agreement, which provides
that the "provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary and phytosanitary
measures as defined in Annex A of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures". The TBT Agreement operates to "extend and
clarify the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade reached in the Tokyo
round".202 It regulates the certification procedures of the Contracting States, with
the aim being that they do not become barriers to trade. The agreement has
attached a "Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and Application
of Standards by standardising bodies" which is intended to be adopted by both
governments and private organisations.
7. Conclusion
The historical and political climate which preceeded not only the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, but also GATT 1947 has lead to the current legal and
political situation with agricultural production. Agriculture is still high on the
political agenda at both the EC and the WTO level of governance. The impact of
the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, together with its
interaction with its supporting agreements are continuing to impact on the EC
CAP. How exactly the WTO agreements have been interpreted needs to be
examined however, in order to obtain an accurate understanding of their legal
effect. This will be examined in the next chapter, chapter 5, with the impact of
WTO law on EC law being examined in chapter 6. Chapter 7 and the following
chapters will then go on to analyse the impact of the synergy of the two legal
systems and their respective "case laws".
201 Discussed further to the extent that it affects the global trade in agricultural commodities, in
chapter 8.
202 WTO website http://www.wto.org.
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While comparisons and contrasts will be made in chapter 7 between the
legal structure and operation of the EC and the WTO, and its precursor, the
GATT, in the area of agriculture, it is important to note that the role of law at
these two levels of governance differs. While both the EC and the WTO have
been given legal capacity,1 by their legal documents, the governance of the EC is
based on the rule of law; the role of law at the WTO/GATT level is more
problematic. As stated by Ladefoged Mortensen, WTO research had to deal with
the "interaction between 'the politics of judicialisation', and 'the legalisation of
trade polities', with the constant interaction between the "WTO legal system and
the WTO bargaining processes".2 This is reflected in Article 11 DSU. This
bargaining process within the WTO legal system is also reflected by the fact that
the WTO legal texts provide for almost all internationally recognised political
and legal4 methods of dispute settlement in the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
The variety of ways that the DSU can be utilised is not, however, always
reflected in practice, as Petersmann observes that "good offices, conciliation and
mediation are, however, hardly ever resorted to in GATT and WTO practice".5
This perhaps is unfortunate as private commercial entities, both at a national and
international level are increasingly making recourse to Alternative Dispute
1 Article 281 EC (ex. Article 210 EC) and Article VHI of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organisation.
2
Mortensen, Jens Ladefoged; The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of
Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity, E.L.J. 2000, 6(2), 176-204, at page
193.
3
Consultations/negotiations, good offices, mediation, inquiry, conciliation, Petersmann, Ernst -
Ulrich; Alternative Dispute Resolution - Lessons for the WTO, Ch. 2 in Weiss, Friedl (ed.)
Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the practice of Other
International Courts & Tribunals (Cameron May, London, 2000), at page 29.
4 International Adjudication, public international arbitrator, mixed international arbitration, private
International Arbitrators, Judicial settlement by domestic courts. Ibid, at page 27 et seq.
5 Ibid, at page 33.
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Resolution.6 However, it has been noted that ADR operates best when the parties
have a balanced bargaining power, which is not always the case in WTO Dispute
Resolution. Recourse to a court-like procedure better protects parties who would
have a weaker bargaining position.7 The consultation provisions are "limited to
GATT (or GATS) Article XXII situations, and subject to the consensus of the
o
member to which the request for consultations is addressed". Arbitration is
currently only provided for by the DSU in two instances, in order to "determine
the reasonable period of time in which to comply with the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB under Article 21.3 DSU", and "to determine the level of
suspension of concessions (retaliatory measures) under Article 22.6 - 22.7 DSU".9
Recourse to the currently permitted alternative methods of using the DSU may
however develop in future, and this should be borne in mind when considering the
possible future development of the WTO.
In addition, it should be noted that the respective positions of the WTO
Secretariat and the European Commission differ considerably within their
respective legal systems, thereby affecting the development and enforcement of
law differently within the two structures. The WTO Secretariat occupies a "much-
criticised role....in the drafting of WTO Panel reports",10 while the EC
Commission has been expressly given the role of "guardian of the Treaty", with
the power, not only to bring infringement proceedings against recalcitrant
ii n
Member States, but also to "initiate pre-litigation" dispute resolution
6 Ibid, at page 28.
7 Ibid, at page 29.
8
Rosas, Allan; Joinder of Parties and Third Party Intervention in WTO Dispute Settlement, Ch. 6
in Weiss, Friedl, (ed.) Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the
practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals, Cameron May, London, 2000, at page 83.
Ibid, at page 85.
10 Usher, J.A.; Joinder of Actions, Submission of Observations in References for Preliminary
Rulings, and Intervention by Member States, Community Institutions, and any Other Person in
ECJ Proceedings, Ch. 7 in Weiss, Friedl (ed.) Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures:
Issues & Lessons from the practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals (Cameron May,
London, 2000), at page 89.
11
Pursuant to Article 226 EC (ex. Article 169 EC).
12 Pursuant to both Article 226 (ex. Article 169 EC) and Article 227 EC (ex. Article 170 EC).
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procedures.13 As stated by Usher, "this overt policing role is very different from
that of the WTO Secretariat".14
Both the European Court of Justice of the EC, and the Dispute Resolution
System of the WTO are "courts of attribution" in the sense that they are restricted
by the powers granted to them by their legal documents, and their "room for
manoeuvre is limited".15 As Hudec points out, governments, the controlling
entities of both the EC and the WTO, are "collective entities", not possessing a
"single mind and a single thought process".16 The impact of the political thought
processes of member state governments differs in its influence on the application
and interpretation of law once written at the EC and WTO level. At the EC level,
the ECJ case law has been referred to by the late Judge Mancini as coinciding
with the "making of a constitution for Europe",17 with the Treaty of Rome
underlying "the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and
the judiciary".18 This separation of powers is not so evident at the WTO, with
national politics, or the "autonomous linked games" of the CAP and the WTO, of
Coleman and Tangermann,19 continuing to influence the development and
enforcement ofWTO case law.
In addition to the above problems, while the WTO operates to regulate
part of the globalisation process, "only certain aspects" of the globalised
"economic political space have been brought under interstate control, and
13
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at page 33.
14
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 89.
15 The Hon. Lord Mackenzie Stuart; "Problems of the European Community - Transatlantic
Parallels; (1987) 36 ICLQ 183, at page 186.
16
Hudec, Robert E.; Enforcing International Trade Law; The Evolution of the Modem GATT
Legal System, Butterworth Legal Publishers, 1991, 1992, 1993, at page 358.
17
Mancini, G. Federico "The Making of a Constitution for Europe" (1989) 26 C.M. L. Rev. 595-
614, at page 595.
18 Eleftheriadis, Pavlos; "Aspects of European Constitutionalism"; ECR 1996 21(1), 32-42, at page
33.
19
Coleman, William D. and Tangermann, Stefan; The 1992 CAP Reform, the Uruguay Round and
the Commission: Conceptualising Linked Policy Games, J.Com.Mar.St. 1999, 37(3), 385-405, at
page 387.
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therefore, subject to formal governance".20 The WTO is restricted in that its
structure is that "of attribution", so it "has not been given the authority to cope
with market distortions stemming from strategic market behaviour amongst the
global firms"21 which strongly influence the process and effect of global trade. As
Ladefoged Mortensen has stated "globalisation is governed by a complex network
of interconnected sites of governance in which private and public actors
bargain".22 These other actors constantly influence the development of the case
law of the WTO panel process, and therefore the WTO, as a site for "genuine
rule-based governance of globalisation... remains incomplete".23
That the "rule of law", or a "rule-based" or "rule-oriented system" is
beneficial to the operation of market economies is recognised by Jackson, as "a
constantly recurring theme in many writings".24 Jackson notes when comparing
the EC and the WTO, that the EC "strikes a foreign observer as remarkably
"rule/court" - oriented even when compared with the governments of some of its
member states".25 With regard to the WTO, he uses the term "rule orientation", as
opposed to the terms "rule of law" or "rule-based system". He says that the term
"rule orientation implies a less rigid adherence to 'rule'" and allows for more
fluidity in approach, thereby facilitating a system of bargaining and negotiating
which permeates the WTO system.26 This is reflected in the fact that "purely
27
bilateral dispute settlement proceedings remain an exception in the WTO".
Third party intervention has been so frequent in GATT/ WTO dispute resolution
98
that, by Rosas' calculations, in the first 22 panel or Appellate Body reports,
9Q
"third parties were absent in only three". In addition, intervention by third
20
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 18.
21 Ibid, at page 183.
22 Ibid, at page 203.
23 Ibid, at page 203.
24 Jackson, John H.; The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO; Insights on treaty law and
economic relations, Cambridge University Press, 2000, at page 7.
25 Ibid, at page 47.
26 Ibid, at page 8.
27
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at page 34.
28
Op. cit. footnote no. 9, at page 83.
29
Namely Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTDS8, 10-11/AB/R, 4 October 1996.
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parties can result in a veritable rugby scrum, with the first Bananas case having
17 intervening parties, and Canada - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical
o i of)
Products, 11 Members, with the recent EC- Export Subsidies on Sugar case
having 4 appellants,33 and 22 third country interveners, a total of 26 parties in
all.34 The multiplicity of interveners reflects the fact that intervention need not be
on behalf of either party, but can reflect a view independent of the disputing
oc
parties. Intervention can occur in "all four phases of GATT/WTO dispute
settlement", namely; "consultations, panel proceedings, appellate review, and
multilateral surveillance of the implementation measures".36 Under Article 10
DSU third parties "have an opportunity to be heard by the panel, and shall receive
the first written submission of the parties to the dispute".37 The WTO panel
oo oq
decisions of the first Bananas case and the Hormones case developed this
process, in limited circumstances to "enhanced" third party rights, "with 'broader
participatory rights', including the right to attend fully both substantive meetings
of the panel and to make a statement also at the second meeting".40 While only the
parties to the dispute may appeal to the Appellate Body, third parties continue to
have a right to be heard41 on appeal.42
Canada - Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 June 1997, and United States - Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic Random
Access Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) ofOne Megabit or above from Korea. WT/DS 99/R,
29th January 1999.
30
European Communities - Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas,
complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (WT/DS 27).
31 Canada - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS 114/9, panel report dated the
27/4/00.
32
Op. cit. footnote no. 9, at page 83, footnote no. 24.
33
one of which being the EC.
34
European Communities - Export subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/29, WT/DS266/29,
WT/DS283/10, 15th October 2004.
35
Op. cit. footnote no. 9, at page 84.
36
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at page 34.
37
Op. cit. footnote no. 9, at page 84.
38
Op. cit. footnote no. 30.
39 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 13 February 1998, para. 133.
40
Op. cit. footnote no. 9, at page 84.
41 Pursuant to Article 17.4 DSU.
42
Op. cit. footnote no. 9, at page 84 et seq
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The ECJ, for its part, permits the more traditional joinder of cases, both
under its case law,43 and under Article 43 of the ECJ's Rules of Procedure.44
Member States, not only of the EC, but also the EEA, and EC and EEA
institutions have the right to "submit written observations", and/or appear at a
hearing45 and present their argument orally 46 Intervention in a case between other
parties by a Member States or an institution of the EC, is also permitted under
ECJ rules; however, in contrast with the WTO provisions, intervention "must be
limited to supporting the submissions of one of the parties".47 This limitation
prevents the development of a WTO rugby scrum, and keeps matters neatly
focused on two sides of a legal argument. This neatness in legal approach is also
reflected in the fact that, contrary to the continuing opportunity for intervention
by third parties in all of the "all four phases ofGATT/WTO dispute settlement",48
in the EC, as set out in Breedband v. Acieries du Temple,49 intervention by third
parties is limited to the period prior to judgment.50 (In very limited circumstances
third party proceedings after judgment are permitted in ECJ jurisprudence.)51
The WTO can therefore be classified as a weak enforcer, a weak monitor,
S9
and a weak legitimiser, possibly its optimal status, given that "globalisation
cannot be regulated by institutions of a classic, intergovernmental nature, even if
53such institutions are intended to be universal'", however this view is debatable.
Whether this situation will continue to pertain still has to be established. The
GATT/WTO legal system has developed rapidly from its Wyndham-White
43 Joined Cases 28, 29 and 30/62 Da Costa en Schaake v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie
[1977] ECR 1795.
44
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 90.
45 As happened in Case 48/74 Charmasson v. Ministerfor Economic Affairs [1974] ECR 1383,
1391; [1975] 2 CMLR 208.
46
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 92.
47 Ibid, at page 97.
48
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at page 34.
49 Joined Cases 42 and 49/59 Third Party Proceedings Breedband v. Acieries du Temple [1962]
ECR 145, 158.
50
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 107.
51 Ibid, generally for further details on third party proceedings. This issue will be further examined
in chapter 7, in the context of the differing procedures during litigation at the ECJ and at the WTO
panels and Appellate Body.
2
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 186.
53 Ibid, at page 190.
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period, of "'negotiating' atmosphere of multilateral diplomacy, to a more
'arbitration' - oriented procedure designed impartially to arrive at the truth and the
best interpretation of the law."54 It may well continue to develop in unanticipated
directions in the future.
2. GATT - development of a legal system
GATT 194755 came into existence with "fundamental flaws in its
institutional underpinnings"56 with the demise of the Havana Charter. As stated by
Ladefoged Mortensen, it was an "international organisation without any legal
personality based upon a provisional agreement, provisionally staffed, and funded
C7
on an ad hoc basis". GATT's successor, the WTO, is itself subject to a "number
CO
of structural imperfections", given that it is a "member-driven network
organisation" with "asymmetrical distribution of power and resources in the world
economy".59 The development of the GATT/WTO legal system has to be
understood against this backdrop of this asymmetrical distribution of power and
resources. Given this problematic start, it is no surprise that GATT took some
time to find its way. GATT started its existence in the realm of unchallenged
diplomacy in the 1950's. By the 1960's the two main trading blocks, the EC and
the US were taking an anti-legalistic approach in the face of increasing demands
for GATT issues to be resolved in a legal manner.60 Adjustments still needed to
be made to put the damaged-from-birth infant structure ofGATT, which was
developing rapidly in the 1960's, before a legal system could develop. As stated
by Hudec, "the 1960s can be seen as a period when GATT more or less suspended
its legal system while it tried to sort out, by negotiation, the legal and economic
54
Jackson, John J.; Restructuring the GATT System, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London 1990, at page 63.
55 As discussed in detail in chapter 4.
56
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 178.
57 Ibid, at page 178 et seq.
58 Ibid, at page 178.
59 Ibid, at page 178.
60
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 12.
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adjustments that were needed to accommodate its new members and its new
agenda."61
The opening of the Tokyo Round negotiations in the 1970's brought with
it the need to take a more legalistic stance, with the U.S. now favouring a more
legalistic approach, with the domestic need to prove "stronger enforcement of US
69
trade agreement rights". The dispute resolution mechanism was increasingly
resorted to during the 1970's, however it was only with the 1980's that law, as a
discipline, came to the fore in the GATT process. Panel procedures were
increasingly "depoliticised" with the increasing use of precedent in GATT panel
reports. The dispute settlement rules were codified for greater clarity, and GATT
opened its legal office in 1983 "in order to improve expertise, quality, credibility
and confidence in panel findings".63 As will be discussed in this chapter, the
development of this global legal system was developed in the post-WTO era.
2.1 Nature of law at the GATT/WTO level
The issue of legal precedent is key to the development of a legal system.
While under the 1947 system earlier panel reports could certainly be cited in
subsequent cases "neither the manner they were made nor the manner they were
adopted were rigorous enough to entitle the precise legal rulings in such decisions
to binding effect on future controversies".64 GATT cases were originally referred
to using numeric "cryptic BISD citations",65 in a manner that "only insiders could
understand", possibly "trying to hide the common law process".66 The
development of a practice of precedent can be traced from the Spring
Assemblies67 case of 1982, with that panel ruling having been "adopted with a
61 Ibid, at page 13.
62 Ibid, at page 13.
63
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 191, footnote no. 41.
64
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 263.
65 Ibid, at page 265.
66 Ibid, at page 265.
67 US - Imports of Certain Automotive Sprine Assemblies Panel Report adopted on May 26, 1983,
BISD 30S/107.
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reservation that its adoption would not bar further challenges to the U.S. section
337 law", thereby recognising the possibility of a form of binding precedent for
rulings not subject to such a reservation.
By the end of the 1980's rulings were being "laced with citations to earlier
panel rulings". 9 By 1989, the Canadian ice-cream and yoghurt70 panel decision
71
contained 12 references to earlier cases. The two 1989 adopted EEC apple
restrictions panel rulings,72 in cases brought by Chile73 and the United States,74
ruled that they were not bound by an earlier 1980 panel decision brought by Chile
against the EC on the same circumstances.75 Three reasons were given by the
1989 panels for this approach, 1. "the earlier panel had not explained its
conclusions", 2. An even earlier 1978 panel decision conflicted with the 1980
decision, and 3. "the panel's terms of reference called for independent
judgment".76
Divergent practices developed in, for example, the area of the peiishibility
of agricultural goods, an exception to the application of Article XI:2(c.)(I). The
Japan-12 panel ruling77 did not refer to an earlier 1978 panel report on the same
7R
issue. Canadian ice-cream and yoghurt, explicitly stated that it would not
follow the 1978 decision.79 The Oilseeds panel80 of 1990 cited three times an
68
Op. cit. at footnote no. 16, at page 263.
69 Ibid, at page 265.
70 Canada - Import Restrictions on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Panel Report adopted on 5th December
4, 1989, BISD 36S/68.
71
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 265.
72 which were asked to examine the EC restrictions on apples against the requirements of Article
XI:2 (c.)(I) or (ii).
73 EEC - Restrictions on imports ofDessert Apples - Complaint by Chile Panel Report adopted on
June 22, 1989, BISD 36S/93.
74 EEC - Restrictions on Import ofApples - Complaint by the US. Panel Report adopted on June
22, 1989, BISD 36S/135.
75
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 244.
76 Ibid, at page 264.
77
Japan - Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, Panel Report adopted on
March 22, 1988, BISD 35S/163.
78
Op. cit. footnote no. 70
79
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 264.
80 EEC - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers ofOilseeds and Related
Animal-Feed Proteins ("Soya-Panel"). Panel Report adopted on January 25, 1990, BISD 37S/86.
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earlier, 1982, un-adopted ruling of the Canned Fruit panel. As stated by Hudec,
"the fact that the two parties ended up debating the meaning of the Canned Fruit
panel ruling in the subsequent GATT lawsuit was a defining moment in the use of
precedent in GATT law". Hudec interpreted this case as an example that the
"'authority' of earlier panel rulings depends simply and solely on how much sense
they make",82 thus reinforcing the "rule orientation" classification of Jackson in
2000.83
2.2 GATT interpretative standards
The interpretative standards to be operated by the GATT panels have
wavered between flexible construction, in the early days, to strict interpretation,
since, in particular the 1980s. The FIRA case84 in 1984, developed a "national
treatment" test that "struck down commitments giving even the slightest
oc
advantage to Canadian goods", under Canada's Foreign Investment Review Act.
o/r
This approach was followed in the Superfund panel decision of 1987, when the
panel refused to allow a de minimis exemption for a tax differential between the
87
treatment of national and foreign goods of 0.19 percent. The Section 337
88
decision of 1989 followed this trend, whereby the panel held that the test of "no
less favourable treatment", in Article III GATT 1947, had to be met for each
individual importer, and was not one of a judgment of the effect of the act,
8Q
contrary to the U.S. view on the matter.
81 United States v. European Community: Production Aids on Canned Peaches, Canned Pears,
Canned Fruit Cocktail and Dried Grapes. Complaint: 19 March 1982 (L/5306).
82
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 265.
83
Op. cit. footnote no. 24 at page 278.
84 Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA) Panel Report adopted on
February 7, 1984, BISD 30S/140.
85
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 265.
86 US - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances ("Superfund Act") Panel Report
adopted on June 17, 1987, BISD 34S/136.
87
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 266 et seq.
88 US - Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930 Panel Report adopted on November 7, 1989, BISD
36S/345.
89
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 267.
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2.3 Burden of Proof
The issue of the burden of proof of compliance with GATT exemptions
has also been dealt with by a series of GATT panels, starting with Japan-1290 in
1988, and followed by both the Chilean91 and US92 complaints about EC apple
restrictions in 1989, and the Canadian ice cream and yoghurt case,93 also in 1989.
These panels held that, despite the difficulty that it would pose for the contracting
parties, the burden of proof in order to comply with a GATT exemption would lie
with the contracting party claiming the exemption. They held that any other
interpretation would "create gaps in GATT legal protection that would be fatal to
the balance of reciprocity".94
2.4 Definition of Actionable Harm
The definition of actionable harm was developed in the more legalistic
1980s, in favour of a "stronger more administrable approach based on proof of
competitive disadvantage",95 rejecting the previous "cause-and-effect trade
damage",96 starting with the 1979 Soybean Oil91 case. This change was hard
fought. The panel in Soybean Oil adopted the "trade damage" test, however the
QO
US had the panel decision overruled on that basis. This was followed by the
Japanese leather quotas case99 in 1983, which held that "even unfilled quotas
cause harm" as its affected planning. The un-adopted 1982 Canned Fruit100 panel
report attempted to develop the doctrine of "trade damage" further, with a finding
90
Op. cit. footnote no. 77.
91
Op. cit. footnote no. 73.
92
Op. cit. footnote no. 74.
93
Op. cit. footnote no. 70.
94
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 268.
95 Ibid, at page 268.
96 Ibid, at page 269.
97 United States v. Spain: Measures Concerning Domestic Sale ofSoyabean Oil, Complaint: 1
November 1979 (L/4859).
98
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 268.
99 United States v. Japan: Measures on Imports ofLeather [II] Complaint: 5 January 1983
(L/5440).
100
Op. cit. footnote no. 81.
197
that "proof of cause-and-effect trade damage was not needed for a case of non¬
violation nullification and impairment".101 The EC objected and this resulted in
1 QO
the non-adoption of the panel ruling. The 1987 Superfund decision reinforced
the development of the "trade damage" doctrine with the finding that a de minimis
effect was not sufficient to avoid breaching GATT rules. This approach was
1 rn
reinforced in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages later that same year. The issue
arose again in the EC Oilseeds case.104 The panel again said that proof of trade
damage was not necessary, with proof of a "competitive disadvantage" sufficing.
3. The development of law under GATT 1947
The cause of action under GATT 1947 was the Article XXIII claim of
"Nullification and Impairment" of rights. The exercise of rights under this cause
of action, and the operation of the GATT legal framework as a whole have been
problematic at times, as evidenced in the Canadian Eggs105 case, where an
attempt was made to enforce a provision in GATT 1947 which no of the main
GATT member states was obeying.106 The 1976 DISC cases,107 which concerned
US and EC tax regimes exposed a number of weaknesses in the GATT dispute
settlement system, to include "the lack of any institutionalized source of high
quality legal analysis,"108 the GATT secretariat still having no legal office at this
stage, or an appellate system, to deal with errors in panel rulings. The general
view of DISC was that the panels had made a "pretty serious mistake" in their
approach to EC tax laws, which lead to a blocking of the adoption of the panels'
reports in these cases.
101
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 269.
102
Op. cit. footnote no. 86.
103
Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages Panel Report adopted on November 10, 1987.
104
Op. cit. footnote no. 80.
105 Canadian Import Quotas on Eggs ("advisory ruling"), WP report, adopted on February 17,
1976, BISD 23S/91.
106
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 45.
107 US Tax Legislation (DISC) Panel report presented on November 12, 1976, BISD 23S/98.
108
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 45.
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The MIPS case,109 which dealt with minimum import prices, brought panel
hearings to a new level of legal argument, with the lawyers from USTR, operating
their first section 301 action against the EC, adopting a legal "carpet bombing"
strategy,110 with diplomacy no longer an option as a tactic. The now infamous
U.S. section 301 of the Trade Act 1974111 itself became the subject matter of a
WTO panel report in 2000.112 Section 301 procedures permit either the US
government to "self-initiate" or a "citizen to file a petition", not just on the basis
that "foreign actions violate international rules" which are classified by the statute
as being "unjustifiable", but also on the basis that foreign legislative practices are
"unreasonable" with much latitude being given to the definition of such practices
1 1 o
which can be deemed "to be unfair and deserving countermeasures". A section
301 action does not require "injury" proof, or even "violation of a trade
agreement". It is sufficient that a measure is something which "burdens or
restricts United States commerce".114 Having initiated the procedure the US
government is "not obliged to abide from the outcome of the procedure", not is it
obliged to "refrain from action until the international procedures are formally
completed".115 (The EC for its part, operates the Trade Barrier Regulation,116
which will be discussed in chapter 6.)
The carpet bombing strategy adopted in the MIPS case exposed many
flaws in the dispute resolution system; the "existing procedure's capacity for legal
109 United. States v. European Community: Programme ofMinimum Import Prices (MIPS),
Licenses, etc. for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables. Complaint: 29 March 1976 (L/4321).
110
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 48.
111
As amended by Trade Agreements Act 1979, the Tariff and Trade Act 1984 and the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988. Provisions are now found in the Trade Act of 1974 (as
amended to December 1988), sections 301-306, 19 USCA Art 2411-2416 (1980 and Supp. 1988).
As to application to services, see 19 USCA Art 211 (e)(1)(A) (1980 and Supp. 1988).
112 United States - Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R Panel Report adopted
by the DSB on January 27, 2000.
113
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 71 et seq.
114 Ibid, at page 72.
115 Ibid, at page 71.
116 Council Regulation 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common
commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international
trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization",
OJ L 349/71 of 31 December 1994, amended by Council Regulation 356/95, OJ L 41/3 of 23
February 1995.
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analysis was inadequate to the task",117 despite providing the longest panel report
to that date under the GATT 1947 system. This lack of adequacy of the panel
procedures to deal with legal analysis pervaded many of the disputes at the time,
however it was felt that cases such as Animal Feed Proteins11^ were dealt with
reasonably successfully. Commentators' view was that cases such as DISC and
MIPS were "creating even more pressure on the meagre legal resources of the
existing system".119 The creation of the GATT legal office in the 1980's was
partly as a result of these cases,120 contributing inter alia, to a strengthening of the
GATT legal process.121
The post Tokyo Round litigation of the United States, much of which was
based on s.301 actions, and against the backdrop of the new Tokyo Round codes,
focused on the U.S.'s problems with the EC's CAP. It should be noted that the
plurilateral agreements on Dairy products and Bovine Meat, were both designed
"to accomplish price maintenance rather than trade liberalisation".122 The five
U.S.-E.C. cases were Wheat Flour,123 Pasta,124 Canned Fruit,125 Citrus,126 and
VAT}21 128 Had the U.S. complaints been successful then the CAP would have
had, at that time, to be radically altered, such a change not having been reflected
1 ?Q
in the Tokyo Round agreements. The EC won the Wheat Flour case, the US
won the others, but all of these panel rulings were blocked by the losing party,
with the exception of the VAT panel report, which was "just barely adopted after a
117
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 50.
118 EEC - Measures on Animal Feed Proteins Panel Report adopted on March 14, 1978, BISD
25S/49.
119
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 57.
120 Ibid, at page 129.
121 Ibid, at page 137 et seq.
122 Ibid, at page 27.
123
European Community - subsidies on exports ofwheatflour, SCM/42 (21 March 1983).
124 United States v. European Community: Subsidies on Exports ofPasta Products', Complaint: 24
February 1982 (SCM/Spec/8) (Subsidies Code).
125
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long struggle".130 It should be noted that the blocking mechanism is no longer
available in the post- WTO regime; the expiration of the "peace clause", to be
analysed further in chapter 7, has since been added to the legal mix in this area.
3.1 Value Added Taxes (VAT)131
The VAT case was a complaint by the U.S. against the E.C., pursuant to
the provisions of the Tokyo Government Procurement Code. This case concerned
the definition of "contract value", with the EC using a VAT inclusive figure, with
the majority of GATT contracting parties using a VAT exclusive figure, which
1 ^9
once it met the code threshold was subject to the provisions of the code. The
panel found against the EC, ruling that whatever internal problems the EC had on
the matter, "such problems could not change the interpretation of a legal
document". This lack of regard for internal problems may have an effect on the
potential development of the EC's multifunctionality argument with regard to its
agriculture. The findings of the panel were eventually adopted, and the
Community undertook to "work towards compliance, but with 'flexibility'".134
4. After the Tokyo Round
After the Tokyo Round the panels, in a more robust legal fashion, began to
i or
develop GATT jurisprudence. Norway Textiles had established that Article XIX
restrictions, and the Tokyo Safeguards Code, could not be used selectively to
target particular countries.136 The Coffee137 panel held that the definition of "like
130
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131
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product" was to include all products treated under one tariff item, thereby
broadening the definition of "like product", leaving "governments ... less free to
• 1 ^8
discriminate" between products, thereby adding to free movement of goods.
The 1982 Tuna case139 was, however, more problematic. While appearing to be a
successful case on paper, the U.S. managed to force Canada to sign an
international fisheries agreement, in order to comply with U.S. law. The strong
arm tactics operating in this case "amounted to a failure for GATT law",140 with
the non-GATT compliant U.S. legislation remaining on the statute books. The
Quartz Watches141 case was more successful from a GATT law perspective, with
the panel rejecting the EC's argument that "a practice acquiesced in for a long
period becomes a 'law-creating fact,' altering the initial legal prohibition".142
Other cases of the period were not so successful, with the panel finding in Spring
Assemblies143 being set aside, and the report in Vitamin B-12,144 while adopted,
remaining completely unintelligible.145
5. GATT 1947 and the agricultural cases
Operating against the backdrop of UN Food and Agriculture Organisation
(FAO) and other commodity agreements,146 and the non-legally binding
provisions of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,147 GATT 1947
did not lead to the free trade of agricultural products. For its part GATT 1947 only
provided for differentiated treatment for agricultural products in Article XI, which
138
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deals with the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions, with the balance
of the GATT 1947 regime to apply to both agricultural and non-agricultural
goods. The Article XI section 2 exemptions were drafted "fairly restrictively",148
however these exceptions widened with time.149 Two major factors influenced
this widening, "the waiver given to the Americans150 and the creation of the
European Communities".151
1 59
Japan-12 was an early attempt to impose GATT rules on agriculture,
despite years of neglect in this area. The panel in this case was "quite strict in
respecting the legal text".153 This was the first systematic application of Article
XI:2(c.)(I), which deals with import restrictions on any agricultural or fisheries
product, imported in any form. The Japan-12 panel gave an explanation of Article
XI:2(c.)(I), and what each section meant, based on a strict legal interpretation of
the text. The panel found that "some requirements were found to be essentially
meaningless, while others proved extremely difficult to comply with".154 The
burden of proof was with Japan to prove compliance with the provision, as Article
XI:2(c.)(I) was an exception to the general rules of GATT.155 On the facts, the
panel found that none of Japan's restrictions complied with Article XI:2(c.)(I).
The Semiconductor case elaborated on the ruling in Japan -12, by holding that
"administrative guidance would be treated as a restriction if (1) it created an
inducement to comply with the restrictive policy and (2) it was necessary to
successful implementation of the restrictive policy".156
148
Delcros, Fabian; The Legal Status of Agriculture in the World Trade Organization, State of
Play as the Start ofNegotiations, Journal of World Trade 36(2), 219-253, 2002, at page no. 221.
149 Ibid, at page 221.
150 Dealt with in Chapter 4.
151
Op. cit. footnote no. 148, at page 222.
152
Op. cit. footnote no. 77.
153
Op. cit. footnote no. 16, at page 215.
154 Ibid, at page 215.
155 Ibid, at page 215.
156 Ibid, at page 217.
203
The issue of EC subsidies arose in the EC-Sugar Subsidy cases.157 Twin
panels were set up in 1979 dealing with Australia and Brazil's complaints that the
EC's export subsidy on sugar was "taking more than an 'equitable share of world
export trade' in violation of GATT Article XVI:3".158 The complaint about the
trade in sugar was made against the backdrop of the International Sugar
Agreement of 1977,159 to which the EC was not a party, but by which "member
countries voluntarily restrained exports to raise prices", contrary to the ethos of
GATT.160 The international sugar market was therefore "riddled with market-
distorting practices on the part of most market participants".161 It would appear
that the sugar panels were attempting to avoid a confrontation with the EC.
According to Hudec, the US had "signed a secret letter assuring the Community
that the Subsidies Code would not be used to attack the fundamental character of
1 ff)
the Common Agricultural Policy". The Sugar panels, in this highly sensitive
political situation, claimed that there was a lack of proof of the "cause-and-effect
linkage between EC exports and the market loss" of the complaining states.
Rather, they found that "serious prejudice" had been shown as per Article XVI: 1,
requiring "an obligation to consult about how the subsidy may be limited, with no
obligation to agree to anything".163
In the case of EC Apples164 the Community, pursuant to its common
organisation in fruit and vegetables,165 attempted to prevent the importation of
Chilean apples in order to "remove a temporary apple surplus" in compliance with
the requirements of Article XI. It was claimed however, that the surplus in apples
157
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within the EC was not temporary, but rather a systematic problem arising from the
operation of the EC's policies, which encouraged the production of apples.166 The
panel, whose report was adopted subject to reservations, did find in the Chile
case, that the EC Apples provisions "qualified as a restriction on marketing", and
that Chile did not have as large a quota to import into the EC as it should have
had.167 The later 1989 cases of EC Apples (USm and Chile)169 would revisit this
issue. Following the test set down in Japan-12170 regarding the interpretation of
171
Article XI:2(c.), the 1989 panels, deciding to make up their own mind on the
issue, held that the EC's overproduction of apples could not be considered a
"temporary surplus" within the terms of Article XI:2(c.)(I). The EC agreed to
adopt the report subject to reservations on the interpretation of Article
179 17T
XI:2(c.)(I). A similar case, Norway Apples and Pears, a decade later, based
on similar facts, took a similar line, with Norway accepting the ruling of
violation.174 Korean Beef175 which tried, unsuccessfully, to use the "balance-of-
payments justification" also fell foul of Article XI:2(c.)(I).176
Further problems arose with the application of GATT rules to agricultural
commodities in the 1979 Soyabean Oil177 case (referred to in the U.S. as the Soy
bean case). In an effort to protect domestic olive oil producers, Spain had
restricted the domestic market of Soyabean oil, requiring the export of Spanish
178
produced soyabean oil, thereby affecting U.S. exports to adjacent markets. The
panel ruled that "oil crushed from imported soybeans became a domestic product
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at that point, so that the restriction against the internal sale of soybean oil was not
harming any imported product".179 Second, internal quantitative restrictions did
not violate Article 111:5, as domestically produced soyabean oil and imported
soyabean oil were treated in a like manner. The panel further held that soyabean
• 180
oil and olive oil were not "like products" and so could be treated differently.




The 1990 EC Oilseeds case revisited this particular commodity. At the
time of creation of the EC's CAP the EC had entered into an agreement with the
United States on agricultural products. The US agreed to "release tariff bindings
on key CAP products", in return for the EC granting "free access (zero tariff
bindings) to imports of oilseeds and nongrain animal feeds".183 The EC subsidy
for the production of oilseeds within the EC was perceived by the U.S. as acting
"just like the tariff that the EC had agreed to eliminate",184 with EC governmental
intervention acting to cancel out the previous U.S. advantage. Two issues arose in
the panel report, one the EC subsidy, which was paid to crushing mills, rather
than to farmers, and secondly, the fact that the subsidy operated to nullify and
impair the U.S. tariff binding on oilseeds, and was therefore in breach of Article
XXIII GATT. The panel held that "a payment not made directly to the producers
is not paid 'exclusively' to them within the terms of Art. III:8(b) of GATT",185
and that the EC provisions "did not in fact ensure that payments to producers"186
were incorrectly calculated. The issue of the definition of producer had arisen in
1 87
the Manufacturing Beef case where the panel had refused to extend the term
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"producer" to a slaughter house. (It should be noted that neither the Uruguay
Round Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement or Agreement on
1 RQ
Agriculture provide a definition for "producer"). The EC Oilseeds panel further
held that the subsidy was not therefore a permitted production subsidy190 thereby
constituting a non-violation nullification and impairment of U.S. rights.
The EC's system of export subsides used to compensate for the artificially
distorted prices of agricultural commodities within the EC as a result of the
operation of the common organisations, was at issue in the un-adopted 1983 EC
Wheat191 dispute. The US had argued that the EC's share of the world market was
artificially increased as a result of the export subsidy, giving it "more than an
equitable share of world trade".192 In the U.S.'s view, this also met the
"displacement" definition of Article 10:2(a) of the Tokyo's Subsidies Code.193 The
hope with this case was that if "GATT law could successfully freeze the size of
subsidised EC exports, the present EC agricultural program would smother under
an ever-growing pile of surplus product".194 This panel refused to follow as
precedent the finding in French Wheat and Flour195 and decided to approach the
issues in this dispute afresh.
The panel in Wheat Flour had a problem with both the EC's and the U.S.'s
theories, and found that it could not make a decision, as it could not find a clear
meaning for the "equitable share concept". The panel agreed with the EC that the
world's wheat flour market was "very artificial and distorted", with the panel
doubting that "there was any standard by which one could impose a legal order on
such a market".196 They also lacked an undistorted year to use as a comparator.
188
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The fact that the US operated a scheme similar to the EC was relevant to the panel
decision. The panel did take the view that the U.S.'s argument as to overall
"displacement" was inappropriate, and that the test to be used should be
"displacement in individual markets".197 On that basis the panel found that "none
of the 17 U.S. claims had been proved".198 The issues in Wheat Flour were never
settled with the U.S. subsequently blocking the adoption of this panel report.199 A
subsidy war between the EC and the U.S. followed, all of which led to a greater
effort in the run up to the Uruguay Round to address the issue of agricultural
subsidies.200 The issue of EC export subsidies has arisen again in the post WTO
framework in EC- Export Subsidies on Sugar,201 when the EC was held by the
panel, and confirmed by the Appellate Body to have breached its commitments
909
under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. The panel held that there had been
prima facie evidence that "since 1995 the European Communities total exports of
sugar exceeded its quantity commitment level" in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, resulting in the nullification and impairment of "benefits accruing to
the Complaining parties under the Agreement on Agriculture".203 The issue of the
interaction of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture with the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was also raised in this case, which will be
referred to again in later chapters of this thesis.
Another unadopted panel report was the 1983 Pasta204 report, a case
brought pursuant to the U.S. s.301 procedure. The panel held that the payments to
pasta producers to compensate for the higher costs of raw materials due to the
197 Ibid, at page 150.
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199
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operation of the CAP was not permitted, as pasta was not a "primary product" as
required by Article XVI, but rather a manufactured good. Article 9 of the Tokyo
90S
Subsidy Code, prohibited "all export subsidies on non-primary products". No
reference in this code was made to the "raw material component of processed
agricultural or fisheries products".206 Article XVI:3 ofGATT, which dealt with
subsidies for primary products, required that "such subsidy shall not be applied in
a manner which results in that contracting party having more than an equitable
share of world export trade in that product". The US was seeking the removal of
"all export subsidies",207 a direct attack against the CAP. The U.S. had, on the
adoption of Article XVI:4, reserved its own rights with regard to the subsidy on
"raw cotton content of cotton fabric, as a way of equalising the high cost of cotton
created by U.S. support prices",208 exactly what the EC was doing with pasta.
While other contracting parties had initially objected at the time to the U.S.'s
reservation, other countries had adopted practices similar to the U.S. while the
U.S. had, over time, abandoned its stance on cotton. 9 The U.S. argued that their
own behaviour had been on the basis of an explicit reservation, and as no other
reservation had been made for primary products, no other contracting party should
210be exercising an exemption for subsidies for primary products. The EC blocked
the adoption of this report, gaining support for its approach from other contracting
parties.211
212A similar line was taken in the Canadian ice cream and yoghurt case,
where the Canadians were attempting to protect domestic producers of yoghurt
and ice cream from the adverse effects of a domestic policy designed to raise the
price of their raw material, milk. As yoghurt and ice cream were not primary
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products, the panel "condemned the measure", but recognised that Canada could
continue to protect its raw milk production.213
5.1 Canned Fruit214
Another s.301 case, in Canned Fruit the EC's subsidy "went a good bit
further than equalising the cost of raw materials",215 and operated to "equalise all
cost differences between EC and foreign producers".216 Once again the U.S.
launched an all out attack on the CAP, claiming that "all compensatory subsidies"
be treated as non-violation nullification and impairment (NV N&I). The
Community's defence was to the effect that a NV N&I claim "required a specific
917
cause-and-effect showing of trade damage resulting from the subsidy". The
panel found that the payments on dried grapes were GATT compliant, but that
those on canned fruit were in breach ofGATT provisions, finding that the
"subsidy constituted a new form of artificial disadvantage to the extent it
exceeded the amount necessary to equalise world prices an the higher CAP prices
of raw fruit".218
The findings in Pasta and Canned Fruit closely mirrored each other, both
permitting "the EC to neutralise the cost disadvantage the EC itself had created by
imposing very high domestic prices for raw materials under CAP price
91Q
supports". The findings of both cases only extended to limit
990
overcompensation. The issue of "trade damage" was also dealt with in Canned
Fruit, developing on the finding in Soybean Oil, "the panel ruled that even an
equity-based finding of NV N&I did not require cause-and-effect proof of lost
213
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exports".221 It was sufficient to prove that the government action had resulted in a
change in "competitive position". While the EC accepted the point about
overcompensation, the EC continued to block the panel report on Canned Fruit in
the GATT Council on the basis of its finding that "proof of cause-and-effect trade
damage was not required for a finding of non-violation nullification and
impairment". The dispute was eventually settled and the panel report
withdrawn.224
5.2 Citrus225
As referred to in chapter 3 the GATT Citrus dispute arose as a result of the
EC's development of "Euro-Med" agreements. While Article XXIV:5(c.) GATT
permitted exceptions to the MFN status for "interim agreements" leading to either
customs unions or free trade areas, a question arose as to whether the EC's Euro-
Med agreements were really such "interim agreements", particularly as only one
of such partner states226 had, to that date, complied "with the GATT's requirement
997
of prompt and comprehensive elimination of trade barriers". The US claim was
that such "Euro-Med" agreements did not comply with the GATT definition of
"interim agreements", and that the preferential access of citrus fruit from such
countries was in breach of the MFN principle. It was felt that the US, pursuant to
a s.301 complaint, was attempting to use the argument as leverage to gain access
to the EC market, rather than dismantling the network of "Euro-Med"
agreements.228 The GATT panel found the Citrus complaint difficult to deal with.
The panel found that the investigation of "the conformity of the agreements with
GATT Article XXIV",229 had to be done pursuant to review proceedings under
221 Ibid, at page 156.
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Article XXIV:7, and that until such a review had been conducted then the legal
status of such agreements under GATT was unresolved. The panel found that
the US was entitled to expect benefits from GATT Article 1 on the MFN
principle, and that this MFN status "had been impaired" by the existence of the
ooi
m
"Euro-Med" agreements, with a consequent requirement for the EC to "repair
trade losses in two product categories (oranges and lemons) where there had been
a meaningful trade diversion". The EC was aggrieved that the GATT-legality of
the "Euro-Med" agreements was still unresolved, and blocked the adoption of the
9T9
panel report by the GATT Council. The main problem with the findings was
the uncertainty of the finding, as legal uncertainty as to the "Euro-Med"
agreements could lead to them being found in compliance with the provisions of
Article XXIV GATT, therefore there would be no possibility of finding a
nullification and impairment action under Article XXIII.233 The U.S. did agree
during the course of the Citrus case that "it would make no further legal
challenges to the EC's regional agreements with Mediterranean countries".234
6. The 1982 Ministerial Declaration
By the 1982 Ministerial Declaration the EC was adopting a more positive
attitude to dispute resolution by GATT, as evidenced by its use of the system
"more frequently and more positively".235 The Ministerial Declaration highlighted
the "existing strains" in the system which were "aggravated by differences of
9or
perception regarding the balance of rights and obligations under the GATT".
The Declaration recommended that the panels "reach clear decision, and follow
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through with clear recommendations for action", which effectively called for a
707
"very significant change of practice", from one based on diplomacy.
6.1 Post 1982 litigation
The FIRA case238 dealt with Canadian legislation imposing on foreign
investors trade related requirements. The U.S. claimed that these provisions were
in breach of either GATT Articles III or XI. Canada replied stating that foreign
investment regulation was outside the provisions ofGATT. The panel delivered a
cogent legally argued report outlining how foreign investment matters interacted
with GATT regulation, stating that "various buy-Canadian requirements were a
violation ofGATT Article III, but that no GATT obligation prohibited the export
performance requirements" of the Canadian act. Canada eventually accepted
the report and complied with its findings. Another legally argued case was the
Manufacturing Clause case240 concerning US legislation which operated as "an
import prohibition against certain foreign-made books", which was clearly in
breach of Article XI GATT (general elimination of quantitative restrictions). The
panel findings in FIRA24] and the Manufacturing Clause242 case were seen as
setting new standards of "quality in GATT dispute settlement proceedings",
advancing further the role and quality of law in GATT dispute settlement.
Domestic law of the member states of the WTO increasingly came under
the spotlight in the post 1982 litigation. The EC challenged internal U.S. law in
two cases in 1986, the Superfund case,244 and the Custom User Fee case.245 The
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238
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U.S. Superfund legislation246 provided for a "slightly higher tax rate for foreign
petroleum" than for domestic petroleum, while the Custom User statute247 charged
importers ad valorem, which resulted in importers of valuable items paying
considerably more than the cost of the customs service rendered to them. Both
cases would have required Congress to amend its legislation, something that
USTR,248 the party defending these actions, would have found very difficult to
guarantee. In the Superfund case the panel held that it was not the purpose of
Article III of GATT to preserve competitive equality. Equally it held that
violations of Article III GATT should not require "proof of cause-and-effect trade
damage."249 The panel in the Customs User Fee case held that the customs user
fee being imposed by the U.S. had to be a "uniform charge equal to the cost of the
OCQ
service". The panel ruled in the Superfund case that the parties should "take
note of the statement by the United States that the penalty rate would in all
probability never be applied," with the panel in the Customs User Fee case
suggesting "that the Contracting Parties recommend that the United States bring
the merchandise processing fee into conformity with its obligations under the
959
General Agreement".
253The Alcoholic Beverages (Canadian Liquor Board) case, questioned the
internal constitutional structure of Canada, whereby the federal states retained
control over alcoholic beverages, and under which state trading companies had
been set up, and acted to protect these enterprises.254 The Canadians were required
to change these laws, a requirement which could have caused problems of a
constitutional nature, had the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement not been
246
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recently agreed, which the federal government of Canada used as a method to
give "European Community beverages the same treatment it had agreed to give
United Sates beverages" in that agreement. The problems encountered by the
US and Canada with regard to control of their legislation together with the issue
of the legal relationship of GATT/WTO law with domestic legislation are
problems with which the EC for its part has also had to grapple. These problems,
in the context of the EC, will be revisited in chapter 6.
7. Post Uruguay Round Litigation
Jackson, referring to the Tokyo Round results stated that "the most
striking characteristic is the balkanization or fragmentation of dispute settlement
under the various Agreements".256 As a consequence USTR's documentation
expressly made changes to the DSU "a principal goal of.. U.S. negotiations"
OCT
during the Uruguay Round. Strengthening the dispute settlement process, the
agreed changes included "1. time limits for each stage of the settlement process;
2. creation of an appellate body; 3. no requirement for consensus in the adoption
of decisions; and 4. automatic authorization for countermeasures." This change
in status for the DSU under the WTO was reflected in the change of style and tone
of the panel and appellate body reports. One of the longest standing issues, the
relationship between WTO/GATT law and national law was addressed when the
provisions of s.301 of the US Trade Act 1974, long a thorn in the side of the
dispute settlement process, and ofmany of the other participant countries of the
WTO/GATT, became the subject matter of a panel report in 2000.
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256
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7.1 United States • Sections 301 -310 of the Trade Act of 1974259
Section 301 of the US Trade Act had been highly controversial at an
international level for many years. It altered the internal constitutional structure of
the US by providing the executive with power which normally resided with
Congress, giving the US President much more authority to negotiate international
trade policy on behalf of the U.S.260 Congress for its part had been very unhappy
with the GATT dispute procedures, with the President not originally being
required by s.301 to refer a dispute to the GATT.261 The 1979 amendment to
s.301,262 by way of insertion of a new s.303 did require USTR263 to "refer the
matter to international dispute settlement procedures where applicable", but did
not require those procedures to be "fully completed before the USTR" could
"recommend action".264
S.301, originally, and as it evolved, was seen by the other contracting
parties to GATT in a hostile light. The 1988 amendments, making the use of
the s.301 procedures more "mandatory" with the discretion of the executive being
9 f\f\
"reduced in certain cases of "unjustifiable" actions ...by foreign governments"
led, inter alia, to the EC protesting at the level of the Council, and releasing a
9 f\R
press statement "expressing 'serious concern'" over the Act. The aggressive
unilateralism exhibited by the U.S. pursuant to the provisions of s.301 is believed
by many to have been "the catalyst for the movement to the new WTO dispute
259
Op. cit. footnote no. 112.
260 Jackson, John H., Davey, William J. & Sykes, Alan O. Jr.: Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations, Cases, Materials and Text, West Group, St. Paul, Minn, 2002, at page 318.
261
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262
By way of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.
263 The United States Trade Representatives, a branch of the Executive.
264
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 70, at endnote no. 50.
265
By way of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.
266
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 71.
267
European Community News, No. 24/88.
268
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 71, endnote no. 49.
216
resolution system".269 By 2000, however, the EC's concerns over the continuing
existence of s.301 on the U.S. statute books led to the panel decision in the s.301
panel report, with the EC complaining that "by adopting, maintaining on its
statute book and applying" these provisions of the Trade Act after the coming into
force of the WTO, the US had "breached the historical deal that was struck in
Marrakech".270
The s.301 panel stated that the issue was "whether, on the correct
interpretation of the specific WTO obligation at issue, only mandatory or also
discretionary national laws are prohibited".271 They further stated that if a member
of the WTO reserves to itself, by way of national law, the right to do "something
which it has promised not to do under Article 23.2(a.) DSU", this would go
"against the ordinary meaning of Article 23.2(a) read together with Article 23.1"
DSU.272 The s.301 panel expressly stated that the provisions of WTO law did
97^
produce indirect effect within the jurisdictions of its member states, as its
subjects did not comprise nationals ofmember states as well as member states
themselves, although individuals were still considered to be of "relevance to the
GATT/WTO legal matrix".274 The panel recognised however,275 that the ongoing
threat of a member state to act contrary to the provisions of Article 23 could of
itself cause serious damage to the activity of the market place, producing "a
'chilling effect' causing serious damage in a variety of ways".276
The panel found277 that the drafting of s.304, "by mandating a
determination before the adoption of DSB findings and statutorily reserving the
right for this determination to be one of inconsistency" was "presumptively"
269
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270 Ibid, at page 319.
271 Ibid, at page 323.
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chapter 6.
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inconsistent "with the provisions of Article 23.2(a)" of the WTO Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes.278 While the
panel in this case expressly ruled out the possibility of finding, on this occasion,
that WTO law has direct effect within the domestic jurisdictions of its member
states, elements of the development of a doctrine of supremacy ofWTO law over
domestic law, at least with regard to the provisions of Article 23 DSU appear to
be emerging. The US was saved the embarrassment of having to amend its
legislation by virtue of the existence of a US Statement of Administrative Action
97Q
(SSA). The panel found that matters pertaining to the WTO had been "carved
out" of the "general application of the Trade Act" by as SSA, as the Trade Act
discretion had thereby been limited, requiring section 301 determination of a
breach of US rights "on the Panel or Appellate Body findings adopted by the
DSB."280 This "curtailment of the discretion" was found by the s.301 panel to be
"lawful and effective".281
Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974 was further amended by section 407 of
the Trade and Development Act of 2000.282 This provided further teeth to section
301, by "permitting the U.S. to rotate the list of products targeted for tariffs every
six months." This addition to the US s.301 armoury led to a request for
consultations by the EC,284 with the U.S. restraining from utilising the new
ooc
provisions. It is clear that s.301 will continue to be problematic in the
relationship between the U.S. and the WTO, with its EC counterpart, the Trade
Barrier Regulation, 286 with its less aggressive approach, being less
controversial.287
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7.2 Further legalisation of the dispute settlement process
The development of precedential value of panel and appellate body rulings
ooo
has continued apace in the post- WTO structure. The interpretation of treaty
texts in a strict legal manner has been emphasised in both the Gasoline289 case and
the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages290 reports.291 The Japan - Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body report also led to the statement that "panels
'should' take into account previous adopted panel reports, which create 'legitimate
• OHO
expectations' concerning future dispute settlement outcomes". This is leading,
while not to legal certainty in an absolute sense, to greater legal certainty than
under the GATT 1947 system.
The strengthening of legal process has also been evidenced in the post-
Uruguay panel reports, starting with the pre-WTO case of Tuna/Dolphin, but was
further developed in the Desiccated Coconut,293 and Indian Patents294 cases.
Desiccated Coconut interpreted Article 7.2 DSU as imposing "a requirement that
all claims that the complainant is making be in the first instance contained in its
9QC
request for a panel." Indian Patents for its part held "that a party must specify
the exact legal provision in a WTO agreement that it is relying on, in order for a
claim related to that provision to be adjudicated, even if the claim itself has
288
Howse, Robert; Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law,
in Weiler, J.H.H.(ed.): The Early Years ofWTO Jurisprudence, The EC, the WTO and the
NAFTA, Towards a Common Law of International Trade, Oxford University Press, 2000, at page
60 et seq.
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296
appeared in the Terms of Reference". Howse is of the view that the Appellate
Body, in these two cases, "has clearly underscored the view of the DSU as
9Q7
embodying justiciable due process rights." The making of an objective
assessment by a panel under Article 11 DSU is now a legal duty, with the
Appellate Body interpreting "the DSU as establishing procedural disciplines" for
the panels.298 The Hormones299 case held that the finding300 by a panel "of non-
relevancy is itself a finding of law, subject to appellate review".301 Similarly the
Appellate Body in Periodicals302 found that a breach of Article 11 DSU could
arise where a panel mishandled or disregarded "evidence on the record", which of
itself could "affect the sustainability of its legal conclusions upon appeal".303
The requirement for a panel, under Article 11 DSU, to make an "objective
assessment of the facts of the case" is of particular relevance in the context of
dealing with competing values, to include the non-trade values and interests
protected by Article XX GATT. This point is of particular relevance in the
context of agriculture, given the EC's view as to the multifunctionality of
agriculture,304 together with the issue of sustainability of agricultural practices.
Like issues had arisen in the GATT cases of Tuna/Dolphin and Canadian
Salmon and Herring306 with little success. In Tuna/Dolphin the panel explicitly
chose "simply to disregard evidence that related to the impact of the measures in
0(Y7 "308
dispute on non-trade values and interests". In Canadian Salmon and Herring
a prohibition by Canada on the export of unprocessed salmon and herring,
296 Ibid, at page 45.
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classified by the Canadians as part of a conservation program, was held to be a
merely protectionist measure, and therefore GATT incompatible.309
The post-WTO 1998 Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body ruling,310 operating on
the basis of a requirement under Article 11 DSU for an "objective assessment",
which, read in conjunction with Articles 12 and 13 DSU, was obliged in the
circumstances to take information from NGOs in certain circumstances, the
Appellate Body thereby overruling the panel's report on this matter, and
Oil Olo
broadening the use of amicus curia briefs at the WTO. The issue of non-trade
concerns was further examined by the Appellate Body in BeefHormones,313
referring to the "delicate and carefully negotiated balance... between these shared,
but sometimes competing, interests of promoting international trade and of
protecting the life and health of human beings."314 It should also be noted that the
Appellate Body in Shrimp/Turtle, in developing a WTO interpretation of the term
"exhaustible natural resources", while not expressly referring to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted the process set out therein, by
prioritising "evolving international law" over the negotiating history of GATT
1947 315 Appellate Body, in Shrimp-Turtle316 "extensively consulted
agreements and context outside the WTO Agreement" with a view to interpreting
the provisions ofGATT 1994,317 evidencing a development of breath and depth in
WTO/GATT jurisprudence. This approach to non-GATT/WTO international law
oio
has been evolving over time. In the pre-WTO Thai Cigarette case the evidence
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of the World Health Organization, pleaded by one of the parties, was ignored by
the panel.319 More recently however, the post-WTO BeefHormones™ case stated
that it was a panel's duty to make an "objective assessment", taking into
consideration all relevant matters, but not to delegate "part of that duty to some
other institution".321
7.3 Post WTO Agricultural dispute resolution
The impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture on the post-WTO
dispute resolution process was affected by the continuing existence of the Article
13 Agreement on Agriculture peace clause, which expired at the end of 2003.
This should lead to a greater range of agricultural tariff concessions becoming
392
subject to non-violation nullification or impairment actions. An in depth
analysis of the impact of the expiry of the peace clause will be made in chapter 7.
An unsuccessful attempt was made to plead the Subsidies and Countervailing
323Measures (SCM) Agreement in the recent EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar case,
with the Appellate Body declining "to complete the legal analysis" of the impact
of the SCM Agreement on the case in light of the panel's failure adequately to
address the issue. After a very interesting discussion as to whether the principle of
estoppel formed part of WTO law, an issue which was left unresolved, and the
operation of the principle of judicial economy, which since the Canada - Wheat
394
Exports and Grain Imports Appellate Body ruling clearly does form part of
WTO jurisprudence, the EC was found to be in violation of its obligations under
the Agreement on Agriculture, by overpaying export subsidies on sugar.
The impact of the Article 20 Agreement on Agriculture's non-trade
concerns will also be of interest for the future development of agricultural trade
319
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regulation. The Appellate Body ruling in BeefHormones is worth noting in this
context. This case concerned Article XI GATT and the SPS Agreement. The
ruling of the panel, and to a certain extent the Appellate Body was to the effect
that domestic measures which either "restrict trade by discriminating against
imports", or operate to "prevent the access of imports into the national market
(even if equally restricting domestic products)," will be reviewed by the WTO.326
In interpreting this case, Chambovey introduces the concept of in dubio mitus,
whereby if there is ambiguity in interpreting a treaty, then that interpretation
"which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes
less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general
on7
restrictions upon the parties", is the one to be preferred. This would be in line
with the view of the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones, when it stated that it could
not be assumed that "sovereign states intended to impose the more onerous, rather
than the less burdensome obligations". While this approach to treaty
interpretation may lead to greater preservation of sovereignty of the member
states of the WTO, it may prove to be an obstacle to the development of Article
XX(b) exemptions to WTO provisions.
8. Remedies
In addition to giving a panel ruling on a particular measure, under Article
19 DSU both panels and Appellate Bodies are empowered to "suggest ways in
which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations". This
provision of the DSU has not been developed as, as stated by Mavrodis, "panel
325
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members and their Secretariat advisors normally seek to avoid making their ruling
any more intrusive than necessary".330 A similar reluctance on the part of the
panels to utilise the full powers of the DSU is reflected in the use of remedies.
Remedies for WTO wrongs are, with the exception of some anti-dumping and
countervailing duty cases, limited to "surveillance" and retaliation. Surveillance
operates pursuant to Article 21 DSU in order to ensure implementation of adopted
OO 1
recommendations or rulings, which are reviewed initially six months after the
ruling, with the issue of compliance remaining "on the DSB's332 agenda until the
issue is resolved".333 Article 22 DSU applies the remedies of "compensation and
the suspension of concessions". This compensation should be voluntary, and
"consistent with covered agreements" with the amount to be "mutually
acceptable." Compensation was used in a number of antidumping and
countervailing duty cases "in the late 80s and early 90s". This approach has
encountered problems in the post-WTO regime,335 as the US, at s.129 of its
Uruguay Round Agreement Act of 1994,336 provided that "'liquidated' entries
would not be refunded even though the GATT- illegal duties could be revoked for
all 'unliquidated' entries".337
Hudec is of the view that the lack of "compensation for past wrongs", a
norm in domestic legal jurisdictions, reflects "a view of GATT law as having a
lower status than domestic law" and the requirement for GATT legal obligations
to be perceived as not having direct effect, GATT law being perceived as more
330 Hudec, Robert E.; Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, quoting
from Petros Mavroidis in his then unpublished chapter on Remedies in Mitsu Matsushita, Petros
C. Mavoridis & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The World Trade Organization Law, Practice, and
Policy, Oxford University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-19-876472-3, Ch. 19 in Friedl Weiss (ed.)
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International Courts & Tribunals (Cameron May, London, 2000), at page 381.
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a "diplomatic instrument" than a legal system.339 With the increasing
development of the WTO as a legal system, the demand for monetary
compensation may well return.
A further remedy is the Article 22 DSU Suspension of Concessions.
While this option is open to all member states of the WTO, as pointed out by
Hudec,340 economically, it is in reality only open in disputes with similar sized
economies, or smaller economies. The asymmetry in power between the member
states of the WTO, and the failing of the WTO in not being a rule based, rather
than a rule oriented system is exposed by the fact that retaliation is not an option
for disputes brought by developing countries against developed countries. This
failure to provide a balance among the member states "can be viewed as a serious
flaw in the basic structure ofWTO legal remedies".341 In addition, retaliation
049
operates economically as a self inflicted harm on the member state retaliating.'
9. Conclusion
Despite the WTO's best efforts to develop an effective legal system, much
popular dissatisfaction with its operation results from the fact that the WTO "only
governs one aspect of globalisation in actuality", a matter outside its
competence to resolve, while being held responsible for all aspects of
globalisation. In addition many conflicts in world trade do not appear within the
WTO framework.344 Access to justice is one of the problems of the DSU
structure, with a modest attempt being made to redress the balance with the
opening of the voluntarily funded independent legal advisory centre after the
339 Ibid, at page 383, et seq.
340 Ibid, at page 392, et seq.
341 Ibid, at page 393.
342 Ibid, at page 392.
343
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Seattle ministerial meeting.345 This will not, however, rebalance the asymmetries
in power in the operation of the DSU, as only "few governments .. possess
adequate institutional resources to tackle the complexities of the global trade
issues".346 These, as outlined by Ladefoged Mortensen, include "extensive legal
expertise, access to scientific resources, and permanent diplomatic
representation".347 The WTO itself is not in a position to provide these for
developing or least developed states, as the WTO has only "about 1.7% of the
o4o
combined budged for the six international economic organisations", and is
generally considered to be understaffed (at approx. 400 officials) and under-
resourced,349 as reflected in the recent industrial disputes at the WTO. In addition,
the lack of institutional autonomy350 within the WTO, and the lack of a tripartite
division of power, between the legislative, executive and judiciary of the WTO,
limits the progression of the WTO's development from a rule orientated system to
«i
a rule based system."
In addition to the above, new codes are also required to be elaborated, in
particular to cover the issue of competition rules at a global level (known in the
discourse as "Trade Related Anti-Trust Measures" or TRAMS). Both the
OECD" and the UN" have shown some leadership in this area, having
developed preliminary codes and policy documents in this area,354 however these
do not appear to be forthcoming in the Millennium round of negotiations. In
addition the codes as currently designed also need to be revisited for their focus
on trade, which according to Ladefoged Mortensen, has been "specifically
345 Ibid, at page 200 et seq.
346 Ibid, at page 203.
347 Ibid, at page 203 et seq.
348 Ibid, at page 197.
349 Ibid, at page 197.
350 Ibid, at page 198.
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designed to serve global corporate expansion and the harmonisation process"
contain no provision for curbing "certain harmful forms of corporate
development, no matter what problems they bring".356
356
Op. cit. footnote no. 2, at page 177.
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Defining what is WTO law, which was examined in detail in chapters 4
and 5, and how EC law should interact with it, is quite problematic. The most
likely candidate for comparison with WTO law would be international law;
however, differences with International Law permeate the WTO legal order.
Issues such as limited third party intervention and tight time schedules have been
highlighted by Cottier.1 Equally it has been noted that the rulings of the WTO
Panels and Appellate Body, unlike those of the ICJ, may not be made by lawyers
at all, but may be staffed by a mixture of lawyers, economists, or other
professionals in order to provide a sufficiently wide range of experience in order
to adequately deal with the "in-depth interdisciplinary discussions and
assessments" of the issue at hand. The distinction between a "rule-based" and a
"rule-oriented system" discussed in detail in chapter 5, continues to pose a
problem. With the increasing development of law at the WTO level, as evidenced
by the line of GATT/WTO "caselaw" examined in chapter 5, legal consistency is
now ensured through the input of the legal division of the secretariat, which
"assists panellists to take account of precedents and doctrine" and to develop their
draft findings in a WTO precedent compliant way. This development must,
however, be understood against the backdrop of the constitutional structure of,
and institutional balance within the WTO, which will be analysed in chapter 7.
It has been observed by legal academics that the law created and operated
by the WTO, with the exception perhaps of the subject matter of the TRIPs
Agreement,4 stands out from International law as operated by the ICJ in its
approach to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. The rule of exhaustion of
1
Cottier, Thomas; Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: characteristics and
structural implications for the European Union, CMLRev. 35, 325-378, 1998, at page 342.
2 Ibid, at page 349.
3 Ibid, at page 349.
4 The TRIPs Agreement makes extensive reference to domestic litigation and dispute resolution
provisions that are required to be implemented and to be operated to protect intellectual property
by the WTO member states.
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local remedies, according to Kuijper,5 is well established at the ICJ, as evidenced
6 7
by the Interhandel case, and the ELSI case. Furthermore, the ICJ has stated that
"this principle of customary international law cannot be dispensed with by treaty
partners by way of implication",8 but dispense by way of implication appears to
be exactly what has happened within the WTO, as only a provision within the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement9 appears to address this issue, although perhaps
not in a way that would satisfy the ICJ, should the provisions ever come before
it.10 Kujiper advocates the maintenance of the rule of exhaustion of local
remedies, as its strength would be the prevention of "endless inter-State
conflict".11 Cottier, however, takes the contrary view, as he finds that such a rule
would create great difficulties "in the pursuit of offensive trade interests", in
particular with regard to the operation of the EC's Trade Barrier Regulation,12
resulting, in all likelihood, in the end of the third track of the TBR,13 and the
development of "time-consuming and costly"14 litigation within the domestic
jurisdiction of fellow WTO member states. Cottier is firmly of the view that the
dispute "should be settled as quickly as possible", with GATT and WTO practice
and procedure being "better equipped [than customary International law, as
operated by the ICJ, and requiring the exhaustion of national remedies] to serve
the needs of individuals and companies seeking redress".15
It should perhaps be noted at this point that the TRIPs Agreement
provides, at part III of the Agreement, that WTO member states should provide
both civil and criminal remedies for breach of intellectual property rights,
5
Kuijper, Pieter Jan; The New WTO Dispute Settlement System; the Impact on the European
Community, J. W.T. 1995, 29(6), 49- 71, at page 67.
6 Switzerland v. the United States, ICJ reports 1959, 6, at 27.
7 ELSI case, ICJ Reports, 1989, 15ff.
8
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11 Ibid, at page 71.
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15 Ibid, at page 342.
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specifying that, for civil remedies, that there should be fair and equitable
procedures,16 rules of evidence,17 injunctions,18 provisions for awards of
damages,19 together with other remedies.20 In addition there should be a right to
information21 and provisions for indemnification of the defendant in the case of
abuse of enforcement procedures.22 The TRIPs provision on the criminal law
sanctions which WTO member states have to provide, in the event of "wilful
trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial sale" is less
detailed.23
Another factor which differentiates WTO law from International law is the
legal status of the findings of the panel and appellate bodies. Unlike the findings
of the ICJ, they are "not24 judgments in their own right", thereby differing from
"courts of law proper".25 This state of affairs does not, however, weaken the
system, but on the contrary, given that panel and Appellate Body reports then
proceed through an endorsement and monitoring process by all the member states
in the Dispute Settlement Body,26 results in the panel findings have been given
teeth, and therefore are "less likely to stay isolated and unimplemented in real life,
97
as is frequently the case with traditional international adjudication". As with
commercial arbitration processes, out-of-court settlements remain an option at the
WTO.28 Issues such as the development of standards for review may still have to
be developed by the Appellate Body, but as pointed out by Cottier, in this regard
9Q
the WTO is no different from many other legal systems, and is "far removed"
16 Article 42 TRIPs.
17 Article 43 TRIPs.
18 Article 44 TRIPs.
19 Article 45 TRIPs.
20 Article 46 TIPSs.
21 Article 47 TRIPs.
22 Article 48 TRIPs.
23 Article 61 TRIPs.
24
Except if parties agree to binding arbitration.
25
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 345.
26 Articles 20 and 21 DSB.
27
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 346.
28 Ibid, at page 347.
29 Ibid, at page 350.
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from the ECJ's traditional view of the GATT 1947 system of a mechanism for
"conciliatory, non-judicial... diplomatic dispute settlement".
The EC Commission has reacted to the development of the WTO, and its
"compulsory and binding" dispute settlement mechanism, by establishing a group
of GATT specialist lawyers "within the external relations team of the legal
o 1
service". This has been complemented by the announcement by both the
Council and Commission that "they will scrupulously respect the criteria of WTO
law in future agreements".32 The WTO has therefore already "exerted a
preventative effect" on the internal workings of the EC, greater than was the case
under GATT 1947.33 Matters, such as free trade agreements and customs unions
have, therefore to be WTO proofed, as evidenced in the recent ACP Cotonou
Agreement,34 as discussed in detail in chapter 3, with its predecessor, the Lome
agreement having been the subject matter of the series of cases commencing with
the first Bananas case35 at the WTO, and the EC's Euro-Med agreements having
been the subject matter of the pre-WTO Citrus case.36 In addition, and of
particular interest in the context of this thesis, agriculture, pursuant to the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, has now been brought back into the regulatory and
enforcement framework,37 with the CAP being subject to the need to reform, as
evidenced by its recent mid-term review,38 although those reforms may yet have
not gone far enough, given the recent EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar39 case,40
30 Ibid, at page 350.
31
Op. cit. footnote no. 5, at page 60.
32
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 363.
33 Ibid, at page 363.
34 2000/483/EC: Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States (ACP) of the one part, and the European Community and its Member
States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 [Official Journal L 317 15.12.2000].
35
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas,
complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (WT/DS 27).
36
European Communities - Tariff Preferences to Citrus Products ofcertain countries in the
Mediterranean Region (request for negotiations 8111 August 1980, L5012).
37
For a detailed discussion on how agriculture fell out of the GATT 1947 regulatory framework
see chapter 4.
38
Analysed further in chapter 8.
39
European Communities - Export subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/29, WT/DS266/29,
WT/DS283/10, 15th October 2004.
40 Which is discussed in chapter 5.
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particularly in light of the expiration of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture's
peace clause.41 Issues at play in the minds of key decision makers would be the
"particularly high" cost ofWTO non-compliance, in light of the EC's "imperfect
constitutional structures",42 with the likelihood of serious problems arising both
domestically and internationally.43 The loss of the veto mechanism within the
WTO, and the development of the EC's Trade Barrier Regulation44 also brings
immediacy to WTO legal obligations.45
2. The issue of Direct Effect of GATT/WTO law within the EC legal
system.
2.1 Pre-WTO ECJ case law
As neither the WTO nor GATT is expressly referred to in the EC treaty,46
the relationship between the two organisations, in the context of EC
jurisprudence, has been developed by way of case law of the ECJ. The perception
of the ECJ's changing personnel of the relationship between the evolving EC
legal system and that of international law has evolved over the years. Article 302
EC47 empowers the European Commission, to "maintain such relations as are
appropriate with all international organisations".
European Law requires the EC to adhere to all of its international law
commitments, with "the provisions of such an agreement" being deemed to form
"an integral part of the Community system", with an obligation being placed on
41 The potential impact of the expiration of the peace clause is analysed in chapter 7.
42 Which is analysed in chapter 7.
43
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 366.
44 which is analysed later in this chapter.
45
Op. cit. footnote no. 1, at page 357 et seq.
46
Although reference is made to international reciprocal agreements under Article 310 EC,
(Article 238 EC, pre Amsterdam).
47 Article 229 EC, pre Amsterdam, which should be read in conjunction with Article 310 (ex
Article 238 EC.
48 Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Manz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. K.G. a.A. [1982] ECR 364, at
paragraph 13.
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the ECJ to ensure the "uniform application" of the terms of such agreements
throughout the Community"49 in order to ensure that they are not used to create
barriers to trade. However, in the early case of Hageman v. Belgium,50 the ECJ
held that the provisions of the EEC - Greece Agreement of Association, prior to
Greece becoming a full member of the then named EEC, had "no bearing" on the
interpretation of an internal EEC Regulation.51 In the Hauptzollamt Manz case52
the ECJ found that compliance with the provisions of international legal
agreements was "the responsibility of the Community institutions or of the
Member States, and in the latter case, according to the effects in the internal legal
order of each Member State which the law of that state assigns to international
agreements concluded by it", thereby recognising the dualist nature of the legal
systems of some of the EC member states, but not elaborating on whether the EC
legal system itself was to follow either the monist or dualist traditions with regard
to its own obligations under International Treaties.
With regard to the GATT/WTO, ECJ jurisprudence recognises that the EC
took on the external trade obligations of its member states, with regard to
commitments under the GATT, as far back as on the 1st July 1968, when the EC
<ro
introduced its Common Customs Tariff. The ECJ has taken upon itself the role
of interpreter of the GATT by way of preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC,54
with regard to issues arising as and from that date, (1968).55 A divergence in case
law has however, emerged, between the ECJ GATT/WTO jurisprudence, and the
ECJ jurisprudence dealing with other EC international agreements, with the
49 Ibid, at paragraph 14.
50 Case 181/73 Hageman v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449.
51 The provisions in question were Articles 41 and 43 of the Agreement of Association between
the EEC and Greece, with the internal provision being Article 9(3) of Regulation (EEC) No 816/70
of the Council of 28 April 1970 laying down additional provisions for the common organisation of the
market in wine, OJ L 99, 05/05/1970 p. 1, dealing with countervailing charges.
52
Op. cit. footnote no. 48, at paragraph 14.
53 Joined Cases 267 - 269/81 Anmenistrazione delle Finanze dello State v. Societa Petrolifera
Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA Michelen Italiana (SAMI) [1982] ECR 801.
54 Article 177 EC, pre Amsterdam.
55
Op. cit. footnote no. 53.
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allegation being made that the court had not been "consistent in its approach".56
The ECJ itself had attributed this apparent difference in approach to the "certain
asymmetry of obligations" in for example the Lome Conventions, compared to
those undertaken in the WTO/GATT agreements.57
Following the GATT/WTO line of cases, in 1972 the ECJ recognised that
the provisions of GATT 1947 were binding on the Community,58 however the
same case went on to say that on the issue of whether or not an EC provision is
illegal because it is in breach of a public international law obligation, that it was
necessary to establish; 1. that public international obligation is binding on the
Community, and 2, where the proceedings are before a national court, that the rule
would be self-executing.59 Regard would also have to be had to the "spirit, the
general scheme and the terms of the general agreement".60 In 1972 it was found
that, because there was great flexibility in the earlier GATT, it was considered
that the particular part of GATT in question at the time was not self-executing. By
198861 the ECJ was prepared to refer to GATT 1947 documents for the purpose of
interpreting a provision in EC legal provisions, where the EC legal provision
appeared to facilitate this approach.62 The signing of the new WTO agreements in
1994 brought the issue of the legal relationship between the member states of the
EC and the EC, and the legal relationship between the EC and the now to be
formed WTO back before the learned judges of the ECJ in the guise of Opinion
1/94. This Opinion addressed the issue of the competence of the EC in signing
the various WTO agreements, of the then version of Article 113 EC, (renumbered
Article 133 EC post Amsterdam, which has since been amended with the EC's
56
Rosas, Allan; Case Note; Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, CMLRev. 37: 797-816, 2000, at
page 798.
57 Ibid, at page 813.
58 Cases 21 - 24 /72, International Fruit Company N.V. and others v. Producktschap Voor
Groenten en fruit [1972] ECR 1219 24 October 1973, at paragraph 18.
59 Ibid, at paragraphs 7 and 8.
60 Ibid, at paragraph 20.
61 Case 70/87 Fediol v Commission [1989] ECR 1781.
62 The point at issue here was a definition of subsidy, which was not expressly defined in Article 3
of Regulation No. 2176/84, but reference was made in the Regulation to provisions of Article
XVI ofGATT 1947.
63
Opinion 1/94 (re WTO Agreement) [1994] ECR 1-5267
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competence being substantially extended by the ratification of the Treaty of
Nice),64 but did not address the issue of what was to be the legal effect of those
WTO agreements within the EC legal jurisdiction. This issue was left to be
addressed by further cases before the ECJ in the post-WTO era.65
2.2 Post-WTO ECJ case law
The post-WTO ECJ case law on the legal relationship between WTO law
and internal EC law is epitomised in the tensions and findings of Case C-149/96
Portugal v. Council.66 Two doctrines of interpretation had been carried forward
from the pre-WTO ECJ case law, those of Fediol61 and Nakajima.68 The
Nakajima doctrine, from the 1991 judgment,69 built upon the cases of
70 71
HauptzollamtMainz and SIOT, which held that the Community was "under an
obligation to ensure compliance with the GATT 1947 and its implementing
measures",72 with the EC regulation in question in this case having been adopted
70
"in order to comply with the international obligations of the Community",
thereby becoming subject to judicial review for compliance with, in this case,
Articles 2(4) and (6) of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code.74
The Fediol doctrine75 built upon the findings, of, inter alia, International
Fruit Company,76 that "GATT provisions were not capable of conferring on
64
Opinion 1/94 will be discussed further in the context of the GATS and TRIPs Agreement in
chapter 8.
65 For a further analysis of the findings of Opinion 1/94 please refer to chapter 3.
66 Case C-149/96: Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, [1999] ECR 1-8396, at
paragraph 49.
67
Op. cit. footnote no. 61.
68 Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision v Council [1991] ECR 1-2069.
69 Ibid.
70
Op. cit. footnote no. 48.
71 Case 266/81 SIOT v. Ministero delle Finanze and Others [1983] ECR 731.
72
Op. cit. footnote no. 68, at paragraph 31 of the judgment.
73 Ibid, at paragraph 31.
74 Ibid, at paragraph 32 of the judgment.
75
Op. cit. footnote no. 61.
76
Op. cit. footnote no. 58.
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citizens of the Community rights which they can invoke before the courts",77
given the "broad flexibility of its provisions, especially those concerning
deviations from general rules, measures which may be taken in cases of
exceptional difficulty, and the settling of differences between the contracting
no nQ
parties". The ECJ in Fediol also relied on the Kupferberg judgment, which
held that the fact that parties to an international agreement had set up their own
institutional mechanism for "consultations and negotiations inter se in relation to
the implementation of the agreement" did not "exclude all judicial application of
orv
that agreement". Building on these foundations, the ECJ, in Fediol, found that
the ECJ was not prevented "from interpreting and applying the rules ofGATT
with reference to a given case, in order to establish whether certain specific
81commercial practices should be considered incompatible with those rules," and
that the fact that the regulation in question,82 entitled "economic agents .. to rely
on the GATT provisions .. in order to establish the illicit nature of the commercial
practices which they consider to have harmed them" and that said economic
agents were "entitled to request the Court to exercise its powers of review over
the legality of the Commission's decision applying those provisions".
In the 1994 judgment of Federal Republic ofGermany v. Council of the
European Union,84 a case concerning the banana protocol,85 the ECJ, building on
the Fediol and Nakajima doctrines, held, that while "the provisions ofGATT have
the effect of binding the Community",86 given the great flexibility of the
77
Op. cit. footnote no. 61, at paragraph 19 of the judgment.
78
Op. cit. footnote no. 61, at paragraph 20 of the judgment.
79
Op. cit. footnote no. 48.
80
Op. cit. footnote no. 61, at paragraph 21 of the judgment.
81 Ibid, at paragraph 20 of the judgment.
82 Council Regulation 2641/84, OJ 1984, L 252/1.
83
Op. cit. footnote no. 61, at paragraph 22 of the judgment. .
84 Case C-280/93 Federal Republic ofGermany v Council of the European Union [1994] ECR I-
4973.
85 Protocol annexed to the Implementing Convention on the Association of the Overseas Countries
and Territories with the Community, pursuant to the then Article 136 EC, the current version of
which is now Article 187 EC.
86
Op. cit. footnote no. 84 at paragraph 105 of the judgment.
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provisions of GATT,87 and the fact that GATT itself does not provide that its rules
are to be unconditional, "an obligation to recognize them as rules of international
law which are directly applicable in the domestic legal systems of the contracting
parties cannot be based on the spirit, general scheme or terms of GATT".88 Even
Germany, as a member state of both the EC and the WTO was not in a position to
invoke the provisions ofGATT 1947 in the ECJ. The Court concluded that in
such circumstances, "it is only if the Community intended to implement a
particular obligation entered into within the framework of GATT, or if the
Community act expressly refers to specific provisions of GATT" that the ECJ
could "review the lawfulness of the Community act in question from the point of
view of the GATT rules".89
By the time that the judgment in Portugal v. Council,90 was delivered by
the ECJ the thinking of the ECJ had evolved, and GATT 1947 had been
substituted by the WTO package of agreements, amongst them GATT 1994 and
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture. Building on the ruling in Germany v.
Council,91 the ECJ recognised that, "in conformity with the principles of public
international law" the EC was free to conclude an agreement with a non-EC
member state, which could be made to have effect within the "internal legal order
Q9
of the contracting parties", and that it was only in the absence of such an express
agreement that the ECJ would have to determine what legal effect, if any, such an
Q<3
agreement would have within the EC legal jurisdiction. Under international law,
it was recognised by the ECJ, that there was an obligation for "bona fide
performance of every agreement"; however, this of itself did not determine what
legal effect that international agreement would have within the domestic
jurisdiction of the contracting parties.94 The ECJ recognised the difference
87 Ibid, at paragraph 106 of the judgment.
88 Ibid, at paragraph 110 of the judgment.
89 Ibid, at paragraph 111 of the judgment.
90
Op. cit. footnote no. 66.
91
Op. cit. footnote no. 84.
92
Op. cit. footnote no. 66 at paragraph 34.
93
Relying on Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, paragraph 17.
94
Op. cit. footnote no. 66, at paragraph 35.
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between the WTO treaty texts and the earlier GATT 1947 Agreement, particularly
with regard to the dispute settlement mechanism. The ECJ was of the view that
the continuing emphasis on negotiation between the parties to the WTO
agreements mitigated against the WTO agreements by themselves having any
impact on the internal legal operation of the EC. Any greater emphasis being put
on the WTO agreements, other than legal documents in international law, would,
in the view of the ECJ, "have the consequence of depriving the legislative or
executive organs of the contracting parties of the possibility afforded by Article
22 (DSU) ... .of entering into negotiated arrangements even on a temporary
basis".95 The Court went on to say, referring back to the Fediol and Nakajima
rulings, that it was "only where the Community intended to implement a
particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the
Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO
agreements, that it is for the Court to review the legality of the Community
measure in question in the light of the WTO rules".96 As pointed out by
Zonnekeyn, "the fundamental changes in the GATT system have not induced the
ECJ to depart from its former case law as regards the status of GATT in the EC
97
legal order". This approach in Portuguese Textiles was followed in a 2001
no
judgment on the TRIPs Agreement. (The interaction of the TRIPs Agreement
with EC provisions on intellectual property in the context of agriculture will be
examined in chapter 8).
The finding of the ECJ in the Portuguese Textiles case, above, is in line
with the thinking of the WTO panels on this matter, as reflected in the WTO panel
ruling in United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of1974." This
95 Ibid, at paragraph 40 of the judgment.
96 Ibid, at paragraph 49 of the judgment.
97
Zonnekeyn, Geert A.; "The Status ofWTO Law in the EC Legal Order; The Final Curtain?"
J.W.T. 34(3): 111-125, 2000, at page 111.
98 Case C-89/99 Schieving-Nijstad vofand Others v Robert Groeneveld,, [2001] ECR page I-
05851, at paragraph 55.
99 United States - Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R Panel Report adopted
by the DSB on January 27, 2000, at para. 7.72.
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panel,100 ruling on US law, referring to the doctrine of direct effect, stated at
paragraph 7.72 of its ruling, that "neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been
interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect".
Following this approach, the GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order "the
subjects of which comprise both contracting parties or members and their
nationals."101 However, as pointed out by Zonnekeyn, the panel report does have
i r\o
an interesting aside in a footnote, to the effect that the issue of whether WTO
agreements would "create rights for individuals" which national courts would
have to protect, "remains an open question, in particular in respect of obligations
following the exhaustion of DSU procedures in a specific dispute".103 In addition,
the panel reserved the right to the WTO to "construe any obligations as having
direct effect", and that in the absence of such construction, member states of the
WTO were not precluded from, "following internal constitutional principles,"
finding that some obligations "give right[s] to individuals".104
A very strong line of dissenting academic opinion has developed to this
case law, inspired by the opinion of AG Saggio, in the Portuguese Textiles case,
and followed up and elaborated upon by a variety of academics. Snyder,105 for his
part has highlighted opinion of AG Jacobs in Netherlands v. European
Parliament and Council,106 the "importance of negotiation and reciprocity in
GATT/WTO dispute settlement", a "political view" given that the Advocate
General was taking into consideration issues outwith the confines of his own, the
EC's, legal system. Reliance was made on the "reciprocal character of the WTO
Agreements", with the WTO being seen as a "forum for negotiations", which
100 Also discussed in chapter 5 in the context of the development of law under GATT 1947.
101
Op. cit. footnote no. 97, at page 112, footnote no. 7.
102 Footnote no. 661.
103
Op. cit. footnote no. 97, at page 124, quoting the panel in United States - Sections 301 310 of
the Trade Act of 1974.
104 Ibid, at page 124.
105
Snyder, Francis; The Gatekeepers: The European courts and WTO law, CMLRev 40; 313-367,
2003.
106 Case C-377/98, Netherlands v. European Parliament and Council, [2000] ECR 1-6229, at para
147 of the opinion.
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some commentators referred to as being "anachronistic,"107 but which other
commentators took as being fair comment, with Ehlermann warning against
unduly tying the "hands of the Community negotiators".108 For his part Rosas
warned against the ECJ "depriving the legislative and executive bodies of the
Community of the margins of manoeuvre which is enjoyed by the similar bodies
of the trading partners".109
Concern had been expressed by some academics that if the ECJ were to
give direct effect within the EC legal system to WTO law, then if the EC's WTO
trade partners were not implementing WTO rules, how would the EC be able to
react if some sort of legality control was recognised within the EC. AG Saggio
had addressed this issue in Portuguese Textiles to the effect that such "non¬
compliance would be sufficient reason for the non-application of the WTO
Agreements by the EC courts and would" in the event of recognition of WTO law
within the EC legal system, "leave no possibility for Member States and
individuals to invoke their provisions directly".110 Saggio utilised Article 41 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in support of his argument, which
provided that parties "to a multilateral agreement are authorized, within certain
limits, to derogate by a bilateral agreement from the application inter se of the
provisions of the multilateral agreement".111 However, if the Vienna Convention
is to be pleaded in support of the case, then according to Petersmann, under
Articles 26 and 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and
under Articles 300 and 307 EC, then WTO obligations should "take legal primacy
over secondary EC law".112
107
Op. cit. footnote no. 97, at page 121.
108 Ibid, at page 121.
109
Op. cit. footnote no. 56, at page 807.
110
Op. cit. footnote no. 97, at page 116.
111
Op. cit. footnote no. 56, at page 805.
112
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich; Alternative Dispute Resolution - Lessons for the WTO, Ch. 2 in
Friedl Weiss (ed.) Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the
practice of Other International Courts & Tribunals (Cameron May, London, 2000), at page 37.
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The issue of the non-reciprocity of direct effect, initially raised by AG
Tesauro in the Hermes case,113 was also addressed by AG Saggio, to the effect
that principles of customary international law could be used to lead to either "the
non-application or even extinction ofWTO agreements".114 In a convoluted
argument, which perhaps negated his argument for legality control, AG Saggio
argued that "the WTO dispute settlement rules are not capable of limiting the
competency of the ECJ".115 He further went on to say that WTO panels were not
"judicial bodies", but rather "conciliatory mechanism[s] for the settlement of
disputes"116 of a more political nature. This, however, did not prevent the ECJ,
within the EC legal jurisdiction from "going further", and "thus from annulling
117
Community acts as being considered contrary to the WTO". Why the ECJ
would choose to go further is however a moot point. It has also been pointed out
that the compensation mechanism written into the DSU "cannot prevent the WTO
118
Agreements being invoked in a direct legal proceeding" at an EC level. In
addition the "compensation mechanism" does not give a right to a party to
"violate a legal obligation" under the WTO agreements, but "merely constitutes a
practical option to temporarily defuse a dispute between WTO members who are
parties to a dispute."119
The ECJ has emphasised, in rejecting direct effect and allied arguments,
with regard to the effect ofWTO law within the EC legal system, the importance
of negotiation between parties to a dispute under Article 22(2) DSU, if there has
been a failure "to implement the recommendations and decisions of the Dispute
190
Settlement Body within a reasonable period of time". Therefore, the argument
goes, that if the ECJ imposed upon the EC, and its member states, direct effect,
113 Case C-53/96 Hermes International/ FHTMarketing Choice BV, [1998] ECR 1-3603, at
paragraph 33 et seq.
14
Desmedt, Axel; "European Court of Justice on the Effect of the "WTO Agreements in the EC
Legal Order", LIEI, 2000 27(1), 93 -101, at page 97.
115
Op. cit footnote no. 97 at page 114, referring to paragraph 23 of the opinion.
116 Ibid at page 114.
117Ibid at page 115.
'18 Ibid, at page 123.
119 Ibid, at page 123 et seq.
120 Ibid, at page 118.
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that would "deprive the legislative and executive bodies of WTO Members of the
• 191
possibility to search, even on a temporary basis, for negotiated solutions,"
thereby depriving "the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the
scope ofmanoeuvre enjoyed by similar organs of the EC's major trading
199
partners." Rosas has, in particular, highlighted the issue of the lack of
democratic accountability ofWTO bodies, and argued that "granting direct effect
to WTO rules" would play into the hands of the likes of anti-globalisation
protestors", and "could instead deprive the democratic institutions of the EU and
other WTO members of the margin of manoeuvre they currently possess so as to
strike a balance between trade and societal values."123
Others have raised concern about the possibility that, if direct effect of
WTO rules was granted within the EC legal system, compensation could then be
granted to individuals and legal bodies in the event that member states or the EC
passed law not in compliance with WTO rules, and that that situation had to be
avoided. As Desmedt has observed, that line of argument avoids dealing with the
current "odd situation" in which the EC's trading partners would be able to claim
compensation through the DSU for a breach of WTO rules by the EC, but that
"any claim based on the violation in question by a subject in the EC would be
rejected".124 For Desmedt this situation is particularly odd as it "deprives these
agreements, as well as Article 300(7) EC Treaty of much of their meaning for EC
19c
citizens." Despite this reasoning, as indicated by the panel report in United
19 ft
States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, and by EC law academic
commentators, it is still possible to "envisage giving direct effect to rulings of the
dispute settlement bodies as adopted by the DSB."127
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Op. cit. footnote no. 56, at page 816.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 114, at page 100.
125 Ibid, at page 100.
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2.3 Legality control
Despite the fact that the ECJ had held that GATT provisions did not have
direct effect on the EC given their great flexibility, in Federal Republic of
128
Germany v. Council of the European Union, AG Saggio, in Portuguese Textiles
did not argue for the direct effect of the WTO agreements, even though their
provisions were less flexible than equivalent GATT provisions, but was of the
view that the lack of direct effect "should not affect the legal effect of these
Agreements in the EC legal order".129 As Desmedt has pointed out, the AG
"clarified the often blurred distinction between direct effect and legality
130control". In Zonnekeyn's view, the great "novelty of the Portuguese Textiles
i o 1
case" was the development of the legality control debate, with the dispute
settlement mechanism being implicitedly recognised as being essentially
governed "by politics rather than by the rule of law".132 Under this "legality
control" approach, an "international agreement can serve as a norm for legality
control even if the agreement does not have direct effect", with any view to the
1 33
contrary limiting the scope of Article 300(7) EC, which provides that
"Agreements concluded under the conditions set out in this Article shall be
binding on the institutions of the Community and on Member States".134 AG
1 oc
Saggio sidelined the issue of the preamble to Council Decision 94/800, which
provides that the WTO agreements were not to be deemed to have direct effect,
stating that it was "for the court to determine whether or not the WTO
13f\
agreements" would have direct effect.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 84.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 97, at page 116.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 114, at page 95.
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132 Ibid, at page 120.
133 Ex Article 228 EC.
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135 Council Decision 94/800, Official Journal L 336, 23/12/1994 p. 1
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The ECJ, in its reasoning in the Portuguese Textiles case, implied "that
legal control of acts adopted by the Community institutions on the basis ofWTO
law" would not be possible as the ECJ must preserve for the EC legislator the
freedom necessary "in order not to endanger the EC's future negotiating position
towards its trading partners in the WTO".137 Zonnekeyn sees this as not being a
legal argument, but rather a political one, being "an obvious assault to the Trias
politic' principle,138 which ought to be the cornerstone of every legal system".139
The view therefore being adopted was that the "absence of direct effect of an
international agreement protected the validity of Community acts".140
2.4 Accommodation and Acculturation
In the absence of either direct effect or legality control, academic
commentators have been examining the ECJ's line of judgments for indirect
effect principles, in particular Rosas, who interprets indirect effect in this context
as being "an obligation for domestic courts to interpret national law in the light of
WTO law."141 This principle of consistent interpretation has been developed from
the Hermes142 case, and the International Dairy Agreement case,143 but as
Zonekeyn has said, it would only be a "valuable substitute for direct effect" but
not for legality control,144 with Desmedt advocating this approach as developing
into possibly "the most effective method for parties to invoke WTO rules".145
While it is undoubtedly true, as Snyder has said, that the European courts often
"use WTO law as an aid in interpreting a range of EC legal instruments",146
particularly with regard to "foreign trade, notably imports, agriculture, anti-
137
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dumping and intellectual property",147 it would perhaps be overstating the case to
say that there is currently an obligation on the EC courts to interpret EC law in
"light of WTO law".148 As Snyder goes on to say "direct effect is not the only
way of creating relations between sites of governance".149 It might perhaps be
more accurate to describe the reaction of the ECJ to WTO law is as a process of
"accommodation", with the ECJ not feeling itself obliged to follow WTO law, but
is, where possible, prepared to accommodate the principles and provisions of the
WTO regime within its own jurisprudence.
The relationship between the WTO and the EC legal systems is not
however restricted to the interpretations of the ECJ. While the ECJ has "been
most in the public eye" in this regard, "other EC institutions also interpret WTO
(law) regularly in their work",150 in particular, the European Commission,
through its "right of initiative to propose EC legislation".151 Using the
terminology of the cultural anthropologist, the term "acculturation" could be
utilised to describe the influence ofWTO law on EC law outwith the operation of
the ECJ. Acculturation has been used by colonial applied anthropologists, in the
context of European colonisation, "to describe the changes in tribal culture" in
the context of the minimisation of "the role of coercion and the loss of tribal
autonomy."152 While there has been no conquest of European legal culture by the
WTO, there has been a voluntary engagement by the EC legal system with the
emerging WTO legal system, with consequent changes in the legal and
institutional "tribal" culture at an EC level. This view is reinforced by Snyder who
states that "WTO law has profound implications for the EU constitution", having
"already begun to reshape relations between (the) EC and (its) Member States".1 3
It has as a result of the development of the practices of "clear reference,
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transposition and consistent interpretation" of WTO law within the EC legal
system resulted in "institutional growth and expansion, fostered policy integration
and reinforced the development of a legal culture oriented to multi-site
governance".154 It is therefore possible to describe the legal relationship between
the WTO and the EC, covering both the intra- and extra - ECJ points of contacts
as being a relationship of accommodation and acculturation.
2.5 Trends in the International Case law
From the case law of various contracting parties to GATT 1947 around the
world, there appears to be the development of a trend in the GATT/ WTO
jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, which may match, to a certain extent, the
developments of approach within the ECJ in the same period. It would appear that
there was a movement from initially viewing GATT 1947 as either having, or
having the potential to have, direct effect, but as GATT and the WTO laws
become more complex and profound, to a retreat from this initial position, to the
development of a conclusion that perhaps the WTO legal regime may not have
direct effect after all in domestic jurisdictions.
At the GATT panel level, the issue of the direct effect of GATT 1947
provisions arose in the panel report of United States: Alcoholic and malt
beverages,155 which held that "Article XXIV: 12 was not applicable to the United
States". The panel was convinced, on the basis of the writing of Jackson and
Hudec, that "GATT law had become part of US federal law, and since federal
law, according to the US Constitution, is supreme over state law, any inconsistent
state law had to give way before GATT".156 The issue of a federal state being
responsible for the actions of its constituent states is confirmed by Article 22(9) of
the DSU, which in the absence of control being enforced by the federal
Ibid, at page 367.
155 United States: Alcoholic and malt beverages, BISD 39S/206, para. 5.78 - 5.80. at page 206.
Adopted 19 June 1992.
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government on the sub-national government, imposes "compensation and
i cn
suspension of concessions" provisions on the federal state. To the astonishment
1 CO
of Kuijper, the US has managed, through its implementing legislation and its
accompanying statement of administrative action, to reduce "itself to the same
situation as the EC" by expressly "limiting the supremacy of federal law over
state law", and thereby managing largely to "undo the consequences of' the
adopted panel report in United States- Alcoholic and malt beverages.159 The
current situation is that the US federal government can only force a state
government to comply with WTO provisions by way of the federal government
taking a court action "comparable to action pursuant to Article 169 of the EC
Treaty" (now Article 226 EC) against the state concerned.160 It should also be
noted that the WTO agreements now contain "an elaborate mechanism for
consultation with state authorities with a view to guaranteeing that state law is in
conformity with the WTO Agreement and its Annexes".161
On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, in Japan, Iwasawa, in his
writings,162 refers to two domestic Japanese cases which addressed the issue of
the direct applicability of GATT 1947 in Japan, namely the Kolbe Jewellery
case163 and the later Kyoto Neckties case.164 Under Japanese law "treaties are
accorded a high authority", overriding statutes, even those subsequently enacted,
under Article 98(2) of the Japanese Constitution.165 Following this approach, the
157 Ibid, at page 70.
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Kakeishu 519, 524 - 25.
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supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or
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courts in the Kolbe Jewellery case suggested that GATT 1947 had direct effect
within Japan. The later Kyoto Neckties case caused uproar in Japanese legal
academic circles when the Kyoto District court's judgment, "apparently denying
the direct applicability of the GATT" was endorsed by the Japanese Supreme
Court in 1990, a "poorly reasoned case" according to Iwasawa, and another
academic, Professor Matsushita claiming that the courts in Kyoto Neckties
seemed "to ignore Article 98(2) of the constitution",166 a strange claim to lay at
the feet of any Supreme Court, leading to the possible conclusion that the decision
was taken for unexpressed politically pragmatic, or accomodation reasons, along
the lines taken by the ECJ in the later (1999) Portuguese Textiles case.167
An interesting line of GATT jurisprudence can be seen within the EC, on
the issue of the direct effect of GATT 1947 within the Italian jurisdiction. During
the latter part of the 1960's the Italian lower and appeal courts had ruled that
"Article III, para. 2 of GATT conferred on private parties a right to invoke it
before the courts,"168 leading to the Italian state being ordered to reimburse GATT
illegal taxes levied on importers. When the ECJ was holding that the EC had been
substituted for the Member States with regard to commitments under the GATT
from the 1st July 1968, with the introduction of the Common Customs Tariff,169
the Italian Corte di Cassazione was upholding, in 1968, the findings of its lower
courts with regard to Article III, para. 2 of GATT.170 Since that finding, however,
the impact of the ruling had "progressively lost significance in practice",171 with
166
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the Italian courts beginning to reverse their position on GATT 1947 in subsequent
179
cases. During the 1970's, while the ECJ was holding that in International Fruit
that GATT 1947 was binding on the Community, the Italian courts were
"developing the concept" that GATT 1947 had direct effect, and that "specific
provisions may be considered as self-executing" in light of their particular
content, independent of other provisions of the agreement, and regardless of
173"elements such as the absence of a jurisdiction for the settlement of disputes".
The Italian courts were aware that the ECJ had taken a different line on this issue,
with the Corte di Cassazione stating that, in comparison to the ECJ line, its view
was wider than that of the ECJ, and also recognising that different member states
of the EC might take different positions on the legal effect ofGATT 1947,
holding that "GATT could not be considered [a Community act] under [the then]
Article 177".174 By the time, however, of the SIOT and SAMI references to the
ECJ in 1983, by the Corte di Cassazione, the Italian judiciary were following the
ECJ's line on the legal status of the GATT 1947, thereby reversing earlier Italian
case law on the matter.
2.6 More recent cases
The issue of the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO has
175arisen again in the more recent cases, all dealing with bananas, of Atlanta and,
what have become known as the "March 2001" judgments, of Cordis,176 Bocchi
Food111 and T.Port,178 The Atlanta case was heard at the CFI, and an appeal made
to the ECJ, where the issue of the relationship between the EC and the WTO was
172
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argued. The ECJ, in its judgment, confined itself to procedural issues, and did not
address directly the substantive issue of the relationship between the EC and the
WTO, as the plea on this matter was not included in the original appeal
documentation, and therefore deemed inadmissible. The Advocate General, did
address the issue at paragraphs 3 to 32 of his opinion. The "March 2001"
judgments were all heard at the CFI level. Only T.Port was appealed to the
ECJ,179 but on appeal the ECJ only addressed the issue of the CFI's calculation of
reference quantities.
In the Atlanta case at the ECJ protection of legitimate expectations was
pleaded. While the Advocate General recognised that this was "one of the
fundamental principles of the Community", as the Community retained a
discretion as to its running of its common markets "traders had no legitimate
expectation that an existing situation which the Community institutions could
1 80
alter in the exercise of their discretionary powers would be maintained".
Further, the claim for non-contractual liability of the Community under Article
181215 EC, required "proof of illegal conduct, damage and a causal link", with, in
the AG Mischo's view, the claimants falling at the first hurdle, proof of illegal
conduct. The claim in this case was not that the EC provisions dealing with the
common organisation of bananas were in breach of the "substantive GATT
provisions or those of the WTO", but rather that, in light of the findings at the
1 Q-^
WTO in EC-Bananas, on the issue of the EC banana regime, the EC provisions
were now illegal. The claimant therefore pleaded that the "legislative provisions
[were] applied to the appellant in disregard of the binding effect on the
Community of the decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body".183 The AG
stated that this plea was inadmissible as it had not been entered in the original
179 Ibid.
180 At paragraph H8 of the judgement in Case C-104/97P. Atlanta AG v. European Community,
[1999] ECR1-6983, [2001] 1 CMLR 20.
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appeal documentation from the CFI. However, utilising the common law
technique of an obiter dicta, the AG stated that in any event, following the case of
1 84
Commission v. Germany, the appellant could "not profitably set up the
incompatibility of Regulation 404/93 with the WTO Agreement to contest the
reasoning of the Court of First Instance."185 Going even further down the obiter
dicta line, the AG stated that even the claim that EC law was in conflict with a
decision of the Dispute Settlement Body, "would not assist the appellant's
1 86
case", on the basis that even a ruling of the Appellate Body of the DSU does
not "impose on the party whose legislation is found to be contrary to the WTO
provisions a duty immediately to amend that legislation".187 The AG went on to
say that "Clearly... the rights which a decision of the Appellate Body would
intend to confer on individuals have nowhere near the scope which the appellant
1 88
seeks to give them". This is particularly in light of the fact that, as pointed out
by Zonnekeyn, "Article 22 of the DSU gives WTO members the possibility of
maintaining the unlawful measures in place beyond the reasonable period of time
1 OQ
if the parties to the dispute have agreed on a suitable compensation."
In the Cordis case,190 which was heard by the CFT, it was reiterated that
"the WTO Agreement and its annexes are not intended to confer rights on
individuals which they could rely on in court",191 nor could the Community incur
i no
"non-contractual liability as a result of infringement of them". The position in
1 QO
Portugal v. Council, that, despite the significant differences between GATT
1947 and the WTO Agreement they both "nevertheless accord considerable
importance to negotiation between the parties"194 was reaffirmed. The issue of the
184
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possibility of an imbalance of obligations between member states of the WTO,
should the ECJ take any other line, was also addressed. The CFI also reaffirmed
the ECJ's line in Portugal v. Council195 that the Community judicature could not
"deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Community of the scope for
manoeuvre enjoyed by" the Community's trading partners within the WTO.196
The argument was made in this case that there should be developed a "new
category of misuse of powers" to the extent that the Commission adopted a
regulation in breach ofWTO obligations. This was rejected outright. It is
established case law of the ECJ that misuse of powers can only be claimed if
legislation is "adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end
other than that stated",197 but such an allegation was not being made, or could not
be made, by the applicants in the Cordis case.198 The claim that a new category of
misuse of powers should be developed was therefore rejected. The CFT reaffirmed
that, following Portugal v. Council,199 the ECJ or CFI was only required to
"review the legality of' a provision of EC law "in the light of WTO law", when,
either, 1. "the Community intends to implement a particular" WTO obligation, or
2. if a piece of EC law "refers expressly to the precise provisions of the
agreements contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement".200 As neither the
WTO panel report (22 May 1997),201 nor the Appellate Body report (9th
September 1997)202 "included any special obligations which the Commission
intended to implement, within the meaning of the case-law, in Regulation no.
2362/98",204 then no such a claim could made in this case.
195
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In Bocchi Foods205 the arguments and the findings of the CFI followed
closely those of the Cordis case. The T.Port206 CFI case followed closely both the
arguments and findings of Bocchi Foods and Cordis, with the CFI stating that "it
should be noted that it is clear from Community case-law that the WTO
Agreement and its annexes are not intended to confer rights on individuals which
907
they could rely on in court". The CFI restated the position in Portugal v.
Council by saying that "it is only where the Community intends to implement a
particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or where the
Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the agreements
contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement" that it became subject to either
ECJ or CFl review "in the light of the WTO rules".208
With reference to the March 2001 judgments, Peers is of the view209 that
the CFI was in error in concluding that the "implementation exceptions" could be
"deduced from previous case law". Peers argues that while previous case law
certainly did clarify the position with regard to the 1993 Regulation dealing with
bananas, "it had not ruled on the applicability of those exceptions to subsequent
amendments of the Regulation". He advocates that it is "strongly arguable" that
the purpose of the 1998 Council Regulation was "related to a WTO obligation",210
pointing out the reference within the preamble to the regulation of the WTO
commitments. Further the explanatory memorandum accompanying the
regulation referred to the need to bring EC law in line with WTO law, and that a
211
"system of import licences compatible with the WTO should be introduced". In
light of this persuasive argument, it is hard to ignore Peers' view that it is difficult
to distinguish between a measure "being adopted "in order to comply" with the
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WTO ruling", as the 1998 regulation clearly is, and a measure "intending to
implement a WTO obligation".212
Two further cases worth examining in this context are the Biret case213 and
the Van Parys case.214 The Biret case215 raised the issue of the impact of a DSB
ruling on the non-compliance of EC law with WTO law and the possibility of the
development of "no-fault liability for the Community in respect of its normative
acts". Both of these issues were rejected at the CFI hearing with the CFI finding
that "the purpose of the WTO agreements is to govern relations between States
.... for economic integration... and not to protect individuals".216 The CFI
217reaffirmed the findings in Portugal v. Council, following the Fediol and
218
Nakajima hypothesis, and found that the facts of the Biret case did not fall
within the two exceptions to WTO law not having direct effect in EC law. It
further found that the ruling of the DSB did not alter the EC's law in this area,
finding that a ruling of the DSB would only become relevant if the Court had
found that the agreement in question, in this instance the SPS agreement, had
direct effect, which was not the finding of the CFI in this case.
Biref s claim that the CFI should develop "its case-law in the direction of
a system of no-fault liability for the Community in respect of its normative
acts"219 was also rejected on the basis that this plea was introduced late in the
proceedings and should have formed part of the original pleadings in this case.
Problems also arose with the pleadings on appeal, so that the effect of the DSB
ruling was not properly ruled on by the ECJ. The ECJ did however state that it,
the ECJ, had to take into consideration the period of time given by the WTO to
212 Ibid, at page 611.
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the EC to amend its laws, and any examination of liability of EC institutions for
the non-amendment of laws within that time period would "render ineffective the
220
grant of a reasonable period for compliance" with the DSB ruling. The ECJ
therefore found that no damage could be proven to have occurred after the
"reasonable period for compliance", so it did not have to rule further on the
matter. It also avoided ruling on the second plea, "concerning the Community's
alleged no fault liability"221 as it had been submitted too late to be considered.
The opinion of AG Alber in the ECJ case does however cast a different
light on the issues raised in Biret. At paragraph 83 of his opinion, he states that a
ruling of the DSB removes the margin of manoeuvre ofWTO contracting parties,
with the obligation being to implement the findings of the DSB immediately and
without condition. This, therefore, alters the nature of the obligation of the WTO
member states, as there is, after a DSB ruling, an "obligation sufficiently clear and
precise". He did recognise, however, that there was a need for a Community
legislative measure to put in place the provisions of the legislative changes in this
• 222situation. He went on to say that, from the point of view of Community law, the
right of the free exercise of economic activities would be in favour of the
recognition of direct effect of the rulings of the DSB, after the expiration of a
reasonable delay for amending EC law.223 In such a situation Alber is also of the
opinion that there would be a case for recognising the possibility of bringing a
224
case for compensation for EC non-compliance with WTO law.
The above points highlight some problematic issues from a legal
perspective, which resolve themselves with relative clarity when examined from a
political perspective. The response of the ECJ follows what appears to be political
reasoning rather than pure legal reasoning, as to the legal effect ofWTO law
within the EC jurisdiction. It gives rise to a question as to the exact balance of
220 At paragraph 65 of the judgment.
221
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222 At paragraph 89 of the opinion.
223 At paragraph 110 of the opinion.
224 At paragraph 112 of the opinion.
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powers between the EC and its member states in the context of the EC's
relationship with the WTO and, in this context, the relative role of the EC
institutions within the EC jurisdiction and the role that the ECJ has developed for
itself within the EC. While the EC is clearly set up to run on the basis of the rule
of law, the issue does arises whether the ECJ should ignore the "unanimous
position of the Governments" of the EC vis a vis the WTO.225 As stated in one
Common Market Law Review editorial, the balance is between the ECJ acceding
to governments' demands pursuant to pressure "from weak industries defending
their own short term interests" or should the ECJ protect the interests of EC
consumers and the EC's own interests by "granting direct effect of' what were
then GATT 1947 obligations "against the wishes of the Governments".226 As
pointed out in the same editorial, "the Court cannot govern Europe",227 despite the
highly political role that it has been asked to play in the context of the legal
relationship between the EC jurisdiction and the WTO jurisdiction. This would
reflect the discourse in chapter 7, to the effect that the ECJ is unable to govern
99R 99Q




The Van Parys case, following the Biret case, was therefore key in
discovering possible future ECJ jurisprudential developments in this area. The
Van Parys case, perhaps given the need for a clear statement on this matter, was
909
heard in Grand Chamber by the ECJ. The question posed, as stated by the ECJ
was whether the Commission, in adopting tariff quotas which breached the EC's
WTO commitments, in light of the "avowed intention" to reform the EC's
"regime for the importation of bananas into the Community" in order to conform
with its WTO obligations, exceeded its authority. The ECJ pointed out,
225 Editorial Comment; Strengthening GATT, CMLRev. 1983 page 393, at page 395.
226 Ibid, at page 396.
227 Ibid, at page 396.
228 Ibid, at page 396.
229 And which was referred to in chapter 5.
230
Op. cit. footnote no. 97, at page 121.
231
Op. cit. footnote no. 214.
232 At paragraph 4 of the judgment
257
reaffirming Portugal v. Council, that "the WTO agreements are not in principle
among the rules" to be used for the purpose of ECJ judicial review of EC
234 233 236
secondary legislation. The ECJ reaffirmed the Fediol and Nakajima
rulings, 7 stating that even when the DSB had held that domestic measures were
in breach ofWTO rules, the "WTO dispute settlement system nevertheless
938
accords considerable importance to negotiation between the parties", given that
compensation or "the application of concessions or the enforcement of other
obligations" were substitutable remedies on an interim basis to the withdrawal of
the non-WTO compliant domestic measures.239 Reaffirming the politically
pragmatic argument above, the ECJ stated that giving direct effect to either WTO
agreements or DSB rulings would deprive "the legislative or executive organs of
the contracting parties of the possibility afforded by Article 22 of that
memorandum of reaffirming a negotiated settlement, even on a temporary
basis."240 If the ECJ took this line, then this discretion, which fellow WTO
members would benefit from, would be denied to the EC institutions. Therefore
the Grand Chamber of the ECJ held that, in the circumstances of this case, that it
was not possible for a party to plead before the ECJ that Community law was in
breach ofWTO law.241
3. Access to the WTO dispute settlement system from the EC
Given the above line of ECJ caselaw on the impact ofWTO law within the
EC legal system, the question which must be posed is can individuals, either
natural or legal, interact in any way with the WTO. As discussed in chapter 5 the
US business community interacted with the WTO legal framework through s.301
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of the Trade Act 1974. On this side of the Atlantic, one political mechanism, the
Article 133, formerly the Article 113 procedure, and one legal mechanism, the
949
Trade Barrier Regulation, are available.
3.1 The Article 133 procedure
Most cases brought by the EC to the WTO or GATT panels arose by
virtue of Commission instigation, either of its own volition, or through an
informal complaint process, from either a member state of the EC, or from
industry. Initially the case would have been examined by the GATT division of
what was once referred to as DG1, but since 1992 by "a special team ofGATT
949
lawyers in the Legal Service". The 133 Committee, formerly known as the 113
Committee, a "Council committee which advises the Commission on the conduct
of the common commercial policy,"244 would then decide on whether to proceed
with the dispute at the WTO/GATT level, by way of requesting "the constitution
of a panel" after the carrying out of the "necessary formal consultations under
Article XXIII GATT" or equivalent code.245 Political pragmatism pervades
decision making at this level, with a high level of cooperation between the
institutions. The issue of which institution would take precedence over the other
in the case of an Article 133 action has never arisen. The case would then be
presented by the WTO specialists in the EC's legal service, "in close
collaboration with the competent Commission department",246 with input at times
from relevant EC member states or industries.
242 Council Regulation 3286/94 laying down Community procedures in the field of the common
commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under international
trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization",
OJ L 349/71 of 31 December 1994, amended by Council Regulation 356/95, OJ L 41/3 of 23
February 1995.
243
Op. cit. footnote no. 5, at page 54.
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3.2 The New Commercial Policy Instrument
The precursor to the current Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR) was the New
Commercial Policy Instrument (NCPI). The NCPI's development was inspired by
US developments in this area. The issue of the interaction of member states' legal
systems with GATT arose with the development of the US's development of a
"new procedure in US trade law" section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act of
947
1962. The European Commission responded by proposing, in the early 1960's
"a Community mechanism to respond to foreign unfair trade practices".248 While
these early developments did not have an impact on the development of the
GATT, with no proceedings ever getting to hearing under the US's 1962 act, and
the European Commission's proposals for a similar measure not being adopted,249
they paved the way for future developments in this area by both jurisdictions.
Section 301 proceedings were introduced into the US legal system, under the
Trade Act in 1974, with private parties now availing of the complaint procedure,
with their rights, along with those of the executive "to take action against foreign
9S0
unfair trade practices" having been strengthened. In addition, the US
authorities were prepared, controversially, to utilise the s.301 procedure "to
oc i
ignore GATT obligations and take aggressive action to protect US interests".
Despite Community complaints, the US "continued to refine and sharpen Section
301"252 in its 1979 and 1984 legislation.253
As a consequence the EC developed the "New Commercial Policy
Instrument" (NCPI),254 which operated from 1984 to 1994, when it was amended
by Regulation (EC) No. 522/94,255 but was subsequently amended and replaced
247
Bronckers, Marco C.e.J.; Private Participation in the Enforcement of WTO Law: the New EC
Trade Barriers Regulation CMLRev. 33: 299-318, at page 300.
248 Ibid, at page 300.
249 Ibid, at page 301.
250 Ibid, at page 301.
251 Ibid.at page 301.
252 For a fuller discussion of s.301 of the US Trade Act 1974 see Chapter 5.
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by the Trade Barrier Regulation (TBR),256 "which formed part of the overall
Uruguay Round implementation package".257 The Commission, in drafting the
proposal for the NCPI was careful to ensure that the EC continued to operate
within its international legal commitments, thereby avoiding some of the
controversy being garnered by the US's s.301 procedure, with reliance being
made on the "threat of GATT-authorised retaliation".258 Such authorisation for
retaliation was exercised once under GATT 1947, when the Netherlands was
authorised to retaliate against the US when restrictions were imposed on dairy
ocq 96n
products. According to Kuijper, this route gave rise to few "fully fledged
GATT panel" complaints, with the exception of the AKZO complaint, which
961
developed into the panel report U.S. - Section 337 of the TariffAct of 1930.
The NCPI provided for two methods of activation, one by way of EC
member states complaints, and the other by way of "private complaints
969
representing a European industry". Member States did not utilise the first
method, preferring the more direct Article 113 mechanism, as it then was. The
private complaint mechanism, during its ten years of existence, saw the
Commission formally considering seven complaints, of which five resulted in
further investigations.263 As the NCPI permitted "private complaints to rely on
GATT principles" it was therefore subject to judicial review,264 such a review of
the Commission's decision not to pursue an NCPI investigation being made in the
Fediol case,265 with the ECJ reviewing and upholding the Commission's decision
256
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257
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258
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to reject the complaint, thereby creating an important precedent, not only for the
NCPI, but also for the current TBR.266
3.3 Trade Barrier Regulation267
The EC's Trade Barrier Regulation, the successor to the pre-WTO New
Commercial Policy Instrument and drafted to cover both goods and services,268
entered into force, pursuant to the Uruguay Round legislative reform, in January
1995, together with a revised basic antidumping and counterveiling duty
regulation. Unlike the anti-dumping regulation, the TBR is "not designed to
implement third countries' obligations under specific WTO agreements".269 In
addition, the TBR was designed to "overcome the weaknesses" of the NCPI,
"through improved concepts that correspond better to the features of the new
multilateral rules".270 In line with the policy adopted by the EC for the NCPI, and
unlike its US counterpart, the s.301 mechanism, first, the TBR operates entirely
within the framework of international legal obligations, second, it is not used as a
mechanism for further opening up of third party markets beyond commitments
already given in WTO treaty texts, and third, retaliatory measures cannot be
271
imposed unless international dispute settlement had been followed. The
approach adopted by the EC, as set out by Van Eeckhaute, is a) "better co¬
ordination and pooling of information within the Commission in order to tackle
the barriers more effectively", and b) putting more emphasis on the role of
business and enterprises, encouraging them to be more pro-active in bringing
forward complaints and providing information.272 Both the substance of the
complaints and the procedures to be followed in the TBR have "several notable
266 Van Eeckhaute, Jean Charles; Private Complaints against Foreign Unfair Trade Practices, JWT
33(6) 199-213, 1999, at page 207.
267
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changes" from the NCPI.273 The TBR, in comparison to the NCPI, is also
considered to be more focused in its application, with possibly fewer complaints
being admitted under it, than under the previous regime.274
While its provisions are not identical, the TBR is drafted in order to match
the complaints being brought with the right to a cause of action under the WTO
agreements, the key test being "obstacle to trade", with the intention that the TBR
would be used to "enforce the Community's existing rights under internationally
agreed rules".275 The TBR is considered to be the "organic link" between EC
mechanisms and the WTO, being an important addition to the trigger mechanism
to activate the WTO dispute settlement mechanism,276 with both, in WTO terms,
violation and non-violation complaints being covered.277
There are four requirements to activate the TBR; "(i) the trade practice in
question must constitute an actionable "obstacle of trade"; (ii) the practice must
produce adverse trade effects or cause injury to a Community enterprise or
industry; (iii) the practice should have a material impact on the economy, a sector
or a region of the Community (the "material impact test"); and (iv) it must be in
the overall interests of the Community to adopt remedial action (the "Community
interest test")."278 The measure complained about must be "attributed to the
97Q
government of a third country, or its agencies". As stated by MacLean, these
tests ensure that "the necessary factual and substantive circumstances exist to
justify action at the international level", with, in general, "hard evidence" required
980
by the Commission "to substantiate these claims".
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There are three groups of potential complainants under the TBR,281 first,
complaints by Community industries, the most popular option, second, complaints
by one or more Community enterprise, less used, and third, complaints by
member states of the EC,282 which, as with this option under the NCPI, has never
been used. The requirement to prove adverse trade effects is covered by both
"effects caused (or threatened to be caused) to individual enterprises by trade
001
barriers on third country markets", is key under this title. Five tests have been
used in determining the issue of "adverse trade effects";
1. "inability to penetrate third country markets effectively {Brazilian
284 285 286
Cognac , Japanese Leather Quotas , Canadian Parma Ham )
2872. Loss ofMarket Share by Community Exporters {Brazilian Textiles ,
788
Brazilian Sorbitol, )
3. Increased costs for Exporters {Brazilian Steel Import Licensing289)
4. Loss of Legitimately anticipated Revenues {US Cross-BorderMusic
Licensing290)
281
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285 98/354/EC: Commission Decision of 19 May 1998 adopted pursuant to Council Regulation
(EC) No 3286/94 concerning obstacles to trade represented by Japanese practices in respect of
imports of leather (notified under document number C (1998) 1373), Official Journal L 159,
03/06/1998 p. 65.
286 Notice of initiation of an examination procedure concerning an obstacle to trade, within the
meaning of Regulation (EC) No 3286/94, consisting of trade practices maintained by Canada in
relation to the imports of Prosciutto di Parma, Official Journal C 176, 22/06/1999 p. 6.
287 1999/234/EC: Commission Decision of 17 March 1999 under the provisions of Council
Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 concerning the Brazilian non-automatic import licensing system and
its operation (notified under document number C (1999) 607), Official Journal L 86, 30/03/1999 p.
22.
288 2002/440/EC: Commission Decision of 27 May 2002 terminating the examination procedure
concerning obstacles to trade, consisting of trade practices maintained by Brazil in relation to
imports of sorbitol, Official Journal L 151, 11/06/2002 p. 14.
289 1999/44/EC: Commission Decision of 6 January 1999 pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No
3286/94 concerning the Brazilian import licensing regime for steel plates (notified under
document number C(1998) 4468), Official Journal L 14, 19/01/1999 p. 32.
290 98/731/EC: Commission Decision of 11 December 1998 under the provisions of Council
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Increased Exports to the Community (Chilean Swordfish )."
A separate matter of "interference with the supply of input materials" was
considered a factor in only one case, Argentinean Raw Hides and Finish
Leather,293 with the issue of "injury" coming to the fore in only two cases,
Chilean Swordfish and Brazilian PREX Export Financing,294 with the concept of
99S
"adverse trade effects [being] the predominant one in practice".
Two tests must be met, one that an obstacle to trade is caused in a third
country market, and two, that there is "demonstration that these third country
market effects have an impact on the economy of the Community".296 The
Community would therefore only take action for the benefit of the economy of the
Community as a whole, and not in defence of just one industry or enterprise.
Complaints under the enterprise heading are restricted to unilateral or plurilateral
agreements, thus including the WTO agreements, but cannot be based on bilateral
997
agreements. Despite this the TBR remains, for WTO matters, "the only market-
opening instrument that can be triggered by the private sector and it offers a
298
formal procedural context, and thus enforceable rights, to the complainants". It
is considered to be "an efficient private sector tool" in making the Commission
take action, and in re-prioritisation of Commission action "in areas in which
business faces difficulties".299 Possible remedies under the TBR can include300
291 2000/296/EC: Commission Decision of 5 April 2000 under the provisions of Council
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301
commencement of a dispute settlement procedure, or international consultation,
acceptance of an offer to change provisions by third countries,302 the
commencement of negotiations with the relevant third country under Article 133
EC, or the adoption by the EC of retaliatory measures.303
In reviewing the importance of the TBR, it should be borne in mind that it
is not the only method of commencing a dispute settlement, as it is still possible
informally to notify the Commission of any problems, and for EC member states
to utilise the 133, formerly the 113 committee route.304 The voting mechanism for
member states under the 133 committee route is however different from that used
under the TBR mechanism, as "a minority of Member States, or even one
Member State" can block this process "on the basis of (internal) policy
considerations".305 Under the TBR mechanism the Commission is the main
decision maker, ("with the exception of the adoption of retaliatory measures")
with the Council,306 "at the request of a Member Sate (revising) the Commission's
decision by qualified majority". The ECJ has however, in the 1989 Fediol
judgment308 "refused to leave the determination of Community interest
exclusively in the hands of the Commission", subjecting it to a limited form of
judicial review.309 In Van Eeckhaute's opinion the ECJ will, in TBR cases, limit
itself to traditional judicial review matters, of procedure and institutional misuse
310
of powers, of "whether manifest errors of appreciation were committed". This
311
opinion is endorsed in the CFI judgment in the Prepared Mustard' case, which
concerned the Commission's decision not to proceed with a TBR process. The
300
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CFT held,312 that judicial review of such a Commission decision "mist be limited
to verifying that the relevant procedural rules have been complied with", that the
facts of the case have been accurately represented, and that "there has not been a
manifest error of assessment of those facts or a misuse of powers".
The choice of either the 133 Committee route or the TBR for either a
member state or industry complainant may therefore be a strategic decision.
Use of the TBR mechanism need not, however, lead to a panel complaint, as its
mechanism also permits a negotiated settlement of the issue in question, thereby
resolving the issue as quickly and as pragmatically as possible.314 In a case where
there is a choice of mechanisms for initiating a complaint to the WTO the TBR
mechanism, given its investigation process, is more likely to be adopted in
oic
situations where "the merits of a case are not all that obvious", while the more
straightforward cases are likely to take the more direct Article 133 route. Due
process concerns in the TBR mechanism have been raised by Sundberg and
Vermulst,316 with regard to protection against fishing expeditions, and the lack of
transparency in the whole process, particularly if it was felt that the EC was
"throwing around its economic weight" in complaints against developing
countries, in which situation the TBR could be construed as being itself an
obstacle to trade.317
It should be noted that the TBR has, in practice, generated less work than
anticipated, with the 133 committee remaining the more popular route of initiating
a panel hearing. The EC's antidumping and anti-subsidies laws have a much
010
higher strike rate of initiating a panel hearing than the TBR.
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313
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4. Relationship with EC member state legislation
4.1 A relationship with member states
Having established the legal relationship between WTO law and EC law
earlier in this chapter, and the issue of private party interaction through EC law
with the WTO legal framework, the issue of how EC member state law interacts
with EC law in the context of the WTO legal framework needs now to be
addressed. Article 22(9) of the DSU, under the WTO regime, currently provides
that the DSU rulings on the WTO agreements "may be invoked in respect of
measures affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or
authorities within the territory of a member".319 Federal governments are thereby
made responsible for the actions of state or subnational governments, and are
liable to pay any compensation due as a consequence of a ruling against the
federal government arising from the actions of state or subnational governments.
Kuijper, writing in 1995, was of the view that while these provisions "certainly
apply to (federal) Member States" of the WTO, and that it did "not as yet apply to
the Community".320 He did allow for the argument that as the EC has exclusive
competence for Article 133 matters, Article XXIV: 12 should apply only to the EC
and not to the member states of the EC (who also were signatories of both GATT
1947 and the WTO texts), however he doubted whether "that position would be
acceptable to the Members of the WTO and GATT".321 This matter has yet to be
clarified, either at the WTO level, or within the EC legal framework. An internal
EC enforcement mechanism could however assist in resolving any possible
difficulties in this area.
319 Its counterpart under the GATT 1947 framework was Article XXIV:12 GATT 1947.
320
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4.2 Enforcement mechanism
Both Kuijper322 and Cottier323 are of the view that there is a need to
develop an internal EC mechanism to ensure compliance by the member states of
the EC with WTO commitments. In the absence of a new mechanism being
designed, (Cottier) or in the absence of direct effect of WTO provisions within the
EC legal system (Kuijper), then the most appropriate current provision of the EC
treaty to be utilised would be the currently numbered Article 226 EC (ex. Article
169 EC). Flaws arise however with this approach, as Article 226 EC provides for
a mechanism which is slower than the WTO dispute settlement procedure; should
a third party WTO member state wish to take proceedings against an EC member
state for non-compliance with WTO provisions, given the "so strictly bound [ ]
deadlines" in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the panel process would be
begun before the EC Commission would be able to commence Article 226 EC
-394
proceedings. While reference is made by both writers to the use of the then
numbered Article 169 EC case against Germany regarding the GATT Dairy
Agreement, they are both doubtful as to the efficacy of this method of
enforcement. It is for this reason that Cottier proposes a "special mode of political
monitoring by and within the EC of compliance and implementation of WTO and
other international agreements by Member States",326 arguing that Article 27 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which puts an obligation on the
EC to honour its international treaty obligations would justify this
development.327
322 Ibid, at page 71.
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4.3 Issue of exclusive competence
The issue then arises as to what extent the WTO agreements cover areas of
exclusive and shared competence between the EC and its member states. As
stated by Lord Slynn of Hadley,328 the currently numbered Article 133 EC329 "has
raised in particular difficult questions" as to the competence of the EC, and
through it, the competence of the EC Commission, together with the issue of the
relationship between the EC and its member states. This is complicated by the fact
that the ECJ, in Opinion 1/78, found that the Common Commercial Policy had
"a dynamic and evolutionary character", and that the EC must have "the
possibility .. to take account of new needs and new developments".331 This
•309
approach was reflected in Opinion 2/91, when the ECJ stated, developing from
the ERTA judgment, that the "principle of exclusivity" cannot be limited to
areas where the EC has "adopted rules within the framework of a common policy,
'1'lA
but is applicable in all areas corresponding to the objectives of the Treaty." In
335
Opinion 1/94 the ECJ provided however that the now numbered Articles 95
EC" and Article 308 EC, " could not "in themselves confer exclusive
competence on the Community".338
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In order to resolve this issue, in the absence of clarity from the EC Treaty,
this matter has to be analysed through the use of principles developed by the ECJ,
which in themselves are not clear. What is clear, in the matter of GATTAVTO
Agreements, is that the Member States of the EC have "retained competence over
budgetary matters" 339 relating to WTO membership. In addition, Emilou, quotes
Timmermans340 as arguing, relying on the case law of the ECJ, that even in the
area ofCAP common organisations, EC member states, even in this highly
occupied field, "retained a parallel power to adopt national measures provided
that they did not jeopardise the objectives and functioning of the common
markets",341 however EC member states would be precluded from entering into
international agreements in such policy areas. Emilou points out, relying on
Kapetyn, however, that in areas where there are no such common policies, EC
member states were not so restricted.343 In World Trade matters there is, however,
such a common policy, the Common Commercial Policy, which has been
regularly extending its competences in the redrafts of Article 133 EC, most
recently by the Nice Treaty, to cover GATS and TRIPs, of which more in chapter
8.
Kuijper, for his part, throws a spanner in the works, by pointing out that
the ECJ, in Opinion 1/94 "does not use the term "mixed competence"
(competence mixee), but "joint competence" (competence partagee).344 He goes
on to say that the drawing of sharp distinctions between EC and member state
competence may not be "helpful" in addressing issues "involving the management
of the WTO Agreement", and in issues of "cross retaliation", adding that the duty
to co-operate between the EC and its member states on this point is more
339
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important.345 Should the issue ofWTO obligations by the EC and its member
states be relegated to the area of joint or shared competence under EC
jurisprudence, then we enter another very difficult area of EC law, that of
subsidiarity.
4.4 The issue of Subsidiarity
The principle of subsidiarity is written into the EC treaty in Article 5 EC.
The lack of clarity as to the exact legal, as opposed to political, meaning of this
Article, has led to efforts at an official level to define the meaning of the term
"subsidiarity" within the EC context. The Conclusions of the Presidency of the
European Council in Edinburgh346 "issued guidelines on the application of
subsidiarity", which were subsequently put into effect by the Inter Institutional
Agreement of 25th October 1993.348 A protocol was attached to the Amsterdam
Treaty, which provided, in Article 1, that each of the institutions was to ensure
that the principle of subsidiarity was complied with, which would include the
ECJ. It was clear therefore that the concept of subsidiarity was to be judicable.
This however, in practice, has proved to be problematic. Cottier sees the
relegating of the issue of WTO competence within the EC to an issue of
subsidiarty between the EC and its member states as strength from the point of
view of the "internal power relations" within the EC.349 He does however, admit,
that from an external perspective, this approach "hardly reinforces the position of
Europe in relations with other Members of the WTO, in particular the United
States".350 Cottier also highlights the issue of differentiating "law-making" and
"law-applying" case law, and he advocates the politically pragmatic, though
345 Ibid, at page 60.
346 11-12 Dec 1992.
347
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349
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legally less satisfying approach of "team-work" between the "Commission and
the national administrations concerned" in WTO disputes.351
4.5 The political dimension
Addressing this issue from a political perspective, it is clear to Cottier that
"non-compliance [with WTO law] may even threaten the consistency of the
Union's legal order", and with it the concept of the supremacy of Community
law. The accommodation of the ECJ to WTO law could be seen as being a
politically pragmatic approach of the ECJ to the reality of the evolving WTO
legal order. Cottier points out that the supremacy of EC law depends on
"legitimacy and persuasion", with legal provisions which are "inconsistent with
international obligations" putting this in jeopardy. In addition, non-compliance
by the EC or part of the EC with WTO commitments would lose credibility of
WTO member states for the EC, and would loose for the EC international market
rights access.354 This view, while undoubtedly correct, has to be reconciled with
the approach of the ECJ to the "recognition" of WTO law within the EC legal
framework, as analysed earlier in this chapter. Allied to this is the acculturation of
the non-judicial institutions of the EC to the WTO legal framework.
5. Conclusion
The above discussed line of cases in the ECJ, and its response to the legal
effect ofWTO law within the EC jurisdiction gives rise to the issue of the balance
of powers between the EC and its member states, the EC institutions within the
EC jurisdiction, and the role that the ECJ has developed for itself within the EC.
351 Ibid, at page 354.
3,2 Ibid, at page 366.
353 Ibid, at page 366.
354 Ibid, at page 366.
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The issue of governance and the nature of law at both the EC and the WTO level
will be examined in detail in chapter 7. While it has always been accepted and
expected that the EC would operate on the basis of the rule of law, the extent to
which the EC should interact with the WTO in a purely legal manner,
unadulterated by issues of policy, remains a moot point. This is particularly
relevant when a pure legal interpretation of a particular position would conflict
with the "unanimous position of the Governments" of the EC vis a vis the World
Trade Organisation. While it can be argued that the ECJ has been politically
pragmatic in not granting direct effect to WTO law within the ECJ, in defence of
its own interests, to grant such direct effect would also be "against the wishes of
the Governments".356 While the ECJ has not being attempting to so "govern
Europe", particularly in light of the ECJ's ruling, sitting in Grand Chamber in
oro
the recent Van Parys case there clearly has been evidence of accommodation of
EC law to WTO law where circumstances permits. Some writers would, however,
argue that the ECJ has not been shy of developing law when it felt the need to do
so, as in the development of the Treaty of Rome itself, converting "a traditional
OCQ
multilateral treaty" into a "constitutional charter governed by a form of
constitutional law".360 Mancini nevertheless has pointed out, the ECJ "would have
been for less successful had it not been assisted by two mighty allies: the national
o/: -I
courts and the Commission". On the issue of GATT and WTO, when the issue
comes before the ECJ "even the Commission [has pleaded] against applying the
international rules within the Community legal order".362 Perhaps a more effective
analysis can be made of the situation when, unlike with many other international
legal obligations entered into by the EC, the WTO, and before it GATT 1947, do
have within them very effective dispute resolution mechanisms. The issue of the
355
Op. cit footnote no. 225, at page 395.
3,6 Ibid, at page 396.
357 Ibid, at page 396.
358
Op. cit. footnote no. 214.
359
Mancini, G. Federico "The Making of a Constitution for Europe" (1989) 26 CMLRev. 596, at
page 596.
360
Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, JCMS, Vol.35, Nol, page 97.
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EC, and the ECJ's relationship with other international tribunals has caused
problems for the ECJ in other instances. This issue is brought to the fore by
Usher, who points out that this issue of possible overlapping jurisdictions with
international tribunals "has arisen in a number of requests under Article 300 for
an Opinion".363 He goes on to point out that in Opinion 1/91, which dealt with the
creation of an EEA Court, the ECJ, in defence of its own prerogatives, held that
"to confer .. .jurisdiction on the EEA Court was incompatible with Community
law".364 This is in line with the observation that the ECJ has shown itself to be
hostile to the creation of, or accession to, other international "tribunals with
overlapping jurisdiction" or membership.365 While the ECJ has exercised an
ability to be both restrictive and developmental in its interpretation of the EC
treaty, it is most activist in its efforts to "ensure the uniform control of the validity
of Community acts," and the exercising of "judicial control over the activities of
the EC bodies in the context of the legal process". It is perhaps somewhat naive
to expect the ECJ to exercise its activist abilities at its own expense, in the
defence of law of another organisation merely for the sake of the discipline itself.
The operation of the TBR can also be seen to be based on the rule of law,
but not exclusively governed by it. Political issues, such as the Community
interest come into play in deciding whether or not to proceed with a TBR action,
even when all of the other legal tests have been met. To this extent the fact that
the WTO is rule oriented rather than rule based, albeit becomes more and more
legalised with time, could be said to be having an impact on how the EC, both
through its case law, and its operation of the TBR, interacts with it. In addition,
while the tripartite division of powers has been resolved at the EC level, such
resolution is nowhere in sight at the WTO level, thereby by requiring caution on
the part of EC actors in their interaction with the WTO. The synergy of EC and
363
Usher, John; The Assertion of Jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice, Ch. 14 in Capps,
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1. Introduction
Stepping back from the detail of this thesis for a moment, it is clear that
we are now engaging in discussions on a post-Westphalian world order, where we
have a "multi dimensional configuration of authority"1 perhaps derived from
Westphalian state order, but developed to such an extent that the constitutional
pluralist would claim that "states are no longer the sole locus of constitutional
1




authority", joined specifically, in the context of this work, by the WTO and the
EC. The globalisation and regionalisation trends that underpin in these two levels
of governance, with their shared origins in Public International law, have an
interdependent and reflexive relationship, with the development of "new and
endemic boundary clashes" between these two polities leading to, as suggested by
Walker, a transformation of mutual self understanding.4 This "contentious
evolution" is in line with constitutional lawyers' pluralistic thinking, which
emphasises "the possibility of constitutional collision between high judicial
authorities of different polities as the major point of contestation and crucial axis
of rational authority",5 an issue, both now, and for future development of law in
this area.
In examining the legal impact of the WTO's legal obligations on the EC,
in any particular policy area, and in particular in agriculture, it is important to note
that the fields of competence drawn by the founders of both the WTO and the EC
were drawn differently, to the extent that the competence encapsulated within one
and not within the other's competence can cause differentiations and distortions in
the development of particular policy objectives. While Petersmann has called for
"new forms of cosmopolitical democracy" to reflect the "globalisation of
economics, politics, law and the environment", in order to "maximise human
rights and real autonomy for personal and democratic self-development across the
traditional boundaries of local and national democracies",6 such an idealised
objective is problematic for the WTO as, as referred to by Ladefoged Mortensen,7
2 Ibid, at page 4.
3
as referred to in chapter 1.
4
Walker, Neil, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, Ch. 1 in Walker, Neil (ed.) Sovereignty
in Transition, Hart Publishing, 2003, at page 27.
5 Ibid, at page 28.
6
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich; From State Sovereignty to the "Sovereignty of Citizens" in the
International Relations Law of the EU? Ch.6 in Walker, Neil (ed.) Sovereignty in Transition, Hart
Publishing, 2003, at page 146 at seq.
7 And discussed further in chapter 5.
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"the WTO ... only governs one aspect of globalisation in actuality" while being
held responsible for all aspects of globalisation in popular opinion. The absence
or weakness of provision for environmental and labour issues in particular from
the WTO framework of legal competence affects the development of WTO
Agricultural policy, and contributes greatly to its "boundary clash" with the EC's
Common Agricultural Policy.9
The consequence of this particular boundary clash raises the issue of the
exact "hierarchical status of ... treaty norms",10 in particular legal systems, and
for the purposes of this thesis, ofWTO treaty norms within the EC, and WTO and
EC norms within EC member states' legal systems. A detailed analysis of this
issue was conducted in chapter 6, with the current position of the ECJ being as
reflected in the case of Portugal v. Council,n as endorsed by the Grand Chamber
of the ECJ in the Van Parys12 case, and the rejection of the concept of direct
effect ofWTO law within the EC, but with the development of the legality control
debate, which keeps open, and unresolved, the issue of boundary clashes of EC
law and WTO law. Possible future developments in this area will be discussed in
chapter 8.
A further issue that comes to the fore in the analysis of the synergy of EC
and WTO law in any particular policy area is the fact that the EC operates on the
basis of the rule of law, while the WTO, having emerged from a history, in the
Wyndham-White period of negotiation and multilateral democracy,13 has a
8
Mortensen, Jens Ladefoged; The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of
Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity, E.L.J. 2000, 6(2), 176-204, at page
177.
9 See further chapter 8.
10
Jackson, John J.; Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal systems: A Policy analysis 86 AJIL
(1992), 310, at page 312.
11 Case C-149/96: Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, [1999] ECR p. 1-8395.
12
Case C-377/02, Leon Van Parys NV v Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), [2005]
ECR 1-01465.
13 Jackson, John J.; Restructuring the GATT system, Royal Institute of International Affairs,
London, 1990, at page 63.
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current status of being rule orientated, rather than being rule based.14 The extent
to which the WTO will develop its rule orientation into a rule-based approach in
the future may be hampered by the prevailing dogma in one if its main sponsoring
member states, the USA. Petersmann points out that the Kantian ideal of
'"international constitutionalism,'" or 'cosmopolitan constitutional law', is not
"shared by most "realist" American politicians and lawyers" who "tend to favour
the 'hegemonic' rather than 'constitutional' concepts of international law and
foreign policy".15 Loughlin refers to, in this context, "imperial sovereignty"16 as
being the consequence of a lack of rule of law in a globalised constitutional
context. In the policy area of agriculture, some of the developing and least
developing nations of the WTO may well agree, "empire" at their expense, where
17
the rules of global trade appear to be stacked against them. There is a need for
1 R
the WTO to reflect Putin's concept of a multi-polar world in order for the WTO
to be a polity designed for longevity.
The difference in governance models of the EC and the WTO, referred to
in chapter 1, will be analysed in greater depth in this chapter. The active
governance structure of the EC, albeit flawed, and requiring adjustment, as
reflected by the current debate on the issue at the EC level, is to be contrasted
with the governance of the WTO which is perceived as suffering from a "lack of
dynamism".19 The role of the judicial mechanisms, the ECJ and the panels and
Appellate Body of the WTO, and their accessibility and approach to decision
making are key determining factors in the choice of trajectory for the
14
For further analysis of this point see Chapter 5.
15
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich; Constitutionalism and WTO law: From a state-centred approach
towards a human rights approach in international economic law, Ch 2. in Kennedy and Southwick:
The Political Economy of International Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, at page 35.
16
Loughlin, Martin, Ten Tenets of Sovereignty, Ch.3 in Neil Walker (ed.) Sovereignty in
Transition, Hart Publishing, 2003, at page 84.
17
Some of the specific issues of these countries are addressed from an EC law context in chapter
3.
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development of the legal jurisdictions of the EC and the WTO, key factors in the
development of "boundary disputes" between the two polities.
20 21
The substantive agricultural law as operated by the EC and the WTO
99 •
also differs markedly. As referred to in chapter 1, the Punta del Este declaration
stated, as one of the objectives of the Uruguay Round texts, the "increasing (of
discipline) on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures
affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade".23 In contrast the emphasis, to
date, of the EC in the area of agriculture has been an emphasis on social stability
of rural areas,24 and ongoing controlled markets within the EC, as reflected in the
second pillar of CAP and the evolving European Rural Policy. Added to the
impact of the still anticipated conclusions of the current Millennium round of
negotiations at the WTO, is the issue of the impact of the expiration of the "peace
clause" on the current WTO agricultural law framework, and its potential impact
on the CAP of the EC. A discussion on the expiration of the peace clause follows
at the end of this chapter, with an analysis of CAP reform being undertaken in
chapter 8.
2. Governance and the nature of law
In order to analyse the interaction of the laws of the EC and the WTO we need
to select existing legal tools of analysis with which to frame our discourse. There
is a need for new tools to be developed in order to reflect the reflexive nature of
the relationship between EC and WTO law, and to reflect the fact that neither
body, nor zone in legal discourse which they inhabit, are static points, but rather
vectors, on a journey from Westphalian International Treaty texts, to some new
location, passing through the area currently occupied by the EC, as a
20 Covered in detail in chapters 2 and 3.




Schott, Jeffrey J. assisted by Buurman, Johanna W., The Uruguay Round: an Assessment,
Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 1994, at page 44.
24 Streasa Conference 1958.
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supranational legal order, benefiting from both supremacy and direct effect, yet to
crystallise into a new, yet to be defined, grundnorm of the post-globalisation and
regionalisation legal and regulatory age. In the interim, the people on the ground,
both metaphysically, and literally, in the case of agriculture, are in need of some
short to medium term forecasting as to the law and regulation that will affect their
economic activities and ways of life. In the absence of new legal tools developed
to tackle the reflexive nature of globalisation and regionalisation, reliance has to
be made on those tried and tested, such as constitutionalism. As stated by Weiler,
"constitutionalism is, too (some would say only), but a prism through which one
can observe a landscape in a certain way, an academic artefact with which one
can organize the milestones and landmarks within the landscape (indeed,
determine what is a landmark or milestone), and intellectual construct by which
95
one can assign meaning to, or even constitute that which is observed."
2.1. Constitutionalisation of law at the EC level
Weiler defines constitutionalism as "the process by which the EC treaties
evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign states, into a
vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and
obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private", with supremacy
9 ft
and direct effect being preconditions for this development. As stated by
97
Mancini, in no other international organisation are there such "law-making and
90
judicial powers" given, with law being seen as a "basic instrument and a central
9Q
symbol of European integration". The constitutionalisation of EC law, has now
become such an accepted phenomenon that legal academics do "not bother any
longer with the constitutional premise".30 It is, however, worth revisiting this
25
Weiler, J.H.H.; The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, JCMS, Vol. 35, page 99.
26 Ibid, at page 100.
27 And referred to in chapter 1.
28
Mancini, G. Federico "The Making of a Constitution for Europe" (1989) 26 CMLRev. 595 -
614, at page 595.
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tools and techniques, M.L.R. 1993, 56(1), 19-54, at page 19.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 25, at page 99.
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issue in the context of the current discourse, given the "migration of the insights
gained" in the EC debate, to, inter alia, the WTO.31 To counter any claims that
the use of the legal tool of constitutionalism is an over ambitious analysis in the
context of the WTO, it should be noted that when the EEC was originally set up,
its foundation treaty "created no claim for (the EC) to be a self-sufficient legal
order, separate from the international agreements that bound the Member
32States." Within four decades the EC had carved out a niche for itself as "a new
legal order", with the EC treaty being regarded as "the highest source of law, i.e. a
virtual Constitution for Europe".33 This was primarily through the judicial
activism of the ECJ, and through the use of the secondary legislative tools of
regulations, directives and decisions,34 which it must be admitted, the WTO
currently lacks. As stated in chapter 1, the interface of EC legal principles with
WTO legal principles in a manner to ensure the smooth interaction of the
European version of regionalism with the development of globalisation in the
guise of the WTO, will prove to be a challenging task for the future. This is made
particularly challenging as the quasi-legal, quasi-political principles of the WTO
appear to be written in a different language from the legal and political principles
of the EC.35
2.2 Constitutionalisation of the WTO treaties
Academics have analysed the development of the WTO from GATT 1947
as the "most successful example of the 'constitutionalisation' of a worldwide
31 Ibid, at page 104.
32
Eleftheriadis, Pavlos; "Aspects of European Constitutionalism" ELR 1996 21(1) 32-42, at page
34.
33 Ibid, at page 35.
34 Jacobs, F.G.; "Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a Constitutional Court?
"Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law, Essays for the Hon. Mr.
Justice T.F. O'Higgins, Edited by Deirdre Curtin and David O'Keefe, Butterworth (Ireland) Ltd.
1992, at page 29 et seq.
35 Such as supremacy and direct effect of Community law, constitutional protection of human
rights, and the concept of "Community liability for unlawful conduct of its institutions or
servants". Dagtoglou, Prodroos D.; The legal nature of the European Community, in Thirty years
of Community Law, European Communities, 1983, at page 40.
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organization",36 based on the principles of non-discrimination and freedom, allied
to the compulsory nature of the WTO dispute settlement system. The rule-
orientation, rather than the rule based system, of the WTO however, prevents the
full development of a constitution at this level, in addition to the asymmetry of
power between the member states of the WTO, within the WTO.37 Given the
greater development of the WTO legal system, in comparison to other regulatory
frameworks at the global level, the question arises whether the WTO "should be
the location of additional inter-nation coordinating power", or if "given the
alternatives, the WTO is capable of evolving into the best location for such power
allocation".38 Even at a purely economic level39 "only certain aspects" of the
globalised "economic political space"40 are under the control of a globalised
regulatory framework, and "subject to formal governance."41 Within its
framework the WTO, as discussed in chapter 1, is seen as a weak enforcer, a weak
monitor and a weak legitimise^ despite its increasing move from a negotiated
framework to one more rule orientated, yet still not as rule based as the EC, with
Ladefoged Mortensen pointing out that if the WTO documents are to become a
"proto-constitution"42 this imbalance needs to be redressed. This has also proved
to be of concern to the Consultative Board set up by the former WTO Director
General Supachai Panitchpahdi, in their report on the future of the WTO,43 of
which more in chapter 8.
36
Op. cit. footnote no. 15, at page 51.
37 As was discussed in chapter 5.
38 • •
Jackson, John H.; Sovereignty, subsidiarity, and separation of powers: the high-wire balancing
act of globalisation, Ch 1. in Kennedy and Southwick: The Political Economy of International
Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec, Cambridge University Press, 2002, at page 31.
39 As was discussed in chapter 5.
40 To be discussed further in chapter 8.
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42 Ibid, at page 203.
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http://www.wto.int.
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2.3 Positive integration law
The development of "positive integration law" at the WTO level, which "goes
far beyond the trade liberalization rules of GATT 1947",44 for Petersmann,
develops "new constitutional challenges" which require redrafting and reform of
the WTO "constitution" 45 Examples of this "positive integration law" began to
develop under GATT 1947, but are becoming more prevalent under the WTO.
GATT 1947 examples, analysed further in chapter 5, include the two 1986 cases
involving the EC challenging internal US tax law, the Superfund case,46 and the
Custom User Fee case.47 Both these cases required Congress to amend its
AO
legislation, a problem for the defending party for the US, USTR, to guarantee or
negotiate upon. The internal constitutional structures of Canada were under
scrutiny in the Alcoholic Beverages (Canadian Liquor Board) case,49 with the
panel requiring the Canadians to change the laws in question, which would have
caused constitutional problems for the Canadians had the Canadian - US Free
Trade Agreement not been recently signed.50 WTO law, despite lacking direct
effect within the EC legal system,51 clearly exercises legality control52 over EC
law, requiring "far-reaching legislative, administrative, and judicial measures for
en
the implementation of WTO rules on domestic laws", not least in the policy area
of agriculture. This development will increasingly lead to a requirement for the
WTO member states to re-examine the design and operation of the WTO, and to
44
Op. cit. footnote no. 15, at page 53.
45 Ibid, at page 51.
46 US - Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (",Superfund Act") Panel Report
adopted on June 17, 1987, BISD 34S/136.
47 US - Customs User Fee Panel Report adopted on February 2, 1988, BISD 35S/245.
48 United States Trade Representative.
49
Import, Distribution and Sale ofAlcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies.
Panel Report adopted on March 22, 1988, BISD 35S/37.
50 For a fuller discussion of this case see Chapter 5.
51 See further chapter 6.
52
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J.W.T. 34(3): 111-125, 2000, at page 121 et seq.
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Op. cit. footnote no. 15, at page 53.
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seek a "new political consensus on the future legal evolution of the WTO".54 This
increasing "'harmonizaiton' of national measures on the basis of 'international
standards'"55 brings into question the origin and the drafters of these international
standards which are driving the positive integration law of the WTO, given the
lack of democratic input into the drafting ofWTO texts, or in fact a lack of
participatory politics in any guise, giving rise to the lack of public confidence in
the system which has, at its most extreme to date, given rise to anti-globalisation
protests around the world. As the WTO texts come to national legislatures or
executives as "package deals" negotiated by trade diplomats, issues such as
human rights and democratic constitutionalism are insufficiently safeguarded in
the process, leading Petersmann to call for greater engagement in the WTO
decision making process by "national parliaments, human rights activists, and
other civil society representatives".56
2.4 Constitutional economics
The economic theory underpinning the WTO, that of market economics, has
also come under scrutiny by legal academics, who point out the "well recognized
en
exception" to free market economics, that of "market failure", often brought
about, inter alia, by a failure in the competition or anti-trust regime in the
particular economy. Petersmann points out that the US Supreme Court's view is
58that '"anti trust laws... are the Magna Carta of free enterprise'", with sections 1
and 2 of the 1890 Sherman Act, the source of US Anti-Trust law, and the
inspiration behind EC Competition law, providing that "Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several State, or with foreign nations, in declared
illegal."
54 Ibid, at page 51 et seq.
55 Ibid, at page 53.
56 Ibid, at page 67.
57
Op. cit. footnote no. 38, at page 25.
58
Op. cit. footnote no. 15, at page 56, quoting United States v. TOPCO Assoc. Inc., 405 U.S. 595,
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The origins of both GATT 1947 and the WTO agreements are international
agreements negotiated by elites, with a strong "producer bias",59 with an emphasis
on negotiating market access concessions for their home state, "while at the same
time limiting that producing market when it comes to imports of goods"60 from
competitor countries, rather than on the development of overarching principles for
the international trading regime which might ultimately restrict their own
country's freedom ofmovement. This situation, as pointed out by Jackson,
"creates a constant tension in the procedures, negotiations, and even in the dispute
settlement system of the WTO".61 A competition law or anti-trust regime has still
69
to be developed for the WTO trading regime; however, Petersmann is dubious
as to recommendations from academics and NGO's on this topic ever likely to be
acted upon by the WTO, "as long as WTO bodies focus so one-sidedly on the
interests of producers and trade bureaucracies". The issue of the lack of Anti¬
trust or Competition law at the WTO level will be discussed further in chapter 8,
with EC Competition law as it affects agriculture also being covered in chapter 8.
2.5 EC and WTO governance
Current theories of governance advocate a role for a state engaged in the
protection of a "pluralistic civil society", "based on fair participation in the
democratic processes" as a "new integrated approach to development".64 The
objective of this governance model is the combination of "economic and material
well-being with physical, moral, intellectual growth" of the state's citizen, in an
environment "in which people can express their own will in a free and responsible
manner" with decisions being taken with a focus on the "developmental and
59 Ibid, at page 56.
60
Op. cit. footnote no. 38, at page 31.
61 Ibid, at page 31.
62 Which will be developed further in Chapter 8.
63
Op. cit. footnote no. 15, at page 57.
64
Weiss, Friedl: WTO decision-making: is it reformable? Ch 3. in Kennedy and Southwick: The
Political Economy of International Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec, Cambridge
University Press, 2002, at page 71.
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environmental needs of present and future generations".65 It is to be assumed that
this ideal should be striven for, not only at the state level, but also at the regional
and global governance level. It is in this context that the EC has been grappling
with the concept of human rights over the last number of years, and has made
attempts to incorporate this into EC law, in the line of cases commencing with
f\f\ f\l
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Hoechst v. Commission, and even queried
whether the EC could itself accede to the European Convention on Human Rights,
zro
in Opinion 2/94. In a recent case before the ECJ, concerning animal health and a
fishery common organisation,69 the ECJ confirmed that fundamental rights were
an integral part of the law enforced by the ECJ, and that the right to property is
one of those fundamental rights. The court further held, however, that
fundamental rights were "not absolute rights but must be considered in relation to
their social function". The right to property could be restricted "in the context of
a common organisation of the markets", as long as those restrictions were within
the objectives and the general interest of the Community, and did "not constitute,
with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference,
impairing the very substance of those rights".7
As Petersmann has pointed out, "human rights, and the need for constitutional
safeguards to protect human rights against abuses of government powers, are
nowhere explicitly mentioned in the more than 30,000 pages of the WTO
71
Agreement and of its annexes and 'schedules of concessions'". A weakness of
the WTO that it cannot properly "consider, balance and co-ordinate the various
public goods and private interests implicated in such a broad programme"72 as is
set out for it in its constituting documents. This is a point of direct relevance to
65 Ibid, at page 71.
66 Case WHO Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125.
67 Case 46/87 Hoechst v. Commission, [1989] ECR 2859.
68
Opinion 2/94 (re ECHR) [1996] ECR 1-1759; [1996] 2 CMLR 265
69 Joined Case C-20/00 and C-64/00, BookerAquaculture Limited (trading as Marine Harvest
McConnell) v. The Scottish Ministers, of the 10th July 2003, at paragraph 68.
70 Ibid, at paragraph 68.
71
Op. cit. footnote no. 15, at page 32.
72
Op. cit. footnote no. 4, at page 32.
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the debate in agriculture, given the reference to non-trade concerns in Article 20
of the Agreement on Agriculture,73 and the development of the concept of
multifunctionality of agriculture at the EC level, and the current reform of the
EC's CAP under the mid-term review.74 While it is accepted that the legal
structures of both the EC and the WTO are more "citizen-oriented" with "legal
guarantees of freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law and compulsory
75
jurisdiction ...that go far beyond those of the power-oriented UN law",
particularly in its security council mode, this development, particularly at the
WTO level, still has some way to go, not just to meet the aforementioned ideal for
governance, but also to catch up with developments on this issue within the EC,
leaving aside the issue of democratic deficit, which, in the purest definition of the
term, still has to be addressed at the EC level.
It should be noted that the superimposition ofWTO law onto the EC legal
framework, in the area of the EC's common commercial policy, which is the
vehicle for the EC's external agricultural policy, is strongly affecting the external
frontiers of the EC's agricultural policy. The EC had not imposed "stringent legal
disciplines such as those of the GATT rules on non-discriminatory and
7f\
undistorted foreign trade competition", which are now greatly influencing the
EC's external CAP, as was discussed in chapter 3.
In addition, with this increasing impact ofWTO law on EC law, perhaps
not through direct effect, as a consequence of Portugal v. Council11 but through
the legality control tool discussed in chapter 6, it should be noted that the nature
of the decision making structures at the WTO level in reaching conclusions and
drafting treaties should be taken into account. It is Jackson's view that there is too
much emphasis at the WTO on "reciprocity", with a high degree of emphasis of
73 of which more in chapter 8.
74 which is analysed in detail in chapter 8.
75
Op. cit. footnote no. 6, at page 149.
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"sovereignty" coming into play in WTO negotiations,78 with less strategic steer on
policy development than might be the case at the EC level. Jackson criticises this
• 79
"mercantilist" approach to negotiation, which does not best serve the needs of
80either international economists, or, the vision of governance espoused by Weiss,
referred to above. More complex ideas such as sustainability and
multifunctionality, which underpin the EC's view of agriculture, are less likely to
thrive in a mercantilist forum. In addition, legal texts which are derived from such
a negotiating and drafting process will, in all likelihood "be more ambiguous than
national laws", with "vague treaty norms"81 thereby being used to challenge EC
and national regulations, which were drafted within a more democratic
framework, and embracing the human rights, EC and national developmental
requirements. Jackson points out that not only are traditional legal documents, not
able "to accommodate the type of evolution, innovation and step-by-step change
of circumstances that must be addressed" at all levels of governance, but such a
statement could also be made about the current framework of the WTO, given its
lack of secondary legal tools, with which it can develop the treaty texts, and the
lack of an executive empowered to so develop them. This disjunction between the
EC policy formulating framework and that of the WTO could, and in the case of
82the EC's Common Agricultural Policy, will upset the "compromise of interests"
achieved within the EC, and in the bi-lateral external relations of the EC on
matters of Agriculture production, and trade in agricultural commodities.
Added to this problem is the relative lack of openness at the WTO, given
that the underlying principle ofWTO dispute settlement is that it is
"intergovernmental and confidential."83 The procedure is "not designed as a
public process" with little or no possibility for "private parties to establish their
78
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82 Ibid, at page 339.
83 White, Eric L.; Written and Oral Submissions in WTO Dispute Settlement, Ch. 9 Weiss, Freidl,
Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of Other
International Courts and Tribunals, Cameron May 2000, at page 126.
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claims or defend their interests".84 As stated by White, "this does not apparently
correspond to modern conceptions of open government, democracy and
procedural transparency".85 It should be noted that Article 18.2 DSU provides that
"Written submissions to the panel or the Appellate Body shall be treated as
confidential, but shall be made available to the parties to the dispute"; although
any party may make its own papers available to the public, it cannot so disclose
papers of any other parties to the dispute. NGO's86 have been lobbying for more
openness in this area, with the US President stating that US submissions to the
dispute settlement mechanism would be made public.87 The WTO has been
striving to address this issue, both administratively and "judicially". In this
respect the situation at the WTO is in contrast to the EC policy on openness, for
oo
its institutions generally, and at the ECJ in particular. This is reflected in the
processes adopted for dispute resolution/ adjudication at both the WTO and EC
level of governance, together with the contrasting approach of the "judicial
authorities" of both organisations to amicus curiae briefs, of which more later.
With this divergent backdrop to the development and implementation of law at
the two levels of governance, the EC and the WTO, it is to be presumed that the
judicial approach of the ECJ and the panels and appellate bodies would
necessarily diverge.
3. Judicial approach
3.1 The right of appeal
Having highlighted in earlier chapters, and in this chapter, that the EC is a rule
based system, while the WTO is a rule oriented system, it should be noted that the
84 Ibid, at page 126.
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DSU "is already more "judicial" than perhaps the drafters intended,"89 with
"perhaps the most important step in the process" being the development of the
Appellate Body.90 International economic conflicts, prior to the founding of the
WTO, had been considered to be "inseparable from politics in general",91 as
obligations had been deemed to be "rather vague and unspecific" and
go
"imperfectly articulated". As Cameron and Orava have pointed out this
development of the law of the WTO is "a matter of degree and trend" which may
QO
be restricted when the "DSU review reaches its conclusions". This shift from the
political to the legal framework for the resolution of international economic
disputes is reflected, as pointed out by Petersmann, in the history of civilization,
with,94 "a gradual evolution from a power - oriented approach, in the state of
nature, towards a rule-oriented co-operation", with the Appellate Body fulfilling
"the requirements of a judicial function"95 thereby avoiding the power based, and
potentially "welfare-reducing counter measures" which are sub-optimal methods
of dispute settlement.96 The approach of GATT 1947 was to favour "flexibility in
settlement rather than certainty in rule application" which was reflected in the
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The WTO introduced a clearer framework for the operation of law at the
global level, with the varying regimes of dispute resolution under GATT 1947
having been replaced by one "integrated and exclusive dispute settlement
QO
system", giving one voice to the Dispute Settlement System, by which members
of the WTO "are required to solve their disputes solely by recourse to the rules
and procedures of the DSU".99 In particular, the legal approach of the Appellate
Body, "sets relevant standards" and provides "forceful feedback" to the panels,
requiring them to "reason their findings thoroughly in the list of findings and
precedents set by the Appellate Body".100
It should also be noted, given the very high number of members of the WTO
that "not all States across the world share the same attitudes to matters of legal
procedure,"101 thereby making the development of a WTO legal system more
problematic than, for example, the development of the EC legal system, with its
smaller number of members, and certain shared legal histories. Given this
problem, added to the fact that treaties are often the work of diplomats rather than
legal experts,102 it is an achievement that some form of legal order is being
imposed by the WTO through its organs.
3.2 DSB/AB and ECJ in their institutional context
In comparing the dispute settlement system of the EC and the WTO it is
interesting to note the different functions allocated to the ECJ and to the WTO
dispute settlement system. The ECJ has been mandated to "ensure that the
interpretation and application of this treaty the law is observed" pursuant to
Article 220 EC. The dispute settlement system of the WTO, for its part, has been
set up to "preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
98 Ibid, at page 22.
99 Ibid, at page 22.
100
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101
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agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in
accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law"
under Article 3.2 DSU.103 The EC treaty is much more explicit about the legal
nature of rights and obligations under its framework, which is reflected in the fact
that the dispute settlement procedure of the EC is allocated the title of "Court of
Justice" and is permanently constituted by "persons whose independence is
beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the
highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of
recognised competence".104
In contrast the panels of the WTO have to be established, pursuant to Article 6
DSU, to address the issues of a particular case, and are to be composed of "well-
qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons
who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a
Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a representative to the
Council or committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or
in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or
served as a senior trade policy official of a Member".105 Even the Appellate Body
of the DSU, a standing body of the WTO, with rotating membership106 of seven
people, each appointed for a four year period, and may be reappointed once, are to
be "persons of recognised authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally,"
while being unaffiliated with any government. The composition of the Appellate
Body of the WTO, given the required composition, is more enabled to create a
new legal jurisdiction for the WTO than might be the case in a panel, which could
be devoid of any legally trained individuals. The difference in staffing
qualifications at the two levels reflects the rule orientated approach of the WTO,
in contrast to the rule based approach of the ECJ at the level of the EC.
103 Ibid, at page 20.
104 Article 223 EC.
105 Article 8.1 DSU.
106 Article 17 DSU.
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The dispute settlement system of the WTO, like the litigation system of
the EC, is now compulsory, under Article 23(1) of the DSU,107 with the Dispute
Settlement Body, a political body, being required to adopt un-appealed panel
reports and all Appellate Body reports. Non-adoption of reports only happens in
1D8
the absence of a consensus at the DSB not to adopt such a report. Bethlehem
points out that this "political oversight of the adjudiciatory process" of the dispute
settlement panels may be expected to have repercussions on the decision making
of the panels.109 Such a political oversight of the workings of the ECJ is not
available within the EC. On the contrary, the political bodies of the EC are
entitled,110 along with the Member States of the EC,111 not only to sue, but to be
sued, within the EC legal framework, such cases to be adjudicated upon by the
ECJ. This different approach to the traditional "tri-partite" division of powers at
the two levels, (between the legislature, executive and judiciary), again will have
an impact on the potential role of law within the two jurisdictions. This issue is of
particular relevance in the context of the "much criticised role of the WTO
Secretariat in drafting of WTO Panel reports".112 That said, it should be noted that
"attitudes and perceptions" at the WTO panel and Appellate Body proceedings
110
"have been fully dedicated to a legal approach". Decisions are made strictly on
the basis of the information presented to the proceedings, all parties being in a
107
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position to rebut and comment on material presented by other parties to the
case,114 with proceedings being conducted in as formal, and law like a manner as
possible. Another important difference in the operation and development of law in
the two jurisdictions is the presence of a "guardian of the treaty", the EC
Commission, within the EC legal structure.115
The dispute resolution system of the WTO is reliant on member states of the
WTO to initiate complaints and to request the formation of panels. The decision
to litigate at the WTO will be strongly influenced by power politics, with only the
strongest of players being the most likely to initiate complaints, unless supported
by a group of like minded member states of the WTO. In addition it is worth
noting that the EC legal jurisdiction engages all the courts and tribunals of its
member states, through its preliminary reference procedure, Article 234 EC,
engaging the private natural and legal individual in the process of European law
compliance through the well established EC legal principles of supremacy and
direct effect. With this aspect lacking at the WTO level, and little possibility of it
being engaged in, in the near future, the possibility of the development of WTO
law through "judicial" activism is hampered. This development is also further
hindered by the provisions of Article 3.2 of the DSU, which requires the
preservation of the "rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements", and the restriction on the DBS not to "add to or diminish the rights
and obligations" under those agreements, thereby providing "security and
predictability to the multilateral trading system". This operates as an "apparent
injunction against creativity" of interpretation by the WTO panels and Appellate
114 Ibid, at page 337 et seq.
115 Pursuant to Articles 226. The EC process under Article 227 (ex Article 170, EC) requires
member states of the EC to make a complaint to the Commission about the behaviour of another
member state, with the Commission issuing a reasoned opinion on the matter. The complainant
state brings the matter before the ECJ "only after the Commission has delivered a reasoned
opinion on the matter or has failed to do so within three months of the date on which the matter
was brought before it." (Lasok KPE QC; Role and efficacy of the EC Commission's reasons
Opinion in Article 169/170 proceedings, Ch. 4, in Improving WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of Other International courts and Tribunals by
Freidl Weiss, Cameron May 2000, at page 55 et seq).
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Body.116 Thus one of the most dynamic aspects of EC law is noticeably absent,
and it would appear, will remain absent in the foreseeable future, from the WTO
legal framework.
3.3 The operation of law at the EC and the WTO
3.3.1 Pre-litigation and litigation procedures
While the political dimension of dispute resolution at the WTO has been
highlighted in chapter 5, the context being one of greater fluidity of approach to
regulation, which permeates the WTO system,117 with Jackson's "rule-
orientation" facilitating a system of "bargaining and negotiation," it does not
follow that the more legalised system of dispute resolution in the EC is devoid of
a political input. Under the Article 226 (formerly Article 169) procedure of the
118
EC, the most comparable EC procedure to that operated by the WTO, the
European Commission is enabled to deliver a reasoned opinion on a perceived
breach of the EC treaty by one of the EC member states, and should the member
state fail satisfactorily to respond to such opinion, then the Commission is entitled
to bring the matter before the ECJ. As Lasok has pointed out,119 this decision of
the Commission is in itself, political in nature. Any pre-litigation settlement being
made between the Commission and the relevant member state in order to avoid
litigation under Article 226 EC is not necessarily the final position on any matter.
A reference under Article 234 EC from any court or tribunal of the EC may bring
both the original breach, and any such subsequent agreement between the
Commission and the Member State under the scrutiny and review of the ECJ.
116
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Such a consequence would not follow from a panel or Appellate Body ruling at
the WTO. Despite the role which the ECJ has developed for itself within the EC
as being the final arbiter in dispute resolution, giving primacy to the (EC) rule of
law, pursuant to the Treaty of Rome's underpinning of "the separation of powers
between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary",120 as was discussed in
chapter 5, this has, as was discussed in chapter 6, given rise to problems in the
context of the EC's relationship with the WTO, and the interconnectivity between
121
the two legal systems, with the ECJ being unable to govern Europe on its own,
199 •
leading to what Zonnekeyn referred to as being "an obvious assault to the "trias
politic" principle",123 through what is clearly not a legal argument.
The request for consultations under the WTO procedure (or lack thereof)
differs somewhat from that which operates under the EC procedure.124 Under the
DSU a request can be made either for a consultation, under Article 4.4 DSU,
195
which "does not have a clear match under the EC Treaty", or for the
establishment of a panel, under Article 6.2 DSU, with the requirements being
19 f\
stricter for the latter option. While it was intended for the DSU to impose
"stricter requirements" procedurally than was the case under the pre-WTO
documents, Jansen points out that it would appear that "basis requirements of
fairness" and of "a judicial or quasi-judicial procedure" have been compromised
197
in the interests of "procedural economy". He further points out that while
procedures have been set out, the case law of the WTO does not appear to have
interpreted or have applied these procedures in a "very coherent and convincing
manner".128 This has led Jansen to conclude that this lack of coherence is "a
120
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matter of serious concern", and in its absence that it is "not at the present time
possible to liken the WTO dispute settlement procedures to a court-like
1 OQ
procedure". It is also important to be reminded in this context that WTO panel
and Appellate Body findings, unlike judgments from the ECJ, are still subject to
political approval, having to go through the process of adoption, pursuant to
Article 16 DSU, for panel reports, and Article 17.14, for the Appellate Body, prior
to being legally binding,
3.3.2 The hearing of the case
A comparison can be made between the manner in which hearings are
heard at the WTO and EC levels. In the EC courts the hearings are normally
conducted in public. While both the ECJ and the CFI130 "enjoy a broadly-defined
ii|
authority to conduct hearings in camera", this right is exercised restrictively. In
camera hearings are normally reserved for the "confidential consideration of
commercial information, and those involving medical information of an intimate
1 ^9
nature". As the CFI hears more of the cases coming under these classifications,
the CFI utilises the in-camera option more often than the ECJ. If only one part of
a case involves confidential matters, then the practice is for the court to sit in
camera only for that part of the proceedings, and to reopen the court for the
balance of the case.133
In contrast to the ECJ practice on this matter WTO proceedings are
"conducted in private, to the exclusion of the public, on the basis of the
confidentiality of the submissions of the parties".134 This approach, allied to the
IOC
relative informality of proceedings at the WTO, in contrast to the European
129 Ibid, at page 46.
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Court's strict legal formalities, has led to the criticism that the WTO procedures
and practices mirror "more the form of international commercial arbitration" in
private disputes, than the settling of disputes between states which have important
1 T6
public dimensions and in which important community interests are affected. To
add to the issue, not only are the proceedings conducted in closed session, but so
are the proceedings before the Appellate Body under Article 17.10 DSU, despite
the fact that on appeal "is to be "limited to issues of law",137 and should not
1 ^8
therefore cover confidential commercial information. This mis-match between
the procedures adopted by the WTO dispute settlement process, and the global
impact of the findings of the panels and the Appellate Body has led to criticism,
with Plender, for one, stating that there is "no good reason why hearings on the
appellate level have to be confidential".139 This issue is also addressed by the
recent Consultative Body report,140 which will be discussed further in chapter 8.
3.3.3 Amicus Curiae briefs
As flagged up in chapter 5, the role of third parties at the EC and the
WTO, during the course of proceedings, differs quite markedly. The WTO dispute
settlement process frequently involves third parties at all stages,141 with "purely
bilateral dispute settlement proceedings" being "an exception in the WTO." All
WTO member states potentially have an interest in the "quasi-judicial
application" ofWTO law.142 The issue however of amicus curiae briefs, from
non-WTO member states interested parties, came before the Appellate Body of
the WTO in Shrimp-Turtle}43 The original panel, upon receiving a number of
unsolicited amicus curiae briefs from environmental NGO's had decided that "it
136 Ibid, at page 177.
137 Article 17.6 DSU.
138
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139 Ibid, at page 159.
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WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, (98-3899).
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was not entitled to consider them".144 The Appellate Body however, decided that
a "panel is entitled to consider non-solicited briefs",145 on an interpretation of
Article 13 DSU, an exercise in "judicial activism" at the WTO level. As pointed
out by White, the reasoning of the Appellate Body on this point was based on
Article 17.9 DSU, which "gives the Appellate Body broad authority to adopt
procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules and procedures in the DSU
or the covered agreements."146 While the Appellate Body went on the provide that
there was "no right to submit amicus curiae briefs and the Appellate Body has no
obligation to consider them",147 the ruling in Shrimp/Turtlex48 can be seen to have
"opened the door to the presentation of submissions by private parties to a
panel,"149 as discussed in chapter 5. White advocates the adoption of a controlled
and regulated process for the submission of amicus curiae briefs, as this would
"no doubt encourage outside participation and even perhaps enhance the
persuasive character", in the eyes of the general global public, of the WTO
dispute settlement procedure.150
In contrast, at an EC level, institutional involvement in litigation before
the ECJ is much more pronounced, with very few cases, unlike at the WTO, being
heard involving one member state litigating against another. This arises as the EC
Treaty "expressly requires in Art. 227 that a member state which claims that
another member state is in breach of its treaty obligations must first bring the
matter before the Commission".151 The Commission operating in its "overt
1 59
policing role", in a case to which the Commission is not an original party,
"empowered rather than required to submit observations" which it "regards itself
144
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as being under a duty" to submit. For its part, the Council is empowered to
make submissions only "where appropriate",154 with both the Commission,155 and
ultimately the ECJ,156 being obliged to take the totality of the body of EC law into
account in their submissions and deliberations respectively.
3.4. Judicial Activism in the EC and the WTO
The issue of judicial activism has been referred to a number of times so far
in this thesis, and it is worth therefore allocating some small space to this issue. In
this chapter Article 3.2 DSU has been referred to as being restrictive of the
development of "judicial" activism at the WTO level, as the DBS cannot alter the
obligations of WTO member states under the WTO agreements. As was stated
earlier, this provision has been described as being an "apparent injunction against
creativity" at the WTO.157 Nevertheless, the Shrimp-Turtle case,158 decided in the
WTO era, has exhibited a level of judicial activism in dealing with amicus curiae
briefs, on the basis that this was a development of a procedural rule, as opposed to
a development or amendment of the DSU.159 The same case, as referred to in
chapter 1, also recognised that the "interpretation of a treaty" is an evolving
matter, with the use of subsequent developments in international law being used
to interpreted a treaty, this view being reaffirmed by the panel in the Poultry160
case. This level of judicial activism might be described as activism within limited
confines. This can be contrasted with activism by the ECJ, which could be
described as, relatively speaking, activism within broad confines.
The ECJ's approach to its founding treaty, the Treaty of Rome, can only
be described as being highly creative at times, to the extent that we can say that
153 Ibid, at page 94.
154 Ibid, at page 94.
155 Article 226 EC.
156 Article 220 EC.
157
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302
the ECJ has managed to develop a "new legal order".161 Such judicial activism
can be evidenced in a number of ECJ cases, amongst them Parti Ecologiste Les
1 f\9
Vers where the court was quite clearly not "interpreting" the treaty, but rather it
was "updating" it, inserting the word "Parliament" into Article 173 (now Article
230),163 an article clearly devoid of the word "Parliament" at that time. This level
of judicial activism is clearly much broader than that set out for the WTO's
dispute settlement bodies, and while the ECJ's activism has occasionally caused
political discomfort amongst the other EC institutions and the EC's member
states, little restraint has since been placed on the ECJ, other than political
pressure. This perhaps is reflecting the fact that the EC operates on the basis of
the rule of law, with the activities of the EC's legislature and executive being
subject to judicial scrutiny, with the ECJ having the final word on any matter
brought before it by way of litigation. This primacy of the judiciary within the EC
structure has however been ceded by the ECJ in matters dealing with the WTO, as
evidenced in the line of ECJ cases culminating in Portugal v. Council,164 which
was discussed in depth in chapter 6.
Development of law at the GATT/WTO level has clearly been evidenced
through the panel and Appellate Body findings discussed in chapter 5. It is
possible that these developments in GATT/WTO law could be attributed to being
development of procedural rules, along the lines of the Appellate Body in Shrimp-
Turtle165Appellate Body, rather than being developments contrary to Article 3.2
DSU. It will be interesting to see how future panel and Appellate Body rulings
will manage to walk the Article 3.2 DSU tightrope, in an institutional structure
where less sovereignty has been ceded from the member states to the
multinational organisation than is the case in the EC, and in light of the fact that it
is the member states at the WTO who close the books on WTO panel and
161
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Appellate Body litigation through the adoption of panel166 and Appellate Body
reports167 through the Dispute Settlement Body.
4. The expiry of the peace clause
While analysing the synergies (or the lack of them) of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, with the EC's CAP, and its legal tools, it is worth noting that since
the expiry of the peace clause (contained in Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture), other WTO Agreements have made further inroads into impacting
on the nexus of the WTO/EC legal dynamic in agriculture, thus further altering
the reflexive relationship between the WTO and the EC in the area of agriculture.
Both domestic support measures, under Articles 13.a and 13.b, and export
subsidies, Article 13.c. of the Agreement on Agriculture, have become more
exposed to WTO dispute settlement litigation pursuant to GATT 1994, and the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). These, in
particular, work out as domestic support measures under Annex 2 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, commonly known as "green box" measures, due to
the fact that they were non - or minimally - trade distorting, become actionable
under the "countervailing duties" heading, and also become subject to actions
under Article XVI GATT 1994, under its subsidies heading, and to actions under
part III of the Subsidies Agreement,169 which deals with actionable subsidies.
"Green Box" provisions also become actionable under Article II GATT 1994 "in
the sense of paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII ofGATT 1994".170 Article II GATT
1994 provides a schedule of concessions, while paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII
ofGATT 1994 provides for nullification and impairment actions, which is
elaborated upon in the DSU.
166 Article 16 DSU.
167 Article 17.14 DSU.
168 Green box measures were dealt with in more detail in chapter 4.
169 Part III of the Subsidies Agreement covers Article 5, adverse effect, Article 6, serious
prejudice, and Article 7 remedies.
170 Article 13.a.ii Agreement of Agriculture.
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The expiry of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture further exposes
domestic support measures that fully comply with Article 6 of the Agreement on
Agriculture. Said Article 6 covers domestic support commitments and aggregate
171 179
measures of support (AMS), and includes, inter alia, Article 6.4 (de minimis
provisions) and Article 6.5 (production limiting provisions). These provisions,
since the expiry of Article 13, are now fully exposed to claims that they are
173
countervailing duties under Article VI GATT 1994, and part V of the Subsidies
Agreement. In addition, they are now subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of
Article XVI ofGATT 1994,174 and Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies
1 nc
Agreement. They also become subject to actions "based on non-violation
nullification of impairment of the benefits of tariff concessions accruing to
another Member under Article II GATT 1994,176 in the sense of paragraph 1(b) of
Article XXIII of GATT 1994".177 Export subsidies, for their part, become fully
exposed to the provisions of the countervailing duties provisions, and are subject
to actions under Article XVI ofGATT 1994178 and Articles 3,179 5180 and 6181 of
the Subsidies Agreement. The SCM agreement however has its own time
limitation imposed upon it by virtue of its own Article 31, which provides that
"the provision of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and
Article 9 shall apply for a period of five years" from the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement, and therefore expired on the 31st December 1999, "because
171 Covered in more depth in chapter 4.
172
A member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total AMS support
payments that (i) are product specific, if they do not exceed 5% of the value of production of that
commodity, and (ii) non product specific support where same do not exceed 5% of the value of the
country's total agricultural production, Article 6(4)a. For developing countries the de minimis
level is 10% and specified agricultural input subsidies are excluded from the AMS (Articles 6.2
and 6.4).
173 Which is titled Anti-dumping and Countervailing measures.
174 Subsidies.
175 Article 5, Adverse effect, and Article 6, Serious Prejudice.
176 Article II GATT is entitled "Schedules of Concessions", with paragraph 1(b) of Article XXIII
of GATT 1994 deals with "Nullification and Impairment Actions".
177 Article 13.b.iii Agreement on Agriculture.
178 Which deals with subsidies.
179 Article 3 Subsidies Agreement deals with prohibited subsidies.
180 Article 5 of the Subsidies Agreement provides for Actionable Subsidies, Adverse Effects.
181 Article 6 of the Subsidies Agreement provides for Actionable Subsidies, Serious Prejudice.
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WTO Members did not decide to extend their application beyond that date".
Article 6.1 defines "serious prejudice" for the purposes of Article 5 SCM, while
Article 8 deals with the identification of non-actionable subsidies, and Article 9,
consultation and authorised remedies, the absence of which would change the
essence of the SCM agreement, and make its operation more cumbersome. It
should however be pointed out that the footnote to Article 32.1 SCM provides that
"action under other relevant provisions ofGATT 1994, where appropriate" is not
precluded.
The extent, however, of all of the above further exposure, is a matter of
debate, particularly in light of Article 21.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture,
which provides that the "provisions ofGATT 1994 and of other Multilateral
Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the
provisions of this Agreement." This provision, in itself, provides an exception to
the general rules that "Annex 1A Agreements are deemed to apply
1 8^
cumulatively", following Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, both
1 84 1 RS 1 8C\
panel and Appellate Body rulings, and Argentina - Footwear, "even if
1 87
there are distinctions between the drafting of the two positions". In reading the
188
various agreements there is a "presumption against" a conflict between two
relevant agreements, as per EC-Bananas,189 and Canada-Periodicals.190 The
reading of treaty provisions, as has been held in Argentina - Footwear,191 Korea-
182
Chambovey, Didier; "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (article 13 of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework, J.W.T.
36(2): 302-352, 2002, at page 316.
183 Ibid, at page 308.
184
Brazil- Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, Report of the Panel, WT/DS22/R, 17 October
1996, para. 227.
185
T/DS22/AB/R, 21 February 1997.
186
Argentina - Safeguard Measures on Imports ofFootwear, report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS121/AB/R, 14 December 1999.
187
Op. cit footnote no. 182 at page 308.
188 Ibid, at page 308,
189
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997.
190 Canada - Certain Measures concerning Periodicals, report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS64/R, 2 luly 1998.
191
Op. cit. footnote no. 186.
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Dairy Products, and Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, must be "consistent with
the principle of effective interpretation of I'effect utile".194 As stated in US -
Gasoline195 "an interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in
reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a threat to redundancy or inutility".196 As
Chambovey points out,197 the position of Article 21.1 of the Agreement on
198
Agriculture was addressed by the Appellate Body in EC - Bananas, though it
has to be said, not in the context of Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
The Appellate Body here held that the other Annex 1A agreements also applied to
agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture had
specific provisions dealing with a particular matter.199 Chambovey has therefore
interpreted this as the WTO Agreement on Agriculture operating as "a kind of lex
specialis" in the WTO legal framework.200
9ftl
Chambovey, in his analysis of this situation, concludes that there are
essentially two contrasting ways of operating the relationship between the
Agreement on Agriculture and the other Annex 1A agreements. Under the first
approach, he adopts a lex specialis framework for the Agreement on Agriculture,
with the other Annex 1A agreements coming into play with regard to agricultural
goods after the expiry of the peace clause, only to the extent that the Agreement
on Agriculture does not specifically deal with the same specific matter. His
second approach is to read both the Agreement on Agriculture and the balance of
the Annex 1A agreements cumulatively at all times, with the documents to be
read in such a way that those other Annex 1A agreements "are not reduced to
192 Korea - Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, WT/DS98/AB/R.
Report of the Appellate Body, 14 December 1999.
193
Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan-Alcoholic Beverages), WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, Report of the Appellate body, 1 November 1996.
194
Op. cit. footnote no. 183, at page 308 et seq.
195
Appellate Body report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R), adopted on 20 May 1996 (US-Gasoline), p. 18.
196
Op. cit. footnote no. 182, at page 309.
197 Ibid at page 308.
198
Op. cit. footnote no. 189.
199
Op. cit. footnote no. 182, at page 309.
200 Ibid, at page 310 et seq.
201 Ibid, at page 315.
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inutility". Taking this second approach, he concludes that "the other Annex 1A
agreements apply to agricultural products, 'except to the extent that'"203 the
Agreement on Agriculture contains conflicting provisions, either specifically or
cumulatively, and that in such event WTO members would not then be "allowed
to act inconsistently with the other Annex 1A Agreements, even if a measure in
dispute has been adopted pursuant to or in accordance with the" Agreement on
Agriculture.204
Steinberg and Jostling205 develop this analysis further, by adopting both
legal theory and economic regression analysis to establish likely scenarios that
could develop in the balance between the Agreement on Agriculture, the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and GATT 1994, after the
expiry of the Peace Clause, and in the absence of further multi-lateral agreements
on this matter. Steinberg and Jostling determine that these agreements must be
read cumulatively, following the cases of Brazil-Desiccated Coconut,206 and
907
Argentina- Footwear. After discarding five possible routes for challenging
908
agricultural subsidies after the peace period, the authors determine that the
"most plausible legal theory" is a claim for "serious prejudice" under the SCM
Agreement Article 5.c, through the operation of Articles 6.3(a) to (c.) and 6.4.
The time limitation of the SCM provisions by Article 31 SCM is not addressed in
this context. One must then prove this "serious prejudice", in the absence of the
Article 6.1 definition, as it has now expired pursuant to Article 31 SCM, in more
202 Ibid, at page 309.
203 Ibid at page 309.
204 Ibid at page 316.
205
Steinberg, Richard H. and Jostling, Timothy E.; "When the Peace ends: the vulnerability of EC
and US agricultural subsidies to WTO legal challenge", JIEL, 2003, 6(2), 369-417, from page 371.
206
Op. cit. footnote no. 189, at paras 155-58.
207
Op. cit. footnote no. 186.
208 These being;
1. "Illegality of agricultural export subsidies under SCM Agreement Article 3
2. Non-violation nullification or impairment
3. A strategy based on countervailing duty cases
4. GATT 1994 Article XVI:2 - "more than equitable share of world trade"
5. Injury caused by subsidized import: a claim under SCM Agreement Article 5(a)".
Steinberg, Richard H. and Jostling, Timothy E.; "When the Peace ends: the vulnerability of EC
and US agricultural subsidies to WTO legal challenge", JIEL, 2003, 6(2), 369-417, from page 343.
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restricted circumstances than usual, in light of footnote number 17 of the SCM
agreement. Footnote number 17 takes the Article 6.3.d test of "increase of world
market share" out of the equation for agricultural commodities, which will also
prove problematic. This is in addition to the traditional problem in agricultural
trade where "correlations between subsidies and adverse effects may be hidden or
weakened by the predominance of other factors affecting trade."209 Article 1 SCM
requires that these contributions are "specific" and "within the meaning of SCM
Agreement Article 2," be actionable.210 Making a distinction between actionable
and illegal, Steinberg and Jostling conclude that Articles 5 and 6 of the SCM
Agreement "potentially may be applied to all types of agricultural subsidies
addressed in the Agriculture Agreement".211
If, according to Steinberg and Jostling's analysis, the payments under the
Agreement on Agriculture are actionable, the question arises if such payments are
to be considered legal. While their conclusion that the "expiry of the Peace Clause
was intended to have teeth so as to stimulate further agricultural reform
212 •
negotiations" may well be true, and the possible consequences of said expiry
213
"follow[s] the trend toward the integration of agriculture into the mainstream"
GATT provisions, whether the panels and the Appellate Body are now authorised
to make such a move is questionable. It should be noted that while the Agreement
on Agriculture contains within it quantitative pledges, there is no such provision
in the SCM Agreement, with the SCM Agreement "defining the situations where
a subsidy is flatly prohibited".214 Given this dichotomy of approach to subsidies in
the two agreements, the cumulative application of these agreements, as argued for
by both Chambovey, and Steinberg and Jostling, would lead to agricultural
subsidies being "submitted to more rigorous rules" than those applicable to non-
Op. cit. footnote no. 205, at page :
210 Ibid, at page 388.
211 Ibid, at page 388.
212 Ibid at page 399.
in213 Ibid at page 399.
214
Op. cit. footnote no. 182, at page 310.
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agricultural subsidies.215 It should also be noted that Article 20.c of the
916 •
Agreement on Agriculture non-trade concerns should be taken into account in
the "ongoing process" of the continuation of the reform process in the area of
agriculture. Non-trade concerns "do not appear anywhere in the SCM
Agreement",217 leading Chambovey at least, to conclude that it is extremely
difficult to assume that agricultural commodities, at this stage, should be fully
integrated into the GATT 94 and SCM rules, particularly as textiles, which were
recently so integrated, has such integration specifically and expressly so provided
for in their own agreement.218
This area of law is currently ambiguous (with Sivues219 writing after
Cancun shedding no further light on this particular issue), thereby bringing the
principle of in dubio mitius into play. This principle was recognised as being part
of WTO law by the Appellate Body in EC - Hormones?20 This principle
originates from international law, and operates "in deference to the sovereignty of
states", whereby if a term, as is the case here with the various possible impacts of
the Peace Clause, is ambiguous, then "that meaning is to be preferred which is
less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which interferes less with the
territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves less general restrictions
upon the parties".221 An opportunity for the Appellate Body to bring clarity to the
legal effect of the expiration of the peace clause arose in the recent EC-Export
Subsidies on Sugar case?22As mentioned in chapter 5, the Appellate Body refused
to examine the interaction of the SCM Agreement with the Agreement on
Agriculture, as the original panel had failed adequately to address this issue. This
215 Ibid, at page 310.
216 Discussed further in chapter 8.
217
Op. cit. footnote no. 182, at page 311.
218 Ibid, at page 311.
219 Siuves, Humberto N.; The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies - The
Outlook Post-Cancun", L.I.E.I. 31(1): 25-42, 2004, from page 25 et seq.
220 EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 13 February 1998, at para. 165.
221
Op. cit. footnote no. 182, at page 310, footnote no. 22.
222
European Communities - Export subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265/29, WT/DS266/29,
WT/DS283/10, 15th October 2004.
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is, perhaps, a missed opportunity to give clarity to the impact of the expiration of
the peace clause, in light of the above academic debate on the issue.
The impact of the expiration of the Peace Clause remains complex, given
the particular tri-partite division of powers at the WTO, or the lack of such
division, in some academic commentators' view point, taking into account Article
3.2 of the DSU, discussed earlier in this chapter, together with the requirement of
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to "preserve the rights and obligations of
Members" ... "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public
international law", foremost amongst those rules, the principle of in dubio mitius.
It is perhaps fair to say that it is only at the end of the current round of
negotiations that WTO members would be in a position to determine whether or
not agricultural subsidies should be placed on an equal footing as any other
subsidies. In the interim the importance of the expiry of the Peace Clause may
perhaps be political, reflecting Jackson's "rule-orientation" rather than "rule-
based" analysis of the WTO processes, with the current round of negotiations
being conducted "in the shadow of its expiry", under threats from the likes of the
Cairns group to litigate, in order to facilitate them, and like minded parties,
obtaining agreement from both the US and the EC for further subsidy
reduction.224 Whether the reform of the CAP by the EC, pursuant to the recent
mid-term review, which is analysed in chapter 8, will be sufficient to avoid some
of the more adverse consequences discussed above of the expiration of the Peace
Clause also remains to be established.
223
Op. cit. footnote no. 182, at page 315 et seq.
224
Op. cit. footnote no. 205, at page 414.
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5. Conclusion
At issue in this thesis is therefore two legal systems at different stages of
evolution, with differing institutional225 and governance mechanisms.226 One of
these legal systems operates on the basis of the rule of law, while the role of law
in the other legal system, while clearly present, is more challenging to define. The
role and operation of the dispute resolution system at the EC and the WTO level
within the institutional framework also differs. In addition, the vision for the
regulation of agriculture differs at the two levels,227 both in the provisions in the
legal texts, but also in the underlying political philosophy as to the role of
agriculture generally. That the WTO and the EC are interconnected legally is also
clear, through the nexus of the EC's Common Commercial Policy,228 through
legality control, and through the operation of the Trade Barrier Regulation.
This connection, even in the absence of the recognition of the direct effect of
WTO law within the EC jurisdiction, is both real and robust. The regulation of
agriculture at the WTO is currently the subject of negotiations, and at the EC level
has recently undergone reform pursuant to the mid-term review. The EC has not
yet fully decoupled its payments to farmers from production, as evidenced by the
continuing use of import and export licences, export refunds, import duties, tariff
quotas and emergency safeguard measures being part of the post-mid-term review
operation of the common organisation in cereals. The expiration of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture's "Peace Clause"232 will undoubtedly have an impact,
with the failure to address the impact of this expiration in the EC-Export
Subsidies on Sugar case,233 unlikely to be repeated. The allied issues to
225 As discussed in chapter 5.
226 As discussed in this chapter.
227 As discussed in chapter 2 for the EC, and chapter 4 for the WTO.
228 As analysed in chapter 3.
229 Discussed in chapter 6.
230 Discussed in chapter 6.
231 As discussed in chapter 2.
232 As discussed earlier in this chapter.
233
Op. cit. footnote no. 220.
312
international trade in international commodities currently regulated by the EC,
discussed in chapter 3, will also feel the continuing impact of the WTO
agreements. Complex as this situation would appear, further issues, such as
competition law, services and intellectual property law, which will be analysed in
chapter 8 all have a role to play in completing the picture of the impact ofWTO
agreements and case law on the EC regulatory framework in the area of
agriculture. In addition the prospects for future developments, at both the EC and
WTO level, some of which while attempting to resolve current problems in this
area, may of themselves throw up further issues, addressed in chapter 8, with an
attempt being made to come to a conclusion as to the legal relationship between
the EC and the WTO in the area of agriculture in the final chapter, chapter 9.
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Chapter 8 Allied Policy Areas, and Prospects for the
Future
1. Introduction
2. Changes to the EC
3. Competition law and State Aids
4. CAP reform and the emerging Rural Policy
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Mid-term review
4.3 Development of EC Rural Policy
4.4. Environmental and Agri-environmental law
4.4.1 Introduction to agri-environmental law
4.4.2 The EC's 6th Environmental Action Programme
4.5 Continuing the Multifunctionality debate of CAP
5. Health and Consumer issues
5.1 Heath issues
5.2 Consumer issues
6. The Cartegena Protocol on Bio-Safety
6.1 The Cartegena Protocol on Bio-Safety within the EC legal
framework
6.2 The WTO, the Environment and the Cartegena Protocol on
Bio-Safety
7. Agricultural, Rural and Environmental law synergies
8. Existing and future WTO situation
9. Intellectual Property and Agriculture
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Plant Patents and Varieties
9.3Geographical Indications
9.3.1 The WTO panel ruing on the EC's Geographical Origin
designation.
10. Services and Agriculture
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11. TRIPs and GATS development in the area of agriculture
12. Conclusion
1. Introduction
The interaction between the WTO's Agreement on Agriculture and the
EC's CAP has to be understood in the context of its setting of the backdrop of
other aspects of the WTO and EC legal framework. While some drawing of a line
has to be made in order to distinguish between those aspects of the setting which
have a greater and a lesser impact on the WTO-EC Agricultural law dynamic,
those aspects which have a greater impact on this legal relationship will be
analysed in this chapter. Of interest is the interaction of the EC's CAP with the
EC's Competition policy, a complex interaction, given the differing relationship
between these two EC policies depending on the existence of a common
organisation in a particular product area. This complex dynamic then has to be
juxtaposed against the lack of any competition policy at the WTO level. The
WTO state aids provisions, mediated through the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
for agricultural products, given the exemption from the GATT provisions on
subsidies for primary products, pursuant to Article XVI GATT, restrict both EC
and national state aid provision in agriculture, with national state aid provision
applying not only in limited non-common organisation situations, but also re-
emerging with the restructuring of the EC's CAP under both the mid-term review
and the proposed changes under the EU Constitution.
The restructuring of the CAP in order to meet the EC's WTO
commitments in agriculture is seeing a re-focusing on the pre-existing emerging
EC Rural policy, with its allied environmental issues. While the EC is adjusting
its CAP in order to be WTO compliant, it may be manoeuvring itself into a
situation where its Sixth Environmental Action Programme, together with its
concept of an Integrated Product Policy, may become the new bone of contention
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between the EC and the WTO. Allied to this is the thorny issue of the legal
interaction of the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety with both the EC and the
WTO legal regimes, particularly in light of the absence of any agreement dealing
with environmental matters at the WTO.
The issues of health and consumer protection are never far from the
discourse on agricultural and food products, with both the EC and the WTO
having developed policies on this area, with the WTO's Sanitary and
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
Agreement coming into the fray. In addition the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPs) and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) complete the set ofWTO agreements which have a major
impact on the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO in the area of
agriculture.
In addition in examining the future development of the nexus between EC
Agricultural Law and WTO law the evolving nature of both the EC and the WTO
have to be taken into consideration. The EC itself may well be subject to reform
under the proposed EU Constitution, which at the time of writing has entered
difficult political waters, but which may, at some time in the future re-emerge,
either piecemeal or intact. The reforms of CAP mid-term review, while radical,
(leading one to speculate what changes the "end of term review" will lead to), do
not yet meet all of the requirements of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, but
may yet, with their refocusing on rural and environmental issues, encounter
further problems at the WTO level, with other WTO agreements. At the global
level the WTO is also hosting the Millennium round of negotiations, which
should in due course lead to either a new WTO Agreement on Agriculture, or
reforms to the existing one.
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2. Changes to the EC
The EC for its part is, subject to referenda, about to be transformed into the
European Union (not to be confused with the current three pillar structure of the
European Union pursuant to the Treaty on European Union 1993). The term
"constitutional" being used for the "Constitution of the European Union" has been
regarded as being "legally meaningless" by academics, as "any text finally agreed
by the Member States was to take the form of a treaty with the same status as all
previous Union treaties".1 At the time of writing, however, the position of the EU
Constitution is in somewhat of a limbo, having been rejected in two consecutive
referenda, in France and the Netherlands, with the term "constitution" having
been more than problematic in those referenda. As with many previous EU
proposals, having reached an initial political impasse, the Constitutional Treaty
may well re-emerge at some later stage, either in its entirety, or in a piecemeal
fashion. It is therefore worth examining the potential future impact of the
provisions of this troubled EU Constitution on the subject matter of this thesis.
The EU Constitution, should it ever come into force, will bring some changes
to the organisation that we have come to know as the EC. Legal personality will
be allocated to the new EU under Article 1-7 EU, with the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the EU being written into Part II of the Constitution. The exact legal
effect of this development, and of the "Court of Justice",2 the new umbrella
institution,3 which will encompass within it the familiar ECJ,4 the new General
Court (replacing the Court of First Instance),5 and the possible "specialised
courts" (formerly known as judicial panels),6 to whom capacity to adjudicate may
1
Arnull, Anthony; Editorial: The Presidents' Tale, E.L. Rev. 2004, 29(1), 1-2, at page 1.
2 Under Article 1-29(1) EU Treaty.
3
Dougan, Michael; The convention's draft constitutional treaty: bringing Europe closer to its
lawyers, E.L. Rev. 2003, 28(6), 763-793, at page 780.
4 Article 111-353 EU
5 Article 111-356 EU
6 Article IH-359 EU
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be assigned7 (by the EU Constitution, to the General Court, or by a European
Law, to the specialised courts), has yet to be established.
On an initial reading, Part II of the EU Constitution appears to replicate the
provisions of the current Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,8
with the change in legal status of its content to being part of the underlying treaty
of the new EU having yet to be established, through an analysis of the case law of
the new Court of Justice on this matter. The abandonment of the familiar
secondary legal tool of regulation, directive and decision, in favour of the new
European Laws, European Framework Laws, European Regulations and European
Decisions,9 will however alter the dynamic of the current EC, and future EU law
generally, begging the question how the EU judicial structure will react to these
developments.
On a re-examination of the allocation of competences between the EU and its
member states the Constitution has retained the central principle that the EU
operates on the basis of "attributed competence",10 with the "general tendency"
being to "reinforce EU power", rather than repatriating it to its member states.11
The barriers between the areas of exclusive and shared competence has, however,
19
"shifted significantly", with the re-categorisation of powers likely to give rise to
"real difficulties".13 The EU Constitution has classified the customs union, and
the common commercial policy under the area of exclusive EU competence,14
further providing that the Union is to have exclusive competence to conclude "an
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of
the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence,
7 Pursuant to Article 111-358 EU.
8 OJ 2000 C364/01, otherwise know as the Nice Charter.
9 Article 1-33 EU
10
Craig, Paul; Competence: Clarity, Conferral, Containment and Consideration. ELRev. 2004,
29(30), 323-344, at page 324.
11 Ibid, at page 326.
12 Ibid, at page 326.
13 Ibid, at page 326.
14 Article 1-13 EU.
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or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope".15 The
EU Constitution has classified under shared competence16 inter alia, the internal
market and "agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine
1 n
biological resources". Also under this classification are the environment,
consumer protection and common safety concerns in public health matters, for the
aspects defined in Part III of the EU Constitution. The "protection and
improvement of human health" is classified as an "Area of supporting,
1 8
coordinating or complementary action", with Article 1-17 not being useable "to
achieve harmonisation in cases where this is precluded by the Constitution".19
This drafting will result in a shifting of the line of tension between the EU's
exclusive external competence and areas of shared competence for internal EU
matters and the current lack of clarity being carried forward to a post-EU
Constitution legal framework.
In addition to the reclassification of exclusive and shared competence within
the Constitution, the issue of subsidiarity remains problematic in the new
document. Subsidiarity has been addressed by the EU Constitution in Article 1-11,
90
together with a protocol attached to the Constitution. Article 1-11 refers to the
principle of conferral being the governing principle of the limits of the Union's
competences with 'the use of the Union's competences' to be 'governed by the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality'. While both subsidiarity and
proportionality are familiar concepts, the conferral principle, despite the new
name, also appears to offer little that is new to the analysis of the law in this area.
Much of Article 1-11 looks familiar, although the reference to whether an action
can be sufficiently achieved by a Member State, in paragraph 3 of this article,
refers to 'either at central level or at regional and local level', adding a new layer
of governance for the post-Constitution EU principle of subsidiarity. The protocol
15 Article 1-13 EU.
16 Article 1-14 EU.
17 Marine biological resources conservation is classified as exclusive competence under Article 1-
14 EU.
18 Under Article 1-17 EU.
19
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 341.
20 Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
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on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality builds on
the principles provided for in earlier EC/EU documentation,21 providing for
procedural mechanisms, involving national parliaments, for the operation of the
principle. As stated by Craig, however, 'it remains to be seen how subsidiarity
• 99
and the Protocol operate in practice'.
While some of the boundary lines between the member states of the new
EU, and the EU itself, and the legal relationship between the new EU and the
WTO will be affected by the EU Constitution, the issue of the exact impact of
WTO agreements and "case law" on the EC, or the proposed new EU legal
jurisdiction have been avoided by the Constitution drafters and remain to be
resolved through further ECJ jurisprudential developments. It should be noted, in
the context of dealing with the future of the WTO/EU relationship that current
core Article 133 EC provisions, although extended to cover new policy areas,
would be substantially re-enacted in Article III-315 of the EU Constitution. Of
note, however, in this article is the provision that the CCP "shall be conducted in
the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action",
perhaps bringing what is now the EC's Commercial Policy within the framework
of the EU's foreign policy, as the "three-pillar-plus-pediment structure" of the
original EU has been demolished,23 with the CFSP together with the PJCCM
pillars being brought into the unitary structure of the new EU, however with
differences that the new Union method within the proposed new "unitary" Union
structure.24 Whether this results in the new EU developing its trade policy as an
international foreign policy tool, along the lines of that adopted by the USA, has
yet to be established. The EU Constitution does not, of itself, resolve the
problematic relationship between what is now the EC and the WTO, which, given
the changes that have been written into the legal framework, could be seen as a
missed opportunity to bring greater clarity to this area. Article 1-13(2) does
21
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 342.
22 Ibid, at page 343.
23
Op. cit. footnote no. 3, at page 764.
24 Ibid., at page 764.
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provide that international agreements the conclusion of which are "provided for in
a legislative act of the Union" 25 are deemed to be within the exclusive
9 f\
competence of the Union with "little containment of EU power" in this area.
How the new "Court of Justice" would interact with the provisions of the
Constitution would also have to be established, although it would appear that the
legal relationship between EC law and WTO law within the EC, or future EU
97
jurisdiction, has been definitively ruled on in the Van Parys case, reaffirming
90
Portugal v. Council, ignoring the Advocate General's creative opinion in the
9Q
Biret case, a full discussion of which was held in chapter 6. While some writers
would argue that the ECJ has not been shy of developing law when it felt the need
to do so, as in the development of the Treaty of Rome itself, converting a
traditional multilateral treaty into a constitutional charter governed by a form of
o 1
constitutional law, it is to be expected that the new "Court of Justice" will desist
from deviating from the Portugal v. Council line, and maintain its
accommodation line to WTO law as discussed earlier in chapter 6.
3. Competition law and State Aids
Most readers of national newspapers, let alone legal texts, would be aware
that the EC has a vigorous Competition law policy, or using the US terminology,
09
anti-trust policy, as set out in Articles 81 and 82 EC. The application of this
policy, based on the concepts of anti-competitive behaviour and "abuse of a
25 Ibid, at page 768.
26
Op. cit. footnote no. 10, at page 330.
27 Case C-377/02, Leon Van Parys NV v Belgisch Interventie- en Restitutiebureau (BIRB), [205]
ECR1-01465.
28 Case C-149/96: Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, [1999] ECR at page I-
08395.
29 Cases C-93/02, and C-94/02, Biret International SA v. Council of the European Union, [2003]
ECR page 1-10497.
30
Mancini, G. Federico "The Making of a Constitution for Europe" (1989) 26 C.M. L. Rev. 595-
614, at page 595 et seq.
31
Weiler, J.H.H.; The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, JCMS, Vol 35, Nol, page 97
32
Formerly Articles 85 and 86 EC.
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dominant position", do not necessarily apply to agricultural activities, due to the
impact of Article 36 EC, which provides that the EC treaty provisions on
competition law will apply to "production of and trade in agricultural products
only to the extent determined by the Council" after having taken account of the
objectives of the EC's CAP as set out in Article 33 EC. The Council did so
determine the extent to which mainstream EC Competition law was to affect
OQ O A
agriculture, in Council Regulation 26/62, which, subject to one amendment,
and two derogations,35 remains the law today. Council Regulation 26/62 provides
exemptions from the provisions of Articles 81 and 82 EC, on the basis of the
Oude Luttikhuis37 tests, which include agreements necessary for attainment of the
oo
objectives set out in Article 33 of the Treaty, which should cover the reforms of
on
the CAP under the mid-term review, and developments pursuant to the currently
developing Pillar II of CAP, pursuant to the EC's view of the multifunctionality
of agricultural activity, of which more later in this chapter.
As referred to in chapter 2 the EC definition of "agricultural products" as
provided for in Article 32 EC, being "products of the soil, of stockfarming and of
fisheries and products of first stage processing directly relating to these products",
is broader than the WTO definition, the WTO definition being the one being used
throughout this thesis. Article 32 EC is complemented by Council Regulation 7a
EC.40 The definitions of agricultural producers and agricultural holdings, for the
purposes of EC law, are not, however, set out in the Treaty, with the ECJ finding,
33 Council Regulation No. 26 applying certain rules of competition to the production of and trade
in agricultural products, OJ L 30, 20/4/62, p. 993.
34
Dealing with the dates of its coming into force.
35
Affecting, respectively, the recognition of inter-branch organisations in the tobacco and the fruit
and vegetable sectors.
36 And presumably will continue to provide protection under the post EU constitution regime,
although this has yet to be confirmed.
37 Case C-399/93, J.G. Oude Luttikhuis and others v. Verenigde Cooperative Melkindustrie
Coberco BA„ [1995] ECR, page I- 4515.
38 To be interpreted pursuant to the ruling in Case 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor de fruit- en
groentenimporthandel, Nederlandse Bond van grossiers in zuidvruchten en ander geimporteerd
fruit Frubo v. Commission of the European Communities and Vereniging de Fruitunie. [1975]
ECR 563.
39
Despite the dismantlement of the common organisations of particular agricultural commodities.
40 OJ 1961, p. 71 (Sp. Edn 1959-1962, p. 68).
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at paragraph 8 of the judgment in the case of Santa Anna,41 that "it is for the
Community institutions to work out, where appropriate, for the purposes of the
rules deriving from the Treaty such a definition of agricultural holding", given
that it is "impossible to find in the provisions of the Treaty or in the rules of
secondary Community law" any such "general uniform Community definition".
Farmers have, however, only recently been defined in Article 2(a)42 of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1782/200343 for the purposes of the new direct support
scheme.
The interaction of the EC Competition policy with the CAP was addressed
in the case of Dijkstra,44 which held that the then Article 85 EC (now Article 81
EC) does not apply to "agreements, decisions and practices of farmers, farmers'
associations or associations of such associations" only where the "conditions laid
down in the second sentence of Article 2(1) of Regulation No. 26" apply. If any
such agreements do not comply with these conditions, then the exemption from
EC competition law cannot be claimed, and the full rigours of the then Article 85
EC, as originally implemented by Regulation 17/62,45 and now by Regulation
1/2003,46 will apply. If the agreement, in such a circumstance, failing to meet the
requirements of Regulation 26, "does not qualify for exemption pursuant to
Article 85(3)" (now Article 81(3) then the agreement is "automatically void and
41 Case 85/77 Santa Anna v. INPS [1978] ECR 527.
42
Article 2(a) provides that "'farmer' means a natural or legal person, or a group of natural or legal
persons, whatever legal status is granted to the group and its members by national law, whose holding
is situated within Community territory, as referred to in Article 299 of the Treaty, and who exercises an
agricultural activity".
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 of 29th September 2003 establishing common rules for
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain support
schemes for farmers and amending Regulations (EEC) No. 2019/93, (EC) No. 1452/2001, (EC)
No. 1453/2001, (EC) No. 1454/2001, (EC) 1868/94, (EC) No 1251/1999, (EC) No. 1254/1999,
(EC) No. 1673/2000, (EEC) No. 2358/71 and (EC) No. 2529/2001, OJ L 270/1.
44 Joined Cases C-319/93, C-40/94 and C-224/94 Hendrik EveritDijkstra Friesland (Frico Domo)
Cooperatie BA and Cornells van Roessel and others v. De Cooperative vereniging
Zuivelcooperatie Campina Melkunie BA, [1995] ECR page 4471.
45
EEC Council: Regulation No 17: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty,
Official Journal L 13, 21/02/1962 p. 204.
46 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L 1/1 4.1. 2003.
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such nullity has retroactive effect".47 In addition it should be noted that
Regulation 26 has no exemptions for Article 82 abuse of dominant position, an
issue which was to come to fore in the context of agriculture in the United Brands
case.48 The granting of licences, a service, by a party in a dominant position, also
became relevant in the WTO case of EC-Bananas,49 of which more later in the
context of services.
The current thinking of the ECJ on the requirements of Regulation 26 was
set out in the case of Oude Luttikhuis.50 This ruling provided that the general rule
in dealing with all competition law issues pursuant to the provisions of the now
numbered Articles 81 and 82 EC, as implemented, and that Regulation 26,
applying to agriculture, was to be a strictly interpreted exception. The Court went
on to say51 that three derogations from the general rule provided for in Regulation
26 were as follows; first, agreements in the context of a national market
organization, second, agreements necessary for attainment of the objectives set
out in what is now Article 33 of the Treaty,52 and the cumulative third test. For the
third derogation to apply, the Court held that the following requirements had to be
met: first, "the agreements in question concern cooperative associations belonging
to a single Member State", second, that they do not cover prices but concern
rather the production or sale of agricultural products or the use of joint facilities
for the storage, treatment or processing of such products", and third, that "they do
not exclude competition or jeopardize the objectives" of the CAP. The second
test, "agreements necessary for attainment of the objectives set out in Article 39
[now Article 33] of the Treaty", provides for a complex test, given, as set out in
chapter 2, the objectives of the CAP are quite often conflicting, leading to the
issues raised in the current multifunctionality debate, referred to also in chapter 2.
47
At paragraph 1 of the ruling of the ECJ in Dijkstra.
48 Case 27/67 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207.
49
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997.
50
Op. cit. footnote no. 37.
51 At paragraph 23 of the judgment.
52 To be interpreted pursuant to the ruling in Case 71/74 Nederlandse Vereniging voor defruit- en
groentenimporthandel, Nederlandse Bond van grossiers in zuidvruchten en ander geimporteerdfruit
Frubo v. Commission of the European Communities and Vereniging de Fruitunie [1975] ECR 563.
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An example of the restrictive interpretation of Regulation 26/62 is the
CO
Goettrup-Kilm case, where it was held by the ECJ that restrictive practices in the
area of fertilizers and plant protection products were not within the agricultural
exception to the mainstream EC competition rules, as set down in Article 36 EC,
and in Regulation 26/62. In this specific case, however, it was further held that
restrictive provisions on the acquisition of goods by members of a cooperative
purchasing association were not to be held in breach of Article 81 EC, "so long as
the abovementioned provision is restricted to what is necessary to ensure that the
cooperative functions properly and maintains its contractual power in relation to
producers."54 This interpretation would appear further to blur what otherwise
should be clear demarcation boundary lines between the CAP and EC
Competition law, in favour of the CAP.
The impact of this derogation from mainstream EC Competition law in the
area of agriculture, with the CAP traditionally focused on "common price", has
"severely restricted price competition".55 However with the decoupling provisions
announced in the mid-term review,56 and being implemented by Regulation
1782/03,57 with the "current moves to producer support" rather than price support,
may restrict the negative impacts of the agricultural derogation to competitive
CO
market forces. However, even under the pre- mid term reform framework it was
"not permissible" further to "restrict the degree of competition" available to
agricultural undertakings as evidenced in the Suiker Unie59 case.60
53 Case C-250/92, Goettrup-Kilm e.a. Grovvareforeningr v. Dansk Landbrugs grovvareselskab
AmbA., [1994] ECR page 1-5641, at paragraph 27 of the judgment et seq.
54 At paragraph 2 of the ruling.
55
Usher, J.A.; EC Agricultural Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, at page 14.
56 To be discussed further in chapter 9.
57
Op. cit. footnote no. 43.
58
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 14.
59 Cases 40-48, 50, 54-56, 111, 113, 114/73 Suiker Unie v. Commission [1975] ECR 1663 at 1949,
1950.
60
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 14.
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Under EC law the rules on state aids form part of EC Competition law, as
the EC concerns itself not only with the actions of private actors but also of states.
Council Regulation 26/62 applies what are now Articles 88(1) and the first
sentence of 88(3) to agricultural products,61 but not the balance of Article 88
EC,62 the operative part of the state aids provisions. Those agricultural products
not covered by common organizations " are "not subject to the substantive state
aid rules".64 As pointed out by Usher, relying on the Societe d'Initiatives case,65
where no common organisation operates, there is still "no general application of
the state aids rules to agricultural products".66 Where the common organisation
had more rigorous provisions on state aids than under the EC treaty provisions
then the more rigorous common organisations provisions were to apply. In the
absence of the application of EC state aid provisions then the Council was in a
position to "authorize a national aid".68
Within the common organisation, Article 34.2 EC expressly provides for
"aids for the production and marketing of the various products," although the
common organisation shall be limited to the pursuit of the objectives set out in
Article 33, and shall exclude any discrimination between producers or consumers
within the Community", with research and training aid being provided for in
Article 35 EC, and Article 36 providing for the authorisation by the Council of
"the granting of aid (by Member States): (a) for the protection of enterprises
handicapped by structural or natural conditions; (b) within the framework of
economic development programmes". The granting of aid by the EC itself to
agricultural producers, the standard method of the operation of the CAP, needless
61 Article 4 of Council Regulation 26/62, OJ L. 30, 20/04/1962, p.993.
62 Which presumably will be substituted by Article III-168 of the new EU Treaty, which
substantially re-enacts the provisions of Article 88 EC.
63 These according to Usher, (Op. cit. footnote no. 56, at page 16) relying on the Commission's
"Community Guidelines for state aid in the agriculture sector, February 2000, as, "potatoes (other
than starch potatoes) horsemeat, honey, coffee, alcohol of agricultural origin and vinegars derived
from alcohol, and cork". (OJ 2000, C232/17).
64
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 16.
65 Case 114/83 Societe d'Initiaitves et de cooperation Agricoles v. Commission [1984] ECR 2589.
66
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 17.
67 As was held in the Case 177/78 Pigs and Bacon Commission v McCarren, [1979] ECR 2161.
68
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 17.
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to say, is not prohibited by the EC treaty. These provisions, when read together,
and elaborated upon by the myriad of various implementing provisions, paint a
completely different picture from that set out for non-agricultural produce under
Article 87 EC. While certain exceptions to this rigorous rule are provided for in
Article 87.2, the clear picture is that while discrimination between undertakings is
prohibited for both agricultural and non-agricultural aids, the emphasis on
competition and trade distortion in the context of favouring particular goods, for
non-agricultural produce, is not mirrored in the agricultural sector. This
dichotomy in approach will have an effect on the interaction of the EC's CAP
with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, given the lack of provisions within the
current WTO regime for competition law together with the WTO Agreement's on
Agriculture's restrictive provision on state aids.
National state aids could exist for non-common market products; however,
intra-EC countervailing duties may still be imposed in such a situation, under
Article 38 EC, with the Commission, and not individual member states, fixing
"the amount of these charges at the level required to redress the balance", in
addition to other possible measures which "it shall determine". It is possible that
national state aid provisions continue to exist, which may be authorised by the
Council, "in the context of a common organisation".69 However, in the absence of
such authorisation, the EAGGF in particular, pursuant to the case of France v.
70
Commission, may "legitimately refuse to finance a Community aid" in such
circumstance.71 National export subsidies may not however be provided where the
agricultural product is subject to an EC common organisation.72
As a consequence of this situation, the line of argument developed that
national organisations of agricultural markets could "no longer operate in such a
way as to prevent the Treaty provisions relating to the elimination of restrictions
69 Ibid, at page 17.
70 Cases 15, 16/76 France v Commission [1979] ECR 321.
71
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 17.
72 Ibid, at page 20.
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on intra-Community trade from having full force and effect,"73 with Article 32 EC
being deemed to permit "countervailing charges to be imposed where national
support measures give rise to low-priced (and presumably subsidized) exports".74
While Usher is of the opinion that the "continued use of Art. 38" might be seen as
incompatible with the post-1992 vision of an internal market without frontiers,75
an interesting situation can be seen to be emerging due to two recent
developments within the EC. The mid-term review, with its deconstruction of
common organisations, due to the decoupling of payments to farmers from
production, and the use of the single farm payment, a more developed policy in
some parts of the EC than in others, and in certain commodities, than in others,
will lead to a greater increase in the numbers of agricultural commodities not
covered by common organisation based state aid rules, thus increasing the number
of commodities in the default position of only being governed by the limited
provisions of Article 88, or Article III-168 of the new EU Constitution, pursuant
to Article 4 of Regulation 26/64, which presumably will continue in force in a
post EU Constitution era, should the Constitution or the relevant parts of it come
into force. Secondly, while recognising that both the EC and its constituent
member states are bound by the commitments in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, the reclassification of agriculture in the new EU Constitution as
being an area of shared competence between the EU and its member states,
pursuant to Article 1-14 EU76 thereby becoming subject to the principle of
subsidiarity, will also increase the likelihood of the development of national state
aids, either through direct, or indirect means. This will be despite the fact that
Council Regulation 1257/1999 "in principle applies the state aid rules to national
measures to support rural development",77 thereby covering developments under
Pillar II of CAP.
73 Case 232/78, European Commission v. France, ECR 1979, page 2729.
74
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 18.
75 Ibid, at page 19.
76
as discussed in detail earlier in this chapter.
77
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 19.
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The Commission's view is that state aid provisions, subject to any specific
TO
exceptions, are fully applicable to agricultural and rural sector activities "with
the exception of those aids which are specifically aimed at the limited number of
7Q
products which are not covered by common organisations of the market". Allied
or* 01 on
to this the fact that the "de minimis" rule does not apply to agricultural aid,
and the financing of any rural policy activity by the state becomes a delicate
operation. In addition, it should be noted that aids to promote diversification
activities, which are within the Rural Development regulation,83 but which are not
concerned with the "the scope of the production, processing and marketing of
Annex I84 agricultural products,"85 are to be treated as if they are outside the
specific agricultural provisions, as mainstream state aids, thereby benefiting from
the "de minimis" rule.86 It should also be noted at this point that Article 6 EC,
which applies to both the agricultural and non-agricultural sector, requires
"environmental protection requirements" to be "integrated into the definition and
R7
implementation" of all Community policies, including state aids. This
complexity is added to when one considers the WTO Agreement on Agriculture's
restrictive provisions on state aids, colloquially referred to as green, blue, and red
box provisions, (in contrast to the GATT 1947's non-application of the provisions
of Article XVI subsidies provisions to primary products), as elaborated upon in
chapter 4.
78
Regulation 26/62 OJ 1962, 993, provides that the competition rules and state aid rules are to
apply to the Agricultural sector except where a common organisation operates. These state aids
may however be subject to Articles 88(1) and (3), which deal with constant review by the
Commission, and the informing of the Commission. The Commission then "cannot oppose the
granting of such aids, although it may submit its comments" on such aid. "Information from the
Commission - Community Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector, OJ C 28, 1/2/2000,
page 2 to 22.
79 Information from the Commission - Community Guidelines for State aid in the agriculture
sector OJ C 28, 1/2/2000, page 2 to 22.
80
De minimis non curata lex - the law does not cure minor breaches.
81 Commission Notice on the de minimis rule for State aid, OJ C, 68, 6,3,1996, page 6.
82
Op. cit. footnote no. 79, page 2 to 22.
83 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 OJ L. 106, 26/6/1999, p.80, at Article 4.
84 Annex 1 of the EC Treaty.
85 Not being covered by the Commission Guidelines on State Aids in the Agriculture sector, OJ C
28, 1/2/2000, page 2 to 22.
86
Op. cit. footnote no. 82, at pages 2 to 22.
87
Op. cit. footnote no. 55, at page 16.
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These exemptions from mainstream EC Competition law and from the
state aids provisions for agriculture have had a profound effect on the
development of the market place for agriculture. It is worth noting that the
emphasis of the CAP has traditionally been the protection of farmers, while, as
QO
stated by the OECD, "Competition law protects competition, not competitors".
Competition law provisions are currently absent from the WTO legal framework,
however under the current round ofWTO negotiations a working group had been
89
set up to examine the "interaction between trade and competition policy" to
cover anti-competitive practices, and to "identify any areas that may merit further
consideration in the WTO framework".90 The workings of this group, were not,
however, to "prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future".91
While the declaration makes reference to UNCTAD work in this area, it is clear
that no new regimes on competition law will be forthcoming from the current
round ofWTO negotiations,92 as "multilateral disciplines in these areas., will take
place only after an explicit consensus decision is taken among WTO Members" to
QO
that effect. This is reflected in the fact that in July 04 negotiations on
Competition law during the Doha round of negotiations were abandoned. There
were a number of issues which may have hindered the development of a WTO
agreement on this issue, not least of which, "only 90 or so of the WTO's members
have competition regimes" most of which "are of recent vintage".94 In addition it
has been recognised that in the area of trade and competition "one size does not fit
88 OECD, Trade and Competition from Doha to Cancun, OECD, 2003, ISBN/ISSN 9264102787,
at page 9.
89 This working group was established at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996
(http://www.wto.org).
90 World Trade Organisation: Ministerial Conference, Singapore, 9-13 December 1996, Singapore
Ministerial declaration, Adopted on 13 December 1996, at point 20 of the declaration.
91 Ibid, at point 20 of the declaration.
92
Although developments at the OECD Joint Global Forum on Competition, which is still
ongoing, might be worth following for early indications of possible future directions in this area.
93 World Trade Organization: Ministerial Conference, Singapore, 9-13 December 1996, Singapore
ministerial declaration, Adopted on 13 December 1996, at point 20 of the declaration.
94Nottage, Hunter; "Trade and Competition in the WTO", Pondering the applicability of special
and differential treatment; Journal of International Economic Law (2003) 23-47, at page 41.
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all", with differentiated treatment not just for developing countries,95 but also
recognising that "even within the most industrially advanced nations" there are
"different policy goals and objectives of competition regimes".96 The working
group was therefore to focus on "specific trade policy issues" rather than looking
Q7
at the broader picture". While some competitive provisions are currently in
some WTO agreements98 none would currently impact on the WTO agricultural
regime.
4. CAP reform and the emerging Rural Policy
4.1. Introduction
As referred to earlier, with the recent reform of pillar I of CAP under the
mid-term review, an allied policy to the EC's CAP is the emerging European
Rural Policy, often referred to, but not exclusively envisaged as, the second pillar
of CAP, and the longer standing EC Environmental Policy. Both of these policies
will increasingly inform the future development of the CAP, particularly in light
99
of the cross compliance requirements under the mid term review of the CAP,
and the requirement of farmers to meet the "good agricultural and environmental
condition" (GAEC) in order to qualify for the direct payments.
4.2 Mid-term review
As referred to in chapter 7, CAP reform has commenced pursuant to
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003100 subsequent to the completion of the
95 Ibid, at page 43.
96
Robertson, Aidan; Book review "K.Kennedy; Competition Law and the World Trade
Organisation, ECLR 2002, 23(2), 113-114, at page 114.
97
http://www.wto.org.
98 With both GATT and GATS having provisions dealing with "monopolies and exclusive service
providers" with further details in the telecommunications provisions Op. cit. footnote no. 188.
9
Op. cit. footnote no. 43.
100 Ibid.
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mid-term review. Under the new regime, which commenced in January 2005 with
a single farm payment (SFP) to "replace most of the existing premia under the
different common market organisations".101 Farmers102 in receipt of the SFP will
have the flexibility to "produce any crop on their land, except fruit and vegetables
and table potatoes",103 subject to the requirement to keep their land in "good
agricultural and environmental condition".104 The SFP is to be calculated on the
basis of "historical reference amounts" comprising "the calendar years 2000, 2001
and 2002".105 Member state options, to include national and regional
differentiation options, have been written into the Council Regulation, to permit
inter alia, the commencement of the SFP by the beginning of 2005, or at the
latest, 2007. It should be noted that certain commodities, such as olive oil,
tobacco, hops and cotton have not been reformed under the mid-term review, still
requiring separate reform measures to be drafted.106 The reform of the EC's sugar
policy will come into force in July 06, bringing it in line with the rest of CAP.
Sugar, in particular, requires reform pursuant to the recent WTO Appellate Body
• • 107
joint ruling on three cases dealing with the EC's sugar regime. In these cases
the Appellate Body ruled, inter alia, that the EC sugar regime was inconsistent
with the EC's "obligation under Articles 3.3 and 8 of the Agreement on
10R
Agriculture" and recommended that the "Dispute Settlement Body request the
European Communities to bring Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/2001, as well
101 OECD: Analysis of the 2003 CAP reform, OECD, 2004, at page 10.
102 Now defined in Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, Article 2 (a) as being "a natural or
legal person, or a group of natural or legal persons, whatever legal status is granted to this group
and its members by national law, whose holding is situated within Community territory, as
referred to in Article 299 of the Treaty, and who exercises and agricultural activity". Agricultural
activity is itself defined in Article 2(c.) as being "the production, rearing or growing of agricultural
products including harvesting, milking, breeding animals and keeping animals for farming
purposes, or maintaining the land in good agricultural and environmental condition". Agricultural
products are defined in Article 2(f) as being "products listed in Annex I of the Treaty, including
cotton, but with the exception of fishery products".
103
Op. cit. footnote no. 101, at page 11.
104 Article 5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003, OJ L 270/1.
105 Article 38 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003, OJ L 270/1.
106
Op. Cit. footnote no. 101, at page 9.
107
European Communities - Export subsidies on sugar (brought by Australia) WT/DS265/AB/R,
European Communities- Export subsidies on sugar (Brought by Brazil) WT/DS266/AB/R, and
European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar (brought By Thailand) WT/DS283/AB/R, all
ruled on by the Appellate Body of the WTO on the 28th April 2005.
108
At point 346(f) of the Appellate Body ruling.
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as all other measures implementing or related to the European communities' sugar
regime.... into conformity with its obligations" under the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture.109
Pursuant to the CAP reform provisions dealing with the balance of the EC
agricultural commodities, Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 provides
options for member states, and their regions, for various methods of phasing in
the new regime, and phasing out the old regime. In addition, when the new regime
has been fully phased in, there will still be coupled payments within the reformed
CAP system.110 While the Commission acknowledges that these reforms will
"help in negotiating a World Trade Organisation (WTO) agricultural agreement",
it would appear that even in its fully reformed format the CAP will still, but to a
much lesser extent, be WTO non-compliant and will still have within it
"significant levels" of market price support, with "distortions to international
trade" having been reduced, but not eliminated.111 Even under the reformed
common organisations, as discussed in the context of cereals in chapter 2, the
"trading market at the external frontiers of the Community" continues to rely on
export licences, export refunds, import duties, tariff quotas and emergency
safeguard measures.112 The further development of modulation113 and the further
construction of pillar II of the CAP under the proposed new rural development
109 At point 347 of the Appellate Body ruling.
110 These continuing coupled payments under the reformed CAP system will include payments in
the arable sector generally, and for durum wheat in particular, beef exceptions, sheep and goat
exceptions, together with drying aid for cereals and direct payments in the outermost regions and
the Aegean Islands. Dairy reforms will be delayed, but after its reform there will still be direct
dairy payments. Source: Analysis of the 2003 CAP reform (OECD), at page 9.
111
Op. Cit. footnote no. 101, at page 43.
112 Council Regulation (EC) No 1784/2003, on the common organisation of the market in cereals,
Official Journal, L 270 of 21.10.2003, and supplemented by Commission Regulation (EC) No
2237/2003 of 23 December 2003 laying down detailed rules for the application of certain support
schemes provided for in Title IV of Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing common
rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain
support schemes for farmers, OJ L 339 of 24.12.2003.
113 Pursuant to Article 10 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003, OJ L 270/1.
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regulation,114 in the opinion of the OECD "opens up the possibility ofmoving
towards more targeted policies"115 in the future.
4.3 Development of EC Rural Policy
Despite the lack of reference to an EC Rural Policy in the current version
of the Treaty of Rome, such a policy has been developing pursuant to the Rural
Policy regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999,116 building on the
vision for a Rural policy as set out in the Cork Declaration.117 The main aim of
this regulation was to "consolidate nine separate instruments into a single legal
1 1 o
framework" to give a greater clarity and "coherence" to pillar II of the CAP.
While the MacSharry reforms "added a more effective second pillar to the CAP,"
CAP remained until the Agenda 2000 reforms essentially a "price support and
production control policy".119 For their part the Agenda 2000 reforms "signalled
i on
greater scope for national discretion in rural development regulation" with the
provision for national envelopes, it was only with the recent mid-term review that
there has been a "partial re-nationalisation of' rural development policy.
The vision of the Cork Declaration is epitomised in statements to the
effect that "Rural Development must address all socio-economic sectors of the
countryside" and that "rural development policy must be multi-disciplinary in
concept, and multi-sectoral in application". It is intended that this policy operates
over a similar territorial area to most of the EC Regional Policy, with the Rural
114
Updating the provisions currently provided for in Council Regulation (EC) 1257/1999, on
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policy operating with a "bottom up" emphasis to an EC adopted policy, as
191
epitomised by the LEADER programmes, in line with the EC principle on
subsidiarity.122 In the context of the CAP, it is interesting to note that the Leader
programme has been conducted pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No
4256/88,123 which deals with DGVI Financing of the CAP. It should however be
noted that, in contrast to the breadth of the Cork Declaration, the Rural Policy
regulation is somewhat limited in focus, with the emphasis being on agriculture
and agri-industries. This does however, bring it directly into the framework of this
thesis.
The Rural Policy regulation takes as its legal basis Articles 33(1) and 33(2),124
which set out the objectives and other considerations of the CAP, and the
19S
currently numbered Article 159 EC, which deals with Economic and Social
Cohesion. The first recital in the regulation reflects the heavy preponderance of
agricultural issues addressed in the regulation when it states that, "a common rural
development policy should accompany and complement the other (emphasis
added) instruments of the common agricultural policy". The Rural policy of the
EC has developed further with the mid-term review of the CAP.
It is expected that following the reform of the first pillar of the CAP,
discussed above, under the mid-term review, the next major focus of CAP reform
will be rural development and the further development of pillar II of CAP.126 As
matters currently stand, the proposed reform of Pillar II of the CAP will be funded
by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), with Pillar I
funding to be covered by the European Agricultural Fund for Guarantee
121
LEADER, LEADER II and LEADER +.
122
As set out in recital 14 of the Rural Policy Directive, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/99 OJ
L EN 16080/2661999 (For a discussion on subsidiarity, see Chapter 6 under the heading,
"Relationship with Member State legislation".)
123 OJ L 374, 31/12/88, page 28.
124 Article 39 EC pre Amsterdam.
125 Article 130b pre Amsterdam.
126
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(EAFG),127 with Council Regulation (EC) No 1290/2005128 having recently been
enacted to that end, with provision being made for some phasing in of its
provisions, with the totality of the Regulation to be in force by 1st January 2007.
In the interim the Rural Development Regulation will continue to fund CAP Pillar
II objectives under EAGGF guidance, Objective 1 programmes with Rural
Development measures, Objective 2 programmes with Rural Development
measures, and Leader+ programmes. Both the aforementioned Objective 1 and 2
policies refer to the current operation of the EC Regional Policy pursuant to
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/99,129 for the period 2000 to 2006. Under
Article 10(3) of that Regulation three objective areas130 and four community
i o 1
initiatives are specified for aid under EC Regional Policy. The Leader+
community initiative, one of the EC Regional Policy tools, focuses on rural
development by local action groups, and builds on the Leader and Leader II
schemes, which were its precursors.
Mariann Fischer Boel, the current EC Agricultural Commissioner,
1 "39
speaking in February 2005 spoke of a new "European Strategy Document for
Rural Development" which she proposes writing, with a view to refocusing the
EC Rural strategy. It is her intention to "make explicit the link between rural
127 Ibid, at page 13.
128 OJL 209/1.
129 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/99, laying down general provisions on the structural funds,
OJL 213, 13 August 1999.
130
Objective 1 is classified as "development and structural adjustment of regions whose
development is lagging behind," to which 135.9 billion Euros are allocated. Objective 2 is
classified as "Economic and Social conversion of areas facing structural difficulties", to which
22.5 billion Euros has been allocated. Objective 3 is classified as "Adaptation and modernisation
of national policies and systems of education and training and employment", to which 24.05
billion Euros has been allocated.
131 The four community initiatives are 1. Interreg II, dealing with cross-border, transitional and
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development and the Lisbon strategy133 and lay the basis for a more strategic
approach to competitiveness, job creation and innovation in rural areas".134 How
exactly this strategy document will develop the second pillar of the CAP has yet
to be established. What is clear however, is that the development of the CAP
generally, both in its Pillar I and II guises, will reflect the increasing overlap
between the CAP and environmental issues, in light of the requirement of farmers
in receipt of the SFP to maintain land in Good Agricultural and Environmental
Condition (GAEC).135 "A "priority list" of 18 statutory European Standards"
forms the basis of the test for GAEC,136 with Council Regulation (EC) No.
1782/2003 requiring compulsory cross compliance with the requirements of other
EC or national schemes that the farmer is operating under.
4.4.1 Introduction to agri-environmental law
The test for GAEC as required by Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1782/2003 has a strong environmental flavour about it. While the EC has set
down some minimum standards that must be complied with in Annex IV to the
Regulation, these minimum standards can be supplemented by the individual
member states, either at a national or regional level, "taking into account the
specific characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic
condition, existing farming systems, land use, crop rotation, farming practices and
farm structures".137 The standards set out in Annex IV deal with soil erosion, soil
organic matter, soil structure and the minimum level of maintenance of land in
order to "avoid the deterioration of habitats". These provisions are supplemented
by the statutory management requirements required by Articles 3 and 4 of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003, which are set out in Annex III to the regulation.
133 SEC (2005) 192 "Lisbon Action Plan incorporating EU Lisbon Programme and
recommendations for actions to Member States for inclusion in their national Lisbon programmes"
http://europa.eu.int/growth and jobs/index en,htm.
134
Op. cit. footnote no. 132.
135 Article 5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003, OJ L 270/1.
136
Op. cit. footnote no. 101, at page 13.
137 Article 5.1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003.
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These are categorised under the titles of environment, plant and animal health, (to
include the identification and registration of animals), public, animal and plant
health, (to include the notification of diseases) and animal welfare provisions.
These provisions are to operate without prejudice to the provisions in Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999,138 "and to agri-environmental measures applied
1 TQ
above the reference level of good agricultural practice".
The development of these provisions, together with the "more targeted
policies" of Pillar I of the CAP, forecasted by the OECD,140 together with the
impending review of the EC Rural policy under the proposed reform of Pillar II
CAP, brings this discourse of CAP reform into the framework of the Sixth
Environmental Action Programme,141 and its key concept of the integrated
product policy.142
The Sixth Community Environment Action Programme143 makes specific
reference to both international trade and the CAP. This is interesting as in the
context of the trade and environment debate within the EC "there has been a
marked reluctance" to deem environmental trade issues to come within the
CCP,144 with "all international environmental agreements" adopted by the EC
having "been adopted on a basis other than Article 113".145 Case law from the
ECJ does not appear to have assisted the matter, with, as stated by Hession and
MacRory, the "distinctions in philosophy"146 behind EC Commercial law and EC
Environmental law continuing to pose problems for the development of this area
138 The Rural Development Regulation.
139 Article 5.1. Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003.
140
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141
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July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, OJ L. 242,
10/9/2002, at page 1.
142 First seen in the European Commission's Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy, COM
(2001) 68 of 7 February 2001.
143
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Hession, Martin and MacRory, Richard; Balancing Trade Freedom with the Requirements of
Sustainable Development, Ch 13 in Emiliou and O'Keeffe, the European Union and World Trade
Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley and Sons, 1996, at page 211.
145 Ibid, at page 211.
146 Ibid, at page 216.
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of law, despite the goal of sustainable development in the post- Maastricht version
of the EC treaty. Provisions covered by EC Environmental policy, of interest in
the context of CAP reform, include the pre-existing Habitats directive,147 the Wild
Birds directive148 and the Water Framework directive,149 which concerns itself,
inter alia, with the pollution of ground waters with pesticides and nitrates. In
addition the EC's state aid guidelines, referred to above and the rural development
policy150 also require an indication of the environmental impact of actions under
their provisions.
4.4.2 The EC's Sixth Environmental Action Programme
The key priorities of the Sixth Environmental Action Programme are climate
change, nature and biodiversity, environment and health and quality of life, and
natural resources and waste.151 In addition to the expected provisions on natural
habitats and wild life, it is interesting to note that reference is made both to the
need to strengthen a "world trade system that fully recognises Multilateral or
Regional Environmental Agreements and the precautionary principle," referred to
in Article 9.2, with reference to the world trade system noticeably being made in
small capitals, leaving open the possibility that either reform of the WTO, or of
some other organisation either to replace or complement the WTO might be a
future line of development for the EC in this policy area. Also of relevance to this
thesis is the reference in the same article to the need to align sustainable
environmental practices with the EC's policy on foreign investment and export
147 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and
Flora, OJ L206, p.7.
148 Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the Conservation of Wild Birds OJ L103 1979.
149 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L327, 22/12/2000,
p. 1-73.
50
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credits. No distinction is made in this document between agricultural and non-
agricultural trade, with the preamble to the decision referring generally to the
need "to achieve decoupling between environmental pressures and economic
growth",152 recognising that "there is considerable pressure from human activity
on nature and biodiversity",153 and that this action needs to be taken at a global
level, as "economic globalisation means that environmental action is increasingly
needed at international level",154 while making a very specific reference to a
matter at the heart of agriculture, (soil) at recital no. 22 of the Preamble, "Soil is a
finite resource that is under environmental pressure". The impact that this
particular development will have on the EC's relationship with the WTO, in the
context of both agricultural and non-agricultural trade, merits further examination.
The integrated product policy, currently drafted in the context of industrial
goods, requires "environmental requirements" to be taken into consideration
"throughout the life-cycle of products", with the requirements to establish "a
compliance assistance programme, with specific help from small and medium
enterprises".155 The integrated product policy,156 is seen as one of the strategic
157
approaches to meeting the environmental objectives of the action plan, has
attracted comment from Quick and Lau, in the context of environmentally
1 SR
motivated tax distinctions and WTO law. They point out that "it is now
recognized that (GATT 1994) does not automatically place a higher value on
trade over the environment". They come to this conclusion on the basis of the
Article XX panel and Appellate Body reports, which they conclude support the
proposition that "environmental protection and regulatory autonomy to protect the
152 At recital 8 of the Preamble.
153 At recital 21 of the Preamble.
154 At recital 30 of the Preamble.
155 At Article 5.3, first indent, of the European Commission's Green Paper on Integrated Product
Policy, COM (2001) 68 of 7 February 2001.
156 First seen in the European Commission's Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy, COM
(2001) 68 of 7 February 2001.
157 At Article 5.3, first indent.
158
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product- " and "ppm-" Debates. JIEL 2003, 6(2) 419-458, from page 419, et seq.
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environment are accepted."159 It is submitted that it is undoubtedly true that
Article XX does provide general exceptions in its various subsections, but how
these subsections are to operate in practice remains unclear. Quick and Lau
conclude that the legal status of the EC's IPP approach vis a vis WTO obligations
is therefore "no longer as clear cut as it was ten years ago when the Tuna/Dolphin
disputes were decided under the old GATT."160 It should perhaps be pointed out
that the Tuna/Dolphin ruling might not have been all that clear on this point as the
panel in that case161 were not satisfied that the US had provided "sufficient
evidence" that the relevant import prohibition had "complied with the
requirements of Article XX and notably sub-paragraph (g) of that article". While
Quick and Lau's analysis of the potential problematic interaction between the EC
and the WTO with regard to the proposed EC's IPP is acknowledged, the clarity
which they attempt to bring to bear on the operation of Article XX of GATT can
yet be challenged. In addition, in the context of the subject matter of this thesis,
the status of the IPP in the context of agricultural goods would have to be
examined in the context of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, and its
provisions under Article 20. Article 20, inter alia, requires the continuation of the
reform process in agriculture to take "into account.... non-trade concerns, ... and
the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement,"
which in their turn provide for, at the fourth recital, "non-trade concerns,
including food security and the need to protect the environment".
The reference of the 6th Environmental Action Programme to the
promotion of "effective and sustainable use and management of land....taking
1 rr\
account of environmental concern" is squarely within this reformed CAP
framework. If the concept of the integrated product policy be adopted in the
context of agricultural products is adopted this would add an important further
dimension to the recent agricultural reform. The possibility of such a development
159 Ibid, at page 448.
160 Ibid, at page 448.
161 At point 4.15 of their ruling.
162 At Article 3.10, third indent of the European Commission's Green Paper on Integrated Product
Policy, COM (2001) 68 of 7 February 2001.
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is clearly indicated in the CAP documentation, and the development of the farm
advisory service, required under Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) No.
1782/2003,163 could become a key factor of the development of the integrated
product policy, which is currently written in the context of industrial products, as
a key factor in the production of agricultural commodities.
4.5 Continuing the Multifunctionality debate of CAP
At this point it is worth referring back to the discussion on the
multifunctionaity of agriculture in chapter 2. There, the development of this
policy was to encompass the issues of "safe and high quality goods", the
protection of the environment, the saving of "finite resources", the preservation of
rural landscapes, and the contribution that agriculture makes to the "socio¬
economic development of rural areas including the generation of employment
opportunities".164 This approach was developed with a view to defending the EC
CAP during the course of the current Millennium round of negotiations at the
WTO, with the European Commission seeing it as a "key issue to be addressed in
the WTO context".165 The diverse and often conflicting objectives of the CAP are
written into Article 33 EC, and despite the many radical changes to the EC under
the new European Constitution, there is no redrafting of these provisions, or
rebalancing of these provisions in Article III-315 EU, despite the changed
economic and political climate in which the CAP, originally drafted in the wake
ofWorld War II and during a period of rationing, is now operating.
Each of these themes is reflected in the recent reforms of Pillar 1 of the
CAP, with the increasing overlap between the CAP and environmental issues, in
particular, as discussed above, the requirement to keep land in "good agricultural
163
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and environmental condition"166 to include the requirement to maintain land in a
manner in order to "avoid the deterioration of habitats" is clearly in line with the
multifunctionalty philosophy that currently underpins the CAP. This reflects the
concern of the Commission that unused land would "not automatically revert to
i cn
its original wild state". It is to be expected that the proposed reform of Pillar II
of CAP, with its underpinning funding from the European Agricultural Fund for
Rural Development (EAFRD)168 will continue this trend. The adoption of the
integrated product policy into the field of agriculture would also develop on this
theme. It could be questioned however, how well the current reform, certainly in
EC legislation, reflects the view of the Commission that agriculture provides
"services" which are "mainly of a public good character",169 and to what extent
this matter is being left to the member states, or the regional authorities of
member states, to write into their "land use" provisions permitted under Article 5
Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 and its Annex IV framework. The vision
of the Committee of the Regions of the provision of a "higher level of
environmental service" than the minimum, possibly being "remunerated by
170
appropriate agri-environmental measures" referred to in chapter 2, has yet to be
written into the CAP reform provisions, but perhaps this will appear in the
anticipated reform of Pillar II CAP.
5. Health and Consumer issues
5.1 Health Issues
Health and consumer issues add to the complexity of the backdrop of trade in
agricultural commodities at the WTO and EC level. Health is this context covers
166 Article 5 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1782/2003, OJ L 270/1.
167
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plant, animal and human health, bringing into the fray different international
organisations. On the issue of human health, both the Codex Alimentarius
Commission,171 and the World Health Organisation (WHO)172 of the UN come
into play. Animal and plant health issues involve, at an international level, the
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC),173 and the International Office
of Epizootics (OIE).174 At a WTO level, issues pertaining to health of animals,
plants and humans, are addressed by the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary measures (SPS). Issues pertaining to consumer law, such as the
labelling of GM foods, would be dealt with, to the extent that they are not SPS
issues, by the WTO Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). It
should be noted that the SPS provisions are "generally more rigorous" than the
TBT agreement, thereby having an important impact on the operation of the
17S
provisions of these two agreements.
The EC, for its part, has well developed policies on human health176 and
177
consumer issues, each underpinned by their own article in the EC treaty,
reflecting an artificial dichotomy between these two policy areas, particularly in
the context of agricultural commodities. Community action on health is lead by
the Council, to "complement national policies", while fully respecting "the
responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and delivery of health
services and medical care",178 while EC Consumer policy is seen as being part of
170
the process to complete the internal market. In addition the European Food
171
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Safety Authority (EFSA)180 has been set up181 to "reinforce the present system of
scientific and technical support which is no longer able to respond to increasing
demands on it".182 It is interesting to note that Regulation 178/2002 further
provides that the EFSA is to "take on the role of an independent scientific point of
reference in risk assessment and in so doing should assist in ensuring the smooth
functioning of the internal market", "thereby enabling the Community institutions
1
and Member States to take informed risk management decisions". The focus on
risk assessment and risk management within the EC is interesting, given that they
1 84
have become key words in the application of the WTO SPS agreement,
becoming the turning point of many disputes before the WTO panels and
1 RS
Appellate Body. There is also a requirement, at recital 35 of Regulation
178/2002, for the strengthening of the link between risk assessors and risk
managers.
At an international level, not only is the EC subject to the provisions of the
WTO SPS agreement, but it has also acceded, in its own right, to a new revised
version of the IPPC,186 becoming a member of the IPPC along side each of its
now 25 member states. It also applied to become a member of the Codex
i on
Alimentarius Commission in 2003, after a change in the internal rules of the
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The WTO agreements on SPS and TBT have a shared ancestry within GATT,
both deriving from the Tokyo Round Standards Code, with the TBT now dealing
188
with "all technical standards and measures not covered by the SPS Agreement".
In addition the TBT covers "standards" and "technical regulations"189 adopted
prior to the coming into force of the WTO, but which have not ceased to have
effect yet.190 Covelli and Hohots have pointed out, that in addition to these
agreements, it is possible that the provisions of Article XX(b) GATT 1994, which
provide a general exemption for the protection of health or life, might still
apply191 separately from the provisions of the TBT and SPS agreements in very
1Q?
limited circumstances, and that the SPS might apply, "even if there is no claim
or finding of inconsistency under the GATT".193 This framework, together with
the aforementioned international agreements, now comprise, in their view, "a
bewildering labyrinth of rules for (...) food regulators to navigate",194 added to
the fact that the SPS Agreement itself, has been held by the Appellate Body in EC
- Hormones195 as being "evidently not a model of clarity in drafting and
communication".196
This labyrinth starts with the interaction, or otherwise, of the WTO SPS
agreement with the international organisations operating in this area. The SPS
agreement encourages, "without obliging Members to adopt the standards,
188 Trebilock, Michael and Soloway, Julie; International trade policy and domestic food safety
regulation; The case for substantial deference by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body under the
SPS Agreement, Chapter 18 in Kennedy and Southwick; The Political Economy of International
Trade Law, Cambridge University Press, 2002, at page 341.
189 It should be noted that "technical regulations" are deemed to be binding, while "standards" are
not considered to be such a rigorous obligation within WTO law.
190
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guidelines or recommendations" of the three international organisations, the
107
Codex Alimentarius, the OIE and the IPPC. The SPS agreement provides at
Article 3.2 that sps measures meeting international standards will be "presumed to
be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement". Standards higher
than international standards are permissible "if there is a scientific justification"
pursuant to Article 3.3 SPS. The Codex Alimentarius was accepted as being such
198
an "international body" by the panel in EC - Sardines as it was "open to all
members".199 The WHO, however, was not accorded such a standing, in the Thai
Cigarettes case,200 when restrictions "necessary for public health reasons"201 were
in dispute, with the panel ignoring evidence for the WHO that the opening up of
markets to US cigarettes led to an increase in smoking.
The distinction between risk assessment and risk management at the WTO
was rejected by the panel in BeefHormones, "as having no textual basis" despite
the fact that a distinction between the two had been "widely recognised in the risk
regulation literature".203 As stated by Trebilock and Soloway, there is a need for
panels to benefit from both scientific expertise, addressing the issue of risk
assessment, and "regulatory/consumer protection expertise" addressing the issue
of risk management, in order to ensure that the "regulatory response to identified
risks meet the least trade-restrictive means and consistency requirements under
Articles 5.6 and 5.5 respectively".204 The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones did
clarify that a valid SPS measure "need not be supported by the majority of the
197 Prevost, Denise; Selected international developments regarding health and environmental
regulation of relevance to the European Union, ELER 2004 13(2) 38-60, at page 56.
198
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relevant scientific community" and "divergent or minority opinion"... "will not
necessarily operate to negate the reasonableness of the relationship between the
measure and risk management".205
The precautionary principle has also suffered at the hands at the WTO,
with the issue of whether it applied "if at all"206 being the key issue in EC -
207 208
Hormones, and Japan - Varietals. In Japan - Apples both the panel and
Appellate Body found that, while the precautionary principle was embodied in
Article 5.7 SPS, it did "not create a broad loophole in the scientific disciplines of
the SPS Agreement", but rather created a "limited exception" where "there is a
true lack of relevant and reliable scientific evidence" for addressing the issue of
risk.209 The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones210 ruled that the precautionary
principle could only be applied "to the extent that it finds reflection in the
provisions of the Agreement itself'.211 The SPS Agreement, at Article 5, for its
part, provides detailed issues which have to be taken into account in conducting a
risk assessment for the purposes of that Agreement. A continuing obligation
remains on countries constantly to review the scientific evidence upon which their
original "precautionary principle" risk assessment was based, with the current EC
position on the precautionary principle being set out in the ECJ case of Pfizer
Animal Health 5A,2'2 as discussed in chapter 3, with the test to be a scientific test,
and the role of the judiciary limited to a judicial review function.
The ECJ for its part, has made it clear that the "precautionary principle" is
an established principle in EC law, through its "routine approval of 'precautionary
205
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regulations'". However, the EC's definition of this principle "remains highly-
generalised and uncertain",214 adding to the "inconsistent global understandings"
of this term.215 AG Mischo has recently stated,216 that judicial review of the use of
the precautionary principle "must be exercised with caution", as courts cannot
"impose their own conviction" on what is a scientific problem.217 The EC
Commission has,218 for its part, distinguished between a strong, and a not-so-
strong application of the principle, in relation to BSE219 matters. The ECJ has yet
to give a clear definition of the principle for operation within the EC jurisdiction.
The lack of clarity of the EC's use of the term "precautionary principle" is
reflected in its litigation at the WTO level on this issue. In the BeefHormones120
case, at the panel stage, who stated that the EC had adopted the "international law
understanding of the precautionary principle" which "overrode the SPS
991
Agreement". By the time the case appeared before the Appellate Body the EC
had a more judicious approach of "providing a detailed explanation of Europe's
>>999
precautionary principle. Both the panel and the Appellate Body found that the
EC's principle was too vague to "override the explicit wording" of the SPS
Agreement, and that the precautionary principle "was not yet accepted in
990
international law", so that line of argument would not be efficacious either. The
SPS standard was therefore held to be binding on the EC.
213
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With the US Supreme Court rejecting the "total adoption" of the
224
precautionary principle in Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst,
one
adopting rather an "evidence first approach" of "quantitative risk assessment",
prior to applying any precautionary factor, the differing "social/cultural
tolerances for certain risks"226 will continue to bedevil the search for a globally
acceptable definition of the term, with much of Doha Ministerial Conference in
2001 addressing "environmental issues including the precautionary principle". 7
5.2 Consumer issues
The WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, for its part,
regulates consumer issues (which are not otherwise SPS issues)228 at the WTO
level. From an agricultural perspective, the labelling ofGM foods would fall
under this agreement, while any safety issues relating to GM foods would fall
within the remit of the SPS Agreement.229 Unlike the SPS, the TBT has to date
generated little WTO case law, appearing "to be generally less stringent on
regulators than the SPS Agreement".231 In EC - Asbestos232 the Appellate Body
ruled that the ban on asbestos was a technical regulation, to which the TBT
applied. Article 2.4 TBT provides that "where international standards exist or are
imminent" then members "must generally use them as 'the basis for' their
technical regulations", a different approach to that taken by the SPS agreement.
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Weakness in the drafting of the TBT articulating international standards
into the WTO framework has resulted in the Appellate Body showing great
reluctance to accord authority to such standards.234 Article 2.4 TBT refers to
"relevant international standards" without specifying whose standards these are to
be. As pointed out by Scott, relevant standards, in the view of the Appellate Body
in the EC - Sardines case "need not be approved by consensus". It is Covelli
and Hohots' view that in the absence of the existence of international standards or
appropriate science, that WTO members, under the broad "approach to risk
assessment" under the TBT Agreement, can still impose technical regulations or
r)'\l
standards. Concern has been expressed about the "legitimacy of the standard-
setting bodies in question", and their susceptibility "to capture" by vested
interests. This is particularly so with regard to the TBT Agreement, as unlike
the organisations explicitly mentioned in the SPS Agreement, the relevant bodies
of the TBT Agreement may comprise either state or private members.240
In contrast, the EU is prepared to grant, "considerable - though contingent
- authority" to international standards "as levers of market access".241 The
Community grants this authority subject to the existence in the international
standards of a "substantive benchmark" with "fundamental procedural
prescriptions", together with the requirements to give "reasons, and transparency
requirements".242 These, or similar tests, are lacking at the WTO level. The
fallback position of members imposing their own standards remains, as long as
234
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they do not operate in a discriminatory way, or are in fact restrictions on trade.243
This causes concern as, for example, in the case of the labelling ofGM foods,
different approaches can exist in different jurisdictions. The TBT Agreement, at
Article 2.8 adds another complexity to the issue of GM food labelling. This
provides that "wherever appropriate, Members shall specify technical regulations
based on product requirements in terms of performance rather than on design or
descriptive characteristics". The US and Canada "regulate the end GM food
products", with very few GM food products being different from their non-GM
counterparts, with the EU, in contrast, regulating the "process used to create GM
products".244 There is a possibility that the EU's regulation of GM products could
be found to be in breach of the WTO TBT agreement. As it is the US has
requested formal consultations245 on the EC's "the de facto moratorium on
approval of GMOs".246
Anderson has pointed out that there is an inherent weakness in the SPS
agreement to the extent that it does not address consumer interests, stating that
"consumers have lacked a voice" arguing that consumer issues should be
947
addressed "via labelling". This is perhaps confusing the nature of the SPS and
the TBT agreements. Blanford and Fulponi raise the issue of differing "values and
beliefs among countries" 248 which should be classified as a consumer matter.
They further extend the consumer debate to issues such as animal welfare,
arguing that where "consumers are not able to distinguish" between animal
welfare friendly goods and others this brings a "dysfunction in the market",249 as a
result of an asymmetry of "information between the buyer and seller" leading to
243
Op. cit. footnote no. 175, at page 786.
244 Ibid, at page 787 et seq.
245 WT/DS291/1.
246
Op. cit. footnote no. 197, at page 44.
247 Anderson, Kym; Agriculture, developing countries and the Doha Development Agenda;
Chapter 6 in Ingco, Merlinda D. and Winders, L. Alan; Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda
Creating a Global Trading Environment for Development, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004.
248
Blanford, David and Fulponi, Linda; Emerging public concerns in agriculture: domestic
policies and international trade commitments; European Review of Agricultural Economics Vo.
26(3) (1999) pp. 409-424, at page 410.
249 Ibid at page 414.
352
"a specific type ofmarket failure".250 Animal welfare issues are not currently
governed by the WTO regime, leading to the potential for future trade conflicts.
While trade in such "ethical food" is limited at the moment, it is likely to grow in
oci
the future as more countries introduce "binding regulations for animal welfare".
Some discussion has been held on the inclusion of factors other than "uniquely
science based and human health oriented" provisions within the Codex
259
Alimentarius, which might well be one way of addressing the issue of trade in
food produced complying with an internationally approved code on animal
welfare standards, thereby avoiding the possibility of countries adopting what
might otherwise be regarded as new non-tariff barriers.254 Blanford and Fulponi
go on to suggest that an "independent private organisation", such as "the ISO in
955
the agro-food sector" might have a role to play in this area.
6. The Cartegena Protocol on Bio-Safety
6.1 The Cartegena Protocol on Bio-Safety within the EC legal
framework
The Cartagena Protocol on Bio-Safety has added another complication to
the EC WTO discourse on trade in agricultural commodities. On the issue of GM
95
foods, the Cartegena Protocol on Bio-Safety is regarded by the EU "as the most
significant international cooperative effort to address the challenges posed by
GMOs."257 The Council, by way of Council Decision 2002/628/EC of the 25th
250 Ibid at page 414.
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252 Ibid, at page 420.
253 Ibid at page 420.
254 Ibid, at page 420.
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June 2002 approved the signing of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which
was adopted in Montreal on the 29th January 2002, having been attached to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, agreed under the United Nations
Environment Programme. The European Community then put in place its own
operational provisions under this protocol by way of Regulation (EC) No
1946/2002.259 This protocol permits the taking of measures which affect the
importation ofGMO's "in the absence of scientific certainty on these potential
risks".260 It therefore bases its operation on the precautionary principle, as stated
in paragraph 2 to the preamble of Regulation (EC) No. 1946/2002, which itself
adopts the precautionary principle for the working of this regulation within the
EC, as stated in the 22nd recital to the preamble. As also discussed in chapter 3,
while the ECJ has recognised that the "precautionary principle" is an established
principle in EC law, through its "routine approval of 'precautionary
regulations'",261 the "highly-generalised and uncertain"262 use of the term within
the EC continues to be a problem generally, and it can be anticipated, will be a
problem specifically in the context of genetically modified organisms.
6.2 The WTO, the Environment and the Cartegena Protocol on
Bio-Safety
The Cartegena Protocol on Bio-safety,263 has been referred to as a "de facto
trade agreement" on GM products, which "enshrines" the precautionary
principle,264 which principle has a less prominent status within the SPS and TBT
Agreements. The Protocol permits the taking ofmeasures which affect the
importation of GMO's, "in the absence of scientific certainty on these potential
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259
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risks".265 While the Protocol itself confirms that "obligations under other
266international agreements are not abrogated by it", with its reliance on the
068
precautionary principle, and the TBT and SPS Agreements, will resolve
269 270
itself, given the panel view in BeefHormones that the precautionary
principle "was not yet accepted in international law",271 with the SPS standards
being held to be binding on the EC. These issues will be problematic given public
sensitivity to issues of food quality and animal and plant health, particularly in the
EC, after numerous recent scares and incidents. Relationships between the WTO
and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) will therefore be
crucial.
The resolution of the issue of scientific uncertainty, and the interpretation or
even the use of the term "precautionary principle" at the WTO, which remains
outstanding, will hopefully be addressed by way of ministerial declaration after
the 6th ministerial conference. Clarity needs to be brought to this issue at the
WTO, particularly from the perspective of the EC, however, it should be noted
that a ministerial declaration is just that, a declaration, and not a provision of a
legally binding agreement, until such time as it is adopted by a subsequent legal
agreement.27 It may however, given the fact that the WTO is rule oriented rather
than rule based, assist in giving a political background for a decision by either the
panel or Appellate Body in a particular case. The developing synergy within the
EC of agricultural, environmental and rural law, in the guise of the mid-term
review of the CAP, with the continuing tense relationship between agricultural
and environmental issues at the WTO level requires some resolution. In addition
the tensions between the two levels of governance in the area of health and
265
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266
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consumer protection could also be lightened with some clarity on the WTO's
approach to the precautionary principle. This may however prove problematic
given the differing "social/cultural tolerances for certain risks" amongst its
member states, as epitomised by the US Supreme Court's ruling in Industrial
Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst.21A The problematic relationship between
the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements, and the lack of
97S
clarity as to how that relationship will resolve itself, added to the lack of clarity
as to the status of the precautionary principle within the WTO legal order, will all
add to complexity as to how the currently unclear EC definition of the
precautionary principle will be interpreted for the purposes of the EC
implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety within the EC legal
framework.
The Doha Ministerial declaration,276 for its part, in the lead up to the World
Summit on Sustainable Development277 encouraged "efforts to promote
cooperation between the WTO and relevant international environmental and
978
developmental organisations". The current Millennium round of negotiations is
to include negotiations on the "relationship between existing WTO rules and
979
specific trade obligations set out in" MEAs. These negotiations are however to
be limited in scope, concentrating on the "applicability of ... existing WTO rules
as among parties to the MEA in question", without prejudicing the rights ofWTO
members not parties to such MEAs. Such direction as is encompassed in the
parameters of the discussions on WTO/MEA relationships opens up a series of
interesting possible outcomes to these negotiations, with one possibility being of
MEA's providing a lex specialis for acceding member states, within the WTO
framework. The usual practice in reading WTO and MEA agreements is to
273
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interpret them "in a mutually supportive way".280 However, as pointed out by
281
Prevost, "it is possible that unavoidable conflicts may arise".
The CTE has been caught between the conflicting values between states
on the issue of the environment,282 with developing countries requiring focus on
the "trade impacts of environmental measures" and not on the "environmental
aspects of trade rules". The development of a WTO policy on the environment,
or even on a more restricted focus, of the interaction of environmental measures
with global trade, suffers from a lack of a strategic steer, with state representatives
at the WTO being mercantilist rather than neo-liberal in their outlook.284 In the
absence of such a strategic overview at the WTO, with an absence of GATT input
into the "design stages of environmental policies", thereby bringing to global
environmental regulation "a moderating influence from the trade policy point of
00 c
view", the issue of global regulation of the environment has been left to the
United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), and its Multilateral
Environmental Agreements (MEAs), with "fewer detailed rules and less
judicialized enforcement regimes".286
987
The Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, for its part, has recently attempted
to address the issue of a diversity of sites for the regulation of trade and
988
environmental issues, by stating in its preamble, that it is "recognising that
trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to
achieving sustainable development" which is supported by the phrase289
280 Ibid, at page 55.
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"understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol
to other international agreements". This is seen as an attempt "to establish the
relationship between the Protocol and the WTO", making it clear that "the WTO
and MEAs are separate but equal bodies of international law."290
The current relationship between WTO trade law and the environmental
provisions within the WTO framework, and in international environmental
agreements, is a particularly thorny issue, as it is perceived that "all
environmental measures have economic effects and all trade measures affect the
environment".291 In addition there is a need to examine the Article XX GATT 47
exceptions in light of current environmental issues. As Howse has stated, the issue
is whether under current "available scientific evidence" whether a resource is
running out now, giving rise to a member's "legitimate reason today for taking
trade-restricting measures", and not "because it was thought to be running out
more than half-century earlier!".292 The WTO Committee on Trade and
Environment (CTE) was "established in 1995 by a Ministerial Decision at the end
of the Uruguay Round", with a mandate to "identify the relationship between
trade measures and environmental measures to promote sustainable
development" and "to make recommendations on whether any modifications to
WTO provisions are required with respect to the three pillars" of the WTO,294
goods, (of which agriculture forms part), services, and intellectual property, (both
of which also interact with agriculture, to varying degrees). As pointed out by
Shaw and Schwartz, the CTE has, to date, "focused on identifying the relationship
one
between trade and environmental measures".
290
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One anticipated outcome of these negotiations is set out in the Doha
Ministerial declaration as being "the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of
tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and services".296 The
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was further instructed in the Doha
Ministerial declaration to give particular attention to the "effect on environmental
measures on market access", with particular regard for developing and least-
developed countries, the impact of possible provisions on the TRIPs agreements,
297and the issue of "labelling requirements for environmental purposes." The CTE
was to have reported back to the 5th ministerial conference.298 Unfortunately the
Cancun conference concluded without consensus, with the "July package" merely
referring to reports of the Negotiating Group on rules, the Special Session on the
committee on Trade and Environment, and the Special Session of the Council for
TRIPs, presumably as a result of a lack of consensus to date on these issues. Early
indications as to how matters under this heading will resolve themselves will have
to await the conclusion of the 6th ministerial conference.299
Another interesting legislative development, this time the US's
Bioterrorism Act300 could equally give rise to WTO litigation, given its
requirements for all food consignments into the US to be notified to the US Food
and Drug Administration,301 together with the added documentation requirements
of the food trade chain. As the US did not, in drafting this legislation, keep in
mind the WTO TBT or SPS Agreement, it is possible, as pointed out by Prevost
that this "may become the subject of a dispute at the WTO". She goes on to query
whether such a dispute would be raised under the TBT, the SPS, or under GATT
1994 itself. We can anticipate interesting times ahead under the topic of health
and consumer issues in the international trade of agricultural goods.
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In the WTO - Environmental law debate, one of the most controversial
issues is "process and production methods", or as Charnovitz refers to them,
^09
"PPMs". It is the method of production of a particular internationally traded
303
commodity which has been at issue in the non-agricultural Shrimp/Turtle and
Tuna/Dolpin304 cases, and which is now coming to the fore in the GM debate. The
process of fishing for shrimp, which was had not "been certified as having
regulatory regimes in place to prevent the killing of sea turtles",305 and the similar
argument as to "differences in harvesting technique" which arose in the
Tuna/Dolphin, are familiar to WTO lawyers. As Charnovitz points out it is
products which are compared, rather than "policies or practices of the importing
state and the state of origin" under Article III GATT 47.307 However, the reality of
the implementation of the US rules on the import of shrimp was leading to shrimp
"caught using methods identical to those employed in the United States" were
being excluded simply because they had "not been certified by the United States",
leading the Appellate Body to conclude that the US was more interested in
changing policy of other states, rather than the "stated objective of protecting and
or\o
conserving sea turtles". It was therefore held that the US measures in the
Shrimp case did "not fall within the scope of Article XX".309 As pointed out by
Scott, however, the panel did point out, that while the focus of the WTO
Agreements was the "promotion of economic development through trade" that
environmental considerations were "important for the interpretation of the WTO
Agreement".310
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Charnovitz is of the opinion that properly implemented process and
production methods would be permissible at the WTO, despite that continuing
insistence of the WTO Secretariat that "PPMs violate trade rules".311 He points
out that for agricultural commodities, that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
states that payments for environmental programmes "must be dependent on
specific conditions" to include those dealing with "production methods or
"319
inputs", having originated as a concept from the 1979 version of Technical
Barriers to Trade", which "focused on the production method rather than product
characteristics."313 He divides PPMs into product-related and non-product-related
PPMs,314 stating that the TBT would appear to "cover product-related PPMs," but
T1 S
"does not address other PPMs," which would appear to be more correctly
addressed by the SPS, with its focus on the protection of "life or health within the
territory of the importing country".316
Returning to the issue of genetically modified organisms, the debate here
is on the process and production method of the particular commodity. As Scott
has pointed out, referring to the proposal for an EC regulation on GM food and
feed, the proposed European provisions on GM crops covers not only concerns as
to "the protection of human health and the environment" but also "a number of
additional objectives, including animal health and welfare, and consumer
o 1 *1
protection defined broadly." She points out that while the precautionary
principle is not explicitly written into these proposals, Article 1 refers to the
"general principles laid down in the EFSA regulation"318 with Article 7 of that
regulation identifying the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle
311
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will "therefore enter through the backdoor",319 bringing us back to the issue as to
how to interpret this principle in light ofWTO commitments.
7. Agricultural, Rural and Environmental law synergies
The juxtaposition of EC Agricultural law, EC Environmental law and EC
Rural law appears to be developing synergies at the EC level, while the same
nexus at the WTO between trade in agricultural commodities and environmental
concerns remains tense. The comprehensive rewriting of the CAP under the mid¬
term review, to include the requirement for any payments to be made subject to
meeting the "good agricultural and environmental condition" standards (GAEC),
matches the aspirations contained, and the statements of intention set out in the
Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, provides a challenging but
clear basis for the future production of agricultural produce. This, allied to the
potential of a more robust and independent EC Regional policy (independent of
the CAP), could be developed to meet the needs of the rural community. These
changes in the CAP have, as one of their main driving forces, the need to comply
with the WTO Agreement on Agriculture through the decoupling of payments to
farmers. The replaced policy, environmentally motivated, including the Integrated
Product Policy (IPP), as has been shown, may however, encounter problems at the
WTO regulatory level. This arises from the inherent tensions that continue to exist
between trade and agriculture at the WTO, and between the WTO and the MEAs.
The lack of a "comprehensive general agreement on the protection of the
environment similar to the WTO Agreement for the world trading system"
remains a problem,320 together with the lack of "a specialized compulsory
jurisdiction for the settlement of environmental disputes," despite the
319
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establishment of an environmental matters chamber at the International Court of
Justice, which has not proven popular with states, with "only very few cases
322submitted" arising from or involving international environment harm. How
these two levels of governance will resolve the tensions between these issues,
given the different interactions between these policies at the EC and the WTO, in
the absence of greater clarity on the issue arising from new documentation that
may emanate from the current round of negotiations at the WTO, remains to be
seen, particularly as many environmental disputes are "characterized by scientific
uncertainty", which is tackled by the EC on the basis of the "precautionary
principle".
8. Existing and future WTO situation
An analysis of the future direction ofWTO law in the area of agriculture is
more problematic than one that focuses on the future direction of the EC law on
324-
agriculture, as the Millennium round ofWTO negotiations is still ongoing, with
few of the key issues in this area being subject to even interim agreement to date.
32S
Only the Cancun decision, otherwise known as the "July package", on
32^ 327
modalities, and the ad-valorem equivalents agreement ofMay 2005, have to
date been forthcoming. This has resulted in a consequential lack of clarity on the
future reflexive relationship between the two levels of governance in this
commodity area. Indications as to future developments can however be gleaned
from the current Agreement on Agriculture, in particular from the expiry of the
322 Ibid, at page 39.
323 Ibid, at page 40.
324 With cotton being negotiated on separately, as "members' views differ as to whether it should
be negotiated under agriculture or in some other part of the negotiating structure". WTO
Agriculture Negotiations; the issues, and where we are now, updated 1 March 2004,
http://www.wto.org.
325 Decision adopted by the General Council on 1st August 2004, WT/L/579.
326 Reached at the WTO Mini-Ministerial Meeting in Paris on ad valorem equivalents on the 4th
May 2005.
327 The Doha Development agents: WTO trade talks agreed on EU proposals to move forward
agriculture talks, Paris, 4 May 2005, available on the Europa Website at http://europa.eu.int. under
European Commission - trade issues - news.
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peace clause, contained in Article 13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.328 What
can be anticipated however, are developments pursuant to the currently in force
Agreement, in particular the possible continuing impact of the expiry of the peace
clause, (contained in Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture) as
discussed in chapter 7, together with a more in depth analysis of possible future
developmental trajectories for Article 20.c of the Agreement, which deals with
non-trade concerns. These are to be taken into consideration in the continuation of
the reform process, which is currently subject to negotiation under the Millennium
round of negotiations.
The exact legal nature of the Agreement on Agriculture vis a vis the balance
of the Annex 1A agreements, in particular the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures Agreement, in light of the expiration of the Article 13 peace clause, has
yet to be established. As stated by Siuves, the current lack of addressing of the
expiration of the Peace Clause, "widens the scope of the legal possibilities for
challenging the violation of rules concerning agricultural export subsidies". As
ion
elaborated on in chapter 7, Chambovey's distinction between the Agreement on
Agriculture's "lex specialis" status, or cumulative approach to the Annex 1A
agreements, whereby all GATT provisions are to apply to agricultural
commodities, only to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture does not
provide an alternative specific provision, will have a radical impact on the
development on the global trade in agriculture in future years, given the "intrinsic
disruptive role played by agricultural export subsidies on the international
(agricultural) trade market", even in the absence of a Millennium Round
m i
agricultural agreement, or amendments to the existing agreement.
328 Which was discussed at length in chapter 7.
329
Siuves, Humberto N.; The Expiry of the Peace Clause on Agricultural Export Subsidies - the
Outlook Post-Cancun, Legal issues of Economic Integration 31(1): 25-42, 2004, at page 40.
330
Chambovey, Didier; "How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (article 13 of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework,
Journal of World Trade 36(2): 302-352, 2002, at page 310.
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The Millennium round of negotiations has however opened,' with the
agricultural negotiations being conducted pursuant to Article 20 of the Agreement
on Agriculture. Proposals on agriculture had been submitted by 121 governments
to the Doha Ministerial Conference, with the most substantive document
issuing from these negotiations being the Cancun decision, otherwise known as
-504
the "July package", with further developments anticipated at the Hong Kong
ministerial, due to be held in December 2005.335 Agreements have been reached
to date on the intention to "abolish all forms of agricultural export subsidies",336
the date of which has yet to be established, together with the intention to "set new
rules" to streamline trade and customs procedures. More substantially
modalities have been agreed, to include framework formulas, for the reduction of
import barriers, export subsidies and domestic support measures.338 Substantial
reductions of the overall level of trade-distorting support "from bound levels" is
anticipated from each WTO member state,339 with changes currently undei
negotiation for both the blue box and green box classification of payments. In
addition the possibility of different rules for sensitive products has been allowed
for in the July package,340 which also provides that there will be enhanced
monitoring and surveillance of the implementation of the provisions of the
Agreement on Agriculture.341 These changes, when finalised, will have to be read
in light of developments in parallel negotiations on the balance of the Annex 1A
documents, in order to establish the full impact of the Millennium round of
changes.
332 With negotiations having started early in 2000.
333 November 2001.
334 Decision adopted by the General Council on 1st August 2004, WT/L/579.
335 After the date of submission of this PhD thesis.
336 WTO News: 2004 News Items. DDA July 2004 Package: meeting summary 31 July Round -
the -clock meetings produce "historic" breakthrough,
(http://www.wto.org/cntzlish/news e/news04 e/dda package sum 31iulv04 e.htm).
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 Text of the "July package" - the general Cancun decision, Decision adopted by the General
Council on 1 August 2004 WT/L/579, Annex A Framework for Establishing Modalities in




Of interest is the reference to "non-trade concerns, special and differential
treatment to developing country members, and the objective to establish a fair and
market-orientated agricultural trading system, and the other objectives and
concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agreement" provided in Article 20.c
of the Agreement on Agriculture. Debate has been ongoing as to the exact
encompass of the phrase "non-trade concerns" since the coming into force of the
Uruguay Round treaty texts. The "July package", at paragraph 2, refers to the
non-trade concerns "as referred to in paragraph 13 of the Doha Declaration"
which will "be taken into account"342 in the ongoing negotiations. For its part, the
Doha Declaration, at point 13, dealing with Agriculture, states that the WTO takes
"note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted
by Members and confirms that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in
the negotiations as provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture".343 It would
appear from that the reading of the July package that it is the non-trade concerns
of developing countries which will be taken into account, while the Doha
Declaration would appear to reflect the non-trade concerns of all of the WTO
member states, thereby bringing into consideration the multifunctionality and
rural development position of the EC at these negotiations.344
The above negotiations are being conducted against a backdrop of
continuing debate as to the constitutional and institutional challenges for the
WTO. The lack of progress of negotiations at the multilateral level has resulted in
343 DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial declaration WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 20 November
2001.
344
Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on: the 'Proposals for Council Regulations (EC)
concerning the reform of the common agricultural policy': ' Council Regulation (EC) on the
financing of the common agricultural policy';' Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation
(EEC) No 1766/92 on the common organization of the market of cereals and repealing Regulation
(EEC) No 2731/75 fixing standard qualities for common wheat, rye, barley, maize and durum
wheat'; 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing a support system for producers of certain arable
crops'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on the common organization of the market in beef and veal';
'Council Regulation (EC) on the common organization of the market in milk and milk products';
'Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 establishing an additional levy
in the milk and milk products sector'; 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing common rules for
direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy';' Council Regulation (EC) on
support for rural development from the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund
(EAGGF)' CdR 273/98 fin, Official Journal C 93, 06/04/1999 p. 1, at page 2 et seq.
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"resort to bilateral and regional trade agreements" as a default mechanism for
progressing trade interests, with, for example, the US announcing that "it would
move ahead with "will do" countries on a bilateral basis, leaving others
behind".345 This development is reflected in the recent report of the Consultative
Board set up by the now former WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpahdi.346
Looking at the reality of the operation of the WTO treaty texts, rather than the
idealism of their content, the Consultative Board has been critical of the
"spaghetti bowl" of discriminatory preferences that have been operating in
047 T4R
practice," and the "current spread of Preferential Trade Agreements", contrary
to the MFN concepts enshrined in the WTO treaty texts. In addition the reaction
of WTO member states to panel and Appellate Body rulings is, in the eyes of the
Consultative Board, "worrisome". 49 The view that member states can "buy out"
of their obligations is seen as being "harmful to the system". As discussed in
chapter 7, the view that the development of the WTO from GATT 1947 as being
the "most successful example of the "constitutionalisation" of a worldwide
organization", is still clearly not without its problems, with the Consultative
Board being concerned with the still held view that the WTO is a rule-orientated
rather than rule based system. Apparently strongly influenced by the development
of the EC, the Consultative Board sees the WTO as a "sui generis international
organization",351 advocating that the "role of the Secretariat as guardian of the
WTO system should be reaffirmed".352
345
Op. cit. footnote no. 329, at page 26.
346 The Future of the WTO - Addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium; report by
the Consultative Board to the Director - General Supachai Panitchpahdi, WTO 2004. at
http://www.wto.int.
347 At point 3 of the report.
348 At point 1 of the report.
349 At point 22 of the report.
350
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich; Constitutionalism and WTO law: From a state-centred approach
towards a human rights approach in international economic law, Ch 2. in Kennedy and Southwick:
The Political Economy of International Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec,
Cambridge University Press, 2002, at page 51.
351 At point 7 of the report.
352 At point 36 of the report.
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A process of the strengthening of the governance of the WTO is
advocated, with the recommendation that the WTO Secretariat should be
encouraged to generate "a greater intellectual output and policy analysis",353 with
"meaningful increases" of the WTO budget to be made, by way of "annual growth
rates in excess of other better funded institutions".354 If these suggestions are
taken on board in the current round of negotiations, together with the
recommendations that the WTO develops a "set of clear objectives for the WTO's
relations with civil society and the public at large",355 and in particular with least
developed countries,356 these may well contribute to the development of the
"proto-constitution"357 advocated by Ladefoged Mortensen, as discussed earlier in
oco
this thesis. The Consultative Board is however quite clear that the WTO should
focus exclusively on being a forum for trade negotiations,359 with official WTO
observer status only being allocated to other organisations only on the basis that
they can contribute to trade negotiations. However, as a counter balance, it does
recommend that, in an effort to develop transparency at the WTO, the panel and
Appellate Body hearings should be generally open to the pubic, with a disputing
party having to show "good and sufficient cause" to exclude members of the
public from all or part of a hearing.360 These recommendations would therefore
reject the suggestion of Jackson that the WTO should become the locus of
"additional inter-national coordinating power" outwith its trade mandate. Co¬
operation with "other intergovernmental agencies" is however recognised as a
method of adding value and legitimacy to WTO activities.362
353 At point 36 of the report.
354 At point 37 of the report.
355 At point 12 of the report.
356 At point 13 of the report.
357
Mortensen, Jens Ladefoged; The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of
Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity, E.L.J. 2000, 6(2), 176-204, at page
203.
358 In chapter 7.
359 At point 7 of the report.
360 At point 21 of the report.
361
Jackson, John H.; Sovereignty, subsidiarity, and separation of powers: the high-wire balancing
act of globalisation, Ch 1. in Kennedy and Southwick: The Political Economy of International
Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec, Cambridge University Press, 2002, at page 31.
362 At point 6 of the report.
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9. Intellectual Property and Agriculture
9.1 Introduction
Less currently contentious than the relationship between the EC and the WTO
in the area of health and consumer issues, but with plenty of potential for conflict
in the future, the issue of the interaction of the various Intellectual Property
regimes operating within the EC and at a global level is a PhD thesis in itself. The
best that can be done in this part of this thesis is to provide a brief sketch of some
of the aspects of the WTO and European intellectual property regimes as they
interact with the EC and WTO agricultural regimes, and leave for future
researchers the in-depth analysis of same.
The WTO TRIPs Agreement, like GATT 1994 and its allied agreements,
engendered a debate as to whether it had direct effect within EC law, with the
TRIPs specific arguments to the effect that intellectual property rights are "private
rights", owned by individuals. Like the GATT agreements, the pillars of TRIPs
are the MFN and NT concepts,363 allocated on the basis of nationality,364 which it
o zrc
is argued would be "best defended by their owners". Despite the fact that
earlier International law treaties, the Paris Convention' and the Berne
Convention367 had been granted direct effect by the EC, the ECJ, (for the same
363
It should be noted that national treatment is subject to the exceptions provided for in the Paris
Convention, under Article 3 TRIPs. Talia Einhorn; The impact of the WTO Agreement on TRIPS
(Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) on EC law: A challenge to regionalism, 35
Common Market Law Review, 35; 1069-1099, 1998, at page 1069.
364
Einhorn, Talia; The impact of the WTO Agreement on TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights) on EC law: A challenge to regionalism, 35 Common Market Law
Review, 35; 1069-1099, 1998, at page 1072.
365 Ibid, at page 1097.
366 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883-1967.
367 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 (latest version
Paris, 1971).
369
reasons as for the GATT agreements), has continued to deny direct effect to the
TRIPs Agreement within the EC legal jurisdiction.
The interaction between TRIPs and the other WTO agreements has also given
rise to much academic speculation, in light of Article XX(d) GATT, which
provides an exemption for inter alia, intellectual property. The conclusion drawn
by Bronckers is that "TRIPs is a lex specialis or sui generis," with its provisions
gaining "absolute precedence over the GATT".369 The failure of TRIPs to address
the issue of the exhaustion of rights370 has however led to the possibility of GATT
provisions re-entering the fray,371 but the consensus of opinion appears to be that
the issue of the exhaustion of rights has been left with the member states of the
WTO to decide, either on the basis of national or regional exhaustion of rights, as
is the case in the EC.
It is interesting to note that the ECJ in Opinion 1/94312 held that the "primary
objective of TRIPS is to strengthen and harmonize the protection of intellectual
property on a world-wide scale."373 The "strengthening" of intellectual property
"374-
rights "amounts to increased trade restrictions" as Intellectual Property
protection is now "upgraded in the WTO" vis a vis GATT 1947.375 The barring of
the import of products from countries where compulsory patents have been
awarded continues to be permitted under TRIPs.376 As pointed out by Bronckers,
a liberalisation of the trading regime in intellectual property would have resulted
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in the granting of international exhaustion rights under TRIPs. This has not
happened. In fact, TRIPs has strengthened intellectual property rights globally, by
368
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370 In Article 6 TRIPs.
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1/94.
374 Ibid, at page 144.
375 Ibid, at page 150.
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Op. cit. footnote no.364, at page 1085.
377
Op. cit. footnote no. 369, at page 157.
370
requiring member states of the WTO to put in force sufficiently robust legal
regimes to meet its requirements, but in addition TRIPs also permits WTO
member states to "adopt measures that provide for more extensive protection"
than is required under TRIPs. As Einhorn points out the possibility of barring
goods manufactured under a compulsory patent licence "proves that there is no
need for harmonisation" of intellectual property law under TRIPs.379
Unlike goods however, intellectual property is not fully embedded as a policy
within EC competence, as since Opinion 1/94 both the EC and its member states
are "jointly parties to TRIPs".380 The EC has exclusive competence to deal with
the import of counterfeit goods, however there is a lack of clarity as to where
otherwise to draw the line with regard the competence of the EC and its member
states. Some attempt was made to address this issue with the Nice amendment to
Article 133 EC. This provides that "the Council shall act unanimously when
negotiating or concluding an agreement" with unanimity also required "for the
adoption of internal rules or where it related to a field in which the Community
has not yet exercised the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty by adopting
internal rules." The provisions of Article 133 EC have been substantially re¬
incorporated into Article III-315 of the Constitution for Europe. With this
continuing requirement for unanimity with regard to intellectual property aspects
of the CCP, the exact delimitation of the transfer of sovereignty to the EC on this
matter remains unclear.
The areas of intellectual property most relevant to agriculture are patents,
plant varieties, and geographical indications. The failure of the Community Patent
Convention381 to come into force has an impact on EC Agricultural law. The non-
378
Op. cit. footnote no. 364, at page 1094.
379 Ibid, at page 1094.
380 Ibid, at page 1077.
381 Also known as the Luxembourg Convention on a Community Patent 1975, [1976] O.J. LI 7,
which has since been followed up by a Proposal for a Council Regulation on a Community Patent,




EC Munich Convention on the grant of a European Patent (EPC) set up the
European Patent, issued by the European Patent Office, and operates one source
of a patent within the EC. National patents also continue to remain in force. The
two main areas of protection of intellectual property of living things, plant patents
and plant varieties, also exhibit a problematic boundary delineation.
9.2 Plant Patents and Varieties
With regard to the intellectual property aspects of plants, TRIPs provides, at
Article 27.1 that patents should be available "in all fields of technology", subject
to public order or morality, to include the protection of "human, animal or plant
TOO
life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment". It should be
noted that "moral disapproval by some sections of the community" is not a TRIPs
oo4
exception.' Article 27.3 TRIPs does provide that WTO member states may
exclude from patentability treatment for animals, and "essentially biological
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and
microbiological processes". If such an action is taken by a WTO member state
they have to provide "for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by
an effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof'. This allows for
the Plant Variety Right system as operated by the EC.386 Roberts is of the opinion
007
that this drafting appears to favour the use of patents for plant varieties. It
should be noted that mico-organisms are not exempted by TRIPs, and are to be
covered by patent systems.
The European Patent Convention (EPC) for its part provides at Article 53 that
European patents will not be granted for "plant or animal varieties or essentially
biological processes" or their production. Patents will however be granted for
382 Of the 5th October 1973.
383 Article 27.2 TRIPs.
384 Roberts, Tim; Patenting Plants around the World, EIPR 1996, 18(10), 531- 536, at page 535.
385 Article 27.3.b TRIPs.
386 This provision is currently under review pursuant to paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha
Declaration.
387
Op. cit. footnote no. 384, at page 539.
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microbiological processes or products. There is no separate registration system for
animal varieties. The definition of "plant variety",388 the demarcation line
between patents for plants, and the requirement for the registration of a plant
aoQ
variety has had varied definitions under the two regimes. The UPOV
convention390 provides the "central model" for plant varieties,391 which has been
followed in the EC's Council Regulation 2100/94 on Community Plant Variety
OQO
Rights, operating through the Community Plant Variety Office in Angers,
France. Plant variety rights had been unpopular until the coming into force of the
1991 revised version of the UPOV, which strengthened and lengthened the
protection of plant varieties, with trees and vines now covered for 25 years, and
other species, 20 years, bringing them in line with the patent system protection.
Farm saved seed can be replanted on the same farm under the UPOV394 in certain
OQC
(traditional) crops. This has been echoed in the EC directive under Article 14,
with small farmers not being required to remunerate the holder of the plant variety
for this practice. Large farmers are, however, required to "pay an equitable
remuneration to the holder" for such a practice.396
388 It is provided in the Plant variety directive that a variety must be distinct, uniform, stable, new
and have an approved variety denomination, allocated by the Community Plant Variety Office,
and that the variety must not "degenerate when it is reproduced" (Millett, Timothy; The
Community System of Plant Variety Rights, ELRev. 1999, 24(3), 231-258, at page 236). However
the use of the term by the European Patent Office has not always matched this definition.
389 Funder, Joshua V.; Rethinking Patents for Plant Innovation. EIPR 1999, 21(11), 551-577, at
page 556 et seq.
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The second line of intellectual property rights with regard to plants is patents.
The patentability of plants has caused problems for some years, as plants cannot
OQ7
be "manufactured wholly by man" in contrast to a machine, and plants
themselves are subject to "spontaneous genetic variation", with any purchaser of a
plant, as well as the plant itself, being in a position to reproduce from it. As stated
by Flounder "plants do not fit easily within patent principles".398 Whole plants,
therefore, are excluded from the patent process, though under Article 53(b) of the
EPC "components and parts of plants may be the valid subject-matter of a
patent",399 with both biological products and processes involving plants now
being patentable.400 Genetically engineered plants were refused a patent in the
Novartis case,401 which effectively requested a patent for a new plant variety. The
Enlarged Board of the EPO in this case did find that inventions which were not
covered by plant variety rights could be patented, if they otherwise met the
requirements of patent law.402 This approach is reflected in the EU Biotechnology
Patenting Directive, which only covers plants.403 Novartis is also the case which
recognised the patentability of transgenetic plants, which had been deemed to be
unpatentable until then.404 In the absence of specific laws dealing with animals,
only the patent system is available, however, as has been pointed out by
Schertenleib, "transgenic animals are not animal varieties".405
In order to address the issues which might arise as a result of the simultaneous
operation of the patent system over plants, and plant variety rights, Article 12 of
the EC Biotechnology Directive provides for a compulsory licence in one system,
397 Ibid, at page 231.
398
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399 Ibid, at page 568.
400 Ibid, at page 565.
401 Case: Novartis/Transgenic plant (GOl/98) [2000] EPOR 303.
402 Case Comment EPO: Patents - Patentability of Plants Tim Roberts, EIPR, 2000, 22(3), N49, at
page N49.
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404
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405 Ibid, at page 211.
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if it is required in order to exercise rights under the other system.406 Further
complications may arise in the interaction of legal systems, as the limitation on
the use of genetic material may be affected by the Convention on Biological
Diversity.407 Concerns as to the maintenance of genetic diversity, and concerns
about "biopiracy" may influence the development of the law in this area,408 in
light of Article 53(a) of the EPC which provides that "patents shall not be
granted" for inventions "which would be contrary to ordre public or morality".409
This issue is currently being addressed, along with the review of Article 27.3b of
TRIPS, under the broadened discussions pursuant to paragraph 19 of the 2001
Doha Declaration.
As TRIPs develops, it will be influenced by perceptions of the WTO member
states, amongst them the USA. Similar debates to those in the EC have arisen in
the US,410 however the US solutions have differed from those in the EC, with US
plant breeders having complete freedom to choose between plant patents and
plant varieties.411 This approach was confirmed in the Pioneer case,412 reaffirming
the earlier ruling in Chackrabarty,An that utility patents were available for plants,
a case which, as pointed out by various commentators, dealt with bacteria and not
plants.414 If patentability of plants gains dominance under TRIPs, as it appears to
have done in the US, the patentability of plants has led some to question if farm
406
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A third, but somewhat different area of intellectual property in the area of
agriculture, is geographical indications. The EC operates systems of Protected
Designations of Origin, (PDO's),416 Protected Geographical Indications (PGI's)417
and Traditional Speciality Guaranteed (TSG's),418 with some querying as to their
TRIPs compliance. The development of these registrations reflects the
Commission's view that, under CAP reforms the market for agricultural products
will be refocusing on quality products rather than the production of "large
amounts of subsidised products" 419 The focus is therefore on the development of
a quality policy, as well as giving value to both the geographical origin of a
product, and its traditional method of production.420 PDOs and PGIs are both
legislated for in Regulation (EEC) no. 2081/92, with the intention to protect
names, the distinction between the two classifications being "how closely the
product is linked to the specific geographical area", with the PDO being more
geographically rigorous than the PGI. The PDO registration requires two tests to
be met. All stages of production, "processing and preparation" must take place in
the specified area, and there must be a "close objective link" between distinctive
415
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416 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2081/92 of 14 July 1992 on the protection of geographical indications
and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs, Official Journal L 208, 24/07/1992
p. 1, as amended.
417 Ibid.
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features of the product, and its place of origin, arising from its "geographical
environment", to include "its inherent natural and human factors".421
PGIs in contrast require only one of the production stages to take place in
the specified area,422 with the Commission being of the opinion that the "link is of
a different nature" for PGIs than for PDOs,423 with PGIs allowing for a "more
flexible objective link", with it being sufficient to meet the test that the reputation
for the agricultural product is "attributable to the geographical origin".424 It should
be noted however that generic names cannot be protected under either the PDO or
the PGI registration.425 In contrast Regulation (EEC) No. 2082/92 protects
traditional recipes.426 The product, in order to be registered as a TSG, must have a
"specific character" either, for example, through its taste or its raw materials, or
its traditional mode of production or processing.427 A TSG must "possess features
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that distinguish it from other products" and it must be a traditional product. Its
name must not contain any protected geographical indications or designations of
origin.429 The protection of a TSG is rather for "other specific features or
character".430 Once registered, a TSG product can be branded as a "traditional
speciality guaranteed",431 and use the relevant Community symbol. The TSG is
intended for products for human consumption, and does not include tobacco
products 432 Processed products, outwith the subject matter of this thesis are also
covered, such as chocolate and cacao derived products, and other processed foods
such as pre-cooked meals, sauces and ice cream.433 Natural mineral waters were
removed from the ambit of Regulation 2081/92 by Council Regulation (EEC) No.
421 Article 21.2(a), second indent, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92.
422
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425 Article 3, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92.
426 Article 4, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2082/92.
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692/2003, as they were more effectively covered by their own pre-existing
legislative provisions.434 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 692/2003 did however
extend Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92 to cover wine vinegar, which is not
covered under the geographical indications provisions for wines and spirits.435
This system of registration of, in particular, geographical indications led to a
referral to the WTO dispute settlement system by both the United States and
Australia. A panel was set up436 which recently ruled on the WTO compliance of
these regimes, pursuant to two separate DSU complaints by the United States and
Australia.437
9.3.1 The WTO panel ruling on the EC's Geographical Origin
designation
4oo
The United States, in its pleadings, had pleaded in a number of alternatives.
The panel rejected the US claim that the EC had failed to implement its
obligations under Article 2.2 of the TRIPs Agreement,439 or that the regulation
was inconsistent with Article 1.1 of the TRIPs Agreement.440 In addition the panel
rejected the US claim that the execution of the regulation by the authorities of EC
member states was in breach of Article 4 of the TRIPs Agreement,441 or that it
breached Article 111:4 of GATT 1994,442 or that the regulation was in breach of
Article 2(2) of the Paris Convention 1967, as incorporated by Article 2.1 of the
TRIPs Agreement with domicile or establishment requirements.443 With regard
the objection to the granting of a geographical indication to another party, the
434 Council Directive 80/777/EC of 15 July 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member
States relating to the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters, Official Journal L 229,
30/08/1980 p. 1.
435
Op. cit. footnote no. 419 at page 9.
436
European Communities - Protection of trademarks and geographical indications for
agricultural products andfoodstuffs, WT/DS/174 & WT/DS/290, 15th March 2005.
437 Ibid.
438 DS 174.
439 At point 8.1(m) of the ruling in DS 174.
440 At 8.1(n) of the Ruling in DS 174.
441
At point 8.1(1) of the ruling in DS 174.
442 At 8.1 (i) of the ruling in DS 174.
443 At 8.1(g) of the ruling in DS 174.
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panel confirmed that the regulation was not inconsistent with either Articles 3.1
TRIPs,444 Article 2.1 of the Paris Convention, as incorporated by Article 2.1 of
the TRIPs Agreement,445 or Article 4 of TRIPs.446
The US was however successful in its claim that the regulation was
inconsistent with Article 16.1 TRIPs447 with regard to the co-existence with trade
marks, but that this was "justified by Article 17448 of the TRIPs agreement",449
with the panel exercising "judicial economy" with regard to a number of other
complaints.450 The panel ruled against the EC on the basis of "equivalence and
reciprocity conditions" for the granting of protection of geographical indications,
pursuant to Article 3.1 TRIPS451 and Article 111:4 GATT 1994,452 (both of which
deal with national treatment), with regard to the requirement of the transmission
and validation of documents by third country governments of applications and
objections and participation in inspection structures. The panel therefore ruled
that there had been nullification or impairment of benefit accruing to the United
States under these agreements, pursuant to Article 3.8 DSU,453 which provides
that "where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed under a covered
agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification
or impairment". The panel therefore recommended that the EU bring EC's
Council Regulation 2081/92 "into conformity with the TRIPS Agreement and
GATT 1994".454 The ruling in the Australian case,455 while reflecting the different
approach to pleading the case essentially ruled in a like manner to the USA case.
444
At 8.1 (e) of the ruling in DS 174.
445 At 8.1(f) of the ruling in DS 174.
446 At 8.1(k) of the ruling in DS 174.
447 Which grants protection to the owner of a registered trademark.
448 Which provides an exception of Article 16 TRIPs, "provided that such exceptions take account
of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and third parties."
449 At 8.10) of the ruling in DS 174.
450 With regard to the United States' claims under (a) Article 2(1) of the Paris convention (1967),
as incorporated by article 2.1 of the TRIPS agreement (except as noted at paragraph 8.1(f), Article
4 of the TRIPS agreement, except as noted at paragraph 8.(k) and (1), and Articles 41.1, 41.2, 41.4,
42, 44.1 and 65.1 of the TRIPs Agreement and Article 1:1 of GATT 1994.
451 At 8.1(d) of the ruling in DS 174.
452 At 8.1(h) of the ruling in DS 174.
453 At point 8.3 of the ruling in DS 174.
454 At point 8.4 of the ruling in DS 174.
455 DS 290.
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The Dispute Settlement Panel adopted both of these panel reports, DS174 and
DS290 on the 20th April 2005. The EC has since changed its policy and process in
this area. Clearly the WTO system approves generally of the nature and tone of
the EC's system of registration of geographical indications, a matter which should
support the EC's bid to establish a similar system at a multilateral level during the
current round of negotiations; however, the unduly bureaucratic approach of the
EC regulation to the interaction of third country applicants for EC geographical
indication registration, or otherwise third country interested party interaction with
the system requires, from a WTO perspective, some redrafting.
10. Services and Agriculture
The last of the three pillars of Annex I to the WTO Agreement, the
General Agreement on Trade in Services also merits some examination. At first
appearance the connection between the trade in agricultural goods and services
may appear to be tenuous. This perception was disproved by the ruling of the
Appellate Body in EC-Bananas,456 of which more later. GATS comprises the
framework agreement, eight annexes, and "schedules of specific commitments" of
individual member states, specifying the sectors in which the member states are
prepared to make concessions.457 The services covered are "services in all
sectors"458 except those "supplied in the exercise of governmental authority".459
Services are divided into four methods of supply or "modes". These are cross
border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and the movement of
persons. GATS therefore deals not just with the actual supply of a service but also
"establishment in view of the supply of services".460 The issue of the free
456
Op. cit. footnote no. 49.
457
Sauve, Pierre; Trade Rules Behind Borders: Essays on Services, Investment and the New Trade
agenda, Cameron May 2003, at page 22.
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Bourgeois J.H.; The EC in the WTO and Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession,
CMLRev. 32(3): 763-787, 1995, at page 765.
459 Article 1.3 GATS.
460
Op. cit. footnote no. 458, at page 765.
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movement of persons has "much in common with regular migration".461 In such a
context it is possible to understand "the potential complexity of developing
disciplines" under GATS.462
As a consequence of the political sensitivity of GATS the effect of this
document is somewhat different from either GATT or the Agreement on
Agriculture. The general WTO concepts of Most Favoured Nation463 and National
Treatment464 appear in the GATS, however they operate differently here than in
other agreements. Market access under GATS, in contrast to GATT and its
associated agreements, is only required "to the extent of' member states' "specific
commitments in their schedules"465 under Article XVI GATS 466 Not only are
exceptions to the MFN rule provided for, but NT "can also be subject to
qualifications".467 Not only could members specify their exceptions at the time of
the signing of GATS, but so too can member states "shape their commitments ex
ante and [be enabled] to modify their commitments ex post."468 A truly
remarkable level of discretion for a WTO agreement! The drafting of the GATS
has also a "hybrid nature", with some of its provisions applying to "any measure
by a member that affects trade in services", and others dealing with specific
commitments only.469 The MFN rule is cross sectoral, while market access and
national treatment disciplines only apply to the specific commitments ofWTO
member states under the GATS.470
461
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While GATS does deal with other provisions,471 covering an ambitious
agenda, the actual effect of this particular document is limited, recognising that
472
the development of the law in this area "will be a progressive one", with GATS
being added to in future negotiations. The negotiating in this sector under the
Uruguay Round was quite conservative, with cross-linkages, not only between
GATS and other WTO agreements not having been made in the trade offs, but
also not having been made between different GATS provisions.473 This caution
was also reflected in the fact that most countries bound their GATS obligations at
a higher level than they actually operate in practice 474 The underlying
"considerable sectoral diversity" in regulation of the various areas that GATS
attempts to address has resulted in "policy tensions" in the drafting of GATS,
requiring "flexible (and dual) rule-making responses".475 Disciplines have yet to
be developed in various service sectors, pursuant to Article VI:4 with the
accountancy sector being the only one so covered to date.476 Until such disciplines
are developed a WTO member state cannot provide "licensing and qualification
requirements and technical standards" which would operate in order to "nullify
and impair" specific commitments made pursuant to "Article VI:4 (a) to (c) and
(2)» 477 Negotiations under the GATS Agreement re-opened in February 2000,
478with a mandate progressively to liberalise international trade in services.
471 Such as transparency, economic integration, recognition of education standards, domestic
regulation, public monopolies, government procurement, emergency safeguards, and freedom of
movement of payments, subsidies for services, with provisions for exemptions for "health, safety,
consumer protection or national security", Op. cit. footnote no. 459, at page 26.
472
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Round, John Wiley and Sons, 1996, at page 92.
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The EC's interaction with GATS was addressed in Opinion 1/94,479 where
a distinction was made between the four modes of supply. Mode one, cross border
supply, was found to be squarely within the competence of the EC, and the then
version of what is currently Article 133 EC,480 as it was "not unlike trade in
goods".481 The other three modes of supply482 were found to be in a different
position, and were not covered by the CCP as it then was, with the final ruling of
the ECJ being that competence in GATS matters was shared between the EC and
its member states. It should perhaps be noted that the Commission, "being the
negotiator for the Community and the Member States" attached a schedule of
commitments to GATS on behalf of all of the EU members at the time.483
The amendment of the CCP provision by the Nice Treaty to allow for
GATS negotiations by the EC, with, as with TRIPs negotiations, unanimity being
required in the Council for the conclusion of agreements in this field.484 For its
part, the EU Constitution, (which is currently in troubled legal waters) in Article
III-315 replicates the unanimity provisions of the post-Nice Article 133 with
respect to the conclusion of international agreements in the area of services.
Article III-315.6 provides that "the exercise of competences conferred by this
Article... shall not affect the delimitation of internal competences" within the
Union. It is to be expected that as the GATS develops, as it is expected to do,
further tensions and strains on the division of competences in GATS issues within
what is currently the EC will become evident. In particular, the issue of the
establishment of a service provider under EC law, provided by R v. Secretary of
485Statefor Transport ex. parte Factortame Ltd. and others (No. 3) as a "matter of
general principle" of the EEC treaty, as it then was, "should be interpreted in a
479
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480
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manner consistent with international law",486 but that "to require member states to
depart from the universally recognised criterion of the owner's nationality would
place Community law in conflict with international law, which should be
avoided". The relevant international law concerned the flag of a particular vessel.
Whether this case could be distinguished, or whether it could also apply to future
developments of GATS law as it affects EC law, and the law of EC member
states, has yet to be established.
The ruling of the Appellate Body in EC-BananasA%1 brought together the
strands of trade in agricultural goods and services in a very concrete way. The
panel at the earlier hearing had found that there was no legal basis for "an a priori
exclusion" of GATS from a case concerning the import licensing regime of
bananas into the EC.488 The Appellate Body for its part held that GATS has a
"broad reach"489 and upheld the findings of the earlier panel ruling on this matter.
They went on to state that while "GATS was not intended to deal with the same
subject matter as the GATT 1994,"490 they were not always mutually exclusive.
There was "a third category of measures" that could fall under both GATT and
GATS, which were "measures that involve a service relating to a particular good,
or a service supplied in conjunction with a particular good."491 In such
circumstances the "measure in question could be "scrutinized under both the
GATT 1994 and the GATS",492 with a different focus for scrutiny under the
different agreements. The Appellate Body then went on to state that the "EC
banana import licensing procedures" were "subject to both the GATT 1994 and
the GATS", with these two agreements overlapping in this situation, with regard
to the particular facts in question.493
486 At paragraph 39 of the judgment.
487
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11. TRIPs and GATS development in the area of agriculture
As with the post-Nice version of Article 133 EC the proposed EU Constitution
at Article III-315 provides that the "Council shall act unanimously when
negotiating and concluding an agreement" dealing with trade in services and
commercial aspects of intellectual property. As discussed earlier, little change
therefore can be anticipated in a post EU Constitutional framework on the legal
relationship between the EC and the WTO in the field of either GATS or TRIPs
relevant matters. How a proposed new TRIPs or GATS agreement, or changes
thereto, might develop as a result of the current round of negotiations has still
however to be established. While there is little indication as yet as to how GATS
might develop further so as to intersect with agricultural issues, the possible
development of TRIPs issues as they affect agriculture can however be forecasted.
The issue of the interaction of TRIPs and the Annex IA agreements still needs to
be addressed. The current academic view, held, inter alia by Bronckers is that
"TRIPs is a lex specialis" having precedence over the Annex LA agreements,494 in
light of TRIPs balancing of "trade liberalisation" principles with the need for
"increased intellectual protection", in contrast to GATT's exclusive focus on trade
liberalisation 495 This view needs somehow to be reconciled with the apparently
opposing view that there might be an interaction between the two annexes in the
field of exhaustion of rights 496 The future development of TRIPs with regard to
the existing tension, both in the EC and in the US, between the use of plant
patents and plant variety rights will also merit following. Also requiring a
solution is the issue of the interaction of the UN Convention on Biological
Diversity with TRIPs, particularly in the area of "biopiracy" and "ordre public or
morality"497 which are currently under review in the current WTO negotiations.
Geographical indications (GIs), as operated, inter alia, by the EC are also up for
494
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review, with the European Commission holding the view that "geographical
indications are an important matter for the European Communities",498 given the
need to refocus on the production of quality agricultural products, rather than
quantity, in light of the mid-term review of CAP. The Commission states that the
EC's three main objectives in this area for the current round of WTO negotiations
are; first, the development of a "multilateral register of geographical indications",
second, the extension of geographical indication protection from not just wines
and spirits, but also to encompass cheeses, teas and rice, to the extent that non-
traditional producers cannot produce these products with "made in the USA" or
"in the style of..." , both issues for the TRIPs negotiating committee, and third,
"ensuring market access for EU GI products", a matter for the Committee on
Agriculture negotiations.499 The EC's current system of registration of
geographical indications and designations of origin, as operated under EC Council
Regulation 2081/92500 was itself brought into question at the WTO, being the
subject of two recently adopted WTO panel rulings.501
498 Intellectual property; Why do geographical Indications matter to us? Brussels, 30 July 2003
http:europa.eu.int - European Commission - Trade.
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12. Conclusion
The complexity of the restructuring of the CAP to meet existing WTO
commitments taking into account the EC's existing rural policy, and vision of the
impact of environmental law considerations, (to include a possible Integrated
Product Policy in EC agricultural law) is adding complexity to an already difficult
legal interaction between two evolving legal regimes, with differing approaches to
law in their constitutional and operational framework. In addition the differing
approaches to health and consumer issues, highly relevant in the context of
agriculture and food, at the two levels of governance, must also be added to the
mix. While the EC might be manoeuvring its CAP in order to be WTO compliant,
new WTO issues may well emerge from the EC's revised policy position on
agriculture. Further complexity is added by the highly relevant, but perhaps non-
core issues of the impact, or otherwise, of competition policy, intellectual
property and services law on this dynamic. No conclusions can be brought to bear
at this stage of the development of the legal relationship between the EC and the
WTO, except that further disputes will undoubtedly reach the WTO dispute
resolution system in these areas in the future, in the absence of an adequate
response to the issues highlighted in the course of the current round of WTO
negotiations. Added complications will arise in the future from the continuing
evolution of both the EC and the WTO.
A speculative point could perhaps be made at this stage on the possible future
development of EC agriculture, and its potential impact with GATS. As lawyers
who follow environmental developments would be aware, the EC, pursuant to the
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, has developed an emissions trading scheme
(EU ETS), pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC,502 which commenced operation in
January 2005. The philosophy behind this scheme was the attainment of emission
502 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 October 2003
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, OJ L 275/32.
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control objectives utilising an economic model and rationale, and avoiding
previous command and control models of regulation, which had proven to be
economically inefficient in the arena of agriculture. While the mid-term reform of
the CAP is less explicit as to the rationale a similar trend can be seen behind the
move from the price support mechanism of the unreformed CAP, and the
methodology inherent in the mid-term review.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the multifunctionality debate within the
CAP, which is very explicit, has been discussing the provision of the agricultural
community of "services" which are "mainly of a public good character",503 with
the detail of these "services" to be written into the national or sub-national plans
for the GAEC tests provided for in Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) no.
1782/2003. It is to be anticipated that some of the lessons learned in the
Environmental directorate of the Commission will inform the agricultural
directorate and the national and sub-national levels of governance over time. It is
possible that the thinking behind the currently existing EU ETS will inform a
possible future trading scheme for "agricultural environmental services" of a
"public good character". Should such thinking develop, then undoubtedly the
GATS agreement, or its successor, will develop a more active dynamic with the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, or its successor, given the intention for these
service provisions to be "remunerated by appropriate agri-environmental
measures",504 as discussed earlier in this chapter, and in chapter 2. Such a
development would further bring agriculture into the still developing field of
competence of the GATS Agreement, given the "broad reach" which this
Agreement was held to have had in the Appellate Body in the EC-Bananas505
ruling. This could happen either as an exclusive GATS activity, or a
GATT/GATS activity,506 involving "measures that involve a service relating to a
503
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particular good, or a service supplied in conjunction with a particular good."507
Whether a development could lead to environmental services being provided by
less developed non-polluting countries to more-polluting countries through a
global market place, is something which perhaps could be examined in future
global agri-environmetal negotiations.
It is clear that the subject matter of this thesis is very much in flux, with
the two legal jurisdictions being examined, the EC and the WTO, both being
subject to major reform developments at the moment. It is unclear whether the
new European Constitution will be ratified in its current format by all of the
current 25 member states of the WTO, and as a consequence, whether it is the EC,
with its current dealing of agriculture as predominantly a matter of exclusive
sovereignty of the EC, where the EC has set up a common organisation of a
particular agricultural commodity, or the proposed new EU Constitution
classification of agriculture as being a matter of shared competence between the
new EU and its member states, that will be the foundation of the future
development of the CAP. For its part the WTO agreements are currently under
negotiation under the Millennium Round of negotiations, with little development
to date having been achieved in the agricultural negotiations.
Should the jurisdictional issues remain unchanged at either the EC or the
WTO level, changes will nevertheless follow in the agricultural area, with the
mid-term review of the CAP now in operation, with national and sub-national
regions still to fill in the details under the now devolved powers under the
reformed CAP. This will in due course be complemented, in the short to medium
term, by the reform of Pillar II of the CAP. The integrated product policy of the
EC is anticipated to pose problems for the EC-WTO legal nexus, as will the
outstanding unreformed elements of the CAP. At the WTO level, the full impact




changed dynamic between the various WTO Annex IA agreements as they affect
agriculture.
While the possible future impact on the legal nexus of the EC and the
WTO in the area of agriculture of the GATS can only be guessed at, the impact of
the TRIPs Agreement is already clear, as indicated by the recent WTO panel
rulings on GI's, however the tensions between plant varieties and plant patents
still requiring to be resolved. The differing interaction of both legal jurisdictions
with international law, particularly environmental law, will also pose problems in
the future. It is to be hoped that the foregoing analysis will assist the reader in
better understanding the reflexive relationship between these two levels of
governance, and their turbulent dynamic in the area of agriculture. Such is the
state of the law, and of the underlying policy in this area, that it is not however
possible to provide the reader with a definitive prognosis as to the problems that
arise in this area. A caveat must also be placed on the foregoing analysis. For the
purposes of addressing a particular issue within a specific word count, and within
a defined period of time, a focusing in on particular issues is required. A further
analysis of the legal interaction between the EC and the WTO in the area of




2. Conceptualising globalisation and regionalisation
3. Issues with the current regulatory framework
4. The land - economics nexus
5. Issues for the future
1. Introduction
As stated at the outset of this thesis, the focus of this work has been the
legal relationship between the EC and the WTO in the area of agriculture. While
both legal jurisdictions have clearly documented provisions dealing with
agriculture, these specific provisions are not the only provisions which impact on
the legal nexus between these two levels of governance dealing with agriculture.
Just as the specific provisions dealing with agriculture at both levels of
governance interact with allied provisions in other documents or policy provisions
in order to complete the picture of regulation in the area of agriculture in their
own jurisdictions, so too do these levels of governance not only interact with each
other, but also with legal provisions and policies outwith their jurisdictions. These
complex relationships of law and policy, with "support for agriculture is primarily
strategic in nature" across countries,1 are further complicated by the fact that both
jurisdictions, independent of their agricultural provisions, are in the process of
self transformation, upon which potential changes at the WTO level in the area of
agriculture, and ongoing radical changes with the EC in this area must also be
added to the mix. The entirety of the reflexive relationships required to be
examined in order to obtain a detailed picture of the state of agricultural law at
this legal nexus cannot however be encompassed in one PhD thesis. Limitations
of time and word count have necessitated a selection of certain issues, and a
1
Delcros, Fabian; the Legal Status of agriculture in the World Trade Organization; State of Play at
the Start of Negotiations, J.W.T. 36(2): 219-253, 2002, at page 219.
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deselection of others for discussion. Matters which have been omitted by this
thesis by virtue of the need to focus on key areas include the entirety of the issues
concerning developing and least developed countries, which are having an
increasing influence on the subject matter of this thesis, at the UN, WTO and EC
levels (through the EC's GSP, the Euro-Med agreements and the Cotonou
agreement). In addition practically the entire operation of the UN's Food and
Agriculture Organisation has been omitted from this thesis, despite its undisputed
impact on global trade in agricultural commodities. Issues directly concerning the
WTO and the EC, to include legitimacy and democracy issues, of relevance to the
issue of governance at these levels, issues which result in the use of much press
ink have also been omitted from this thesis, in order to focus in depth on the
issues at or closest to the legal nexus between the EC and the WTO in the area of
agriculture, the chosen focus point of this thesis.
2. Conceptualising globalisation and regionalisation
As referred to above, neither the EC nor the WTO occupy static points in
legal theory, but rather are both in the process of development into a new, yet to
be defined, grundnorm of the post-globalisation and regionalisation legal and
regulatory age. Whether the WTO will move from the "trade policy" to the more
"integration" model as used by the EC, as observed by the OECD, has yet to be
established, given the weakness in the current WTO framework of the
"mercantilist" approach to negotiation.4 This "mercantilist" approach does not
accommodate the more complex ideas of either international economic or
governance models, which include concepts very much to the fore in agricultural
discourse, such as sustainability and multifunctionality. In addition, the absence
of reference to human rights in any of the WTO agreements is an inherent flaw in
2 And as discussed more fully in chapter 7.
3 Discussed in chapter 1.
4
Jackson, John H.; Sovereignty, subsidiarity, and separation of powers: the high-wire balancing
act of globalisation, Ch 1. in Kennedy and Southwick: The Political Economy of International
Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec, Cambridge University Press, 2002, at page 30.
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the system.5 While both Article XX GATT 47 and Article 20 of the Agreement on
Agriculture both refer to "non-trade" concerns, the ability of the WTO
membership and institutional framework to develop these provisions to meet the
increasingly complex needs of the global community will continue to be
challenged. This weakness in the inability of the WTO to "consider, balance and
co-ordinate the various public goods and private interests implicated" in the broad
programme for development set out in the WTO documents,6 together with the
current emphasis in the documentation on enhancing "global corporate
expansion", with no provision for the curbing of "certain harmful forms of
corporate development, no matter what problems they bring",7 remains a problem
o
in need of a "proto-constitution" solution, such a proto-constitution as forms the
backbone of the EC regulatory regime.
The development at the WTO level of either such a "proto-constitution" or
even greater capacity to deal with the "non-trade" concerns of the GATT and the
Agreement on Agriculture, appears to be currently unlikely. This view is arrived
at as the recent report from the WTO's Consultative Board recommends9 that the
WTO should remain a forum exclusively for trade negotiations,10 with only co¬
operation with "other intergovernmental agencies"11 being recommended, in
recognition of the increasing complexity of issues being addressed by the WTO
panels and the Appellate Body. Problems will continue to manifest themselves at
5 As critiqued by Petersman, and discussed in chapter 1. Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich;
Constitutionalism and WTO law: From a state-centred approach towards a human rights approach
in international economic law, Ch 2. in Kennedy and Southwick: The Political Economy of
International Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec, Cambridge University Press, 2002,
at page 32.
6
Walker, Neil, Late Sovereignty in the European Union, Ch. 1 in Walker, Neil (ed.) Sovereignty
in Transition, Oxford - Portland Oregon 2003, at page 32.
7
Mortensen, Jens Ladefoged; The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era of
Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity, E.L.J. 2000, 6(2), 176-204, at page
177.
8 Ibid, at page 203.
9 Discussed in chapter 8.
10
At point 7 of the report.
11
At point 6 of the report.
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the WTO given the fact12 that the WTO has been constituted and resourced to
• 13
govern only "one aspect of globalisation in actuality".
In addition the role of law at the two levels of governance differs. The
WTO14 can be classified as a weak enforcer, a weak monitor, and a weak
legitimiser,15 with law gradually emerged from the "negotiating atmosphere of
multilateral diplomacy" which marked the origins ofGATT 1947. The future
development of law at the WTO may however be affected by the very large
number of members at the WTO, and their differing approach to law within their
domestic jurisdictions.16 In contrast, the role of law at the EC would appear to be
unquestionable, with the EC having been set up, and being run on the basis of the
17rule of law. This is reinforced by the EC emergence as a "constitutional regime".
This view however can be questioned when it comes to the subject matter of this
1 8
thesis, the analysis of the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO, with
a continued aversion of the ECJ to the granting of direct effect to the provisions of
the WTO agreements within the EC jurisdiction, as evidenced in Portugal v.
Council}9 Added to this is the operation of the EC's TBR20 where political issues,
such as the Community interest, comes into play in deciding on whether to
proceed with a TBR action, what is otherwise a legal mechanism.
12
As discussed in chapter 5.
13
Op. cit. footnote no. 7, at page 177.
14 Discussed in chapter 4.
15
Op. cit. footnote no. 7, at page 186.
16
Watts, Sir Arthur KCMG QC, Burden of Proof, and Evidence before the ICJ, Ch. 15 in Weiss,
Freidl (ed.), Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the
Practice of Other International Courts and Tribunals, Cameron May 2000, at page 289.
17
Marks, Gary, Hooghe, Liesbeth, Blank, Kermit, European Integration from the 1980s: State-
Centric v. Multi-level Governance, J.Com.Mar.St.1996, 34(1), 341-378, at page 369.
18 As discussed in chapter 6.
19 Case C-149/96: Portuguese Republic v Council of the European Union, [1999] ECR at 1-08395.
20
Analysed in chapter 6.
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3. Issues with the current regulatory framework
Both the global regulatory framework for agriculture and that of the EC
have undergone many changes over the years, with, since the accession of the EC
to the WTO, with the mid-term review with its "largely decoupled single payment
scheme" being "widely seen" as being "a response to the pressures brought upon
farm policy-makers by the international trade negotiations".21 The "process of
agricultural policy reform" within the two levels of governance have been
22
classified by Coleman and Tangerman as "autonomous, linked games", which
describes a state of "reaching and equilibrium" at one level results in "new
23
assessments of pay-offs for policy reform in the other". In addition to the
continuing issue of "how quickly, and how completely" WTO members, the EC
included, is "willing to change its agricultural policies" once a ruling has been
24
made against them at the WTO, the changes are not, however, complete. For
example, as pointed out by Jostling and Raw, the "average agricultural tariff' is
"probably about 40 percent" in contrast to the industrial tariffs, which are usually
"closer to 5 percent" with "some manufactured goods... now traded duty free".25
As stated by Delcros, "it is now up to the negotiators," of the current round of
negotiations, to "decide whether and to what extent agriculture" should continue
to benefit from exceptions from the regulations for non-agricultural commodities
at the WTO.26
21 Swinbank , Alan; Developments in the Doha Round and WTO dispute settlement: some
implications for EU agricultural policy, (2005) 32 European review of Agricultural Economics
551, at page 552.
22
Coleman, William D. and Tangermann, Stefan; The 1992 CAP Reform, the Uruguay Round and
the commission: Conceptualizing Linked Policy Games, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.
37, No. 3 pp. 385-405, Page 387.
23 Ibid, at page 388.
24
Op. cit. footnote no. 21 at page 557 et seq.
25
Josling, Tim and Raw, Allan; Options for enhancing market access in the new round, Chapter 9
in Ingco Merlinda D. and Winders L. Alan; Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda Creating a
Global Trading Environment for Development, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, at
page 176.
26
Op. cit. footnote no. 1 at page 253.
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At the EC level the shift in emphasis from Pillar I to Pillar II of CAP27 is
only now beginning to be seriously undertaken with the recent mid-term review.
Despite this the CAP still suffers tensions emanating from the original
"multifunctional" drafting of its treaty provisions, with such a multifunctional
approach being championed by the European Commission's agricultural
directorate. While the CAP has been reformed to meet the needs of free trade in
agricultural commodities, the underpinning philosophy of the WTO's Agreement
in Agriculture, in which "import levies have disappeared, being replaced by
customs duties",28 the CAP still utilises, in contradiction to the concept of free
trade in agricultural commodities, a simplified structure of import and export
licences, export refunds, import duties and tariff quotas, together with emergency
safeguard measures.
For its part the WTO regulatory regime is also incomplete, despite the fact
that the "inclusion of agriculture in the rules of the WTO is one of the main
29 30achievements of the Uruguay Round Agreement." Its "substantial waivers"
however could be subject to further disciplines being anticipated in agriculture
emanating from the current WTO round of negotiations. A further integration of
internal WTO regulatory provisions is anticipated with the recent expiration of the
Agreement on Agriculture's peace clause,31 with the Agreement on Subsidies and
32
Countervailing Measures coming into the agricultural frame. A further
tightening of legal discipline at the WTO can also be anticipated, not only based
on existing documentation, but also for new areas of competence which the WTO,
should it wish to complete its global regulatory framework, would need to
33
address. For example, the issue of the regulation of rules of origin still has to be
resolved at the WTO level; the Uruguay Round Agreement on Rules of Origin for
27 As discussed in chapter 2.
28
Usher, J.; EC Agricultural Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, at page 81.
29
Op. cit. footnote no. 1 at page 253.
30 Ibid, at page 253.
31 Article 13 Agreement on Agriculture.
32 As discussed in particular in chapter 7.
33 As discussed in chapter 3.
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non-preferential trade, despite providing clarity as to when non-preferential rules
of origin are to be applied, still reads as a document reflecting work in progress.
The variety of practices which exists in "rules of origin" to include
regional cumulation rules will also, no doubt, become the subject matter of the
output of the joint work of the WTO's Committee on the Rules of Origin,34 and
the World Customs Organisation. In addition the WTO has yet to enter the fray in
the area of export credit insurance, with the OECD being the international body
currently providing the lead in this area, despite the fact that export credit is seen
o c
to be "of great importance in international trade" for the EC, being "a key
instrument of commercial policy".36 New disciplines on "export credits, export
<37
credit guarantees or insurance programmes" are anticipated from the WTO,
given the agreement amongst WTO member states to "work toward the
00
development of internationally agreed disciplines". All of this, in due course,
will have to be added to the WTO agricultural law mix. Another noticeable
exception from the rules and disciplines of the WTO is the operation of any type
of competition policy in the area of agriculture. The development of such a
discipline could cause problems for agricultural regimes, as pointed out by the
OQ
OECD "competition law protects competition, not competitors", which would
adversely impact on the functions of EC's CAP in the protection of agricultural
communities and their regions. While the prognosis for the development of a
comprehensive agreement on competition law at the WTO is doubtful, given the
lack of competition law regimes within many of the WTO member states
domestic jurisdictions, with many others being of "recent vintage",40 the fact41
34
Operating through the WTO's Technical Committee on Rules of Origin
35 As discussed in chapter 3.
36
Snyder, Francis; International trade and Customs Law of the European Union, Butterworths,
1998, at page 174.
37 Ibid, at page 289.
38 Ibid, at page 289.
39
OECD, Trade and Competition: From Doha to Cancun, OECD 2003, at page 9.
40
Nottage, Hunter, "Trade and competition in the WTO", Pondering the applicability of special
and differential treatment; JIEL (2003) 23-47, at page 41.
41 As discussed in chapter 8.
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that a WTO working group has been set up42 must be taken into consideration
when completing the picture for the future development, over the medium to long
term, of the legal relationship between the EC and the WTO in the area of
agriculture. Development however during the course of the Doha round on this
point will not be forthcoming given the abandonment of negotiations on this
issue.
A matter which is coming to the fore in agricultural matters in recent years
is the contrast in the relationship between the EC and the WTO and external legal
standards and organisations. This issue remains problematic for the legal nexus
between the EC and the WTO. This problem manifests itself through the EC's
granting of "considerable - though contingent - authority" to international
standards,43 in particular with regard to TBT matters.44 With a similar approach
lacking at the WTO level, member states are required to utilise their own
standards, as long as they do not operate as restrictions on trade, or as a
discriminatory mechanisms.45 A potential golden opportunity for the WTO
provisions on externally set standards to be aligned with similar EC provisions
would appear to have been missed during the development of the WTO. Issues
such as the labelling ofGM foods fall into this regulatory disjunction, increasing
both the current and potential future volume of disputes being brought before the
WTO's dispute settlement system as a result.
A similar issue, and one coming to fore given the rewriting of the EC-CAP
is the interaction of the EC and WTO trade and agricultural provisions with
environmental and social provisions. This interaction is not only present, but also
highly active within the EC jurisdiction, given the synergies with EC
Environmental law, as evidenced in the need to keep land in "good agricultural
42 This working group was established at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in December 1996
(http://www.wto.org).
43 Scott, Joanne; International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and
Standards) in the EU and the WTO EJIL 2004, Vo. 15 No. 2, 307-354, at page 330.
44
As discussed in chapter 8.
45 Covelli, Nick and Hohots, Viktor, The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods under the WTO
Agreements, JIEL 6(4), 773-795, at page 786 et seq.
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and environmental condition" (GAEC), and EC Rural Policy, with the rebalancing
of CAP between its two pillars. Such synergies are notably weak or absent at the
WTO level. In the absence of internal synergies, it is worth noting that the
interaction at the WTO level of the WTO regulatory regime with Multilateral
Environmental Agreements is also proving problematic.46 This, in the absence of
the "proto-constitution" at the WTO, with the "trade policy" approach rather than
the "integration" model of development being utilised at the global regulatory
level, will result in undue pressure being put on Articles XX ofGATT 1947 and
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture to paper over the cracks of the
"mercantilist" drafting of the WTO documentation. The WTO's Committee on
Trade and the Environment has already been caught in these particular headlights,
having to reconcile the conflicting values between states on the issue of the
environment,47 with developing countries requiring focus on the "trade impacts of
48
environmental measures" and not on the "environmental aspects of trade rules".
While this nexus at the WTO remains tense, at the EC level EC Agricultural law,
EC Environmental law and EC Rural law appear to be developing synergies as
evidenced in the recent and anticipated reforms of the CAP. The consequences of
the divergence of approach for the legal nexus between the EC and the WTO in
the area of agriculture could be highly problematic.
4. The land - economics nexus
The above tensions at the WTO can be analysed in the context of a
disjunction between economics, upon which international trade principles, and
those of the WTO are unquestionably based, and land,49 with "economics as a
46 As discussed, inter alia, in chapter 8.
47 Shaffer, Gregory C.; "If only we were elephants": The political economy of the WTO's
treatment of trade and environment matters. Ch 12. of Kennedy and Southwick: The Political
Economy of International Trade law, essays in Honour of Robert E. Hudec, Cambridge University
Press, 2002, at page 359 et seq.
48 Ibid, at page 359.
49 As discussed in chapter 1.
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discipline float(ing) free from the natural world"50 clearly no longer expedient, an
issue with which the EC is attempting to grapple. This disjunction between land
and economics is proving now, and will continue in the future, to be highly
problematic for the development of an agricultural regulatory framework at both
the WTO and EC levels. The EC's original "multifunctional" drafting of the EC
Treaty provisions dealing with the CAP,51 with the continuing advocacy of the EC
of a multifunctional approach to agriculture, reflected to a certain extent in the
mid-term review provisions, will add to these tensions. In addition the potential
for further development in the evolving EC Rural Policy and potentially in the
EC's 6th environmental action programmes' Integrated Product Policy,52 could
add to this problem.
5. Issues for the future
Issues which will, as opposed to may, prove problematic in the future
include, inter alia, the expiration of the additional temporary waiver from the
WTO of the provisions of Article 1.1 GATT for the Cotonou Agreement,53 due to
expire on the 31st December 2007. This Cotonou waiver has already lead to a
WTO arbitration ruling.54 The EC was required under the additional temporary
waiver agreement to substitute a "tariff only regime for exports of bananas" for its
WTO non- compliant tariff rate quotas for this commodity by the 1st January
2006, subsequent to the findings in the EC-Bananas case55 with an opportunity
being afforded to the complainants in that dispute to challenge the "methodology
used for the rebinding of the EC tariff on bananas" under the Doha Waiver, an
opportunity which they took up in this arbitration case. The arbitrator found that
50
Daly, Herman E. & Cobb, John B. Jr.; "For the Common Good: redirecting the economy toward
community, the environment, and a sustainable future"; Beacon Press, 1994, at page 99.
51 Referred to in chapter 2.
52 Both referred to in chapter 8.
53
European Communities - The ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, Decision of 14 November 2001,
WT.MIN (01 )/15, Ministerial Conference fourth Session Doha, 9-14 November 2001.
54 EC - the ACP-EC Partnership - recourse to arbitration pursuant to the decision of 14
November 2001, 1 August 2005, WT/L/616.
55
European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas,
complaints by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States (WT/DS 27).
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"it was satisfied that the internal price calculated by the European Communities in
order to arrive at its envisaged rebinding does not reflect as accurately as possible
the actual prices at which bananas are sold on the EC market."56
In addition the proposed rules of origin reforms for non-preferential rules
of origin, the absence of a GATT GSP code,57 and the continuing development of
the Euro-Med agreements will undoubtedly pose problems for these aspects of the
EC's external trade in agriculture. In addition the potential development of GATS
and TRIPs in their interaction with agriculture will merit close attention, as will
the development of the concept of the "precautionary principle" at the WTO level,
CO
of relevance to health and consumer issues. The concerns of the WTO's
Consultative Board,59 of the "buying out" of the WTO system by member states,
with the "spaghetti bowl" of discriminatory preferences, will also have to be
addressed. Whether the strengthening of the governance of the WTO advocated
by the Consultative Board will be adequately followed up in the current round of
negotiations, and whether that follow up will be sufficient to develop the "proto-
constitution" advocated by legal academics in order for the WTO adequately to
meet the needs of globalised society has yet to be established.
How long the WTO can continue in its current constitutional structure,
lacking the strategic steer needed adequately to address the complexity of the
issues being raised before its panels and Appellate Body is a moot question. In the
absence of the development of the advocated proto-constitutional framework the
remaining question to be asked is to how well the EC can manoeuvre its CAP
through the evolving Byzantine legal framework affecting agriculture at the WTO
level, while still meeting the multifunctional demands of EC society and the
agricultural provisions currently enshrined in the EC Treaty, and repeated in the
provisions of the proposed EU Constitution. A definitive answer to this question
56
Op. cit. footnote no. 54 at paragragraph 92.
57
Peers, Steve; Reform of the European Community's Generalized System of Preferences, J.W.T.
1995 29(6) 79-96, at page 93.
58 As discussed in chapter 8.
59 Also discussed in chapter 8.
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will only be available after the conclusion of the current round of the WTO
negotiations, and the final construction of the reforms of the CAP are in place,
reforms which are due to follow the recent Mid-term review. The legal nexus
between the EC and the WTO in the area of agriculture is still very much in flux.
The potential future trajectory of the EC CAP has been mapped out in the
proposed EU Constitution, with its restatement of the multifunctional objectives
for the CAP, together with the detail of the CAP being set down in the legal
instruments of the mid-term review, and with the proposed development of the
EC Rural Policy. The future development of the regulation of trade in agricultural
commodities at the WTO level remains as yet unclear. Some indication of future
trends can however be gleaned from the negotiations to date. The possible future
"elimination of all export subsidies", which still "remain important in a number of
commodity regimes" such as milk, was indicated in the EC submission in May
2004, when Commissioners Lamy and Fischler, the then Trade and Agricultural
Commissioners were prepared to negotiate on the basis of "full parallelism on all
forms of competition".60 This was in reaction to a USTR press release of Robert
Zoellick in January 2004 that he was prepared to eliminate all export subsidies by
a certain date.61 In addition the ETS has been pressing for improved market access
in all countries, both developing and developed countries, seeking that "tariffs on
all agricultural products would be reduced below 25 percent". Domestic support
reduction is being championed by a reformed Cairns group, who are seeking
"aggressive liberalization in all three pillars" of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture.
The ongoing negotiations have resulted in a three way split in the main
negotiating parties in the area of agriculture, the interestingly named "Friends of
60
Op. cit. footnote no. 21 at page 553.
61
Aggarwal, Rajesh; Dynamics of Agricultural Negotiations in the World Trade Organisation,
J.W.T. 39(4): 741-761, 2005, at page 753.
62 Ibid, at page 742.
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Multi-functionality of Agriculture", led by the EC, the Cairns group, this time
supported by the U.S, and an as yet unorganised group of developing countries,
whose concerns are "poverty alleviation" and "food security/ livelihood
security".64 The earlier Harbison report, by the Chairperson of the Agricultural
negotiations, Stuart Harbison, was able to report on the 7th July 200365
"compromise on a wide range of issues" in the market access debate, with the
then discussion being on two competing tariff reduction formulas, "a simple
average reduction formula along the lines of the formula used in the Uruguay
Round" and a "Swiss-type formula" , "with the maximum tariff at the end of the
implementation period being 25 per cent ad valorem for any tariff item".66
Harbison attempted to bridge the gap between supporters of the two options by
suggesting a "graduated simple average reduction formula". On export
competition he was in a position to report progress in the area of export subsidies,
export credits, food aid, with some debate continuing on the issue of state trading
export enterprises, and export restrictions and taxes.67 Discussion on domestic
support was concentrating on blue box, amber box classifications, and de minimis
levels of support.68 Prior to the drafting of the July 2004 framework agreement a
group called the "Five Interested Parties" (FIP) was set up at the instigation of the
U.S., comprising itself, the EC, Australia, Brazil and India, was set up, "with a
view to sort out differences among them", as it was perceived that agreement
between these five parties was a precondition to final agreement at the talks.69 The
July 2004 framework agreement70 was able to report that a single approach to
market access was going to be adopted, using a single "tiered formula that takes
63 Ibid, at page 742.
64 Ibid, at page 742.
65 Modalities phase: chair's report to TNC, July 2003, available at
http://www.wto.org/englishytratop e/agric e/negoti modtnc iulv03 e.htm.
66 Ibid, at pages 5, 6 and 7 of the report.
67 Ibid, at pages 8 and 9 of the report.
58 Ibid, at pages 9 and 10 of the report.
69
Op. cit. footnote no. 61 at page 752.
70 Found at Annex A to the Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004,
WT/L/579, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dda e/draft text gc dg 31iulv04 e.htm.
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into account... different tariff structures" of the WTO member states.71 The
framework agreement reported on agreement to work on modalities on export
subsidies, export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes,
beyond 180 days, and provisions on food aid. On domestic support there was a
call72 for "substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support", stating
what the negotiations were to focus on, but with no report as to any targets having
been achieved on this topic. There was little reference in this document to non-
trade concerns which have so exercised the minds of EC agricultural policy
makers. There has to date been little progress since the July 2004 framework
agreement.
The multifunctionality of agriculture argument of the EC continues,
however, to be relevant to the current round of negotiations. The EC has being
raising non-trade concerns covering six principal areas. As highlighted earlier in
this thesis, they point out that there is a continuing need to address the issue of the
precautionary principle under the SPS Agreement.73 The "process characteristics"
of how animals or plants are reared are grown is an issue for the EC under the
TBT agreement. The EC are seeking "mandatory labelling" in this area, which
would, inter alia, cover some of its concerns with regard to GM crops.74 The EC
also raise the issue of food security for developing countries. Their fourth non-
nc
trade concern deals with environmental issues of agricultural production, with
their fifth point being rural development,76 and their sixth issue was animal
welfare issues. Under animal welfare issues the EC is seeking to "enlarge the
scope of the green box" to allow for payments to be made by way of
compensation, outwith the Aggregate Measures of Support calculation, to cover
the extra cost involved in maintaining high animal welfare standards.77
71 Ibid, at paragraph 28.
72 Ibid, at paragraph 6.
73
Op. cit. footnote no. 21 at page 556.
74 Ibid, at page 556.
75 Ibid, at page 556.
76 Ibid, at page 556.
77 Ibid, at page 556.
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The above positions of the EC with regard to its non-trade concerns was to
be expected, with the emergence into the WTO negotiations of animal welfare
issues. It will be interesting to see how effective the EC will be in achieving its
objectives at the WTO negotiating table. The WTO has to date, as discussed
throughout this thesis, had problems addressing the EC's concerns in many of
these areas. Some very original though will have to be forthcoming at the WTO in
order to meet the EC's aspirations in this area. What is clear however is that
further clashes of these two levels of governance are likely in the absence of fresh
thinking at one of those two levels. Law is the appropriate discipline with which
to address these issues, while, despite the fact that the role of law at the WTO
level is still contested, the EC clearly operates on the basis of the rule of law. If
the EC proposes pursuing the current multi-functional approach to the CAP then
greater originality of thought will have to be forthcoming at the EC level - as it is
the EC with its greater coherence, greater consensus as to the role of law, and
political unity of development of policy and purpose that has a proto-constitution,
the EC treaty, already in place.
In contrast the larger more diverse membership at the WTO lacks the same
facility to adjust and develop. The EC is in the better position to take evasive
action to avoid the constitutional collision of the high judicial authorities.
Whether the multifunctionality of EC Agricultural policy can continue to be
justified on the basis of economics, ecology or social policy, is a matter for those
disciplines to address, in light of imbalance of support for agricultural activities
inside and outside the EC, and the need for the EC to balance its urban and rural
objectives. The greater imagination of the EC policy makers, with the reliability
of their legal tools, and the flexibility of their use by both EC legislature-
executive and judiciary requires (in the absence of something close to a miracle
emanating from the current round of WTO negotiations), the solution to the
problems of the EC's multifunctional approach to the CAP to emanate from
within the EC. The EC itself is a conceptual and legal experiment which has
proven successful amongst member states with a shared history, underlying social
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construct, and a shared legal tradition, albeit across two main classifications of
law, the common law and civilian legal traditions. The successful results of that
experiment have not, to date, been exported in their entirety, to other parts of the
world. The EC lawyers and policy makers in the area of agriculture, now have an
opportunity to further show its ingenuity and innovation in addressing the EC's
non-trade concerns in a way which is legally effective within the EC, while being
at the same time, WTO compliant. Allowing other member states of the WTO and
other regions of the world to adopt concepts which have been successfully
developed and operated within the EC will in the long term be probably be more
effective in spreading the EC's policies in these areas, than setting the EC up in a






GATT contracting parties, decision on November 28,1979 on
differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller
participation of developing countries GATT, 26th Supp. BISD 203
(1980).
Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, the Contracting Parties decide as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting
parties may accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing
countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
The provisions of paragraphs 1 apply to the following:
Preferential tariff treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to products
originating in developing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of
Preferences,
Differential and more favorable treatment with respect to the provision of the
General Agreement concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of
instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed contracting
parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in accordance with
criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the contracting Parties, for the
mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff measures, on products imported
from one another;
Special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the
context of any general or specific measures in favor of developing countries.
Any differential and more favorable treatment provided under this clause:
shall be designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and
not to raise barriers to or create undue difficulties for the trade of any other
contracting parties;
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shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and
other restrictions to trade on a most-favoured-nation basis;
shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to
developing countries be designed and, if necessary, modified, to respond
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries.
Any contracting party taking action to introduce an arrangement pursuant to
paragraphs 1,2 and 3 above or subsequently taking action not introduce
modification or withdrawal of the differential and more favorable treatment so
provided shall:
notify the Contracting parties and furnish them with all the information they may
deem appropriate relating to such action;
afford adequate opportunity for prompt consultations at the request of any
interested contracting party with respect to any difficulty or matter that may arise.
The Contracting Parties shall, if requested to do so by such contracting party,
consult with all contracting parties concerned with respect to the mater with view
to reaching solutions satisfactory to all such contracting parties.
The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by
them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the
trade of developing countries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the
developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make contributions
which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade
needs. Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall less-
developed contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are
inconsistent with the latters' development, financial and trade needs.
Having regard to the special economic difficulties and the particular development,
financial and trade needs of the least-developed countries, the developed countries
shall exercise the utmost restraint in seeking any concessions or contributions of
commitments made by them to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the
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trade of such countries, and the least-developed countries shall not be expected to
make concessions or contributions that are inconsistent with the recognition of
their particular situation and problems.
The concessions and contributions made and the obligations assumed by
developed and less-developed contracting parties under the provisions of the
General Agreement should promote the basis objectives of the Agreement,
including those embodied in the Preamble and in Article XXXVI. Less-developed
contracting parties expect that their capacity to make contributions or negotiated
concessions or take other mutually agreed action under the provisions and
procedures of the General Agreement would improve with the progressive
development of their economies and improvement in their trade situation and they
would accordingly expect to participate more fully in the framework of rights and
obligations under the General Agreement.
Particular account shall be taken of the serious difficulty of the least-developed
countries in making concessions and contributions in view of their special
economic situation and their development, financial and trade needs.
The contracting parties will collaborate in arrangements for review of the
operation of these provisions, bearing in mind the need or individual and joint
efforts by contracting parties to meet the development needs of developing
countries and the objectives of the General Agreement.
(From John H. Jackson, William J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr. Legal Problems
of International Economic Relations; Cases and Materials and Text, fourth
edition, West Group, St. Paul, Minn, 2002.)
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Annex 2. List of International Commodity Agreements and Related
Arrangements1
Cocoa
1972 International Cocoa Agreement
1975 International Cocoa Agreement
Coffee
1940 Inter-American Coffee Agreement
1962 International Coffee Agreement
1968 International Coffee Agreement
1976 International Coffee Agreement
Olive Oil
1955 International Olive Oil Agreement
1963 International Olive Oil Agreement
1967 Protocol for the Extension of the International Olive Oil Agreement
1979 International Olive Oil Agreement
Rubber
1922 Rubber Regulation Scheme
1934 Agreement for the Regulation and Export of Rubber
1938 Agreement for the Regulation and Export of Rubber
1944 Agreement on Establishing an International Rubber Study Committee
1979 International Natural Rubber Agreement
Sugar
1864 Paris Sugar convention
1 Extracted form Kabir-ur-Rahman Khan; the Law and Organisation of International Commodity
Agreements, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1982, at page XI.
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1902 Brussels Sugar Convention
1937 Agreement Concerning the Regulation of Production and Marketing of
Sugar
1953 International Sugar Agreement
1956 International Sugar Agreement
1958 International Sugar Agreement
1968 International Sugar Agreement
1977 International Sugar Agreement
Tea
1933 International Tea Agreement
1938 International Tea Agreement
1951 International Tea Agreement
Tin
1931 Agreement on the International Tin control Scheme
1931 International Tin Pool Agreement
1933 Agreement on the International Tin Control Scheme
1934 Agreement on the Tin Buffer Stock Scheme
1937 Agreement on the International Tin Control Scheme
1938 Agreement on the Tin Buffer Stock Scheme
1942 Agreement on the International Control of the Production and Export of Tin
1956 International Tin Agreement
1960 International Tin Agreement
1965 International Tin Agreement
1970 International Tin Agreement
1975 International Tin Agreement
Wheat
1933 International Wheat Agreement
1949 International Wheat Agreement
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1953 International Wheat Agreement
1956 International Wheat Agreement
1959 International Wheat Agreement
1962 International Wheat Agreement
1967 International Wheat Agreement
1971 International Wheat Agreement
Annex 3. Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, at the close of
the first session of the 74th Congress, August 26,1935
An Act
To relieve the existing national economic emergency by increasing
agricultural purchasing power, to raise revenue for extraordinary expenses
incurred by reason of such emergency, to provide emergency relief with respect
to agricultural indebtedness, to provide for the orderly liquidation of joint-stock
land banks, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled
TITLE I - AGRICUTURAL ADJUSTMENT2
DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY
That the present acute economic emergency being in part the consequence of a
severe and increasing disparity between the prices of agricultural and other
commodities, which disparity has largely destroyed the purchasing powers of
farmers for industrial products, has broken down the orderly exchange of
commodities, and has seriously impaired the agricultural assets supporting the
national credit structure, it is hereby declared that these conditions in the basic
industry of agriculture have affected transactions in agricultural commodities with
a national public interest, have burdened and obstructed the normal currents of
commerce in such commodities, and render imperative the immediate enactment
of title I of this Act.
IMPORTS
2
Original Act was Title I of Public No. 10, 73d Congress (H.R. 3835) 48 Stat. 31 (1933); 7 U.S.
C. Art. 601 et seq. By sec. 8 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, title I may be referred to
as the "Agricultural Adjustment Act".
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Sec. 22(a.) Whenever the President has reason to believe that any one or more
articles are being imported into the United States under such conditions and in
sufficient quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective or materially
interfere with any program or operation undertaken, or to reduce substantially the
amount of any product processed in the United States from any commodity
subject to any with respect to which an adjustment program is in operation, under
this title he shall cause an immediate investigation to be made by the United
States Tariff Commission, which shall give precedence to investigations under
this section to determine such facts. Such investigation shall be made after due
notice and opportunity for hearing to interesting parties and shall be conducted
subject to such regulations as the President shall specify.
(b) If, on the basis of such investigation and report to him of findings and
recommendations made in connection therewith, the President finds the existence
of such facts, he shall by proclamation impose such limitations on the total
quantities of any article or articles which may be imported as he finds and
declares shown by such investigation to be necessary to prescribe in order that the
entry of such article or articles will not render or tend to render ineffective or
materially interfere with any program or operation undertaken, or will not reduce
substantially the amount of any product processed in the United States from any
commodity subject to and with respect to which an adjustment program is in
operation, under this title: Provided, that no limitation shall be imposed on the
total quantity of any article which may be imported from any country which
reduces such permissible total quantity to less than 50 per centum of the average
annual quantity of such article which was imported from such country during the
period from July 1, 1928, to June 30, 193, both dates inclusive.
(c.) No import restriction proclaimed by the President under this section nor any
revocation, suspension, or modification thereof shall become effective until
415
fifteen days after the date of such proclamation, revocation, suspension, or
modification.
(d.) Any decision of the President as to facts under this section shall be final.
(e) After investigation, report, finding, and declaration in the manner provided in
the case of a proclamation issued pursuant to subsection (b.) of this section, any
proclamation issued pursuant to subsection (b.) of this section, any proclamation
or provision of such proclamation may be suspended by the President whenever
he finds that the circumstances requiring the proclamation or provision thereof no
longer exist, or may be modified by the President whenever the finds that changed
circumstances require such modification to carry out the purposes of this section.
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Abstract
Both the WTO and the EC have come to a crossroads in their development.
The WTO is currently the subject of the Doha round of negotiations, while
the EC, together with pillars II and III of the EU, is about to be re-constituted
under the draft European Constitution. The issue of the articulation between
these two legal systems, despite the best efforts of legal academics over the
years, remains unresolved, as evidenced in the recent case of Biret International
SA v. Council.1 Issues which were resolved in the early years of the EC on the
nexus of the relationship between the EC and the laws of its member states, are
now reappearing at the EC-WTO nexus. The EC-Member State principles of
supremacy,2 direct effect3 and state liability for the non-implementation of
directives4 are now being echoed at the WTO-EC nexus, in the context of
direct effect,5 legality control, and indirect effect. The Biret case raised the
issue of'no-fault liability for the Community' for non-compliance with WTO
law, echoing discourses many years earlier at the EC-MS nexus. The issue of
the boundary demarcations between EC Commercial law and WTO law mer¬
its re-examination in light of these developments, with the continuing imper¬
fect legal articulation between these two jurisdictions resulting in a boundary
clash which requires a resolution. Ideally this resolution would come in the
form of a treaty amendment drafted by the member states of the EU. In this
respect the draft Constitution, which fails to adequately address this issue,
could be seen as a missed opportunity. The ECJ may well find itself obliged to
develop the resolution based upon the Advocate General's opinion in the Biret
case.
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Biret International SA v. Council,6 raised the possibility of the development of
'no-fault liability for the Community in respect of its normative acts' where
there had been a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) ruling on the non-compli¬
ance of EC law with WTO law. The CFI rejected this possibility finding that
'the purpose of the WTO agreements is to govern relations between States
for economic integration... and not to protect individuals'.7 The CFI reaf¬
firmed the findings in Portugal v. Council,8 following the FedoiP and
Nakajimaw hypothesis, and found that the facts of the Biret case did not fall
within the two exceptions to the rule that WTO law did not have direct effect
in EC law. It further found that the ruling of the DSB did not alter the EC's
law in this area, finding that a ruling of the DSB would only become relevant
if the Court had found that the agreement in question, in this instance the SPS
agreement, had direct effect, which was not the finding of the CFI in this case.
The case was appealed to the ECJ, with the opinion of Advocate General Alber
providing a new perspective on this issue.
Building on Germany v. Council,n the ECJ in Portugalnl found that 'in
conformity with the principles of public international law', the EC was free to
conclude an agreement with a non-EC member state, which could be made to
have effect within the 'internal legal order of the contracting parties'.13 Fur¬
ther, it held that it was only in the absence of such an express agreement that
the ECJ would have to determine what legal effect, if any, such an agreement
would have within the EC legal jurisdiction.14 Under international law, it was
6. Op. cit. note 1.
7. At point 72 of the judgment of the ECJ.
8. Op. cit. note 5.
9. Case 70/87 Fediol v. Commission [1989] ECR 1781. Here the ECJ found that it was not
prevented 'from interpreting and applying the rules of GATT with reference to a given case, in
order to establish whether certain specific commercial practices should be considered incompat¬
ible with those rules' (at para. 20), and that the fact that the regulation in question, (Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the strengthening of the common
commercial policy with regard in particular to protection against illicit commercial practices,
Official Journal L 252, 20/09/1984 p. 1) entitled 'economic agents ... to rely on the GATT
provisions ... in order to establish the illicit nature of the commercial practices which they
consider to have harmed them' and that said economic agents were 'entitled to request the Court
to exercise its powers of review over the legality of the Commission's decision applying those
provisions' (at para. 22 of the judgment).
10. Case C-69/89 Nakajima All Precision v. Council [1991] ECR 1-2069. In this case the relevant EC
Regulation had been adopted 'in order to comply with the international obligations of the
Community', (at para. 31) thereby becoming subject to judicial review for compliance with, in
this case, Arts. 2(4) and (6) of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code (at para. 32 of the judgment).
II. Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I- 4973.
12. Op. cit. note 5.
13. Ibid., at para. 34 of the judgment.
14. Relying on Case 104/81 Hauptzollamt Mainz v. Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641, para. 17.
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recognised by the ECJ that there was an obligation for the 'bona fide perfor¬
mance of every agreement'; however, this in itself did not determine what legal
effect that international agreement would have within the domestic jurisdic¬
tion of the contracting parties.15 This approach was echoed at the WTO level
by the panel in United States — Sections 301—310 of the Trade Act of 1974.
This panel, ruling on US law, and referring to the doctrine of direct effect,
stated that; 'Neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by
GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect'. Following
this approach, the GATT/WTO did not create a new legal order, the subjects
of which comprise both contracting parties or members and their nationals.17
However, as pointed out by Zonnekeyn, the panel report does have an inter¬
esting aside in a footnote18 that the issue of whether WTO agreements would
'create rights for individuals', which national courts would have to protect,
'remains an open question, in particular in respect of obligations following the
exhaustion of DSU procedures in a specific dispute'.19 In addition, the panel
reserved the right to the WTO to 'construe any obligations as having direct
effect', and that, in the absence of such construction, member states of the
WTO were not precluded from 'following internal constitutional principles',
finding that some obligations 'give rights to individuals'.20
The above findings formed the legal backdrop to the opinion of Advocate
General Alber in the Biret case. The intervening years between Portugal and
Biret had, however, seen the development of an intense academic discourse in
this area, and saw a number of further cases appearing before the CFI and
ECJ. Of particular interest to this author is Van Houtte's highlighting of the
'political aspect' of the ECJ's decision in the Portugal case, given that the ECJ
took into consideration issues outside the confines of its own legal system,
such as the fact that the EC's contracting parties at the WTO concluded that
WTO rules did not have direct effect within their own legal systems.21 Reli¬
ance was made on the 'reciprocal character of the WTO Agreements' with the
WTO being seen as a 'forum for negotiations', which some commentators
referred to as being 'anachronistic'.22 However, other commentators took it as
being fair comment with Ehlermann warning against unduly tying the 'hands
15. Op. cit. note no. 12, at para. 35 of the judgment.
16. United States — Sections 301—310 of the Trade Act of 1974, report of the panel released on 22
December 1999, WT/DS152/R, at para. 7.72
17. Geert A. Zonnekeyn, 'The Status of WTO Law in the EC Legal Order; The Final Curtain?',
Journal of World Trade 34(3): 111—125, 2000.
18. Note 661.
19. Op. cit. note 17.
20. Ibid.
21. Hans van Houtte, The Law of International Trade, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1995.
22. Op. cit. note 17.
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of the Community negotiators'.23 The WTO bodies' lack of democratic ac¬
countability has been highlighted by Rosas, who pointed out that 'granting
direct effect to WTO rules would play into the hands of the likes of anti-
globalisation protestors', and 'could instead deprive the democratic institutions
of the EU and other WTO members of the margin of manoeuvre they cur¬
rently possess so as to strike a balance between trade and societal values'.24
2. Grappling with the Problem
The academic discourse had developed the concepts of the non-reciprocity of
direct effect,25 legality control26 and indirect effect.27 The legality control ar¬
gument in particular gave rise to a politically pragmatic response from the ECJ
in the Portugal case, when it implied 'that legal control of acts' of EC institu¬
tions pursuant to WTO law would be 'impossible because the ECJ must leave
the necessary 'freedom' to the EC legislator in order not to endanger the EC's
future negotiating position towards its trading partners in the WTO'.28
Zonnekeyn sees this as not being a legal argument but rather a political one,
being 'an obvious assault to the 'trias political' principle, which ought to be the
cornerstone of every legal system'.29 The view therefore being adopted was that
the 'absence of direct effect of an international agreement protected the valid¬
ity of Community acts'.30 These above attempts to rationalise the legal rela¬
tionship between the EC and the WTO have been reflected in the jurispru¬
dence of fellow members of the WTO, most notably in the US and Japan,
with interesting observations to be made on the Italian case law, before it came
under the influence of the ECJ's line on this matter.
23. Ibid.
24. Allan Rosas, Case Note; Case C-149/96, Portugal v. Council, Judgment of the full Court of 23
November 1999, Common Market Law Review 37: 797—816, 2000.
25. Initially raised by AG Tesauro in the Hermes case (Case C-53/96 (reference for a preliminary
ruling from the Arrondissementsrechtbank de Amsterdam), Hermh International v. FHT Mar¬
keting Choice BV, Official Journal C 258, 15/08/1998, p. 9), and commented on by Geert A.
Zonnekeyn in 'The Status ofWTO Law in the EC Legal Order: The Final Curtain?', Journal of
World Trade 34(3): 111-125, 2000, and Axel Desmedt, 'European Court of Justice on the
Effect of the WTO Agreements in the EC Legal Order', LEIE 2000 7(1), 93-101.
26. Axel Desmedt; European Court of Justice on the Effect of the 'WTO Agreements in the EC
Legal Order', LIEI, 200 27(1), 93-101
27. Op. cit. note no. 24.
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3. Trends in International Case Law
The trends of the case law of the US and Japan match, to a certain extent, the
development of the approach of the ECJ to the EC's relationship with the
WTO for the same period. It would appear that there was a movement from
initially viewing GATT 47 as having, or having the potential to have, direct
effect. As GATT and the WTO laws become more complex and profound,
there has been a retreat from this initial position with the development of a
conclusion that perhaps the WTO legal regime may not have direct effect after
all in domestic jurisdictions.
3.1. US
At the GATT panel level, the issue of the direct effect of GATT 47 provisions
arose in the panel report of United States: Alcoholic and malt beverages,31 which
held that the then-version of 'Article XXIV: 1232 was not applicable to the
United States' as the panel noted, at 3.79 of its ruling, that these provisions
were 'designed to apply only to those measures by regional or local govern¬
ments or authorities which the central government cannot control'. They were
convinced, on the basis of the writing of Jackson and Hudec, that 'GATT law
had become part of US federal law, and since federal law, according to the US
Constitution, is supreme over state law, any inconsistent state law had to give
way before GATT.33 This issue was addressed in the Uruguay Round 'Under¬
standing on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994', which is now complemented by Article 22(9) of the
DSU.34 The article addresses the issue of federal states being responsible for
the actions of its constituent states, which, in the absence of control being
enforced by the federal government on the sub-national government, imposes
'compensation and suspension of concessions' provisions on the federal state.35
31. United States: Alcoholic and malt beverages, Panel Report, (DS23/R BISD 39S/206) adopted on
19 June 1992, para. 5.78-5.80. p. 206.
32. Which provides the 'Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be
available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the regional and local
governments and authorities within its territories'.
33. Pieter Jan Kuijper, 'The New WTO Dispute Settlement System; the Impact on the European
Community', JWT 1995, 29(6), pp. 49-71.
34. It provides that 'The dispute settlement provisions of the coved agreements may be invoked in
respect of measures affecting their observance taken by regional or local governments or authori¬
ties within the territory of a member.' When the DSB has ruled that a provision of a covered
agreement has not been observed, the responsible Member shall take such reasonable measurers
as may be available to it to ensure its observance. The provisions of the covered agreement and
this Understanding relating to compensation and suspension of concessions or other obligations
apply in cases where it has not been possible to secure such observance.
35. Op. cit. note 33.
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To the astonishment of Kuijper,36 the US had managed, through its imple¬
menting legislation and its accompanying statement of administrative action,
to reduce 'itself to the same situation as the EC' by expressly 'limiting the
supremacy of federal law over state law', and thereby to largely 'undo the
consequences of the adopted panel report in United States: Alcoholic and malt
beverages.37 The current situation is that the US federal government can only
force a state government to comply with WTO provisions by way of the
federal government taking a court action 'comparable to action pursuant to
Article 169 of the EC Treaty' (now Article 226 EC) against the state con¬
cerned.38 It should be noted that the WTO agreements now contain 'an
elaborate mechanism for consultation with state authorities with a view to
guaranteeing that state law is in conformity with the WTO Agreement and its
Annexes'.39
3.2. Japan
In Japan, Iwasawa40 referred to two domestic Japanese cases, which addressed
the issue of the direct applicability of GATT in Japan, namely the Kolbe
Jewellery case41 and the later Kyoto Neckties case.42 Under Japanese law, 'treaties
are accorded a high authority', overriding statutes, even those subsequently
enacted, under Article 98(2) of the Japanese Constitution. Following this ap¬
proach, the courts in the Kolbe Jewellery case suggested that GATT 47 had
direct effect within Japan. The later Kyoto Neckties case caused uproar in Japa¬
nese legal academic circles when the Kyoto District court's judgement, 'appar¬
ently denying the direct applicability of the GATT', was endorsed by the
Japanese Supreme Court in 1990. This was a 'poorly reasoned case' according
to Iwasawa and another academic, Professor Matsushita, who claimed that the
courts in Kyoto Neckties seemed 'to ignore Article 98(2) of the constitution'.43
This was a strange claim to lay at the feet of any Supreme Court, leading to the
possible conclusion that the decision was taken for unexpressed politically
36. Ibid.
37. Op. cit. note 31.
38. Op. cit. note 33.
39. Ibid.
40. Yuji Iwasawa, 'Implementation of International Trade Agreements in Japan', in Meinhard Hilf
and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), National Constitutions and International Economic Law,
Kluwer 1993, ISBN 90 6544 665 6.
41. Kolbe Jewellery, the relevant judgment was that of May 30, 1966, Kolbe District Court, 3
Kakeishku 519, 524 - 25.
42. Kyoto Neckties case: the relevant judgment here was the Judgment of June 29, 1984, Kyoto
District court, 31 Shdmu Geppd 207, which seems to have been endorsed by the Judgment of
Feb. 6, 1990, Supreme Court, slip op.
43. Op. cit. note 40.
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pragmatic reasons, along the lines taken by the ECJ in the later (1999) Portu¬
guese Textiles case.44
3.3. Italy
An interesting line of GATT jurisprudence can be seen within the EC on the
issue of the direct effect of GATT 47 within the Italian jurisdiction. During
the latter part of the 1960s, the Italian lower and appeals court had ruled that
'Article III, para. 2 of GATT45 conferred on private parties a right to invoke it
before the courts', leading to the Italian state being ordered to reimburse
GATT illegal taxes levied on importers. While the ECJ held that the EC had
been substituted for the Member States with regard to commitments under the
GATT from 1 July 1968 with the introduction of the Common Customs
Tariff,46 the Italian Corte di Cassazione was upholding, in 1968, the findings
of its lower courts with regard to Article III, para. 2 of GATT.47 Since that
finding, however, the impact of the ruling had 'progressively lost significance
in practice',48 with the Italian courts beginning to reverse its position on
GATT 47 in subsequent cases. During the 1970's, while the ECJ was holding
that in International Fruit49 that GATT 1947 was binding on the Commu¬
nity, the Italian courts were 'developing the concept' that GATT 47 had direct
effect, and that 'specific provisions may be considered as self-executing' in light
of their particular content, independent of other provisions of the agreement
and regardless of 'elements such as the absence of a jurisdiction for the settle-
44. Op. cit. note 5.
45. It provides that 'The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any king in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to
like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or
other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles
set forth in para. 1.'
46. Anmenistrazione delle Finanze dello State v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI) and SpA
Michelen Italiana (SAMI) (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di
Cassazione). Joined Cases 267 - 269/81 [1982] ECR 801.
47. Judgment No. 2293, 6 July 1968, Ministero delle Finanze v. Cotonificio Valle Ticino s.p.a., Foro
Italiano 1968, I. 2462; Giust. Civ. 1968, 1, 1571; Riv. dir. int, 1969, 328; Dir. Scambi int.
1968, 504.
48. Carlo Mastellone; Case Report on Case 266/81, SIOT (Societa Italiana per POleodotto
Transalpino) s.p.a. v. Ministero delle Finanze, Ministero della Marina Mercantile, Circoscrizione
doganale di Trieste, Ente autonomo del porto di Trieste. Preliminary Ruling of 16 March 1983
requested by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, and Joined Cases 267-269/81, Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.P.I. (Societa Petrolifera Italiana ) s.p.a. (267/81) and Amministrazione
delle Finanze dello Stato v. S.A.M.I (S.p.a. Michelin Italiana ) (268-269/81). Preliminary ruling
of 16 March 1983 requested by the Italian Corte di Cassazione, CML Rev 20: 559-580, p. 559.




ment of disputes'.50 The Italian courts were aware that the ECJ had taken a
different line on this issue, with the Corte di Cassazione stating that, in com¬
parison to the ECJ line, its view was wider than that of the ECJ. It also
recognised that different member states of the EC might take different posi¬
tions on the legal effect of GATT 47, holding that 'GATT could not be
considered a Community act under (the then) Article 177'.51 However, by the
time of the SIOT and SAMI references to the ECJ in 1983 by the Corte di
Cassazione, the Italian judiciary were happy to follow the ECJ's line on the
legal status of the GATT 47, thereby reversing their earlier case law on the
matter.
4. More Recent Cases
As stated earlier, a number of cases were heard by the ECJ and the CFI
between Portugal v. Council and the Biret case, during which the issue of the
legal relationship between the EC and the WTO arose. These cases, for the
most part, which mainly dealt with bananas, are Atlanta,52 and what have
become known as the 'March 200T judgments, of Cordis,53 Boccbi Food54 and
T.PortA5 The Atlanta case was heard at the CFI, from where an appeal was
made to the ECJ, where the issue of the relationship between the EC and the
WTO was argued. The ECJ, in its judgment, confined itself to procedural
issues and did not address directly the substantive issue of the relationship
between the EC and the WTO as the plea on this matter was not included in
the original appeal documentation and was, therefore, deemed inadmissible.
The Advocate General did address the issue in his opinion. The 'March 2001'
judgements were all heard at the CFI level. Only T.Port was appealed to the
ECJ,56 but on appeal the ECJ only addressed the issue of the CFI's calculation
of reference quantities.
In the Atlanta case at the ECJ, protection of legitimate expectations was
pleaded. While the Advocate General recognised that this was 'one of the
fundamental principles of the Community, as the Community retained a dis¬
cretion as to its running of its common markets', traders had no legitimate
50. Op. cit. note 48.
51. Ibid.
52. Case C-104/97P, Atlanta AG v. European Community, [2001] 1 CMLR 20.
53. Case T-18/99, Cordis Obst und Gemuse Grofhandel GmbH v. Commission of the European Com¬
munities, ECR 2001 page 11-00913.
54. Case T-30/99, Bocchi Food Trade International GmbH v. Commission of the European Communi¬
ties, ECR 2001 page 11-00943.
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expectation that an existing situation would be maintained when the Commu¬
nity institutions could alter it in the exercise of their discretionary powers.57
Further, the claim for non-contractual liability of the Community under Ar¬
ticle 215 required 'proof of illegal conduct, damage and a causal link',58 and,
in AG Mischo's view, the claimants fell at the first hurdle, proof of illegal
conduct. The claim in this case was that, in light of the findings at the WTO
in EC-Bananas59 on the issue of the EC banana regime, the EC provisions
were now illegal, not that the EC provisions dealing with the common
organisation of bananas was in breach of the 'substantive GATT provisions or
those of the WTO'. The claimant therefore claimed that the 'legislative provi¬
sions having been applied to the appellant in disregard of the binding effect on
the Community of the decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body'.
The AG stated that this plea was inadmissible as it had not been entered in
the original appeal documentation from the CFI. However, utilising the com¬
mon law technique of an obiter dicta, the AG stated that in any event, follow¬
ing the case of Commission v. Germany,61 the appellant could 'not profitably
set up the incompatibility of Regulation 404/93 with the WTO Agreement to
contest the reasoning of the Court of First Instance.'62 Going even further
down the obiter dicta line, even the claim that EC law was in conflict with a
decision of the Dispute Settlement Body 'would not assist the appellant's
case',63 on the basis that even a ruling of the Appellate Body of the DSU does
not 'impose on the party whose legislation is found to be contrary to the
WTO provisions a duty immediately to amend that legislation'.64 The AG
went on to say that 'Clearly... the rights which a decision of the Appellate
Body would intend to confer on individuals have nowhere near the scope
which the appellant seeks to give them.65 This is particularly in light of the fact
that, as pointed out by Zonnekeyn, 'Article 22 of the DSU gives WTO mem¬
bers the possibility of maintaining the unlawful measures in place beyond the
reasonable period of time if the parties to the dispute have agreed on a suitable
compensation.66
In the Cordis case,67 which was heard by the CFI, it was reiterated that 'the
57. Ibid, at H8 of the report.
58. Ibid at H9 of the report.
59. European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution ofBananas, Report of
the Appellate Body. WT/DS27/AB/R, 9 September 1997.
60. At point A19 of the AG's opinion.
61. Case C-280/93 Germany v. Council [1994] ECR I- 4973.
62. Ibid at A23 of the report.
63. Ibid at A24 of the report.
64. Ibid at A27 of the report.
65. Ibid at A30 of the report.
66. Op. cit. note 17.
67. Op. cit. note 53.
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WTO Agreement and its annexes are not intended to confer rights on indi¬
viduals which they could rely on in court',68 nor could the Community incur
'non-contractual liability as a result of infringement of them'.69 The position
in Portugal v. Council70 whereby, despite the significant differences between
GATT 1947 and the WTO Agreement, they both 'nevertheless accord consid¬
erable importance to negotiation between the parties'71 was reaffirmed. The
issue of the possibility of an imbalance of obligations between member states
of the WTO, should the ECJ take any other line, was also addressed. The CFI
also reaffirmed the ECJ's line in Portugal v. Council that the Community
judicature could not 'deprive the legislative or executive organs of the Com¬
munity of the scope for manoeuvre enjoyed by' the Community's trading
partners within the WTO.72
The argument was made in this case that there should be developed a 'new
category of misuse of powers' to the extent that the Commission adopted a
regulation in breach of WTO obligations. This was rejected outright. It is
established case law of the ECJ that misuse of powers can only be claimed if
legislation is 'adopted with the exclusive or main purpose of achieving an end
other than that stated',73 but such an allegation was not being made, or could
not be made, by the applicants in the Cordis case. The claim that a new
category of misuse of powers existed should therefore be rejected. The CFI
reaffirmed that, following Portugal v. Council, that 'it is only where the Com¬
munity intends to implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of
the WTO, or where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise
provisions of the agreements contained in the annexes to the WTO Agree¬
ment, that it is for the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to
review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of the
WTO rules.'74 As neither the WTO panel report (22nd May 1997)75 nor the
Appellate Body report (9th September 1997)76 'included any special obliga¬
tions which the Commission intended to implement, within the meaning of
the case-law,77 in Regulation No. 2362/98,78 therefore such a claim could not
be made here.
68. Ibid at point 45.
69. Ibid at para. 50.
70. Op. cit. note 5.
71. Ibid at para. 47.
72. Ibid at para. 49.
73. Ibid at para. 53.
74. Ibid at para. 58.
75. European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Panel
Report, 22nd May 1997, WT/DS27.
76. Op. cit. note 59.
77. Specifically Case C-69/89, Nakajima v. Council, [1991] ECR 1-2069.
78. Ibid at para. 59.
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In Bocchi Foods,79 the arguments and the findings of the CFI followed
closely those of the Cordis case. The T.PorF0 CFI case followed closely both
the arguments and findings of Bocchi Foods and Cordis with the CFI stating
that 'it should be noted that it is clear from Community case-law that the
WTO Agreement and its annexes are not intended to confer rights on indi¬
viduals which they could rely on in court'.81 The CFI restated the position in
Portugal v. Council by saying that 'it is only where the Community intends to
implement a particular obligation assumed in the context of the WTO, or
where the Community measure refers expressly to the precise provisions of the
agreements contained in the annexes to the WTO Agreement, that it is for the
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance to review the legality of the
Community measure in question in the light of the WTO rules'.82
With reference to the March 2001 judgements, Peers is of the view83 that
the CFI was in error in concluding that the 'implementation exceptions' could
be 'deduced from previous case law'. Peers argues that, while previous case law
certainly did clarify the position with regard to the 1993 Regulation dealing
with bananas, 'it had not ruled on the applicability of those exceptions to
subsequent amendments of the Regulation'. He advocates that it is 'strongly
arguable' that the purpose of the 1998 Council Regulation was 'related to a
WTO obligation'.84 Peers goes on to point out that the 1998 regulation 'ex¬
pressly states in its preamble that 'the Community's international commit¬
ments under the World Trade Organisation' should be met'. He further points
out that the 'the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for a
Council Regulation stated that the Council should 'amend Regulation (EEC)
No. 404/93 to bring it into line with our international commitments within
the framework of the WTO' and that a 'system of import licences compatible
with the WTO should be introduced'.83 In light of this persuasive argument, it
is hard to ignore Peers' view that it is difficult to distinguish between a mea¬
sure 'being adopted 'in order to comply' with the WTO ruling', as the 1998
regulation clearly is, and a measure 'intending to implement a WTO obliga¬
tion'.86
79. Op. cit. note 54.
80. Op. cit. note 55.
81. Ibid, at para. 45.
82. Ibid, at para. 57.






5. The Biret Case in the ECJ
All of these cases brings us to the Biret case,87 and the opinion of Advocate
General Alber, which merits examination. The claimant in this case, Biret
requested that the CFI should develop 'its case-law in the direction of a system
of no-fault liability for the Community in respect of its normative acts'. This
claim was rejected on the basis that this plea was introduced late in the pro¬
ceedings and should have formed part of the original pleadings in this case.
Problems also arose with the pleadings on appeal, so that the effect of the DSB
ruling was not properly ruled on by the ECJ. The ECJ did however state that
it had to take into consideration the period of time given by the WTO to the
EC to amend its laws, and any examination of liability of EC institutions for
the non-amendment of laws within that time period would 'render ineffective
the grant of a reasonable period for compliance' with the DSB ruling.88 The
ECJ therefore found that no damage could be proven to have occurred after
the 'reasonable period for compliance', so it did not have to rule further on the
matter. It also avoided ruling on the second plea, 'concerning the Com¬
munity's alleged no fault liability' as it had been submitted too late to be
considered.
The opinion of AG Alber in the ECJ case does however cast a different
light on the issues raised in Biret. At point 83 of his opinion, he states that a
ruling of the DSB removes the margin of manoeuvre of WTO contracting
parties, with the obligation being to implement the findings of the DSB im¬
mediately and without condition. This, therefore, alters the nature of the
obligation of the WTO member states, as there is, after a DSB ruling, an
'obligation sufficiently clear and precise'. He did recognise, however, that there
was a need for a community legislative measure to put in place the provisions
of the legislative changes in this situation.89 He went on to say that, from the
point of view of Community law, the right of the free exercise of economic
activities would be in favour of the recognition of direct effect of the rulings of
the DSB, after the expiration of a reasonable delay for amending EC law.90 In
such a situation, Albert is also of the opinion that there would be a case for
recognising the possibility of bringing a case for compensation for EC non¬
compliance with WTO law.91
This opinion of the Advocate General, should it be adopted in a future
ECJ ruling, would provide a third exception to be added to the FedoiP2 and
87. Op. cit. note 1.
88. At point 65 of the judgement of the ECJ.
89. At point 89 of the opinion.
90. Point 110 of the opinion.
91. At point 112 of the opinion.
92. Op. cit. note 9.
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NakajimcP3 exceptions to the rule that WTO law does not have direct effect
within EC law. These two exceptions, as confirmed in the Atlanta case,94 are
the only ones that currently hold, with a continuing large area of interface
between EC and WTO law being subject to a 'boundary clash'. The question
therefore arises that if a case comes before the ECJ, a 'post-Birei case where
damage can be proven to have occurred after a 'reasonable period for compli¬
ance has passed' and a plea is entered timeously for the Community to develop
'a system of no fault liability in respect of its normative acts' will the ECJ
distinguish the Biret ruling, and adopt the reasoning of AG Alber in that case.
Will the judges of the ECJ, on the other hand, more conscious of the political
position of the ECJ within the EC/EU legal framework, give further meat to
Ehlermann and Rosas's95 argument against unduly tying the 'hands of the
Community negotiations' recognising the severe democratic deficit at the
WTO. The draft EU Constitution merits some examination to see if it sheds
any light on this matter.
6. The Constitutional Aspect of the Relationship with Member State
Legislation
The EU is currently drafting a 'Constitution for Europe'. This document is
intended to address many of the recurrent constitutional problems of the EC/
EU. Article 111-315 of the draft Constitution, (after signature), reflecting a
rebalancing of power between the Council of Ministers and the Commission,
and the adoption of European laws and Framework laws as the new secondary
legislative tools under the Constitution, closely matches the provisions of the
current Article 133 EC. The CCP is, however, extended by the draft Constitu¬
tion to cover not just 'trade in goods' and the post Nice Article 133 provisions
on trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property, but
also to foreign direct investment. The unanimity requirements for voting in
the Council of Ministers in the field of services and intellectual property is
preserved and is also extended to cover the 'negotiation and conclusion of
agreements in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services',96 with
specific provisions being also made for the conclusion of transport agree¬
ments.97 It would appear, from the current draft of the Constitution, that no
such unanimity will be required for international agreements on foreign direct
93. Op. cit. note 10
94. Op. cit. note 32.
95. Op. cit. note 24.
96. Art. 11-317 of the draft 'Constitution for Europe'.




investment. What is new, however, is the statement at the end of Article III-
315 that the CCP 'shall be conducted in the context of the principles and
objectives of the Union's external action', possibly bringing the CCP under the
influence of the more robust provisions being introduced for the EU's Com¬
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the draft Constitution.
6.1. The Issue ofExclusive Competence
Factors which might influence the ECJ in a post Biret judgment would be the
issue of exclusive competence and subsidiarity in the post 'draft Constitution'.
As stated by Lord Slynn of Fladley,98 the currently numbered Article 133 EC"
'has raised in particular difficult questions' as to the competence of the EC
and, through it, the competence of the EC Commission together with the
issue of the relationship between the EC and its member states. This is compli¬
cated by the fact that the ECJ, in Opinion 1/78,100 found that the CCP had a
dynamic and evolutionary character', and that the EC must have 'the possibil¬
ity ... to take account of new needs and new developments'.101 This approach
is reflected in Opinion 2/9A102 when the ECJ stated, developing from the
ERTA judgment,103 that the 'principle of exclusivity' cannot be limited to
areas where the EC has 'adopted rules within the framework of a common
policy, but is applicable in all areas corresponding to the objectives of the
Treaty'.104
In Opinion 1/94, the ECJ provided that the now numbered Articles 95
EC105 and Article 308 EC106 could not 'in themselves confer exclusive compe¬
tence on the Community'.107 The draft Constitution addresses the issue of
exclusive and shared competence in its Articles 12 and 13, referred to above,
98. Lord Slynn of Hadley in the forward to Emiliou and O'Keeffe, the European Union and World
Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley and Sons, 1996.
99. It should be pointed out that the expanse of Art. 133 EC was extended by the Nice Treaty to
GATS and TRIPS.
100. Opinion 1178 on the International Rubber Agreement, [1979] ECR 2871.
101. Jacques H.J. Burgeois, 'The Uruguay Round of GATT: Some General Comments from an EC
Standpoint', Ch 6 in Emiliou and O'Keeffe, The European Union and World Trade Law after
the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley and Sons, 1996.
102. Opinion of the Court of 19 March 1993. Opinion deliveredpursuant to the second subparagraph of
Art. 228 (1) of the EEC Treaty. Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organization
concerning safety in the use ofchemicals at work. Opinion 2/91, ECR 1993 page 1061.
103. Case 22/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR-263 (the ERTA /AETR judgment).
104. Nicholas Emiliou, 'The Allocation of Competence Between the EC and its Member States in
the Sphere of External Relations', Ch 3 in Emiliou and O'Keeffe, The European Union and
World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, John Wiley and Sons, 1996.
105. Ex Art. 100a EC.
106. Ex Art. 235 EC.
107. Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR 5264.
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with the newly expanded CCP being an area of exclusive competence, and
shared competence, under Article 13 being 'where the Constitution confers
(on the Union) a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in
Articles 12 {inter alia, the CCP), and 16'. Article 16 provides for 'supporting,
coordinating or complementary action', and contains both industry and public
health issues, which might be relevant to the CCP. Shared competence is
attributed, inter alia, to the internal market, agricultural and fisheries, (exclud¬
ing the conservation of marine biological resources), social policy, the environ¬
ment, consumer protection and public health issues.
As is pointed out by Craig, rather than conducting a 'root and branch re¬
consideration' of the issue of competence and subsidiarity, the draft Conven¬
tion adopted the approach of the maintenance of the status quo, but where a
shift was made on competence, it had a 'general tendency ...to reinforce EU
power, not to 'repatriate' it to the Member States.'108 It could perhaps be said
that the issue of exclusive and non-exclusive competence may not be finally
resolved by the draft Constitution, should it come into force. An outstanding
problem, relevant to this paper, will be the tension between the Customs
Union policy, an area of exclusive competence and 'other aspects of the inter¬
nal market' which is usually shared competence.109 In addition, the EU's
exclusive external competence, under the post signature Article 1-13(2) when
the internal competence is not exclusively the EU's, retains 'difficulties in
terms of clarity'.110 In order to resolve this issue, both to date, and in this
writer's opinion in the future, in the absence of clarity from the EC Treaty or
the proposed Constitution, this matter has to be analysed through the use of
principles developed by the ECJ, which in themselves are not clear.
What is clear, in the matter ofGATT/WTO Agreements, is that the Mem¬
ber States of the EC have 'retained competence over budgetary matters'111
relating to WTO membership. In addition, Emilou, quotes Timmermans112 as
arguing that, under the current legal framework, even in the area of CAP
common organisations, EC member states, even in this highly occupied field,
'retained a parallel power to adopt national measures provided that they did
not jeopardise the objectives and functioning of the common markets';113
however, EC member states would be precluded from entering into interna¬
tional agreements in such policy areas. Emilou also points out, relying on




111. Eileen Denza, 'The Community as a Member of International Organizations', Ch 1 in Emiliou
and O'Keeffe, The European Union and World Trade Law after the GATT Uruguay Round, John
Wiley and Sons, 1996.
112. From an article in Dutch by Timmermans at [1978] SEQ 276.
113. Op. cit. note 104.
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Kapteyn,114 that in areas where there are no such common policies, EC mem¬
ber states were not so restricted.115 In World Trade matters there is, however,
such a common policy, the Common Commercial Policy.116 This would con¬
tinue to be the case in a post-Constitution EU, as under the draft constitution
there is 'little containment of EU power' in 'the domain of exclusive external
competence'117 under the now numbered Art.I-13(2).118
Addressing the current situation, Kuijper throws a spanner in the works by
pointing out that the ECJ, in Opinion 1/94, does not use the term 'mixed
competence' (competence mixed), but 'joint competence' (competence
partagee).119 He goes on to say that the drawing of sharp distinctions between
EC and member state competence may not be 'helpful' in addressing issues
'involving the management of the WTO Agreement' and in issues of 'cross
retaliation', adding that the duty to co-operate between the EC and its mem¬
ber states on this point is more important.120 This argument could still be
made with regard to a post—Constitution situation, even if it is found that the
line between exclusive and shared competence has been shifted somewhat un¬
der the proposed treaty. Should the issue ofWTO obligations by the EC and
its member states be relegated to the area of joint or shared competence under
EC jurisprudence, then we enter another very difficult area of EC law, that of
subsidiarity. 121
6.2. The Issue ofSubsidiarity
Cottier sees the relegating of the issue ofWTO competence within the EC to
an issue of subsidiarity between the EC and its member states as strength from
the point of view of the 'internal power relations' within the EC.122 He does,
114. At [1978] SEW 276.
115. Op. cit. note 104.
116. Art. 133 EC, recently amended by the Nice Treaty, and to be incorporated into Art. III-315 of
the draft European Constitution (after signature).
117. Op. cit. note 108.
118. Art. 1-13(2) provides that the Union shall have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an
international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union, is
necessary to enable it to exercise its internal competence, or affects an internal Union act.
119. Op. cit. note 33.
120. Ibid.
121. Art. 3B pre Amsterdam, which provides that: 'the Community shall act within the limits of the
powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accor¬
dance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by
the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty.'
122. Thomas Cottier, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization; characteristics and struc¬
tural implications for the European Union, CMLRev. 35, 325-378, 1998.
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however, admit that from an external perspective, this approach 'hardly rein¬
forces the position of Europe in relations with other Members of the WTO, in
particular the United States'.123 Cottier also highlights the issue of differentiat¬
ing 'law-making' and 'law-applying' case law, and he advocates the politically
pragmatic, though legally less satisfying, approach of 'team-work' between the
Commission and the national administrations concerned in WTO disputes.124
The draft European Convention deals with the issue of subsidiarity in the
post signature Article I-11 with a protocol attached to the draft Constitu¬
tion.125 Article I-11 refers to the principle of conferral being the governing
principle of the limits of the Union's competences with 'the use of the Union's
competences' to be 'governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportion¬
ality'. While both subsidiarity and proportionality are familiar concepts, the
conferral principle, despite the new name, also appears to offer little that is
new to the analysis of the law in this area. Much of Article 1-11 looks familiar,
although the reference to whether an action can be sufficiently achieved by a
Member State, in paragraph 3 of this article, refers to 'either at central level or
at regional and local level', adds a new layer of governance for the post-
Constitution EU principle of subsidiarity. The protocol on the application of
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality builds on the principles pro¬
vided for in earlier EC/EU documentation,126 providing for procedural
mechanisms for the operation of the principle. As stated by Craig, however, 'it
remains to be seen how subsidiarity and the Protocol operate in practice'.127
6.3. The Political Dimension
From a first reading, therefore, of the draft Constitution it would appear that
clarity cannot be brought to the EC-WTO legal nexus to be adjudicated on a
post-Biret case. The political aspect of a post-Biret judgment is therefore
thrown into sharp relief. It is clear to Cottier that 'non-compliance [with
WTO law] may even threaten the consistency of the Union's legal order',128
and with it the concept of the supremacy of Community law. This would put
in jeopardy the 'imperfect constitutional structure' of the EC referred to in the
introduction to this article and as recognised in the draft European Constitu¬
tion. Cottier points out that the supremacy of EC law depends on 'legitimacy
and persuasion', with legal provisions which are 'inconsistent with interna¬
tional obligations' putting this in jeopardy.129 Legitimacy of persuasion could
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.
126. Op. cit. note 108.
127. Ibid.




also be jeopardised in light of Rosa's view, referred to earlier, that the lack of
democratic accountability of WTO bodies and the need to 'strike a balance
between trade and societal values' has also to be added to the political mix.130
This then has to be juxtaposed against Zonnekeyn's point that failure to grant
WTO law direct effect within the EC legal jurisdiction in order to grant the
EC negotiators at the WTO room for manoeuvre in future negotiations is an
assault on the trias political principle and is based on political reasoning by the
ECJ, rather than legal reasoning. Kuijper's argument on the duty to co-operate
between the EC and its member states,131 discussed earlier in the context of
exclusive competence, continues on this theme. Cottier, advocating team work
between the EC and its member states with regard to WTO commitments,
reflects this politically pragmatic, rather than strictly legal, allocation of obliga¬
tions. In addition, non-compliance by the EC or part of the EC with WTO
commitments would lose credibility of other WTO member states in the EC,
and would lose the EC international market access rights.132 This academic
analysis is reflected in the ECJ's reasoning in Portugal v. Council and in the
AG's opinion in Biret, with regard to WTO obligation which had not been
adjudicated upon by the DSB.
7. Conclusion
The above points highlight some problematic issues from a legal perspective,
which resolve themselves to relative clarity when examined from a political
perspective. The response of the ECJ following what appears to be political
reasoning rather than pure legal reasoning, as to the legal effect of WTO law
within the EC jurisdiction. It gives rise to a question as to the exact balance of
powers between the EC and its member states in the context of the EC's
relationship with the WTO and, in this context, the relative role of the EC
institutions within the EC jurisdiction and the role that the ECJ has developed
for itself within the EC. While the EC is clearly set up to run on the basis of
the rule of law, the issue does arises whether the ECJ should ignore the 'unani¬
mous position of the Governments' of the EC vis-a-vis the World Trade
Organisation.133 As stated in one Common Market Law Review editorial, the
balance is between the ECJ acceding to governments' demands pursuant to
pressure 'from weak industries defending their own short term interests' or
should the ECJ protect the interests of EC consumers and the EC's own
interests by 'granting direct effect of what was then GATT 47 obligations
130. Op. cit. note 24.
131. Op. cit. note 33.
132. Op. cit. note 122.
133. 'Editorial Comment, Strengthening GATT', CMLRev. 1983, p. 393.
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'against the wishes of the Governments'.134 As pointed out in the same edito¬
rial, 'the Court cannot govern Europe',135 despite the highly political role that
it has been asked to play in the context of the legal relationship between the
EC jurisdiction and the WTO jurisdiction. The ECJ, may, however, be faced
with this role, in the absence of clearer direction from the treaties, in our 'post-
Biret' case.
Some writers would argue that the ECJ has not been shy of developing law
when it felt the need to do so, as in the development of the Treaty of Rome
itself, converting a traditional multilateral treaty136 into a constitutional char¬
ter governed by a form of constitutional law.137 However, as Mancini pointed
out, the ECJ 'would have been far less successful had it not been assisted by
two mighty allies: the national courts and the Commission'.138 On the issue of
GATT and WTO, when the issue comes before the ECJ, 'even the Commis¬
sion [pleaded] against applying the international rules within the Community
legal order'.139
Perhaps a more effective analysis can be made of the situation when, unlike
with many other international legal obligations entered into by the EC, the
WTO and before it GATT 47 do have within them very effective dispute
resolution mechanisms. The issue of the EC and the ECJ's relationship with
other international tribunals has caused problems for the ECJ in other in¬
stances. This issue is brought to the fore by Usher, who points out that this
issue of possible overlapping jurisdictions with international tribunals 'has
arisen in a number of requests under Article 300 for an Opinion'.140 He goes
on to point out that in Opinion 1/91, which dealt with the creation of an EEA
Court, the ECJ, in defence of its own prerogatives, held that 'to confer 'juris¬
diction' on the EEA Court was incompatible with Community law'.141 This is
in line with the observation that the ECJ has shown itself to be hostile 'to the
creation of, or accession to, other international tribunals with overlapping
jurisdiction or membership'.142 While the ECJ has exercised an ability to be
both restrictive and developmental in its interpretation of the EC treaty, it is
most activist in its efforts to ensure the uniform control of the validity of
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. G. Federico Mancini, 'The Making of a Constitution for Europe', CMLRev. 1989, p. 595.
137. J.H.H. Weiler, 'The Reformation of European Constitutionalism', JCMS, Vol. 35, No. 1,
p. 97.
138. Op. cit. note 134.
139. Op. cit. note 133.
140. John Usher, 'The Assertion of Jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice', Ch 14 in Patrick
Capps, Malcolm Evans and Strados Konstadinidas, Asserting Jurisdiction, International and





Community acts and the exercising of judicial control over the activities of the
EC bodies in the context of the legal process. 3 It is perhaps somewhat naive
to expect the ECJ to exercise its activist abilities at its own expense, in the
defence of law of another organisation, merely for the sake of the discipline
itself.
The WTO legal jurisdiction will develop with time, both as a consequence
of further panel and appellate body reports at the WTO, and further rounds of
multilateral trade negotiations. The competing pulls of EC law and WTO law,
with its interdependent and reflexive relationship, with the development of
'new and endemic boundary clashes' between these two polities leading to, as
suggested by Walker, a transformation of mutual self understanding.144 This
contentious evolution is in line with constitutional lawyers' pluralistic thinking
which emphasise 'the possibility of constitutional collision between high judi¬
cial authorities of different polities as the major point of contestation and
crucial axis of rational authority'.145 In the meantime the EC Commercial
lawyer, working with the 'dynamic and evolutionary character of the CCP' 146
is left with an imperfect, but perhaps evolving, situation in the absence of the
direct effect ofWTO law within the EC. These issues will increasingly require
attention in the forthcoming years, in the absence of amendments to the draft
Constitution for Europe prior to enactment, then by way of further develop¬
ments of ECJ jurisprudence.
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Agricultural Commodities: Fortress Europe after Doha?
MARIA O NEILL*
Introduction
It has been well established and commented on by various authors that accession to
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) by the European Community (EC) has had
and will continue to have a profound impact on the operation of the EC's Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Equally affected were the rules operated by the EC
concerning the importation and exportation of agricultural commodities. With the
resumption of the Millennium Round of negotiations a re-examination of this latter
issue is merited, with a view to establishing not just changes to date, but also to
anticipate possible future developments in this area. This paper proposes to examine
this latter issue, taking as its definition of agricultural commodities that used by
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,1 which is narrower than that used by the EC
Common Agricultural Policy.
The EC's ability to enter into international trade agreements is provided for by
Article 133 (ex Article 113) EC (Treaty of Rome as amended).2 This forms the lynch
pin of the EC's Common Commercial Policy (CCP),3 also known as the 'external
* BCL, LLM, MEd Solicitor, Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay Dundee, Bell Street, Dundee
DDI 1HG Scotland.
1 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture specifies the commodities that it covers in its Annex 1. These
are knows as Harmonised System (HS) Chapters 1-24 less fish and fish products (plus specific named
commodities). The reference to HS is the Harmonised System of Classification under the International
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, of the World Customs
Organisation
2 Art 133 (ex Art 113) EC 1. The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles,
particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achieve¬
ment of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and measures to protect trade such as
those to be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies. 2. The Commission shall submit proposals to
the Council for implementing the common commercial policy. 3. Where agreements with one or more
States or international organisations need to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations
to the Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The Commis¬
sion shall conduct these negotiations in consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council
to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework of such directives as the Council may
issue to it. The relevant provisions of Art 300 shall apply. 4. In exercising the powers conferred upon
it by this Article, the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 5. The Council, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may extend the application
of paragraphs 1 to 4 to international negotiations and agreements on services and intellectual property
insofar as they are not covered by these paragraphs.
3 Art 131 (ex Art 110) EC to Art 134 (ex Art 115) EC.
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economic policy'.4 Not only was the article renumbered by the Amsterdam Treaty,
but a new provision, Article 133.5 was added. With the coming into force of the
Nice Treaty5 a new Article 133 was inserted into the EC treaty, which, inter alia,
extended the provisions of Article 133 EC to cover certain areas covered by the
WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)6 and Trade Related aspects
of Intellectual Property (TRIPs)7 agreements. The Amsterdam change was described
by the Commission as not being "an extension of the existing CCP provisions,
but merely a codification of the current position" and case law to date.8 The Nice
changes could, however, be deemed to be an extension of the Article 133 compe¬
tence. This article was originally complemented by Article 116 EC,9 now repealed,
and is currently complemented by Article 19(1) (ex. J.9) Treaty on European Union,
as amended (EU).10 As its provisions are currently drafted, Article 133 gives "an
unusual amount of discretion"11 to the "Council, acting on a proposal from the Com¬
mission, and after consulting the European Parliament"12 as to the development and
expansion of the CCP, to include "both the form and the content" of this policy.13
The ECJ in Opinion 1/94XA referred to "the exclusive competence conferred on
the community" regarding the CCP by Article 133 EC.15 Despite the ECJ's finding
in Opinion 1/94 that only "in so far as rules have been established at internal level
does the external competence of the Community become exclusive", as pointed out
by Marise Cremona, "the Community's CCP powers have been held to be exclusive"
to the EC, with, even in the absence of regulation by the EC, requiring an EC Mem¬
ber State to obtain authorisation for their own developments in this policy area.16
4 M Cremona 'EC External Commercial Policy after Amsterdam: Authority and Interpretation with
Interconnected Legal Orders' in JHH Weiler (ed) The EC, the WTO and the NAFTA; Towards a Common
Law of International Trade (Oxford University Press 2000).
5 Signed 26 Feb 2001, in force from 1 Feb 2003.
6 General Agreement on Trade in Services (15 Apr 1994).
7 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (15 Apr 1994).
8 M Cremona (n 4).
9 Ex Art 116 EEC "From the end of the transitional period onwards; Member States shall, in respect
of all matters of particular interest to the common market, proceed within the framework of international
organisations of an economic character only by common action. To this end, the Commission shall submit
to the Council, which shall act by a qualified majority, proposals concerning the scope and implementation
of such common action. During the transitional period, Member States shall consult each other for the
purpose of concerting the action they take and adopting as far as possible a uniform attitude."
10 Art 19.1 EC (ex Art J.9) Member States shall co-ordinate their action in international organisations
and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in such for a. In international
organisations and at international conferences where not all the Member States participate, those which
do take part shall uphold the common positions.
11 M Cremona (n 4).
12 Art 133.5 EC.
13 M Cremona (n 4).
14 Opinion 1/94 (Re the Uruguay Round Treaties) [1994] ECR 5267.
15 M. Cremona (n 4).
16 Ibid.
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This situation is reflected in the WTO case of European Communities - Customs
Classification of Certain Computer Equipment,17 also known as the LAN case. In
this case the United States "tried to bring a complaint against Ireland and the United
Kingdom" (while agreeing to bring a complaint against the EC as well).18 As can
be seen above, the report, the conclusions and recommendations referred only to the
EC. The case concerned the customs classifications utilised by the Irish and British
authorities. The Appellate Body noted that the "EC constitutes a customs union and
that the "export market" is the European Communities, not an individual Member
State".19 This approach has been bolstered by the European Commission's view
in the areas of shared competence, such as GATS and TRIPs, that "in the absence
of any division of competences between the EU and its Member States, the EU
bears international responsibility for the fulfilment of the entire GATS and TRIPS
agreements," and therefore should always be named as a defendant in a WTO case
against an individual Member State of the EC.20 This is also reflected in the internal
case law of the EC, in the opinion of Advocate General (AG) Tesauro in Hermes,21
and appears now to be reflected in WTO practice.22 The relationship between the
Member States of the EC and the EC in the areas of GATS and TRIPs are further
clarified and extended by the Nice amendments to Article 133 EC.
The exact delimitation of the EC's CCP under Article 133 EC, post Amsterdam,
pre-Nice, with the use of the "technique of delegation of the decision to a future
Council ofMinisters"23 was in need of clarification. The same situation pertains with
regard to the post Nice situation. This arises from the drafting of the Article 133 EC
provisions, and the possibility of its future extension with the article not "specifying
on what basis that decision should be made, or indeed whether a newly extended
commercial policy should possess all the characteristics (such as exclusivity) of the
existing policy."24 This continues to be the case post-Nice regarding intellectual
property provisions, pursuant to Article 133.7 EC, and to the non-Article 133.6
GATS matters. In addition a horizontal agreement has yet to be agreed to dealing
with the areas of competence to be shared between the EC and its Member States
in the areas of services and intellectual property, however, in the interim it would
appear that the occupied field theory would apply.
17 European Communities Customs Classification ofCertain Computer Equipment Report of the
Appellate Body (5 June 1998) WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R).
18 A Rosas 'Joinder of Parties and Third Party Intervention in WTO Dispute Settlement' in Friedl
Weiss (cd) Improving WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Issues & Lessons from the practice ofOther
International Courts & Tribunals (Cameron May London 2000).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Case C-53/96 Hermes International/ FHTMarketing Choice BV, [1998] ECR 3603.
22 M Cremona (n 4).
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
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Agricultural Aspects of the CCP
Long before the emergence of the WTO the interaction of the internal commercial
policy of the EC and the CAP was examined in the Ramel Cases in 1977.25 In that
case it was held at point 19 of the judgement that "the objectives of free movement
and of the common agricultural policy should not be set one against the other nor
in order of precedence but on the contrary combined and the principle of free move¬
ment should prevail save when the special requirements of the agricultural sector call
for adaptations." This would reflect the provisions of the then Article 38(2) EC, now
Article 32(2) EC, which provides that; "Save as otherwise provided in Articles 33
to 38, the rules laid down for the establishment of the common market", namely in
this case, Article 133 (ex Article 113 EC), "shall apply to agricultural products".
The operation of the CAP's common organisation exceptions to the CCP provi¬
sions were explained by the ECJ in Ramel on the basis that "many mechanisms
of the organization of the market, such as price fixing and intervention systems,
by organizing and regulating trade involve limitations on free movement and such
limitations are not therefore of a temporary nature or justified by exceptional cir¬
cumstances but aie chaiacteiistic of the common agricultural policy".26 Therefore
the interference of the free movement provisions imposed by the community in
pursuance of a common organisation would be "acceptable" despite the fact that
"they interfere with the free flow of goods between Member States and distort
competition in the Common Market".27 Therefore to the extent that the internal
CAP treaty provisions do not expressly require a distortion of the application of
the CCP's application to trade within the EC in Agricultural goods, then trade in
agricultural goods within the EC in agricultural goods is to be determined by the
now numbered Article 133 EC. Equally, under the doctrine of parallel powers, as
developed earlier, and as dealt with in Opinion 1/94, then the EC under Article 133
EC has exclusive competence to negotiate externally on the international trade in
agricultural goods. This issue was dealt with in paragraphs 29 to 33 of Opinion 1/94.
There the ECJ expressed the opinion that despite the fact that the then Article 43,
now Article 37 EC, had been held in the case ofEC Commission v EC Council,28 as
being the appropriate legal basis for not only "intra-community trade but also when
they originate from non-Member States",29 that the signing of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture fell into a different category. As the WTO document intended to
25 Joined Cases 80 and 81/77, Societe Les Commissionnaires Reunis SARL v Receveur des douanes
SARL Les fils de Henri Ramel v Receveur des douanes, 20 Apr 1978 [1978] ECR 927.
26 Ibid at point 18 of the judgment.
27 J McMahon Law of the Common Agricultural Policy (Pearson Education 2000).
28 C-131/87, EC Commission v EC Council [1989] 1 ECR 3764, [1991] 1 CMLR 780, para 27.
29 Opinion 1/94 (Re the Uruguay Round Treaties) [1994] ECR 5267, at para 29 of the ECJ's
Opinion.
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"establish on a worldwide basis 'a fair and marked-orientated agricultural trading
system'" then the appropriate EC legal basis for signing the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture was the then Article 113, now 133 EC.30
Two further agricultural relevant WTO agreements were also addressed by Opin¬
ion 1/94, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS), and the Agreement on the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The ECJ held
that the SPS agreement could be concluded "on the basis of Article 133 alone",31
and that the TBT agreement also fell "within the ambit of the Common Commercial
Policy".32 The impact of this decision has had a profound effect on the EC's CAP,
but also the focus of this paper,33 on the import and export regulations of the EC
for Agricultural Commodities.
The Agreements
Generalised Systems of Preferences
The European Economic Community (EEC) Member States had operated a gen¬
eralised system of preferences (GSP) for lesser developed countries (ldc) since
the break up of their respective empires. The third countries within the EEC GSP
scheme usually had colonial links with the EEC Member States. A global system of
generalised preferences was sponsored by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD)34 (UNCTAD I) from 1964, whose objective was "to
increase oxport earnings, promote industrialisation and accelerate tho rates of eco
nomic growth of developing - country beneficiaries".35 These preferences were to
be operated in favour of the ldcs by the developed countries, without any reciproca¬
tion by the ldcs in favour of the developed countries. The UNCTAD GSP built on
pre-existing GSP systems operated by most developed countries, with the excep¬
tion of the United States, but developed a new global, non-discriminatory system
30 Ibid, quoting from the preamble to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture.
31 Opinion 1/94 (Re the Uruguay Round Treaties) [1994] ECR 5267, at para 31.
32 Opinion 1/94 (Re the Uruguay Round Treaties) [1994] ECR 5267, at para 33.
33 See further M O Neill 'The winds of change blow again: the World Trade Organisation's impact
on the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy' (2002) 24:3 Liv L R 181-208.
34 "One of the principal functions of UNCTAD was to 'formulate principles and policies on interna¬
tional trade and related problems of coonomio development' and to 'make proposals for putting the said
principles and policies into effect'" General Assembly Resolution 1955 (XIX), Proceedings ofUNCTAD
II, UN, New York (1968), vol 1, report and Annexes, at 4, quoted in JM McMahon Agricultural Trade,
Protectionism and the Problems ofDevelopment (Leicester University Press 1992).
35 Resolution 21(11), UNCTAD II, vol 1, proceedings and report, UN, New York, (1968), at 38,
quoted in JM McMahon Agricultural Trade, Protectionism and the Problems ofDevelopment (Leicester
University Press 1992).
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"to be offered to all ldcs without discrimination, and were not to be reciprocated
by the ldcs."36 This system was to operate in contradiction to the basic principle
of MFN37 of the pre-existing GATT 47. The GATT Tokyo Round addressed the
issue of the UNCTAD GSP, which, although far from perfect in its operation, was
facilitated by an enabling clause,38 which called for "developing countries to make
contributions or concessions as their economies develop and improve".39 UNCTAD
III,40 held in 1972, called for the GSP to be extended to include "processed and
semi-processed agricultural and primary products in Chapters 1-24 of the Brussels
Tariff Nomenclature41 (BTN)".42 The Brussels Tariff Nomenclature was replaced
by the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) of the World
Customs Organisation (WCO), on the 1st January 1988, of which more later in this
article.
The EEC adopted the GSP on the 1st July 1971,43 before the GATT waiver had
been obtained 44 It is generally considered that the countries trading with the EC on
the basis solely of the GSP, are only in a preferential situation to those countries
which trade with the EC on the basis of the general provisions of "most favoured
nation" basis, which operates under the GATT. Traditionally 59 signatories to the
Lome Convention were in a better position, however Lome has now been replaced
by Cotonou, of which more later in this article. In the non-agricultural goods sector,
even the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries are in a better position
than the GSP countries,45 as are the dependent territories of the EC Member States,
the new applicants for membership, and the Maghreb and Mashreq countries of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and "other Mediterranean countries with special
preferential trade agreements".46 In contrast to the Yaounde and Lome Conven¬
tions, the EC's GSP is unilateral, with "no contractual commitment" being made by
36 A Weston, V Cable and A Hewitt The EEC's Generalised System ofPreferences, Evaluation and
Recommendations, (Overseas Development Institute UK 1980).
37 Most Favoured Nation.
38 BISD 26th Supplement (1980) 203, at 205. See further Annex 1 to this chapter. The provisions of
this Enabling Clause were echoed at the Uruguay Round declaration at BISD 33rd Supplement (1987)
19-27, at 21.
39 J McMahon Agricultural Trade, Protectionism and the Problems of Development (Leicester
University Press 1992).
40 Resolution 77 (III) of Proceedings of UNCTAD III, vol 1, Proceedings, UN, New York, (1972)
85-86.
41 Further the to the Nomenclature Convention of Brussels of 15 Dec 1950, adopted into EC law
by way of Council Regulation 950/68 of 28 June 1968 [1968] OJ Spec Ed (I) 275, together with the
Annex attached thereto.
42 J McMahon (n 39).
43 Inter alia, Reglement (CEE) n° 309/71 du Conseil, 21 juin 1971, portant ouverture de preferences
tarifaircs pour certains produito originaires de pays en voio do developpement, OJ (1971) L 142.
44 J McMahon (n 39).
45 Ibid.
46 A Weston, V Cable and A Hewitt (n 36).
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either the EC or any other GSP donor to "maintain preferences and market access
to Ides". 47
Unlike the pre-WTO system, where GSP schemes operated differently for "indus¬
trial products, textiles, ECSC products and agricultural products,"48 the post-WTO
EC GSP49 is based on two articles, one, dealing with industrial goods,50 and the
other with agricultural goods.51 The differentiation for agricultural products arises
from the objective of the GSP to industrialise developing countries, and from pro¬
tectionist nature of the EC's CAP.52 The main intention of the changes to the EC's
GSP was the "complete abolition of tariff quotas and tariff ceilings",53 with the
regulation54 creating a structure of four levels of tariff reductions.55 The Council
retained the ability to re-impose MFN tariffs "in exceptional circumstances" under
Article 14, Regulation 3281/94.56 More Southern African products were included
with partial graduation, out of the GSP system, back to the general MFN system,
was introduced for wealthier developing countries.57
One of the other main changes to the EC's GSP is the change to the EC's GSP's
rules of origin. While the rules remain substantially the same for the poorest States,
amendments to the EC's Common Custom's Code (CCC)58 resulted in addition to
"donor-country" cumulation being permitted in limited regional groupings, a "gen-
47 Ibid.
48 P Waer and B Driessen 'The New European Union Generalised System of Preferences A Workable
Compromise in the EU - but a Better deal for Developing Countries?' (1995) 29(4) JW.T, 97-124.
49 Relying on Art 133, (ex Art 113) EC.
50 Council Regulation (EC) No 3281/94, 19 Dec 1994, applying a four-year scheme of generalised
tariff preferences (1995 to 1988) in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing coun¬
tries, tariff preferences (1995 to 1998) in respect of certain industrial products originating in developing
countries, OJ (1994) L348/1, corrigendum of 12 Apr 1995 in OJ (1995) L 82/29.
51 Council Regulation (EC) No 3282/94, 19 Dec 1994, extending into 1995 the application of regula¬
tions (EEC) N 3833/90, (EEC) No 3835/90 and (EEC) No 3900/91 applying generalised tariff preferences
in respect of certain agricultural products originating in developing countries. OJ (1994) L 348/57.
52 P Waer and B Driessen (n 48).
53 S Peers 'Reform of the European Community's Generalized System of Preferences' (1995) 29(6)
JWT 79-96.
54 Art 2, Regulation 3281/94, referring to Annex 1, parts 1-4. Some products were excluded from
receiving any benefits at all under Art 1(2), Regulation 3281/94, referring to Annex IX. These prod¬
ucts included a number of primary products, as well as certain glue, leather, steel, aluminium and lead
products, and some other metals. S Peers 'Reform of the European Community's Generalized System
of Preferences' (1995) 29(6) JWT 79-96.
55 1 5 , 30, 65 and 100 per cent.
56 S Peers (n 53).
57 Ibid.
58 The EC's Common Customs Code was set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 Oct
1992 establishing the Community Customs Code, Official Journal L 302, 19/10/1992 at 1, and imple¬
mented by Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code,
Official Journal L 253, 11/10/1993 at 1 The amendments allowing for "donor country cumulation was set
out in Art 72 of Regulation 2454/93, which was added by Regulation 3254/94, Commission Regulation
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eral tolerance for all third-country materials" of up to a maximum of 5 per cent of
ex-works value was introduced, with textiles and clothing being excluded from this
rule.59 A new Management Committee for EC GSP day-to-day issues was also set
up.60
At the time of reform proposals (1990) a document issued from Vice-President
Manuel Marin, which became known as the Marin Memorandum. This document
suggested a scheme for extending the general GSP benefits for specific countries,
which met particular requirements. These requirements included the complying with
a social clause, for an ldc to comply with the provisions of Conventions no 8761 and
9862 of the International Labour Organization, an environmental clause, requiring
compliance with the criteria of the International Tropical Timber Organization, and
the International Monetary Fund criteria, and a drugs provision, for countries, such
as those in the Andean Pact and the Central American countries, who wanted "help
in the fight against drugs".63 These provisions were brought in, for both agricultural
goods and non-agricultural goods by Council Regulation 1154/98,64 and were further
elaborated on in Council Regulation 2820/98.65, 66 The regulation currently in force
for all goods except armaments, is Council Regulation (EC) No. 2501/2001.67 As
stated by Peers, in the absence of a WTO/GATT GSP code, with the backing of
(EC) No 3254/94 of 19 Dec 1994 amending Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 laying down provisions for
the implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community customs code,
Official Journal L 346, 31/12/1994 at 1, which provides, inter alia. Art 72 1. Notwithstanding the provi¬
sions of Art 69, non-originating materials may be used in the manufacture of a given product, provided
their total value does not exceed 5 per cent of the ex-works price of the final product and subject to the
conditions laid down in Note 3.4 in Annex 14.
2. Para 1 shall not apply to products falling within Chapters 50 to 63 of the Harmonized System.
59 S Peers (n 53).
60 Arts 17-19, Council Regulation (EC) No 3281/94, 19 Dec 1994, applying a four-year scheme
of generalised tariff preferences (1995 to 1988) in respect of certain industrial products originating in
developing countries, tariff preferences (1995 to 1998) in respect of certain industrial products originating
in developing countries, OJ (1994) L348/1, corrigendum of 12 Apr 1995 in OJ (1995) L 82/29.
61 C87: Freedom ofAssociation and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (9/7/1948)
http://www.ilo.org.
62 C98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (1/7/49) http://www.ilo.
org.
63 P Waer and B Driessen (n 48).
64 Council Regulation (EC) No 1154/98 of 25 May 1998 applying the special incentive arrangements
concerning labour rights and environmental protection provided for in Arts 7 and 8 of Regulations (EC)
No 3281/94 and (EC) No 1256/96 applying multiannual schemes of generalised tariff preferences in
respect of certain industrial and agricultural products originating in developing countries Official Journal
L 160, 04/06/1998 at 1.
65 Council Regulation (EC) No 2820/98 of 21 Dec 1998 applying a multiannual scheme of generalised
tariff preferences for the period 1 July 1999 to 31 Dec 2001, Official Journal L 357, 30/12/1998 at 1.
66 P Waer and B Driessen (n 48).
67 Council Regulation (EC) No 2501/2001 of 10 Dec 2001 applying a scheme of generalised tariff
preferences for the period from 1 Jan 2002 to 31 Dec 2004, 31/12/2001, OJ L346/1.
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the WTO's Dispute Settlement mechanism, beneficiaries under a GSP system "may
increasingly find that their benefits come with a price."68 This is no doubt an area
where at least an attempt will be made to resolve this issue during the Millennium
round negotiation.
Lome/Cotonou
The conclusion of the Yaounde convention coincided with the development of the
CAP, which had an impact on the Yaounde provisions for agricultural products.
Initially only rice importation from the AASM69 countries was affected, but by
Yaounde II70 (1969)71 agricultural imports were gaining greater preference in access¬
ing the EEC market than non-Yaounde countries72 but were otherwise encountering
barriers set up to protect the CAP. Free trade prevailed for industrial products from
1957, however the position regarding agricultural imports weakened with regard to
"the level of preference given"73 over a period of time.74 When the UK joined the
EEC in 1973 it brought its traditional trading relations with its former colonies into
the AASM framework, the new group of new and emerging countries being now
referred to as the Afro-Caribbean-Pacific Countries (ACP),75 with the treaties now
being referred to as the Lome Conventions. While the ACP countries were given
preferences greater than the GSP countries, these preferences were weakening with
time, with the progressive liberation of trade under GATT 1947, and the MFN
concessions under GATT.
In addition, unlike the GSP system, whose focus, as referred to above, is the indus¬
trialisation of developing countries, and whose drafting was affected by a protection¬
ist approach to the developing CAP,76 with limited agricultural product coverage,77
and different GSP schemes for agricultural and non-agricultural products,78 the Lome
conventions were more agricultural in orientation. While GSP countries were dev¬
eloping their industrial commodity preferences, the ACP countries exported "hardly
68 S Peers (n 53).
69 The Association of African States and Madagascar.
70 1969.
71 Art 2(2) Yaounde II OJ 1970 L 282/2.
72 J McMahon 'The Renegotiation of Lome: inventing the future?' (1989) 14 ELRev 140.
73 Ibid.
74 By virtue of Art "(2) of the convention, agricultural products were excluded from the general
trade obligation of abolishing customs duties, quantitative restrictions and all measures having similar
effects (JO 1970 L282/2)". J McMahon 'The Renegotiation of Lome: inventing the future?' (1989) 14
ELRev 140.
75 http://www.acpsec.org/.
76 P Waer and B Driessen (n 48).
77 J McMahon (n 39).
78 P Waer and B Driessen (n 48).
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any manufactures"79 made greater use of their more liberal preferences for agricul¬
tural products.80
The issue of whether the Yaounde and Lome preferences were GATT compat¬
ible have been an issue "since the beginning of the development co-operation".81
This issue came to the fore with regard to the commodity of Bananas. Lome IV,
which "guarantees... duty-free imports into the Community subject to certain res¬
erves" used to protect the CAP, has attached to it a Banana Protocol, which guar¬
anteed "a market for ACP States' bananas",82 with a Common Organisation of the
Market in Bananas83 being set up.84 These provisions were highly controversial and
culminated, within the EC, in the ECJ case of Commission v Council95 with the Ger¬
man, Belgian and Dutch governments challenging this provision on the basis that it
breached GATT 1947 rules. The ECJ in this case confirmed that GATT 1947 was
an "integral part of the Community's legal order," with the ECJ being competent
to interpret the provisions of GATT. However, the ECJ also held that GATT could
not be "a criterion for the examination of the legality of community acts".86 These
particular provisions were subsequently challenged at the WTO level,87 and were
found88 to be in breach of GATT provisions. The WTO finding, eventually, led to
the redrafting of the ACP relationship, which resulted in the Cotonou Agreement of
2000.
The agreement currently in force is the aforementioned Cotonou Agreement.
This agreement is based on a five pillar framework, to include, a political dimen¬
sion, participation, focus on poverty reduction, financial co-operation, with funding
from the European Development Fund and the European Investment Bank, a new
framework for economic and trade co-operation. The Cotonou, unlike its predeces¬
sors, has been drafted so that its trade provisions are fully in conformity with the
WTO provisions.
79 A Weston, V Cable and A Hewitt (n 36).
80 J McMahon (n 39).
81 J McMahon (n 72).
82 Ibid.
83 The Common Organization of the Market in Bananas Council Regulation No 404/93 of 13 Feb.
1993 on the Common Organization of the Market in Bananas. OJ 1993 L 47/1.
84 U Everling 'Will Europe slip on Bananas? The Bananas judgment of the Court of Justice and
National Courts' (1996) 33(3) CML Rev 401-437.
85 Case 45/86, Commission v Council [1987] ECR 1493.
86 U Everling (n 84).
87 European Communities - Regimefor the Importation, Sale andDistribution ofBananas, complaints
by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States — Report of the Panel (22 May 1997)
WT/DS/27/R/ECU.
88 European Communities -Regimefor the Importation, Sale andDistribution ofBananas, complaints
by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States - Report of the Appellate Body (9 Sept
1997), WT/DS27/AB/R, confirming the Panel's view.
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The Euro-Mediterranean Agreements
Another set of agreements relevant to this discussion are the Euro-Mediterranean
agreements. These agreements hold out no prospect of membership of the EC/EU,89
(except in the case of Cyprus and Malta) but rather the EC hopes to improve the
wealth and stability (economic and political) of its southern borders, in order to "pro¬
gressively (create) a zone of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean".90
The objective is to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (EMEA) through
meshing bi-lateral agreements91 between the EC and the countries of the Mahreb92
and the Mashreq.93 This partnership is still under construction. In effect the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership is a partnership predominately trade related, but inspired
by the EU's concerns as to the security of its borders, both from conflict and wars
and from being subjected to an influx of economic and possibly illegal migrants.
The most developed relationship in this structure is the EC's agreement with
Tunisia,94 where the aim of free trade in goods is the most clearly thought out
policy. Here the agreement regarding duties and charges having equivalent effect
for industrial produce are set out in detail in Articles 6 to 14. This situation is fur¬
ther elaborated on by way of Decision No 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association
Council,95 Article 9 of which provides that "products originating in Tunisia shall be
imported into the community free of customs duties and charges having equivalent
effect and without quantitative restrictions or measures having equivalent effect."
This provision is to include "customs duties of a fiscal nature" under Article 13
of that decision. Goods imported into Tunisia from the EC are to benefit from the
"progressive reduction of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect" over a
period of 5 to 12 years, depending on the particular commodity.96 Agricultural goods
are however treated differently, with agricultural goods provisions to be applied
to agricultural components "mutatis mutandis".97 Agricultural goods are to benefit
from a gradual implementation of "greater liberalisation of their reciprocal trade"
89 Unlike the Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries.
90 Barcelona Declaration, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27 and 28 Nov 1995.
91 To include agreements with Tunisia (July 1995), Israel (Nov 1995), Morocco (Feb 1995), the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Feb 1997) and Jordan (Apr 1997), and the Customs Union signed with
Turkey (6 Mar 1995).
92 Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria.
93 Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Syria, Palestinian Authority.
94 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an association between the European Communi¬
ties and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, OJ L 97,
30/3/98, 2-189.
95 Decision No 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 25 Oct 1999 on the implementa¬
tion of the provisions on processed agricultural products laid down in Art 10 of the Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement establishing an association between the European communities and their Member Sates, of
the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part (1999/743/EC).
96 Art 11 of Decision No 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 25 Oct 1999.
97 Art 10 of Decision No 1/1999 of the EU-Tunisia Association Council of 25 Oct 1999.
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pursuant to Article 16, with differentiation of provisions being provided for different
commodities under Article 17 of Decision no. 1/1999.
As the intention is to create a free trade area around the Mediterranean, permitted
as an MFN exemption by Article XXIV.8 GATT 47 and 94, it should be noted that
such an exemption does not permit differentiation between agricultural and non-
agricultural goods. Clearly these agreements, in the sense that they differ in their
treatment of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities, in a way which does
not reflect the WTO approach to same, could be found to be in breach of the MFN
and its exceptions, requirements under the WTO agreements. It will be interesting
to see how this matter resolves itself in the future.
From a quick review of some of the EC agreements from the perspective of
trade in agricultural commodities, it is clear that there remains a need for a WTO,
or WTO sponsored GSP code, on the assumption that the UNCTAD philosophy
behind the GSP system is going to be adopted in the current economic and political
WTO climate. In the absence of such a code, the EC's current GSP system, for all
the limited benefits which it brings to the GSP beneficiary countries. In addition,
it would appear that the EC's Euro-Med agreements could also be found wanting
if held up to the probing investigations of the WTO, should such a development
occur. It can be clearly evidenced from the Lome / Cotonou scenario that the EC
has to ensure that its external trading relations are WTO compliant, and that should
they be found wanting in this regard, that the EC could be on the losing end of a
WTO panel or appellate body ruling, with the necessity to redraft its external treaty
arrangements in a WTO compliant format.
The Legal Tools
Anti-Dumping provisions
Annexed to the Uruguay Round Final Act, in Annex 1, are two agreements, the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, dealing with antidumping provisions, and the Agreement on Sub¬
sidies and Countervailing Measures. These provisions were implemented into EC
law by Council Regulation 384/96 as amended,98 and Council Regulation 2026/97,"
as amended, respectively. Prior to the Uruguay Round texts the EC had maintained
one scheme for both anti-dumping and countervailing duties. While anti-dumping
98 Council Regulation 384/96, OJ 6.3.96 L56/1, as amended, by Council Regulation 2331/96, OJ
6.12.96 L317/1, and Council Regulation 905/98, OH 30.4.98, OJ 30.4.98, L128/18, replacing Council
Regulation 3283/94 L349/1, 31.21.94 L349/1, as amended by Council Regulation 1251/95, OJ 2.6.95
L122/1., F Snyder International Trade Law and Customs Law of the European Union, (Butterworths
1998).
99 See Council Regulation 2026/97, OJ 21/10.97 L288/1, replacing Council Regulation 3284/94, OJ
31.12.94 L349/22, as amended by Council Regulation 1252/95, OH 2.6.95 L122/2.
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measures are intended to address the issue of "distortive effects which dumping
practices by firms established in third countries in the community market", and
countervailing measures are intended to address the issue of the distortive effects
within the Community market of "unfair foreign government subsidisation",100 the
two new schemes do however overlap at times, with the main differences between
the two being "respective rules on the calculation of the dumping margin and the
countervailable subsidy margin".101 The impact of these provisions on agricultural
trade is however limited by the provisions of Article 21 of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, which provides that "the provisions of GATT 1994 and of other
Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply
subject to the provisions of this Agreement",102 with the Agreement on Agriculture
providing its own provisions which affect the impact of the general provisions on
anti-dumping, countervailing measures, and export subsidies on global agricultural
trade. The exact interaction between these two WTO provisions may however be
an issue for the future, particularly in light of the expiration of Article 13 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, known as the peace clause, which has recently expired,
of which more later.
Export subsidies, for their part, are generally regarded as "one of the most
disruptive elements in the operation of world markets",103 and it is perhaps for that
reason that they are covered by a number of articles in a number of the Uruguay
Round agreements. The exact relationship between these provisions, however, merits
examination. The WTO regulation of subsidies for export of agricultural products
derive from two Uruguay Round documents, the Agreement on Agriculture, Article
8,104 and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 3.1.105
Added to the picture, as with anti-dumping provisions, is the expiration of Article
13 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
100 F Snyder International Trade Law and Customs Law of the European Union, (Butterworths
1998)
101 Ibid.
102 Art 21 Agreement on Agriculture: 1. The provisions ofGATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade
Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
2. The Annexes to this Agreement are hereby made an integral part of this Agreement.
103 D Chambovey 'How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Art 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agri¬
culture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework' (2002) 36(2) JWT
302-352.
104 Art 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture, which provides that "Each Member undertakes not to
provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments
as specified in that Member's Schedule".
105 Art 3.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. "Except as provided in the
Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Art 1, shall be prohibited:
(a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions,
upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I;
(b) subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods."
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With specific reference to the issue of export subsidies, interrelationship between
Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 3.1 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures was addressed by both the Panel106 and the
Appellate Body107 in the Canada - Diary Products case. In the panel report it was
stated that the Agreement on Agriculture does permit the use of export subsidies, but
"only within the limits of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitments levels"
in the relevant Member States' WTO schedules.108 The Appellate Body adopted
a similar line when it provided that export subsidies for agricultural products had
to be firstly examined against the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, and
only if they did not fall within the provisions of that agreement were they then
to be addressed by Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures.109
A question therefore arises as to the role and function of Article 13 of the
Agreement on Agriculture, and its effect on its expiration. A problem arises in the
interpretation of this provision in the context of the aforementioned provisions, to
the extent that Chambovey is of the opinion that the Article 13 provisions appear
to "be reduced to inutility", its interpretation thereby being "dissonant with the
principle of effectiveness in the interpretation of treaties",110 with the expiry of
the "peace clause" of Article 13 having no effect on the pre-existing relationship
between Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article 3.1 of the Agreement
of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. However, as pointed out by Chambovey,
Agricultural export subsidies, while protected from Article 3.1 of the SCM agree¬
ment, could still be actionable under Article XVI GATT. These conflicting view
points can only be resolved by a WTO Panel decision on the point.
As can be seen, as agricultural commodities, along with other primary commodi¬
ties, are treated differently from non-primary commodities, for export subsidies, by
virtue of Article XVI.B.3111 of GATT, they also are dealt with differently for the
106 Canada - Measures Affecting the Importation ofMilk and the Exportation ofDairy Products-
Report of the Panel, (17 May 1999) WT/DS103/R. WT/DS113/R, at para 7.20.
107 Canada - Measures affecting the Importation ofMilk and the Exportation of Dairy Products,
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States Report of the Appellate
Body, (3 Dec 2001), WT/DS103/AB/RW, WT/DS113AB/RW, at para 123.
108 D Chambovey (n 103).
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
1,1 Art XVI.B.3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the
export of primary products. If, however, a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form of
subsidy which operates to increase the export of any primary product from its territory such subsidy
shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having more than a suitable
share of world export trade in that product, account boing taken of the chares of the contracting parties
in such trade in the product during a previous representative period, and any special factors which may
have affected or may be affecting such trade in the product. (For the purposes of Section B. a "primary
product" is understood to be any product of farm, forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or
which has undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial
volume in international trade.)
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purposes of anti-dumping matters. As long as the test of not "more than an equitable
share of world export trade in that product" can be met, then export subsidies are
permitted for agricultural goods, resulting in the consequence that a normal price
for agricultural goods on the world export market would be regarded as a dumping
price for manufactured goods. There is however, a requirement, to reduce export
subsidies, in line with agreed commitments, pursuant to Article 3.3 of the Agree¬
ment on Agriculture."2 There is an agreement amongst the WTO Member States
to "work toward the development of internationally agreed disciplines" dealing
with "export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance programmes", and once
such agreement is reached to "provide export credits, export credit guarantees or
insurance programmes only in conformity therewith".113 Such an agreement at the
WTO has yet to be reached. The above provisions are reflected in the post-Uruguay
round operation of the CAP's common organisations. It is to be anticipated that the
Millennium Round negotiation on Agriculture will pursue this issue, and introduce
greater rigour in the regulation of international trade in agricultural commodities.
In addition, the exact interaction between the WTO Agreement on Agriculture and
both the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 and the SCM Agreement, in light of the expiry of the "peace
clause" will need to be addressed.
Rules of Origin
The issue of rules of origin remained the main unharmonised provision after the
coming into force of the Tokyo Round's Custom's Valuation Code in 1979 and the
International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System of the then named customs Co-operation Council (now known as the World
Customs Organisation) in 1988.114 Guidelines were provided in the CCC convention
dealing with Rules of Origin, however it did not regulate this particular matter. This
lack of a standard "rule of origin" system is of particular relevance to the EC, which
"is one of the most enthusiastic users of.... free-trade areas and customs unions",115
112 Agreement on Agriculture (15 Apr 1994) LT/UR/A-1A/2, Art 3.3; "Subject to the provisions of
paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Art 9, a member shall not provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of
Art 9 in respect of the agricultural products or groups of products specified in Section II of Part IV of
its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels specified therein and
shall not provide such subsidies in respect of any agricultural product not specified in that Section of
its Schedule.
113 F Snyder (n 100).
114 S Inama 'A Comparative Analysis of the Generalized System of Preferences and Non-Preferential
Rules of Origin in the Light of the Uruguay Round Agreement; Is it a Possible Avenue for Harmoniza¬
tion or Further Differentiation?' (1995) 29(1) JWT 77-111.
115 B Driessen and F Graafsma 'The EC's Wonderland; an Overview of the Pan-European Harmonised
Origin Protocols' (1999) 33(4) JWT 19-45.
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with the EC operating different systems in its variety of agreements, ranging from
its Lome/Cotonou relations to its GSP and Euro-Med relations.116 Rules of Origin
break up into two distinct groups, preferential and non-preferential rules of origin.
The non-preferential rules of origin "are commonly understood to apply to most
favoured nation (MFN) trade"117 and are now regulated by the Uruguay Round
Agreement on Rules ofOrigin, to which is annexed,118 a Common Declaration with
Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin. The legal status of this declaration, which
deals with rules of origin in the case of the GSP scheme, or in free trade agree¬
ments, is not clear.119
The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin for non-preferential trade reads as a
document reflecting work in progress. It provides clarity as to when non-preferen¬
tial rules of origin are to be applied,120 and provisions for their application during a
transition period during which clearer rules on "rules of origin" are to be determined.
A Committee on Rules of Origin is set up within the WTO structure, under Article
4.1 of the Agreement, which, assisted by a WTO Technical Committee on Rules
of Origin, (Article 4.2) working with the International law body then known as the
Customs Co-operation Council, now known as the World Customs Organisation
(WCO),121 is to draft new WTO regulations for non-preferential "Rules of Origin".
This is an "ambitious agenda" for the WCO, "to elaborate a harmonized set of
non-preferential rules or origin based on the process criterion" set against years of
varied practice throughout the world.122 The UNCTAD, for its part, has, with few
results, through its Special Committee on Preferences, "been discussing possible
harmonisation of GSP rules of origin for almost twenty years".123 Agreement on
non-preferential rules of origin could lead to further developments in the preferential
rules of origin debate. For its part the EC has legislated for non-preferential rules
of origin in Regulation 2913/92,124 which deals with the EC's Common Customs
Code. This code "defines the non-preferential origin of goods" for the purposes of
"the application of the EC's customs tariff',125 with "the Communities rules on
116 Ibid.
117 S Inama (n 114).
118 Annex II.
119 S Inama (n 114).
120 Art 1.2, when read in conjunction with Art 1.1 of the Agreement on Rules ofOrigin provides that
"Rules of origin (covered by this agreement)... shall include all rules of origin used in non-preferential
commercial policy instruments, such as in the application ofmost-favoured-nation treatment under Arts I,
II, III, XI ofGATT 1994; anti-dumping and countervailing duties under Art VI ofGATT 1994; safeguard
measures under Art XIX ofGATT 1994; origin marking requirements under Art IX of GATT 1994; and
any discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas. They shall also include rules of origin used
for government procurement and trade statistics.
121 http://www.wcoomd.org
122 S Inama (n 114).
123 Ibid.
124 Regulation 2913/92, Official Journal, L.302, 13 October 1992
125 F Snyder (n 100).
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non-preferential origin" following closely those set out in the WTO Agreement on
the Rules of Origin.126
While the rules on preferential rules of origin differ from scheme to scheme,127 the
concept of preferential measures is set out in Article 20(3)(d) and (e)128 of Council
Regulation 2913/92.129 A distinction is also made between "goods wholly obtained
in one country" and goods whose origin "involved more than one country".130
Within the EC the issue ofmulti-origin goods, (known as "goods whose produc¬
tion involved more than one country", allied with the issue of regional cumulation
for Rules ofOrigin differs considerably between the non-preferential rules of origin,
and, for example, the EC's regulation of its GSP, with the system operating for the
GSP being stricter than that being applied for MFN states. Both schemes are pro¬
vided for in a document by the EC, Commission Regulation 2454/93,131 which was
passed in order the implement the EC's Common Customs Code,132 which itself
is contained in Regulation 2913/92.133 The EC, following international guidance,
deems goods, under the non-preferential rules, to originate from the country where
they underwent their last substantial working or processing 134 For goods under the
preferential rules of origin, as in the GSP scheme, the EC requires goods to change
their tariff heading classification in their country of last processing, in order to be
deemed to have come from that country.135 While the preferential text is technical
and explicit, in adopting the process criterion, the non-preferential test is generally
considered to permit "a certain degree of discretion in the hands of' the EC institu¬
tion which is interpreting this provision.136
Regional cumulation provisions for preferential rules also distinguishes pref¬
erential and non-preferential rules of origin, as there is no provision for regional
cumulation in the non-preferential rules of origin, and goods must originate "within
126 Ibid.
127 GSP, Cotinou, EFTA, etc.
128 Art 20.3. Council Regulation 2913/92; "The Customs Tariff of the European Communities shall
comprise:
(d) the preferential tariff measures contained in agreements which the Community has concluded
with certain countries or groups of countries and which provide for the granting of preferential tariff
treatment
(e) preferential tariffmeasures adopted unilaterally by the Community in respect of certain countries,
groups of countries or territories".
129 F Snyder (n 100).
130 Ibid.
131 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code,
Official Journal L 253, 11/10/1993 at 1.
132 S Inama (n 114) .
133 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 Oct 1992 establishing the Community Customs
Code, Official Journal L 302, 19/10/1992 at 1.
134 S Inama (n 114).
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
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a single country".137 In the preferential schemes, the EC has established "special
rules on regional cumulation for specific regional groupings",138 such as ASEAN139
or CACM.140 In these cases, "products originating" from one country in a regional
group, "and used in further manufacture in another country of the group must be
treated as if they originated in the country of further manufacture".141 This will
happen, only if certain conditions are met.142 Some preferential schemes offer
full regional cumulation, others, such as the EC's GSP are only offered "partial"
regional cumulation. Full regional cumulation is granted to the ACP countries under
the Lome / Cotonou agreements.143 The variety of practices existing in the area of
"rules of origin" as a whole is such that, as Imana has stated "the 'neutral' concept
of origin is long gone: today's rules of origin are used as, or simply are, instruments
of commercial policy".144 This lack of neutrality would of itself, bring this issue to
the fore of the WTO's trade policy review investigations.
The role of the WTO's Committee on the Rules of Origin, operating, through
the WTO's Technical Committee on Rules of Origin, with the WCO, will have to
resolve the many complexities of regulation in this area, initially, as set out in the
WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin, for non-preferential rules of origin, but also,
in the absence of some developments at UNCTAD on GSP rules of origin, some
way down the line, also on preferential rules of origin. Of some consolation to the
readers of this paper is the fact that agricultural products are normally raw materi¬
als, or materials at the first state of processing which, for practical purposes, do
not normally give rise to complex questions as to origin. Any agricultural product
which has undergone substantial processing has normally ceased to be an agricul¬
tural product, and has changed its HS classification. We await further clarification
from the WTO on this issue.
The Common Customs Code
A parallel legal issue is that of the EC's Common Customs Code. While not regu¬
lated by the WTO, but rather by the WCO, is one area where substantial global
harmonisation providing a substantia] level backdrop current and future work of the
WTO in the area of trade in agricultural commodities. The EC, in its Common Cus-
137 Ibid.
138 F Snyder (n 100).
139 Association of South - East Asian Nations.
140 Central American Common Market.
141 F Snyder (n 100).
142 As set out in Art 72a(2) ofCommission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 (as amended),
Official Journal L 253, 11/10/1993 at 1.
143 S Inama (n 114).
144 Ibid.
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toms Tariff now "follows closely the structure of the Harmonised System",145 of the
World Customs Organisation, (WCO), as do many other countries around the world.
The WCO, known before 1994 as the Customs Co-operation Council,146 operated
the Common Customs Code (CCC). The CCC was set up under the International
Convention on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Procedures was
first sighed in Kyoto on 18 May 1973, and entered into force on 25 September 1974.
It is currently being updated by the 1999 Revised Convention, which still has to be
fully adopted by the members of the WCO. The WCO comprises 150 members and
is based in Brussels. The Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System
(HS) operated by the WCO, entered into force on 1 January 1988, and is used by its
Member States, the EC and the WTO for the classification of commodities.
While only countries can become members of the International Convention
on the Simplification and Harmonisation of Customs Procedures 1973, as all the
Member States of the EC have signed this convention, the ECJ took the view in the
case of Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnze147 that
"the Community has replaced the Member States in commitments arising from the
Convention",148 with either the Member State holding the Presidency of the EC, or
the Commission representing the EC at WCO meetings.
The EC has signed the International Convention on the Harmonised Commod¬
ity Description and Coding System, 1983, and its amending protocol (1986),149
on the basis of Articles 26 and 133 EC (formerly Articles 28 and 113 EC), and as
reflected in the case of Commission of the European Communities v Council of the
European Communities.150 In this case the Commission had sought to argue that
Council Decision 87/369,151 which implemented the provisions of the International
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System was
incorrectly based. The Commission's view was that this decision should have been
made exclusively on the basis of the then Article 113 EC, and not on the mix of
"Articles 28, 113 and 235 of the Treaty"152 as was adopted by the Council. The then
Article 28 EC, now Article 26 EC, provides for the Common Customs Tariff, with
145 F Snyder 'Governing Economic Globalisation: Global Legal Pluralism and EU law' in F Snyder
(ed) Regional and Global Regulation ofInternational Trade (Hart Publishing Oxford - Portland Oregon
2002).
146 Founded in 1952.
147 Case 38/75 Nederlandse Spoorwegen v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1975] ECR
1439.
148 F Snyder (n 145).
149 Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, 1983, and its amending protocol (1986)
OJ 1987 LI98/3, 1035 UNTS 3, KAV 2260.
150 Case 165/87 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities
[1988] ECR 5545.
151 Council Decision 87/369 of 7 April 1987 concerning the conclusion of the International Conven¬
tion on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System and of the Protocol of Amendment
thereto Official Journal 1987, L 198 at 1.
152 Case 165/87 (n 150).
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duties being "fixed by the Council acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from
the Commission". The ECJ found that the "establishment of a tariff nomenclature"
was indispensable to the application of customs duties",153 and that the dual basis
utilised by the Council, relying on both Article 28 EC and Article 113 EC was
appropriate.154 This HS nomenclature replaced the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature,
which originated from the Convention for the Classification of Goods in Customs
Tariffs of 15 December 1950, managed and interpreted by the Customs Co-opera¬
tion Council. The Brussels Tariff Nomenclature was adopted by the EEC when
introducing the Common Customs Code in 1968, pursuant to Regulation 950/68.155
The Harmonised System has been adopted as the "Combined Nomenclature", and is
contained in Annex 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) 265 8/87,156 meeting the require¬
ments of both the "Common Customs Tariff and of the external trade statistics of
the Community".157 (It should be noted that Annex 1 is replaced annually, "by the
Commission with the assistance of the Nomenclature Committee"158 pursuant to
Council Regulation 2658/87.)159
Conclusion
From this brief study of the above selection of topics the Common Commercial
Policy (CCP) of the EC, as expressed by Article 133 EC, and as interpreted by Opin¬
ion 1/94,160 has and will continue to have a profound impact on the EC's external
trade in agricultural commodities. An impact has not only been felt by EC policy
makers and regulators from the existing WTO legal texts, but future development
arising from existing legal texts still have to evolve. In addition current WTO posi¬
tions and documents indicate future areas for development in this area. In addition,
possible future developments arising from any legal texts, and undoubtedly there
must be, emanating from the current WTO/GATT round of negotiations must be
anticipated. As to the detail of such commitments we may have yet to wait some
years for clarification. What is beyond doubt is that Fortress Europe, to the extent
that it exists for trade in agricultural commodities, is under a concerted and continu¬
ous assault from WTO commitments.
153 At point 8 of the judgment.
154 At points 12 and 13 of the judgment.
155 Regulation (EEC) No 950/68 of the Council of 28 June 1968 on the Common Customs Tariff,
Official Journal L 172, 22/07/1968 at 1.
156 Council Regulation (EEC) 2658/87 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and the Common
Customs Tariff, OJ 7.9.87 L256/1.
157 F Snyder (n 100).
158 Ibid.
159 Council Regulation (EEC) 2658/87 (n 156).
160 Opinion 1/94 (Re the Uruguay Round Treaties) [1994] ECR 5267.
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THE WINDS OF CHANGE BLOW AGAIN: THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION'S IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S
COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY
ABSTRACT. This paper examines the legal relationship between the World Trade
Organisation's Agreement on Agriculture and the European Community's Common Agri¬
cultural Policy {CAP), in light of the reopening of the WTO Agricultural Negotiations in
the Millennium Round. It also examines the impact of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture, on the Mac Sharry reforms of the CAR An in depth study of the EC's Cereals
Common Organisation is included.
Reopening of WTO Agricultural Negotiations
Agriculture is one of the most developed policies within the EC, and one
of the most contentious at a World Trade level. It is often overlooked by
the uninitiated, who find that its high level of development has lead to a
complexity which some find off putting. In addition, the terminology used
is often more familiar to the family farmer than to the legal academic.
The perception that the law pertaining to Agriculture at both the EC and
the world trade level can be ring fenced and can be ignored by lawyers
interested on other areas of law is erroneous. By the very nature of its
high level of development, EC Agricultural law, and its interaction with
WTO regulation can lead to the development of legal solutions to address
agricultural issues which eventually cascade into other EC and WTO legal
arenas. At one stage EC Agricultural issues comprised one third of the
case law of the ECJ. This volume of case law has led to the development
of core EC law principles. It is anticipated that a similar situation will arise
at a World Trade level, and at the nexus between WTO regulation and EC
law.
World Trade regulation in Agriculture is primarily contained in the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which, along with GATT 1994 and
GATT 1947,1 is annexed to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
* Maria O Neill, BCL, LLM, M.Ed., Solicitor, Lecturer in Law, University of Abertay
Dundee.
1 All wto legal documents are available at http://www.wto.org.
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Organisation.2 These documents, with the exception of GATT 1947, are
the product of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which lasted from
1986 to 1994. It was envisaged at the time that these documents would be
eventually superseded by documents leading to even greater liberalisation
of trade pursuant to further multilateral negotiations. The WTO Agree¬
ment on Agriculture, for its part, provided at Article 203 that negotiations
would reopen "one year before the end of the implementation period" of
that agreement, with a view to obtaining "substantial progressive reduc¬
tions in support and protection resulting in fundamental reform". These
negotiations, have now reopened. Negotiations in phase 1,4 which ran from
the 23rd March 2000 to the 27th March 2001 have already concluded,
with phase 2 of the Agricultural negotiations, which opened on the 26th
March 2001 still ongoing. These negotiations have been refocused by the
Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 2001.5 The Uruguay round of
2 In Annex 1.
3 WTO Agreement on Agriculture; Continuation of the Reform Process. Article 20,
"Recognising that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support
and protection resulting in fundamental reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that
negotiations of continuing the process will be initiated one year before the end of the
implementation period, taking into account (a) the experience that date from implementing
the reduction commitments; (b) the effects of the reduction commitments on world trade in
agriculture; (c) non-trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing country
Members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agriculture trading
system, and the other objectives and concerns mentioned in the preamble to this Agree¬
ment; and (d) what further commitments are necessary to achieve the above mentioned
long-term objectives.
4 Phase 1 negotiations led to 7 meetings, 45 proposals, and a wide variety of documents
and proposals.
5 The Doha Ministerial Declaration of November 2001, at points 13 and 14, which
provided; 13. "We recognize the work already undertaken in the negotiations initiated in
early 2000 under Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture, including the large number
of negotiating proposals submitted on behalf of a total of 121 members. We recall the
long-term objective referred to in the Agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented
trading system through a programme of fundamental reform encompassing strengthened
rules and specific commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. We reconfirm our commitment
to this programme. Building on the work carried out to date and without prejudging the
outcome of the negotiations we commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at:
substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all
forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.
We agree that special and differential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral
part of all elements of the negotiations and shall be embodied in the schedules of conces¬
sions and commitments and as appropriate in the rules and disciplines to be negotiated,
so as to be operationally effective and to enable developing countries to effectively take
account of their development needs, including food security and rural development. We
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negotiations led to international legal commitments of both the EC and its
member states, both being members of the WTO, which has led to a radical
change in the internal legal structures of the EC's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP). A new WTO Agreement on Agriculture could lead to more
changes. It is proposed in this paper to examine the effect of the 1994 WTO
agreement on the CAP, taking cereals as a case study, and to look forward
to prospect of future changes to the CAP arising from the interaction of
the regional legal entity of the EC with the global regulatory body of the
WTO.
The Legal Interaction between the EC and the WTO
The EC Treaty has operated to transfer sovereignty in matters pertaining
to agriculture from the member states of the EC to the EC,6 with the agri¬
cultural policy of what is currently the 15 member states7 of the European
Union, operating a unified Agricultural Policy, the Common Agricultural
Policy, or CAP. Each of the member states of the EC, together with the
EC, have all signed up to the global trading agreements, the there main
ones being GATT 1994,8 GATS9 and TRIPS.10 These are enforced through
the World Trade Organisation dispute settlement mechanism, which also
operates the Agreement on Agriculture. The regional Common Agricul¬
tural Policy of the EC, and the WTO Agriculture agreement, have different
histories, different emphases, and differences in political underpinnings.
The regimes of both the EC and the WTO in the area of Agriculture are
legally binding.
Article 302 EC11 empowers the European Commission, to "main¬
tain such relations as are appropriate with all international organisations.
take note of the non-trade concerns reflected in the negotiating proposals submitted by
Members and confirm that non-trade concerns will be taken into account in the negotiations
provided for in the Agreement on Agriculture." 14. "Modalities for the further commit¬
ments, including provisions for special and differential treatment, shall be established no
later than 31 March 2003. Participants shall submit their comprehensive draft Schedules
based on these modalities no later than the date of the Fifth Session of the Ministerial
Conference. The negotiations, including with respect to rules and disciplines and related
legal texts, shall be concluded as part and at the date of conclusion of the negotiating
agenda as a whole."
6 See EC Treaty, Articles 32 to 38 EC, (ex. Articles 38 to 46 EC).
7 Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece,
Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark. Sweden, Finland, Austria.
8 The General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade 1994, which was preceded by GATT
1947.
9 General Agreement for Trade in Services.
10 Trade Related Issues of Intellectual Property.
11 EC Treaty, Article 229 EC, pre-Amsterdam.
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European Law requires the EC to adhere to all of its international law
commitments, with "the provisions of such an agreement" being deemed
to form an integral part of the community system",12 with an obligation
being placed on the ECJ to ensure the "uniform application" of the terms
of such agreements throughout the Community"13 in order to ensure that
they are not used to create barriers to trade. As neither the World Trade
Organisation nor GATT is expressly referred to in the EC treaty,14 the rela¬
tionship between the two organisations, in the context of EC jurisprudence,
has been developed by way of case law of the ECJ.
ECJ jurisprudence recognises that the EC was substituted for the
Member States with regard to commitments under the GATT as far back
as on the 1st July 1968, when the EC introduced its Common Customs
Tariff.15 The ECJ has taken upon itself the role of interpreter of the GATT
by way of preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC,16 with regard to issues
arising as and from that date, (1968).17
In 1972 the ECJ, in International Fruitx% recognised that the provisions
of GATT 1947 was binding on the Community, however the same case
went on to say that the issue of whether or not an EC provision is illegal
because it is in breach of a public international law obligation, it is neces¬
sary to establish; 1. The public international obligation is binding on the
Community, and 2, where the proceedings are before a national court, that
the rule is self-executing.19 Regard must also be had to the "spirit, the
structure and the terms of the convention".20 In 1972 it was found that,
because there was great flexibility in the earlier GATT, it was considered
that the particular part of GATT in question at the time, was not self-
executing. Such an argument would not be as persuasive with regard to
the GATT 1994. The ECJ has yet to overturn a provision of EC law on the
12 Hauptzollamt Manz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. K.G. a.A. (reference for a preliminary
ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof) Case 104/51 [1982] ECR 3641.
13 Supra n. 12.
14 Although reference is made to international reciprocal agreements under EC Treaty,
Article 310 (Article 238 EC, pre-Amsterdam).
15 Anmenistrazione delle Finanze dello State v. Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI)
and SpA Michelen Italiana (SAMI) (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte
Suprema di Cassazione)-, Joined Cases 267-269/81 [1982] ECR 801.
16 EC Treaty, Article 177, pre-Amsterdam.
17 Supra n. 15.
i o
International Fruit Company N. V. and others v. Producktschap Voor Groenten en fruit
(No. 3) (Case 21-24/72).
19 Supra n. 18.
20 Supra n. 18.
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basis that it is incompatible with GATT rules,21 however the policies of the
EC have had to be amended to meet the EC's international legal obligations
under the WTO agreement. An examination of these amendments will be
made in this paper with regard to the common organisation of cereals. In
Opinion 1/9422 the ECJ held that the Common Commercial Policy of the
EC currently enshrined in Article 133 EC23 entitled the Commission to
develop an external Common Commercial Policy.24 Agricultural matters
are linked with the Common Commercial Policy.
Basic Tools of the Cap
The Common Agricultural Policy of the EC developed against the back
drop of the perception that "farmers had a special role in society", partic¬
ularly given the scarcity of food during and after the Second World
War.25 The six originating member states of the EEC were "far from self-
sufficient in foodstuffs", and there was perceived to be "no justification
for the unilateral opening up of markets"26 at that period in history. The
Spaak report of April 1956 advocated special treatment for agriculture,27
in comparison to other activities, on account of the need for food for
human life, social stability of rural society, and the climatic and other
natural factors which are out with human control, which affected farming
more than other economic activities.28 In addition, regional disparities
became another factor in dealing with the agricultural industry in a
different manner to other economic activities.29 The Stresa Conference
of 1958 emphasised the social stability of rural areas and the need to
21 Frederick M. Abbott, Law and Policy of Regional Integration - The NAFTA and
Western Hemispheric Integration in the World Trade Organization System (Kluwer, 1995),
at p. 56.
22 Opinion 1/94 of15.11.1994 Opinion pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty. ECJ
[1994] 5267.
23 EC Treaty, Article 113, pre-Amsterdam.
24 Introducing the concept of Implied Parallel Powers into EC jurisprudence. See A.
Appella "Constitutional Aspects of Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ concerning the WTO",
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 45 (April 1996), pp. 440^-62.
25 R. Moehler; "The Role of Agriculture in the Economy and Society", paper presented
at the Seminar on Beliefs and Values Underlying Agricultural Policies, Lake Balaton,
Hungary, September 19-23, 1996, http://www.fao.org/docrep/W7440E/w7440e03.htm,
accessed 25.1.02.
26 L. Van Depoele, "The Common Agricultural Policy and the Accession of Central and
Eastern European Countries", http://www.zum.lt/akof/kalbos/kal01 .htm, accessed 25.2.02.
27 Supra n. 25.
28 Supra n. 25.
29 Supra n. 25.
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reinforce the family farm. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome derived
from a compromise between existing national interests of the six member
states,30 with the intention of increasing productivity, stabilising markets
and guaranteeing reasonable income for farmers, and reasonable prices for
consumers,31 and was strongly influenced by President Roosevelt's New
Deal policy of the pre-war years.32
The basic tools of the CAP included;
1. Target prices, being the prices that farmers should obtain on the open
market;
2. Intervention Prices, being the prices at which intervention agencies
would buy in surplus produce. This was subsequently modified to
include "quality standards and other regulations" concerning what
would be bought into intervention,33
3. Threshold prices at the frontier, being the lowest possible price that
goods would be bought into the community, the difference between
world market prices and threshold prices being adjusted by way of
variable import levies imposed by the EEC;34
4. Export subsidies, which would be payments made by the EEC on
goods being sold out of the Community onto the world market, to
allow for the differential between world prices, and the internal EEC
price for that produce. In the unlikely event that world prices were
higher than Community prices, then an export tax would be chargeable
on the export of the agricultural produce.35 The main principles of the
Common Agricultural policy became "the common market, financial
solidarity and Community preference",36 with the supposedly uniform
prices for commodities throughout the EC. The CAP has in more
recent years been evolving into a two pillar structure, with the second
pillar contributing to a new European Rural Policy. The development
of the CAP since its inception can been seen as evolving from both the
internal and external needs of the CAP to reform. The 1980s expensive
side effects of CAP of the butter mountains and wine lakes of the
80s, while the CAP, by 1988, had grown to account for over half of
the EC Budget, with the estimation that the CAP cost 160 ECU to
30 R. Voloanen, Secretary General of COPA and COGECA DIS (01) 04, Speech in
AGRO-FOOD 200] \ 7.2.2001; Tampre, Finland.
31 Supra n. 30.
32 Supra n. 30.
33 Supra n. 26.
34 Supra n. 26.
35 Supra n. 26.
36 Supra n. 25.
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benefit a farmer by 100 ECU,37 resulting in serious inefficiencies an
also proving highly contentious, accounting for a very large volume of
case law before the ECJ.
Basic Tolls of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
While the original drafts of GATT 1947 treated manufactured and agri¬
cultural goods in exactly the same way, pressure from the US to protect
the provisions of the US Agricultural Adjustment Act 1933, led to provi¬
sions in GATT 1947 which led to a "proliferation of a wide range of
non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade".38 This situation was exacerbated
in 1955 when the US was granted, by the GATT contracting parties, "a
waiver permitting it to impose quota on agricultural imports in a manner
inconsistent with Article XI:(c)".39 The view developed at that time, at
a global level, that domestic measures supporting indigenous farming
communities was not a matter for international regulation. The Tokyo
round of GATT negotiations developed the position of agriculture within
the regulatory mechanism, with the Tokyo Declaration of Ministers of the
14th September 1973 leading to the coming into force of two commodity
agreements in the area of agriculture, the International Bovine Meat Agree¬
ment40 together with the setting up of the International Meat Council,41
and the International Dairy Agreement,42 which was accompanied by
the establishment of the International Dairy Products Council.43 It was
however, only at the Uruguay round, which led, inter alia, to the Agree¬
ment on Agriculture, that Agricultural issues came centre stage in GATT
negotiations, and Agriculture became one of the more highly contentious
issues in the negotiations that led to the agreement of the final treaty texts.
TheWTO, which came into being pursuant to the Uruguay round agree¬
ments, operates a multi-lateral trading system "based on a non-intrusive,
non-discriminatory, national treatment approach",44 with national govern-
37 National Consumer Council, "Consumers and the Common Agriculture Policy", in
The Future of the CAP: The NCC's Conclusions and Recommendations (1988).
38 K.C. Kennedy, "Reforming Farm Trade in the Next Round ofWTO Multilateral Trade
Negotiations", Journal of World Trade 35/6 (2001), pp. 1061-1079.
39 Supra n. 38.
40 GATT Treaty Texts, Booklet 8 July 1995.
41 See also the Official Journal of the European Communities. OJ LI 980] L 71/7.
42 GATT Treaty Texts, Booklet 10(c), issued December 1995.
43 See also the Official Journal of the European Communities, OJ [1980] L 71/11.
44 OECD, Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System: Synergy and
Divergence, Executive Summary (OECD, 1995), at p. 46.
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ments being free to maintain "divergent policies".45 The WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, concluded pursuant to the Uruguay Round of negotiations
which concluded in 1994 applied to the GATT members as a whole, and




4. Food Security (to encourage stockpiling instead of trade protection, to
achieve food security objectives).
While all of these issues have had an effect on the Common Agricultural
Policy of the European Union, it is perhaps the internal support measures
that have had the greatest, and most direct, impact in the short term.
Effect of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture on CAP
After Uruguay
The Common Agricultural Policy of the EC is structured around common
organisations, as provided for by Article 34 EC.46 Three possible forms of
common organisations are provided for; (1) one based on the common
rules on competition, (2) one based on compulsory co-ordination of
the various national market organisations, and (3) a European market
organisation. The superstructure of CAP was to be based on a three pillar
structure,47 one of "community preference, common prices and common
financing".48 The first pillar, community preference, was based on Article
44.2,49 which has now been repealed by the Amsterdam Treaty. How
effective the second pillar of common prices has operated, is question¬
able.50 The third option of a European Common Market association has
proved to be very popular, with a large number having been set up.51
45 Supra n. 44.
46 Ex. Article 40 EC.
47 McMahon is of the opinion that in later years a forth pillar of co-responsibility was
added. See J. A. McMahon, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy (Pearson Education,
2000), at p. 166.
48 E. Neville-Rolfe The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community (Policy
Studies Institute, May 1984).
49 EC Treaty, Article 44.2: "Minimum prices shall neither cause a reduction of the trade
existing between Member States when this Treaty enters into force or form an obstacle to
progressive expansion of this trade. Minimum prices shall not be applied so as to form an
obstacle to the development of a natural preference between Member States."
50 Supra n. 48.
51 At present there are 22 common market organisations and a number of other
arrangements:
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These organisations have resulted in the centralisation of policy with
respect to each product covered. National organisations have been effec¬
tively replaced by Common organisations, with national organisations only
being permitted to operate to the extent that they do not conflict with
Common organisations.52 Market organisations can be grouped and classi¬
fied according to the extent and degree, or the absence of market support.
This support depends on the economic importance, of lack of same, to
the Community. Products with the greater economic importance have the
most developed, rigid and protective regulations, especially where the
income related thereto is important in relation to farming income as a
whole. Products with relatively less economic importance are treated more
flexibly, while products of little economic significance to the Community
as a whole, but which are important locally, may include internal financial
support measures.53
Cereals Council Regulation No. 1766/92 (OJ L 181/21);
Pig Meat Council Regulation No. 2759/75 (OJ L 282/1);
Eggs Council Regulation No. 2771/75 (OJ L. 282/49);
Poultry Council Regulation No. 2775/75 (OJ L 282/77);
Fruit and Vegetable Council Regulation No. 1035/72 (OJ L 118/1);
Wine Council Regulation No. 822/87 (OJ L 84/1);
Milk Products Council Regulation No. 804/68 (OJ L 148/13);
Beef and Veal Council Regulation No. 805/68 (OJ L 148/24);
Rice Council Regulation No. 1418/76 (OJL 166/1);
Oils and Fats Council Regulation No. 136/66 (OJ L 1966/3025);
Sugar Council Regulation No. 1785/81 (OJ L 177/4);
Flowers and Live Plants Council Regulation No. 234/68 (OJ L 55/1);
Processed Food and Vegetables Council Regulation No. 516/77 (OJL 73/1);
Raw Tobacco Council Regulation No. 2075/92 (OJ L 215/70):
Hops Council Regulation No. 1696/71 (OJL 175/1);
Fibre Flax and Hemp Council Regulation No. 1673/2000 (OJ L 193, 29/7/2000, p. 6);
Dehydrated Fodders Council Regulation No. 603/95 (OJ L 63, 21/3/95, p. 1);
Seeds Council Regulation No. 235871 (OJL 246/1);
Sheep Meat and Goat Meat Council Regulation No. 3013/89 (OJ L 289, 7/10/89, p. 1);
Fishery Products Council Regulation No. 101/76 (OJ L 289, 7/10/89, p. 1);
Bananas Council Regulation No. 404/93 (OJ L 47, 25/2/93, p. 1);
Certain Annex 2 products Council Regulation No. 827/68 (OJ L 151, 30/6/68, p. 16).
Special Measures (re production aids)
Peas and Beans Council Regulation No. 1431/82 (OJ L No.162/28);
Linseed Council Regulation No. 569/76 (OJ L No.67/29);
Soya Beans, Rape Seed, Colza Council Regulation No. 3766/91 (OJ L No.356, 24/12/1991,
Seed and Sunflower Seed p. 17);
Silkworms Council Regulation No. 845/72 (OJ L No. 100/1).
52 Case 36/70: Getreide Import [1970] ECR 1107.
53 M. Melchor, European Perspectives: 30 Years ofCommunity Law (Commission of the
European Communities, 1983).
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Historically, the basic regulation on financing of the Common Agri¬
cultural Policy was Council Regulation 729/70,54 which confirmed the
European Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund,55 which was estab¬
lished by Council Regulation 25/62.56 This fund was separated into two
sections:
1. Guarantee spending, originally without, but now subject to budget
limits, and is sometimes applied on a co-financing basis;
2. Guidance operations, mainly used for investment projects, but limited
to specific amounts.
The Guarantee section was subdivided into two:
1. Export refunds,
2. Interventions intended to stabilise agricultural markets, to include all
internal market measures under the common market organisations.
These included 1st category interventions, i.e. amounts per weight.
These were nearly all aids or premiums, and were totally financed
by the community. Second category interventions included purchasing
and storage operations. This expenditure was usually expressed in
the form of a price. As these products may have later been sold the
expenditure is the sale price less the purchase price and processing
and storage price.57 The EAGGF is the main instrument for providing
stability and support for agriculture in the Community, and for financ¬
ing the structural changes deemed necessary to improve the agricul¬
ture sector. This fund was specifically charged with aiding structural
improvement in agriculture, reducing surpluses by subsiding exports
to 3rd countries, and intervening in local markets by purchase when the
price of products fall below the support level. The current framework
for funding is pursuant to Regulation 1260/1999.58
The Mac Sharry Reforms
While the Uruguay round negotiations were nearing completion, the EC
instigated what became to be knows as the Mac Sharry reforms on Agri¬
culture, after the then incumbent EC Commissioner for Agriculture. These
54 [1970] OJ L No. 94/13.
55 The EAGGF, or using its more common French acronyms, FEOGA.
56 OJ No. 1962/992.
57 R. Barents, The Agricultural Law of the EC (Kluwer Law International. 1994), Series:
European Monographs Vol. 9.
58 OJ 1999 LI61/1.
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reforms had very much an eye on the global negotiations on agriculture.
The European Commission itself described changes in the CAP during the
Mac Sharry reforms, as an effort to "separate more clearly two aspects
of agricultural policy; that of economic efficiency, and that of social and
environmental measures".59 This approach was to be further developed by
the 1999 reforms. Earlier moves in this direction were the Less Favoured
Areas initiative in 1975,60 and the Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA)
programmes,61 which together constituted, in 1993, approximately 1% of
the total UK agricultural budget.62
The main effects of the later 1992 "Mac Sharry" CAP reforms were:63
1. a reduction of intervention prices,64 thus making the agricultural sector
more, though as yet, not fully exposed, to the cold winds of the market
place, and,
2. the introduction of new direct payments, to include the compensation
through direct area payments,65 subject to 15% rotational set-aside (in
1993 non-rotational set aside, at 18 or 21%, was introduced on an
optional basis) for arable crops grown by all except small farmers,
and an increases in the male bovine and suckler (beef) cow premiums
subject to individual limits per holding and to regional reference herds
sizes.66
The most novel aspects of the 1992 reforms were the "accompany¬
ing measures", which for the most part were 50% funded (75% funded
in Objective 1 regions) from the CAP budget. These "accompanying
measures" were a myriad of provisions to include substantial funding
59 European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, "EC
Agricultural Policy for the 21st Century", European Economy: Reports and Studies, No. 4
(European Commission, 1994).
60 Directive on Mountain and Hill Farming in certain Less Favoured Areas, 75/268, OJ,
18, L128 (19 May 1975).
61 Council Regulation on Improving the Efficiency of Agricultural Structures, Official
Journal, 28, L93, 1-18. (30 March 1985).
62 W. Howarth and C.P. Rodgers (eds.) in the Editorial to Agriculture, Conservation and
Land Use: Law and Policy Issues for Rural Areas (Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
1993), quoting from Ministry ofAgriculture, Fisheries and Food, Agriculture in the UK,
1988, HMSO, 1989.
63 European Commission DG for Economic and Financial Affairs, "EC Agricultural
Policy for the 21st Century: The 1992 CAP Reforms"; European Economy Reports and
Studies, No. 4 (1994).
64 1/3 reduction in the cereal intervention price, 15% reduction in Beef, and the
elimination of price support for oilseeds and protein crops.
65 Based on historical base areas and regional yields.
66 There were also extra "extensification" headage premiums if a producer reduced the
stocking rate below 1.4 LU per fodder hectare.
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of schemes to develop the disadvantaged areas of the European Union.
Europe had been divided into objective areas under Article 8 Regulation
(EEC) No. 4256/88,67 with funding for the resulting Regional policy being
found under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),68 the
European Social Fund, the Guidance Section of the EAGGF,69 and the
Cohesion Fund.70 The LEADER programme started at this time,71 which
was soon followed by LEADER II,72 and later LEADER+, with a view to
developing a "Rural Europe".73 The Regional Policy structure was altered
during the 1999 reforms74 when it was amended to cover three objective
areas75 and four community initiatives.76 Pre-accession agricultural and
rural development schemes, for central and eastern European countries are
67 Objective 1: region whose development is lagging behind; Objective 2: indus¬
trial regions in decline; Objective 3: combating long term unemployment; Objective 4:
adapting workers to industrial change; Objective 5(a): agricultural structures in all regions
(Objective 5a provisions are often called "horizontal structural measures", as the entire
Community is eligible. These provisions are exclusively financed by the EAGGF Guidance
Section. Funding varied.); Objective 5b: rural development in certain limited areas; and
Objective 6: Nordic regions, following the accession of the new member states.
68 Currently operating under Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/1999, laying down
general provisions on the structural funds, OJ L 213, 13 August 1999.
69 In the fisheries sector, the Fisheries Guidance fund was also available.
70 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/99, laying down general provisions on the
structural funds, OJ L 213, 13 August 1999.
71 The original LEADER scheme was instigated pursuant to Regulation (EEC) No.
4256/88, Article 8, DGVI Financing of the Common Agricultural Policy.
72 Whose objectives were (1) to ensure that support for exemplary local initiatives
involving local development continues from Leader; (2) to support operations that are
innovative, suitable as a model and transferable, and that illustrate the new directions that
rural development may take; (3) to encourage the exchange of experiences and the transfer
for know-how through a European rural development network; (4) to encourage transna¬
tional co-operation projects developed by the local bodies in rural areas which reflect their
solidarity. See http://www.rural-europe.aeidl.be/.
73 See further http://www.rural-europe.aeidl.be/.
74 By Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/99.
75 Objective 1: Development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is
lagging behind, on the basis that their per capita GDP was less than 75% of the Community
average, (135.0 Billion Euro); Objective 2: Economic and social conversion of areas facing
structural difficulties (22.5 Billion Euro); and Objective 3: Adaptation and modernisation
of national policies and systems of education and training and employment (24.05 Billion
Euro).
76 Interreg III, covering cross-border, transitional and inter-regional co-operation,
Urban, regeneration of urban areas in crisis, Leader+ rural development by local action
groups, and Equal, to cover transnational co-operation to fight against discrimination and
inequality in access to work; Article 20.1 1260/1999.
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covered by SAPARD,77 in addition to the more mainstream PHARE and
ISPA78 schemes.79
Agri-development schemes were also developed under the Mac Sharry
reforms, with the objective of encouraging more extensive, as opposed to
intensive, means of production and to encourage the use of land for nature
conservation and public leisure facilities. This scheme had many objec¬
tives, amongst them the reduction of the polluting effects of agriculture, the
extensification of farming, the general improvement of the environment,
the encouragement of the upkeep of abandoned farmlands and woodlands,
the long term set-aside of land for environmental purposes, the encour¬
agement of public access to land for leisure activities, and finally, the
education and training of farmers so as to enable them to comply with
the above requirements.
A scheme of aid for forestry investment and management, to include a
scheme of compensation for income loss for up to 20 years, which included
the "Community aid scheme for forestry measures in agriculture",80 was
introduced contemporaneously. This latter scheme had as its objective the
conversion of agricultural land to forestry. It did not, however, include
the growth of Christmas trees, which had become a popular pursuit in
some Member States. A system of protection against forest fires was also
introduced.81
The ageing population of farmers throughout the European Union had
also been recognised as an obstacle to the preparation of the farming
community for globalisation influences of the then anticipated WTO
Agreement on Agriculture of 1994, and any subsequent developments.
The encouragement of the transfer of farms to the next generation had
been seen as a primary objective, with various forms of compensation for
early retirement82 being introduced. These included lump sum or annual
payments, for farmers and farm workers over 55, together with aid for
77 Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development.
78 Instrument for Structural Policies for pre-Accession, which operates like the EC's
Cohesion fund for existing EC member states.
79 There are separate aid arrangements for Cyprus and Malta.
80 Regulation No. 2080/92, of 30/6/92, OJ L 215 of 30/7/92, and Regulation No. 1054/94
of 5/5/94, OJ L 115 of 6/5/94, which organises financial control.
81 Regulation No. 2158/92 of 23.7.92 (OJ L 217 of 31/7/92), Regulation No. 1170/93
of 13/5/1993 (OJ L 118 of 4/5/93), Regulation No. 804/94 of 11/4/1994 (OJ E 93 of
12/4/94).
82 Regulation No. 2079/92 of 30/6/92, OJ L215 of 30/7/1992.
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young farmers generally,83 aid in vocational training,84 and other forms
of further education.85 Measures to cover the management costs of young
farmers during the first five years of operation were also covered86 where
the level of aid could have been quite high. This approach would be echoed
in the later 1999 reforms, pursuant to Agenda 2000.
Special provisions had also been allowed for the particular difficulties
facing farmers in mountainous regions, hill farms and less favoured
areas.87 Two types of aid were applicable in these areas: (1) compensation
for permanent natural handicaps; and (2) joint investment aid. The EU
contribution generally amounted to 25% of total financing, however, in
Objective 1 areas and less favoured areas of Italy and Spain this could have
risen to 50%, and even to 75% in some Objective 1 areas. New manage¬
ment tools were also provided for under these provisions, and aid for
accounting on agricultural holdings88 had also been provided.89 General
upgrading of market managing mechanisms90 in pursuit of the reform of
the CAP had been grouped in Objective 5a category of the Structural Fund
83 "Objective 5a: aid for young farmers". The purpose of this aid for the take over of pre¬
existing movable and immovable assets, during the course of setting up of a young farmer.
25,000 young farmers benefit each year. Total available aid ECU 30,000 (all member states
except UK and Netherlands).
84 Nowadays used for courses to set up young people in agricultural holdings Max ECU
10,500 per person, of which ECU 4,000 for courses on the environment, forestry and
reorientation of production, and granted only once in a lifetime. (All member states, except
UK, have introduced national implementation measures).
85 Regulation No. 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6/8/91), Article 28, amended by
Regulation Nos. 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31/12/93) and Regulation No. 2843/94 (OJ L 302
of 25/11/94).
86 Objective 5a: launching aid for mutual aid, replacement and management services.
Regulation No. 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91), Articles 14 to 16 amended by
Regulations 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and Regulation No. 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of
25/11/94).
87 Directive 75/268/EEC of 28/4/75 (OJ L 128 of 19.5.75), Article 17 to 20 ofRegulation
No. 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91) amended by Regulation No. 2328/91 of
15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91) amended by Regulation Nos. 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93)
and 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25.11.94).
88 Regulation No. 2328/91 of 15/7/91 OL J 218 of 6/8/91), Article 13, amended by
Regulation No. 2843/91 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94).
89 Aid can vary from 700 to 1500 ECU. All Member States except Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and UK have adopted national implementing provisions.
90 Regulation No. 2085 of the 20/7/93 amending Regulation No. 4256/88 on the imple¬
mentation provisions of Regulation No. 2052/88 with regard to the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) Guidance Section, OJ L 193 of 1993. Regula¬
tion No. 1282/94 of 2/6/94 laying down the rates of Community co-funding for certain
measures of Objective 5a, OJ L 140 of 1994.
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budget, and primarily concern the improvement of production conditions,
processing and marketing of agricultural and forestry products.
Investment aid in agricultural holdings91 where funding in general
could have amounted to 25% of the cost of improving competitiveness
of a holding, in the context of rational and sustainable development of
agricultural production while protecting the income of farmers, rising to
50% in disadvantaged areas of Spain and Italy, and up to 75% in Objective
1 areas. This funding was not limited to full time farmers. Funding could
have included:
1. the construction of farm buildings,
2. the relocation of farm buildings when this is done in public interest,
3. land improvement operations,
4. environmental protection and improvement,
5. and on condition that this aid is granted in compliance with the general
rules of competition.92
Not only was the production of agricultural produce the concern of
the European Union, so also was the processing and marketing of that
produce,93 with the objective being to relieve the intervention agencies.
Marketing of produce was recognised as being of primary importance,94
with a system to encourage the formation of producer groups and their
unions.95 Aid could have varied from 2 to 5% of value of market
production, to a maximum of ECU 120,000.
Adding value to agricultural produce was seen as a way of increasing
farm incomes through the market either through the encouragement of the
91 Regulation No. 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6.8.91), Articles 5 to 9, 11 and 12,
amended by Regulations Nos. 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of
25/11/94.
92 The UK ceased operating this scheme in 1995.
93 Regulation No. 866/90 of 29/3/90 (OJ L 91 of 6/4/90) amended by Regulation No.
3669/93 (OJ L 388 of 31/12/93) Regulation No. 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25/11/94). (This
regulation replaces Regulation No. 355/77, which concerned the Community aid scheme
for investments in the field of processing and marketing agricultural and fisheries products).
94 Objective 5a: launching aid for producer groups for marketing agricultural products;
countries partaking in this scheme are Belgium, France, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Portugal.
95 Regulation No. 1360/78 of 19/6/78 (OJ L 166 of 23.6.78) amended by Regulation
No. 1760/87, 3875/88, OJ L 346 of 15.12.88), Regulation No. 3808/89 (OJ L 370 of
20.12.89), Regulation No. 3763/91 (OJ L 356 of 24.12.91), Regulation No. 698/93 (OJ
L 74 of 27.3.93), Regulation No. 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93). In addition specific
systems have been set up for the sector of fruit and vegetables (Regulation No. 1035/72 of
18/5/72 OJ L 118 of 20/5/72), for cotton (Regulation No. 389/82 of 15.12.82 OJ L 51 of
23/2/82) and for hops (Regulation No. 1696/71 of 26/7/91 OJ L 175 of 4/8/71).
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growth of organic produce,96 by creating conditions of fair competition,
or through the new Community system of the designation of origin and
geographical indication,97 or the Community system for the protection
of agri-food products benefiting from a certificate of specific character.98
Public agencies and private bodies were targeted under Article 8 of the
EAGGF Guidance Section.99 This funding was designed to facilitate
"pilot projects and demonstration projects relating to the adjustment of
agricultural structure and the promotion of rural development".100
With the European Union pouring all this money into agricultural
schemes it was concerned that national initiatives would not unbalance
its finely tuned aid packaged, and restrictions on national aid for invest¬
ment in agricultural holdings has also been provided for.101 The informing
of the European Citizen and the co-ordination of the various European
rural initiatives was to be carried out by "European Rural Information
and Promotion Carrefours".102 Processing and marketing structures were
96 Regulation No. 2092/91 of 24/6/91 (OJ L 198 of 22/7/91) amended by Regulation
No. 94/92 (OJ L 11 of 17/1/92), Regulation No. 1535/92 (OJ L 162 of 16/6/92), Regula¬
tion No. 2083/92 (OJ L 208 of 24/7/92). Regulation No. 3457/92 (OJ L 350 of 1/12/92),
Regulation No. 3713/92 (OJ L 378 of 23/12/92), Regulation No. 2608/93 (OJ L 239 of
24/9/93), Regulation No. 468/94 (OJ L 59 of 3/3/94), Regulation No. 1468/94 (OJ L 159
of 28/6/94), Regulation No. 2381/91 (OJ L 255 of 1/10/94), Regulation No. 529/95 (OJ L
54 of 10/3/95), Regulation No. 1201/95 (OJ L 119 of 30/5/95), Regulation No. 1202/95
(OJ L 119 of 30/5/95), Regulation No. 1935/95 (OJ L 185 of 5/8/95). A list of bodies
providing certification for the purpose of organic production is published in the OJ (OJ C
284 of October 1993).
97 Regulation No. 2081/92 of 14/7/92 (OJ L 208 of 24/7/92), Regulation No. 1848/93
of 9/7/93 (OJ L 168 of 10/7/93), Decision No. 53/93 of 21/12/92 (OJ L 13 of 21/1/93),
Decision No. 437/94 of 14/6/94 (OJ C 273 of 9/10/93). Communication from the Commis¬
sion (OJ C273 of 9/10/93), completed by Regulation No. 2037/93 of 27/7/93 laying down
the terms of application.
98 Regulation No. 2082/92 of 14/7/92, relating to certificates of specific character of
agricultural products and foodstuffs amended by Regulation No. 1848/93 and Regulation
No. 2515/94 laying down terms of application of the preceding.
99 Regulation No. 2085/93 of 20/7/93, Article 8, amending Regulation No. 4256/88 (OJ
L 193 of 31/7/93). Article 8 deals with the application of Regulation No. 2052/88, OJ L
185 of 15/7/88, (relating to the missions of the EAGGF Guidance Section). See also Article
3 paragraph 3 sub-section 2 and Article 5 paragraph 2 point 3.
100 Community contributions may be up to 75% of the cost of the project for Objective 1
regions and 50% for the other regions.
101 Regulation No. 2328/91 of 15/7/91 (OJ L 218 of 6/8/91), Article 12, amended by
Regulations Nos. 3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31.12.93) and 2843/94 (OJ L 302 of 25.11.94).
102 Established following the Communication of the Commission of the European
Communities, The Future of Rural Society, published in 1988 (COM(88)5012 Final),
implemented following to the Communication SEC(89)1717 final of 13/10/89 relating to
the guidelines of rural development actions.
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also encouraged and funded,103 to encourage the development of new
and higher quality products, to include organic products. This financing
was aimed at persons or bodies who were ultimately responsible for the
financing and investment in these schemes.104
The WTO Areement on Agriculture 1994
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture's first line of attack on the protec¬
tionist measures in operation in the various member states of the WTO,
to include those in operation within the EC, was to calculate support
measures. The concept of an Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS),105
was adopted in the WTO agreement, which was a concept which evolved
from the OECD's measurement of "Producer Subsidy Equivalent". The
AMS is defined in Article 1(h) of the WTO text "as the sum of all domestic
support provided in favour of agricultural producers, calculated as the sum
of all aggregate measurements of support for basic agricultural products,
all non product specific aggregate measurements of support and all equiva¬
lent measurements of support for agricultural products".106 Agricultural
Produce is defined in Article 2 as being any of the agricultural produce
listed in Annex 1 to the WTO agreement. Member States of the WTO
undertake in the Agreement on Agriculture and the schedules attached
thereto to reduce their AMS by specific amounts on specific products.107
103 Regulation No. 866/90 of 29/3/90 (OJ L 91 of 6/4/90) amended by Regulation No.
3669/93 (OJ L 338 of 31/12/93) and Regulation No. 2843/94 (OJ L 3902 of 25/11/94).
These replace Regulation No. 355/77, which concerned Community aid for investment in
the fields of processing and marketing agricultural and fisheries products.
104 Eligible investments:
1. the construction and acquisition of immovable property with the exception of land
purchase,
2. new machinery and equipment, including computer software and programmes,
3. general costs (architects fees, consultants fees, feasibility studies) up to a ceiling of
12% of the cost referred to in the last 2 items. Generally speaking, the investment
must concern Annex 2 products or fishery products. EU Contribution: The financial
contribution from the EAGGF guidance section may not exceed 50% of the eligible
costs in the regions covered by Objective 1 and 30% in other regions. Aid generally
takes the form of capital grants.
All member states have introduced implementing legislation.
105 Article 6 provides the terms of "aggregate measurement of support" and "annual and
final bound Commitment Levels".
106 The Results of the Multilateral Round of Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts.
107 The 1994 commitments in Agriculture under the WTO agreement were for developed
countries to reduce, over a period of 6 years, their average tariffs on agricultural products
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AMS, however, do not include specified domestic subsidies specified
in Annex 2 to the Treaty Texts.108 For the most part these Annex 2109
subsidies are domestic support measures that have little effect on trade
or production. Programs which, however, provide "services or benefits to
agriculture or the rural community" are also exempt110 as long as they do
not involve direct payments to producers or processors. Other schemes that
are not included for AMS purposes include schemes for:
1. public stockholding for food security purposes;
2. domestic food aid;
3. direct payments to producers;
4. decoupled income support;
5. governmental financial participation in income insurance and income
safety net programs;
6. payment for relief from natural disasters;
7. structural adjustment assistance provided through producer retirement
programs;
8. structural adjustment assistance provided through resource retirement
programs;
9. structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids;
10. payments under environmental programs;
11. payments under regional assistance programs.
by 36%, with a minimum cut per product of 15%. The equivalent figures for developing
countries was, over a period of 10 years, a reduction in tariffs for agricultural products of
24%, with a minimum cut per product of 10%. Aggregate measures of support were to be
reduced, for the same time periods, by developed countries, by 20%, and developing coun¬
tries, by 13%, with subsidies on exports to be reduced by developed countries by 36% over
six years, with subsidised quantities being reduced by 21%, and for developing countries, a
reduction over 10% of 24% for export subsidies, with a reduction in subsidized quantities
of 14%. Least developed countries were not required to reduce tariffs or subsidies. See
Agriculture Negotiations: Backgrounder, at http://www.wto.org.
108 A member shall not be required to include in the calculation of its Current Total
AMS does not include support if the payment is (i) product specific support if it does not
exceed 5% of the value of production of that commodity, and (ii) non product specific
support where it does not exceed 5% of the value of the country's total agricultural produc¬
tion. Article 6(4)(a). for developing countries the de minimis level is 10% and specified
agricultural input subsidies are excluded from the AMS (Articles 6.2 and 6.4).
109 wto Agreement on Agriculture, Article 21 provides that the annexes to the GATT
texts are to form an integral part of the agreement.
110 These include research, pest and disease control, training services, extension and
advisory services, marketing and promotion services, and infrastructure services, inspec¬
tion services, environmental and conservation programmes, resource and producer retire¬
ment programs, stockholding for food security, domestic food aid, crop insurance, disaster
relief, regional aids, and structural investment aid.
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These domestic support policies which are deemed not to distort trade are
referred to by trade negotiators as "Green Box" provisions, and are thereby
exempt from the AMS reduction111 commitments set out in Article 4.2.
Some environmental aids are also exempt from the Article 4.2 reduction
commitment, usually if the payments are connected with efforts of the
domestic government to withdraw agricultural land and resources from
production.112 Further exemptions from Article 4.2 obligations are avail¬
able under Annex 5 where Member States agree not to "maintain, resort
to, or revert to any measures of the kind which have even required to
be converted into ordinary customs duties in respect of primary agricul¬
tural products, subject to special treatment reflecting factors of non-trade
concerns, such as environmental protection".113
The recommendations in the GATT documents regarding internal
support are:
1. reduce current levels of domestic support by 50% from a base year of
1988,
2. base reductions in internal support on an Aggregate Measure of
Support (AMS), provided that
(i) reductions in AMS are accompanies by cuts in export subsidies and
(ii) support is not increased for any product (i.e. no rebalancing).114
The agreement is actually to reduce AMS, by equal annual instalments, by
20%, from the 1986-1988 levels, over 6 years.
No subsidies can be granted by Member States that are not specified in
the Treaty Texts,115 unless provided for by paragraphs 2(b) and 4 of Article
9, and the maintenance of the current levels of AMS (i.e. no increase), is
maintained in Article 7. This distinction of AMS and non-AMS payments
has been noted as an opportunity by all Member Countries, not just the
US and the EU, to restructure their Agricultural support programs towards
income supplements, and away from direct production subsidies.116 Annex
3 specifies how to calculate the Aggregate Measurement of Support,
and Annex 4 the Equivalent Measurement of Support. Producer limiting
programs are also given a protected status, as long as the payments are to
be based on fixed yields and area, or the payments are to be paid on 85% or
111 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Article 6.1.
112 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2.
113 K. Kummer, "The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994", Yearbook of
International Environmental Law, p. 609.
114 J.J. Schott assisted by J.W. Burman, The Uruguay Round: an Assessment (Institute
for International Economics).
115 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Article 3(3).
116 Op. cit., footnote 114.
200 maria o'neill
less of production, any livestock payments to be based on a fixed number
of head of cattle. If these criteria are met then such payments will not be
included in the calculation of AMS.117
The 1999 CAP Reforms
The CAP underwent further reform pursuant to Agenda 2000,118 which
was a Commission proposal of July 1997, which was adopted by the
Berlin European Council in March 1999. Agenda 2000 had as its aim,
in line with undertakings given in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
and with the view to the subsequent WTO agricultural negotiations, the
reduction of "guaranteed prices", which were to be compensated by an
increase in direct support to farmers.119 This was to be complimented
by measures to promote the development of "substitute jobs and other
sources of income for farmers", together with the "formation of a new
policy for rural development, which becomes the second pillar of the
CAP".120 It could be argued that the CAP, allied with the Regional policy,
and the operation of the LEADER and LEADER II schemes had already
made efforts in this direction, however, Agenda 2000 had repositioned
these activities to the fore, within the overall CAP strategy. In addition to
redesigning the CAP into a two pillar structure, Agenda 2000 emphasised
the need to integrate "more environmental and structural considerations
into the CAP",121 thereby furthering the move from a prices policy to a
structural policy earlier referred to in this chapter. Food quality and safety
were also made a priority, with the overall objective of Agenda 2000 being
to develop the "multi-functional, sustainable and competitive agriculture"
of the EU.122
Future agricultural legislation was to be simplified, consolidated, and
made available to the public on the internet.123 For example, rural develop¬
ment provisions were consolidated into a single regulatory framework124
117 WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Article 6(5).
118 AGENDA 2000 http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/104000.htm.
119 European Parliament Briefing No. 27; Agriculture and Enlargement, DOC EN/EV/
360/360464.
120 Supra n. 118.
121 Supra n. 118.
122 Supra n. 118.
123 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
Simplification ofAgricultural Legislation, Brussels, 29.01.2001 COM (2001) 48 Final.
124 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 on support for rural development from
the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) and amending and
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from "the previous nine regulations".125 Simplifications also resulted
from the "reduction to three of the number of objectives for structural
measures".126 Other simplifications resulted from the "Small Farmers'
Scheme" payments structure.127 In line with this process of simplifi¬
cation, the horizontal regulations on import and export licences were
consolidated into Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1291/2000,128 which
included much simplification.129 This was to be accompanied by new
"Community Guidelines for State aid in the agricultural sector",130 which
were complimented by the EC's own regulations; Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1259/1999 of 17 May 1999 establishing common rules for direct
support schemes under the Common Agricultural Policy,131 and Council
Regulation (EC) No. 1244/2001 of 19 June 2001, amending Regulation
1259/1999 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under
the common agricultural policy, for farmers receiving small amounts of
132
money.
The guidelines on state aids, which came into force on the 1st January,
2000, provided that certain state aids would be approved subject to
certain conditions. These approved state aids included; investment aid for
farms,133 with higher level of aids being available for "investments linked
to the conservation of traditional landscapes, for the relocation of farm
buildings in the public interest or for the improvement of the environment,
animal welfare or hygiene".134 Aid was approved for "investment in the
processing and marketing of agricultural products",135 as were state aids
repealing certain regulations; Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1750/1999 of 23 July
1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No.
1257/1999 on support for rural development from the EAGGF; Commission Regulation
(EC) No. 2603/1999 of 9 December 1999 laying down rules for the transition to the rural
development support provided for by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999.
125 Supra n. 123.
126 Supra n. 123.
127 Supra n. 123.
128 OJL. 152, 24/6/2000, p. 1.
129 Op. cit., footnote 119.
130 OJ C 28, 1.1.2000, p. 2; OJ C 232, 12.8.2000, p. 19.
131 OJ L. 160, 26/6/1999, p. 113.
132 OJ L 1973, 27.6.2001, p. 1, second recital.
133 Introduced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 OJ L 106, 26/6/1999, p. 80,
at Article 4.
134 TheAgricultural Situation in the European Union 2000 Report, Brussels, 11.02.2002,
COM (2002) 67 final.
135 Supra n. 134.
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to support agri-environmental undertakings.136 Aid was also approved to
compensate for less-favoured areas,137 to help young farmers start up,138
to assist in early retirement schemes, or to reduce production, processing
or marketing capacity. Also included was aid to help producer groups start
up, to compensate for loss arising from natural disasters, adverse weather
conditions or disease, or aid towards insurance against these risks, or aid
to improve marketing of goods, or the genetic quality of livestock, or aid
for "the outermost regions and the Aegean islands."139 Specifically, Article
33 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999140 provided support for the
promotion and adaptation and development of rural areas, to include "land
improvement, reparcelling, setting-up of farm relief and farm management
services", the marketing of quality agricultural products, the provision of
basic services to rural areas, "renovation and development of villages and
protection and conservation of the rural heritage", the "diversification of
agricultural activities and activities close to agriculture to provide multiple
activities or alternative incomes", and "the encouragement of tourist and
craft activities".141 Common rules for direct support schemes set out in
1999,142 were amended in 2001.143 The Structural funds had been dealt
with by Regulation 1269/1999,144 which had provided that Objective 1
funding was to be covered by the ERDF, the ESF, the EAGGF Guidance
section and, where appropriate, the FIFG,145 Objective 2 funding from the
ERDF and the ESF, and Objective 3 from the ESF.146 The financing of the
four community initiatives was also provided for in Regulation 1260/1999.
136 Introduced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 OJ L 106, 26/6/1999, p. 80,
at Article 22.
137 Supra n. 136.
138 Supra n. 136, at Article 8.
139 Supra n. 134.
140 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1257/1999 OJ L 106, 26/6/1999, p. 80.
141 Supra n. 140.
142 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1259/1999 of 17 May 1999 establishing common rules
for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy. Official Journal L 160,
26/06/1999 p. 113.
143 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1244/2001 of 19 June 2001 amending Regulation (EC)
No. 1259/1999 establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common
agricultural policy, Official Journal L 173, 27/06/2001 p. 1.
144 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1260/99. laying down general provisions on the
structural funds, OJ L 213, 13 August 1999.
145 The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance, which is to "contribute to structural
actions in the fisheries sector Objective 1 regions in accordance with Council Regulation
(EC) No. 1263/1999 June 1999 on the financial instrument for fisheries guidance". Article
2.3 Regulation 1260/1999.
146 Regulation 1260/1999, Article 2.2.
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INTERREG and URBAN were both to be financed by the ERDF, Leader
was to be financed by the EAGGF Guidance Section, and EQUAL by the
ESF.147
The reduction in guaranteed prices aspect of the reform was reflected
in the reduction of the intervention price for cereals by 20% in 2000, with
direct aid increased from ECU 54 per tonne to ECU 65 per tonne.148 In
the Beef and veal common organisation, support was to be reduced by
30% in three equal phases, with the then existing intervention system
being replaced by a private storage system. In like manner, the intervention
prices for butter and skimmed milk powder was to be reduced by 15%
in four phases, with similar provision being made for other agricultural
products.149
An Examination of the Cereals' Common Market Before
and After the Mac Sharry Reforms
An example of one of the more developed market organisations is that
of Cereals,150 which was set up against the backdrop of the International
Wheat Agreement, and which is managed by the Management Committee
for Cereals.151 Its objective was to have a single price system for cereals for
the community, but maintaining a flexibility to vary target prices, interven¬
tion prices and threshold prices a number of times a month, if necessary.152
In the market for Cereals153 a target price, and threshold price and inter¬
vention price is set for "a standard quality" of each cereal.154 How these
prices are used differs between the two regulations. The 1975 regulations
specified that the Agricultural Commission was to submit to the Council
147 Regulation 1260/1999, Recital No. 38.
148 Supra n. 134.
149 Supra n. 134.
150 Pre Mac Sharry reforms Regulation No. 2727/75 [1995], OJ L No. 281/1, which
consolidated and updated the previous regulations, but which was repealed and replaced by
Council Regulation (EEC) no 1766/92 of 30 June 1992 on the common organisation of the
market in cereals, OJ L 181, 1.7.92, p. 21. The exact products covered by this regulation are
set out in Article 1 of both regulations. The 1992 regulation operates in conjunction with
Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/92 on assistance for arable farmers. Article 1.2 of Council
Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92.
151 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92, Article 23, as amended by Council Regu¬
lation (EC) No. 1666/2000, Article 1.3, of the 17 July 2000, Official Journal L 193,
29/07/2000 p. 1.
152 Regulation 2727/75, Article 6, and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92, Article
3.4 and Article 6.
153 Being common wheat, durum wheat, barley, maize, sorghum and rye.
154 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92, Article 3.
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a schedule of prices for various cereals such as wheat, meslin, rye, barley,
oats, maize, buckwheat, millet, canary seed, and grain sorghum and prices
for a series of processed products such as meal, flour, and groats.
The target price under the 1975 regime was to be fixed for Duisberg in
the Rhiir, the centre in shortest supply, however the guaranteed minimum
price is for the "marketing centre of the region with the largest surplus".155
This target price was then to represent the optimum level for domestic
prices.156 Wheat was then treated as the basic cereal in pricing discussions
of marketing organisations and corn, sorghum157 and millet, essentially
feed grains, are priced on a conversation ratio related to wheat. The feed
grain rates were then to contribute to the calculation of the target price
for the meat of animals which would be fed on said grains. The wheat
target price then affected the target price of a number of other agricul¬
tural products, not just grains. The preamble of the 1992 regulation states
that the "current policy" on cereals should be "radically reformed". The
pricing mechanism to be used was to lead to "market equilibrium", with
the Community achieving a "better competitive position" globally, to be
achieved by way of the "lowering of the target price to a level representing
an anticipated rate on a stabilised world market". It is interesting to note
that the preamble states that "so as not to encourage producers to opt for
one particular crop, the target price should be the same for the major
cereals". This is a major change in approach to that used in the 1975
regulation. Regulation 1766/92 went on to provide one target price for all
cereals until the marketing year 1995/96 under Article 3.1.
The 1975 regulation provided a uniform intervention price for barley,
maize, common wheat158 and durum wheat, which was fixed for Ormes,
France, the area of greatest supply, represented the minimum market price,
at which intervention agencies are obliged to purchase. The intervention
prices were to be "valid for all Community intervention centres designated
for each cereal".159 The 1992 approach to intervention price is to provide
one intervention price for all cereals, under Article 3.2 of Regulation
1766/92.
A threshold price was also provided for under both the 1975 and 1992
regulations. This was the minimum entry price for third country imports,
155 Regulation 2727/75, Article 2(3).
156 F.G. Snyder, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy (London: Sweet and Maxwell,
1985).
157 S. Andrews, Agriculture and the Common Market (Ames: Iowa State University Press,
1973).
158 Together with a derived intervention price for common wheat, Regulation 2727/75,
Article 4.
159 Regulation 2727/75, Article 3.4.
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the difference in prices being made up by a variable "import" levy which is
paid into the Guarantee and Guidance Fund, referred to above. This import
levy could have varied from day to day, and was fixed "on the basis of the
day from which the imported goods exercise an influence of the internal
market of the Community, that is to say, the date on which they finally
reach this market and enter into competition with domestic products".160
In 1975, in an effort to expose prices more to market forces than previ¬
ously applied, and recognising that some, at least, of the grains were inter
se substitutable, a common intervention price for feed grains was intro¬
duced under the "silo system".161 However in an effort to promote wheat
of a standard suitable for bread making a special reference (floor) price
was introduced for same. Intervention agencies are required to purchase,
at intervention price, any cereals offered to them (except for Maize).
Arrangements were made by way of carry over payments to prevent end
of year rushes to sell grains to intervention agencies, in the fear perhaps
that the following year's intervention price might be lower. Under the 1992
regulation the one threshold price was fixed for all cereals,162 reflecting the
inter-changeability of cereals from the point of view of the farmer, with the
c.i.f. price continuing to be based on the Rotterdam prices, "on the basis
of the most favourable purchasing opportunities on the world market".163
A levy was then imposed on imported cereals, equal to the threshold price
less the c.i.f. price.164 The use of the Rotterdam prices thereby increased
the levy payable. In addition to the payment of the levy, all imports into the
EC, as with all exports from the EC, required a licence.165 Under Annex
I of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94,166 which was enacted in order
to implement the WTO Agreement on Agriculture Article 3.2 of Council
Regulation (EEC) no. 1766/92 was deleted, thereby bringing to an end the
regime of threshold prices in the cereals sector within the EC.
Article 16 of the 1975 Regulation and Article 13 of the 1992 Regula¬
tion deal with the exportation of produce out of the European Community.
160 Case 35/71 Schleswig-Holsteinische landwirtschaftliche Hauptgenossenschafte
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1971] E.C.R. 1083.
161 Regulation 2727/75.
162 Regulation 1766/92, Article 3.2.
163 Regulation 1766/92, Article 10.2, and Regulation 2727/75, Article 13 and 14.
164 Regulation 1766/92, Article 10.1, with the exception of Rye, which had its own
calculations.
165 Regulation 2727/75, Article 12, and Regulation 1766/92, Article 9.
166 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the adjustments and
transitional arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to implement the agree¬
ments concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Official
Journal L 349, 31/12/1994 p. 105.
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The difference between world market prices of quotations, normally lower
than Community prices, may be covered by an export refund. The refund
payment was made depending on the country of export, but may vary
according to the country of destination under the 1975 Regulation.167
Under the 1992 regulation, the "refund shall be the same for the whole
Community", but may "be varied according to use or destination".168 The
granting of this export refund under the 1975 regulations was dependent
on the desire of the community to retain manufacturing jobs in the com¬
munity, and to export processed goods rather than raw materials. Inward
processing arrangements may also have been restricted or prohibited.169
This would nowadays be subject to the EC's obligations under the GATT/
WTO agreements, and has been replaced pursuant to Annex I of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94,170 which operated to delete Title II of
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1766/92, and its replacement by a new Title
II which was drafted to comply with WTO - Uruguay round commitments.
Power is reserved under both regulations to the Community to take what
ever measures are necessary in the event of serious disturbances, of the
threat of same, which may endanger the objectives set out in what is now
Article 33171 of the Treaty of Rome.172 Said disturbances are not specified.
The 1992 cereals' regulation was accompanied by Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 1765/92,173 which establishes a support system for producers of
certain arable crops, on the basis of both rotational and non-rotational set
aside. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1765/92 has since been repealed and
replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1251/1999.174 Council Regu¬
lation 1251/1999 provides a support mechanism for producers of certain
arable crops. It provides in recital no. 7 that "reform of the support scheme
has to take into account the international obligations of the community",
namely the WTO Agreement on Agriculture obligations. It also provides
in recital no. 8 that "the best way to achieve market balance is to approx¬
imate the Community prices of cereals to the prices on the world market
and the provide for non-crop specific area payments". The WTO Agree-
167 Regulation 2727/75, Article 16 (2).
168 Regulation 1766/92, Article 13.2.
169 Regulation 2727/75, Article 17.
170 Council Regulation (EC) No. 3290/94 of 22 December 1994 on the adjustments and
transitional arrangements required in the agriculture sector in order to implement the agree¬
ments concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, Official
Journal L 349, 31/12/1994, p. 105.
171 Ex. EC Treaty, Article 39.
172 Regulation 2727/75, Article 20, and Regulation 1766/92, Article 17.
173 OJL 181, 1/7/1992, p. 12.
174 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1251/1999 of 17 May 1999 establishing a support
system for producers of certain arable crops, Official Journal L 160, 26/06/1999, p. 1.
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ment on Agriculture which EC CAP provisions are mirroring provide for
green box exemptions175 and blue box exclusions.176 The Green box provi¬
sions permit177 "payments under environmental and regional assistance
programmes".178 Payments under Green Box provisions, must be gener¬
ally available to producers within the region"179 and can not be "related
to, or based on, the type or volume of production",180 with the "size
of the payment related to the income loss incurred" and not on current
behaviour,181 thereby limiting the effectiveness of developing green box
payments as steering mechanisms in the development of more sustainable
agricultural practices.182
The Current Situation
As stated earlier, the WTO negotiations on Agriculture have reopened
pursuant to Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. Some of the
negotiating parties have viewed the negotiations as a "tripod" structure,
of "export subsidies, domestic support, and market access", with others
viewing the negotiations as being a "pentangle", the five points being the
above three, together with "non-trade concerns and special and differ¬
ential treatment for developing countries as separate issues in their own
right".183 The issue of rural development has given rise to one of the
lengthiest discussions to date at this round.184 The EC is emphasising the
rural development aspect of Agriculture, in light of its recent restructuring
of agricultural production within the EC185 into a two pillar structure,
with an evolving Rural policy forming the second pillar.186 Terms such
175 Agreement on Agriculture, Article 6.1 and Annex 2.
176 Agreement on Agriculture, Article 6.
177 Agreement on Agriculture, Articles 2.2-2.13.
178 K.C. Kennedy, "Reforming Farm Trade in the Next Round ofWTO Multilateral Trade
Negotiations", Journal ofWorld Trade 35/6 (2001), pp. 1061-1079.
179 James Rude, "Under the Green Box; the WTO and Farm Subsidies", Journal ofWorld
Trade 35/5 (2001), pp. 1015-1033.
180 \ypo Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, paragraph 6.
181 Supra n. 179.
182 Supra n. 179.
183 WTO Agriculture negotiations The issues, and where we are now, 25th January 2002,
http://www.wto.org, at p. 12.
184 Supra n. 183.
185 J.A. McMahon, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy (Pearson Education, 2000),
at p. 120.
186 The Agricultural situation in the European Union 2000 Report, Brussels, 11.02.2002,
COM (2002) 67 final and Agenda 2000. http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/
104000.htm.
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as "sustainability" which has received international recognition through
the Brundtland commission,187 and "multifunctionality", which has yet
to achieve an internationally recognised definition, though the OECD's
positive concept of multifunctionality is the most likely to be adopted,188
are coming to the fore in the EC's approach to the current WTO negoti¬
ations,189 along with the EC's own Agenda 2000 package of reforms.190
Many of the WTO member states have accepted that that agriculture is
not just about food and fibre production, and that it has other functions,
however "although some dislike the buzzword 'multifunctionality' ",191 It
remains to be seen if the Agenda 2000 reforms of the CAP will be sufficient
to meet the requirements of a new WTO Agreement on Agriculture, or
whether further radical restructuring of the CAP will be required, as was
the case in order to meet the EC's legal requirements under the 1994 WTO
Agreement on Agriculture.
University ofAbertay
Dundee, Scotland DDI 1HG
Scotland
UK
187 OECD, Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development (OECD 2001), quoting from
WECD, (World Commission on Environment and Development) Our Common Future
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
188 OECD, Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework (OECD, 2001).
189 "It is essential that the sustainability and multifunctionality principles underpin -
and become the norm in - future world agricultural trade negotiations." Opinion of the
Committee of the Regions on: the 'Proposals for Council Regulations (EC) concerning the
reform of the common agricultural policy': 'Council Regulation (EC) on the financing of
the common agricultural policy'; 'Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC)
No. 1766/92 on the common organisation of the market of cereals and repealing Regulation
(EEC) No. 2731/75 fixing standard qualities for common wheat, rye, barley, maize and
durum wheat'; 'Council Regulation (EC) establishing a support system for producers of
certain arable crops'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on the common organisation of the market
in beef and veal'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on the common organisation of the market
in milk and milk products'; 'Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) No.
3950/92 establishing an additional levy in the milk and milk products sector'; 'Council
Regulation (EC) establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common
agricultural policy'; 'Council Regulation (EC) on support for rural development from the
European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF)' CdR 273/98 fin, Official
Journal C 93, 06/04/1999 p. 1.
190 Op. cit., footnote 118.
191 Op. cit., footnote 183.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Agriculture, the EC and the WTO: a legal
critical analysis of the concepts of
sustainability and multifunctionality
Abstract The agricultural policies of the Member States of the EC have for many years
now been controlled from Brussels under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In recent
years the CAP has, together with other policies of the EC, been refocused from crop
production support to a European rural policy, with the term 'sustainability' being written
into many policy documents. This term has achieved international recognition and the
definition used by the Brundtland Commission has been widely accepted, as evidenced by
its use in OECD documentation. While the term 'sustainability' has been written into World
Trade Organisation (WTO) texts, the robustness of (he term is questionable. The question
then arises as to the legal interaction of WTO texts and multilateral environmental
agreements, which do have 'sustainability' as their core philosophy. A new term has entered
the regional and global debate in the policy area of agriculture, that of 'multifunctionalily'.
The EC is increasingly defining agriculture as being multifunctional. This term has yet to
be clearly defined at EC level, although the OECD has done some work in this area. How
the millennium round of WTO negotiations reacts to the term 'multifunctionality' will have
an important impact on the EC's CAP. This paper examines the issues of sustainabilily and
multifunctionality, with particular reference to the agricultural policies of the EU.and WTO,
and their interaction.
National agricultural policy is no longer the preserve of national governments. In most
western European countries national agricultural policies have been largely controlled
by the regional governance structure of the EC. In addition, agriculture is increasingly
becoming a bone of contention in international trade disputes. This was evidenced in the
fact that the whole of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) under the
Uruguay round of negotiations was held up pending the resolution of agricultural trading
issues between the three main negotiating parties at the international level, the EC, the
USA and the Cairns group. Resolution was eventually reached at BlairHouse in November
1992. Conflicting issues of feeding an increasing global population, at a reasonable price,
while maintaining our respective biodiversilies, local ecosystems and rural populations,
are continuing issues of debate. Differences in social priorities in different areas around
the world will increasingly have an impact on the international debates on agriculture in
this increasingly globalised world. The agricultural policy of the EC will be strongly
influenced by WTO agricultural agreement commitments. In-depth examination of the
interaction of the agricultural policy of the EC and the WTO is merited. For the purposes
of this paper, I propose, however, to focus on the interaction between these two levels of
governance, and to limit my examination to their approaches, together with the views of
the OECD, to the issues of .sustainability and multifunctionality, and then to analyse the
possible impact of any divergence on agricultural policy.
* Dundee Business School, University of Abertay Dundee, Bell Street, Dundee DDI IMG, UK.
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INTRODUCTION
AGRICULTURE, THE EC AND THE WTO
EC—LEGAL ARTICULATION WITH THE WTO
The EC is unusual in that it is the only regional integration association (RIA) currently
recognised as a member of theWTO;1 however, a full elaboration of the relationship remains
outstanding.2 In Opinion 1/943 the ECJ held that the Common Commercial Policy of the EC
currently enshrined inArticle 133 EC4 entitled the Commission to develop an external Common
Commercial Policy,5 with the Common Agricultural Policy being allied with the Common
Commercial Policy. Matters such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)6
and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIP)s7 were held to
be outwith the delegated powers of the EC, and remained in the exclusive competence of the
EC Member States. EC Regulation 1600/95,8 as amended by Regulation 1170/96,9 went on to
incorporate theWTO Agreement on Agriculture into EC law.10
ECJ jurisprudence recognises that the EC was substituted for the Member States with regard
to commitments under the GATT as far back as on 1 July 1968, when the EC introduced its
Common Customs Tariff." The ECJ has taken upon itself the role of interpreter of the GATT
byway of preliminary ruling underArticle 234 EC,'2 with regard to issues arising as and from
that date (1968).13
In 1972 the ECJ recognised that the provisions ofGATT 1947were binding on the Community.14
However, it was indicated in the same case that in order to determine the issue of whether or
not an EC provision was illegal because itwas in breach of a public international law obligation,
it was necessary to establish (1) that the public international obligation was binding on the
Community, and (2) where the proceedings were before a national court, that the rule was
self-executing.15 Regard must also be had to the 'spirit, the structure and the terms of the
convention'.16 In 1972 it was found that, because there was great flexibility in the earlier
1. Whether it is the EC, or its constituent Member States, which vote at WTO meetings is an internal matter
for the EC.
2. FrederickM. Abbott, Lawand Policy ofRegional Integration: The NAFTA and Western Hemispheric Integration
in the World Trade Organization System, (Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht/London, 1997) at 32.
3. Opinion 1/94 of 15.11.1994. Opinion pursuant to Art. 228(6) of the EC Treaty. ECJ [1994] 5267.
4. Article 113 EC, pre-Amsterdam.
5. Introducing the concept of implied parallel powers into EC jurisprudence. See A. Appella, 'Constitutional
Aspects of Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ concerning the WTO' (1996) 45 ICLQ 440.
6. While the cross-border direct supply of services was analogous to the trade in goods and therefore part of
the Common Commercial Policy, the rest of the modes of the supply of services regulated by GATS, i.e.
consumption abroad, commercial presence and the presence of natural persons, exceeded the limits of
Art. 113 EC and the Common Commercial Policy, Opinion 1/94 (case comment) Christopher Vedder and
Hans-Peter Folz, (1996) 7(1) EJIL 131-4 at 131.
7. Article 113 only covered the provisions of TRIPs dealing with the fight against the release of counterfeit
goods into free circulation, since these related to measures taken by Customs authorities at the external
frontiers of the Community. Intellectual property rights did not relate specifically to international trade:
ibid.
8. OJL151 1.7.1995, 12.
9. OJ LI 15 28.6.1996, 10.
10. G. McFarlane, 'Butter Matters', (1998) 460 Tax Journal 21-2.
11. Joined Cases 267-269/81 Anmenistrazione delle Finanze dello Stale v Societa Petrolifera Italiana SpA (SPI)
and SpA Michelen Italiana (SAMI) (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione)
[1982] ECR 801.
12. Article 177 EC, pre-Amsterdam.
13. Above n. 11.
14. Cases 21-24 172 International Fruit Company NV and others v Producktschap Voor Groenten en fruit (No.
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GATT, il was considered that the particular part ofGATT in question at the lime was not self-
executing. Such an argument would not be as persuasive with regard to the GATT 1994. The
ECJ has vet to overturn a provision of EC law on the basis that it is incompatible with GATT
rules;17 however, Council Decision 94/800" 'stated that by its nature, the Agreement establishing
the World Trade Organisation, including the annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being
directly invoked in Community orMember States Courts'. The ECJ in Commission vGermany™
stated that 'the primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over
provisions of secondary legislation means that such provisions must, so far as is possible, be
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agreements'.20
As neither the World Trade Organisation nor GATT is expressly referred to in the EC Treaty,21
the relationship between the two organisations, in the context of EC jurisprudence, has been
developed bv way of case law of the ECJ. Article 302 EC22 does empower the European
Commission to 'maintain such relations as are appropriatewith all international organisations'.
European law requires the EC to adhere to all of its international law commitments, with
'the provisions of such an agreement' being deemed to form 'an integral part of the community
system',2' and an obligation being placed on the ECJ to ensure the 'uniform application' of
the terms of such agreements 'throughout the Community'24 in order to ensure that they are
not used to create barriers to trade.
THE EC VIEW OF SUSTAINABILITY AND
MULTIFUNCTIONALITY
EC SUSTAINABILITy
The European Community's environmental policy, which recognises the precautionary
principle, operates through a framework of action programmes.25 The Fifth Action
Programme26 adopted the concept of sustainable development used in the Bmndtland report,27
and developed the policy framework for its implementation within the EC. It goes on to
say that
the implementation of such a strategy of sustainable development will require a considerable
change in almost all major policy areas in which the Community is involved. It requires that
environmental protection requirements be integrated into the definition and implementation
17. See Abbott, above n. 2 at 56.
18. OJ L336 23.12.1994, 1.
19. Case C-61/94 Commission v Germany [1997] 1 CMLR 281.
20. Above n. 10.
21. Although reference is made to international reciprocal agreements under Art. 310 EC (Art. 238 EC, pre-
Amsterdam).
22. Article 229 EC, pre-Amsterdam.
23. Case 104/51 Hauptzollaml Manz v C.A. Knpferheig & Cie. K.G. a.A. (reference for a preliminaiy ruling
from the Bimdesfiiumzho]) [1982] ECR 3641.
24. Ibid.
25. The First and Second Action Programmes were started in 1972 and 1977 respectively. They
concentrated on pollution control. The Third and Fourth Action Programmes, started in 1982 and
1987 respectively, developed an emphasis on prevention, as well as continuing the development ol
policy on pollution control.
26. 1993 to 2000. Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, meeting within the Council of 1 February 1993 on a Community programme of policy and
action in relation to the environment and sustainable development—a European Community
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development. OJ
CI 38 17.5.1993, 1.
27. Introduction to the Fifth Action Programme, para. 5.
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of other Community policies, not just for the sake of the environment, but also for the sake of
the continued efficiency of the other policy areas themselves,28
with the agricultural sector being one of those targeted underChapter 4.4 of the programme.29
The Sixth Action Programme30 develops the Fifth Action Programme from a cross-sectoral
point of view.31 In addition to the action programmes,32 sustainability has been written into
the EC Treaty at Article 2 EC33 and Article 6 EC.34
Given that free trade between Member States is one of the more important policies within
the EC, and the ultimate target of theWTO, it is interesting to compare the two organisations'
approaches to the issue ofenvironmental protectionmeasures hindering or possibly hindering
such free movement. The EC position is set out in the Danish Bottles case,35 where, in the
summary of the judgment, the ECJ stated, at paragraph 1, that
obstacles to free movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the
national laws must be accepted in so far as such rules, applicable to domestic and imported
products without distinction, may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements recognized by Community law and are proportionate to the aim in
view, in so far as they constitute a measure which least restricts the free movement of goods.
The court went on to say that as the protection of the environmentwas one of the 'Community's
essential objectives', and as long as the measures taken were necessary and the 'resulting
restrictions' were not 'disproportionate', then the environmental protection measures would
be permissible. This is to be contrasted with theWTO Appellate Body's approach in the two
Tuna cases,36 and in the Shrimp case,37 referred to later in this paper.
EC MULTIFUNCTIONALITy
The European Community's views of multifunctionality are still at a policy stage, and have
yet to be written into legal texts; however, the concept, along with that of sustainability, is
being strongly supported by the EC in light of the current round ofWTO agricultural talks.38
28. Chapter 2, third paragraph.
29. The other sectors are industry, energy, transport and tourism.
30. Entitled Environment 2010: Our Future, our Choice, COM (2001) 31, which is due to run from 2001 to
2010, available on the Europa website.
31. With a prioritisation on issues such as climate change, nature and biodiversity, environmental and health
issues, and natural resources and waste issues.
32. Entered into by the Community pursuant to its remit under the environmental policy provisions of the
EC Treaty at Arts. 174 to 176 EC.
33. 'The Community shall have as its task ... to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced
and sustainable development of economic activities'.
34. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of
Community policies and activities referred to in Art. 3, in particularwith a view to promoting sustainable
development.
35. Case C-302/86 Commission v Denmark [1989] 1 CMLR 619.
36. 30 ILM 1594 (1991) and 33 ILM 839 (1994).
37. United States—Import Prohibition ofCertain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS69/AB/R.
38. 'It is essential that the sustainability and multifunctionality principles underpin—and become the norm
in—future world agricultural trade negotiations.' Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on: the Proposals
forCouncil Regulations (EC) concerning the reform of the common agricultural policy: Council Regulation
(EC) on the financing of the common agricultural policy';' Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation
(EEC) No. 1766/92 on the common organisation of the market of cereals and repealing Regulation (EEC)
No. 2731/75 fixing standard qualities for common wheat, rye, barley, maize and durum wheat; Council
Regulation (EC) establishing a support system for producers of certain arable crops'; 'Council Regulation
(EC) on the common organisation of the market in beef and veal; Council Regulation (EC) on the common
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It is the Agricultural Directorates view that the issue of multifunctionalitv in agriculture
encompasses the issues of 'safe and high quality goods', the protection of the environment,
the saving of'finite resources', the preservation of rural landscapes,v> and the contribution
that agriculture makes to the 'socio-economic development of rural areas including the
generation of employment opportunities'.40 The European Commission is of ihe view that
the 'multifunctional character of agriculture' is a 'key issue to be addressed in the WTO
context'.41 The EC recognised that agriculture provides 'services' which are 'mainly of a public
good character'.42 The importance of landscape includes 'stonewalls, terraces, trees and farm
woodlands and archaeological features' which contribute to the 'cultural landscape'.41 The
specific character of land as a commodity is recognised when the Commission states that
unused land does 'not automatically revert to its original wild stale', and 'continued usage' in
a well-adjusted way is a prerequisite for maintaining its environmental value.44
Within the European Community, it is perceived that there is a tendency to 'under-provide'
the public service element of agricultural production, as the producers of these services are
'often not or not sufficiently rewarded by the market'.41 The requiring of farmers to produce
the 'environmental benefits from land use' by virtue of the mere ownership of land could
be considered an 'infringement of private property rights', thus necessitating the carrot
approach, of encouraging the provision of these services through a reward mechanism.4(1
As stated by the Committee of the Regions, 'farmers must be ready to observe basic
environmental standards without compensation'; however, if a 'higher level of environmental
service' is being provided, then farmers should be 'remunerated by appropriate agri-
environmental measures'.47
The philosophy of the EC with regard to the future of agriculturewithin the EC is reflected in
Agenda 2000. Emphasis continues to be put on production; however, the Commission
has recognised that this is leading to continuing pressure on landscape and its related
biodiversity,4a of great importance in the more fragile ecosystem areas. The Commission
has recognised that 'a landscape can be regarded as a system comprising a specific geology,
land use, natural and built features, flora and fauna, watercourses and climate', to which
organisation of the market in milk and milk products; Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation
(EEC) No. 3950/92 establishing an additional lew in the milk and milk products sector; Council Regulation
(EC) establishing common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy; Council
Regulation (EC) on support for rural development from the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee
Fund (EAGGF), CdR 273/98 fin, OJ C93 06.04.1999, I.
39. Reference has been made to the European Landscape Convention (adopted by the Council of Europe's
Committee or Ministers on 19 July 2000, which was signed on 20 October 2000 by 18 countries during a
Ministerial Conference in Florence), bv the European Commission, Communication from the Commission
to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions On the Sixth Environment Action Programme of the European Community 'Environment 2010:
Our future, Our choice'—The Sixth Environment Action Programme COM/2001/31 final.
40. Info-Paper, Agriculture: Process of Analysis and Information Exchange of the WTO; Contribution of the







47. Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the 'Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on
Directions towards sustainable agriculture', OJ C156 6.6.2000, 40.
48. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Reaions on Directions towards sustainable aariculture (COM 99/
0022).
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'should be added habitation patterns and socio-economic factors'.49 There is a fear in European
agricultural circles that the production model of agriculture will result in the abandonment
of the land by large numbers ofmarginal farmers to the extent that 'scrub and forest encroach
and the open landscape will disappear',50 which will not be easily recoverable. European
environmental policy, for its part, deals with someof the issues ofsustainability in agriculture,
with its Directives on Habitats and Wild Birds51 setting up 'special areas of conservation'
SACs) and special protection areas (SPAs) respectively. SPAs were vigorously defended by the
ECJ in the caseCommission vGermany (Leybucht Dykes),52 when it 'made it clear that general
economic and recreational interests do not allow for removal or destruction of SPA land'.53
The social issues of underlying agricultural reform are beginning to receive a specific focus
within the Agricultural Directorate with the development of a European rural policy.54
OECD SUSTAINABILITY
The definition of sustainability commonly used and adopted by the OECD is that of the
Brundtland Commission, which defined sustainable development as development that 'meets
the needs of the presentwithout compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs'.55 Sustainability is seen as being 'resource-oriented, long-term and global' in
concept.56 The OECD, in examining the concept ofsustainability in its policy document Policies
to Enhance Sustainable Development, has noted the propensity for using economic growth as
ameasure for welfare.57 The concept ofsustainability is being promoted at aUN level through
the Rio Conference,55 which approved Agenda 21, the Johannesburg Summit,59 and the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development. One of the main tools for examining the concept
of sustainability is theway, and the extent towhich, 'different types ofcapital can be substituted
for each other', with such substitution not always being possible.60 It is recognised that certain
resources have critical thresholds, and in those circumstances 'more stringent criteria for
sustainability will apply'.61
In designing policies which will be environmentally effective, the OECD has stated that the
policies should secure 'regeneration', 'substitutability', 'assimilation' and 'avoid irreversibility'.62
In cases where there is a 'lack of scientific certainty', then the precautionary principle should
be applied.63 The use of the precautionary principle, however, may cause problems, as different
countries appear to take 'different approaches to valuing potential risks involved in the
implementation ofprecaution in practice'. The OECD advocates that its member states should
examine the possibilities for ensuring that the application of the principle of 'precaution in
environmental policy is more consistent with trade disputes'.64 In addition, member state
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the Conservation ofWild Birds (OJ LI 03 24.04.79) and Council Directive
92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and ofWild Fauna and Flora (OJ L206, 02.07.1992 7).
52. Case 57/89 Commission v Germany (Leybucht Dykes) [1989] ECR 2849.
53. Ibid. But see, now, the Habitats Directive, Art. 6.
54. Under Directorate E of the Agricultural Directorate-general.
55. Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development; OECD 2001, quoting from WECD, World Commission on
Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press; Oxford, 1987).
56. OECD, Multifunctionality: Towards an Analytical Framework (OECD: Paris, 2001).
57. OECD, Policies to Enhance Sustainable Development (OECD: Paris, 2001).
58. The Rio Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992.
59. Johannesburg Summit 2002; World Summit on Sustainable Development, 26 August to 4 September
2002, http://www.johannesburgsummit.org.
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sustainabilily reviews of policies suffer from an underdeveloped methodology for the
measurement of sustainability, which still needs 'to be further strengthened'/*
Analytical tools in this area still need to be worked on in order to adequately develop policies/"
Tools for the measurement of the 'environmental services provided by natural resources' and
different ecosystems, together with the measurement of their threshold points for irreversible
damage, still requires further research/7 as do 'formal methods for estimating non-market
values' of rural amenities, which still lack universal acceptance/8 The dichotomy between
private goods and public goods is recognised; however, the payment to landowners for the
production of non-commodity or public goods, such as 'habitat for wildlife, and sinks for
atmospheric carbon', is also problematic. The OECD advocates that payment should only be
provided where 'under-supplv is a problem', and then only in such a way that does not weaken
'the intrinsic motivation of people to behave in an environmentally responsible manner'."" In
addition, issues such as habitat for symbiotic plants and animals, landscape, recreational
opportunities and flood control are recognised. The OECD advocates the development of
research in order to 'identify low-cost practices that can increase biodiversity without reducing
crop and livestock production', with payments being made to farmers for compensation for
'income losses resulting from application of these practices'.70
The structuring of current payments to farmers needs to be revisited, as it is recognised bv
the OECD that 'much of this support leaks to unintended recipients',71 with current support
systems in most OECD countries benefiting 'those producers who are best able to expand
their operations'.72 The use of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) by both the US
and the EC for the purpose of 'linking market access to compliance with labour and
environmental standards'7' was commented on, with this system being used effectively in
many cases to promote sustainable development, and it is seen by the OECD as offering
'some promise for the future'.74
MULTIFUNCTIONALITY
Multifunctionality as a concept has been examined by the OECD in its paper
'Multifunctionality: towards an Analytical Framework'.78 The OECD is of the opinion that
the term multifunctionalitv 'is not well defined' and is 'prone to different interpretations'.7" It
identifies two concepts ofmullifunctionality, the normative concept and the positive concept.
The normative concept is to view 'multifunctionalitv in terms of multiple roles assigned to
agriculture', with multifunctionality being 'not merely a characteristic of the production
process', but being a 'value in itself, with the maintenance of the 'multifunctional activity'
thus being a policy objective in itself.77 This approach to multifunctionality is rejected bv
the OECD as being unacceptable. The approach to multifunclionality adopted and
examined by the OECD is what it terms the 'positive' concept of multifunctionality.
65. Ibid.
66. The UK government lias been developing sustainabilil v indicators. See hllp://vv\v\v.suslainab!e-
development. gov.uk/indieators/index.htm.
67. See above n. 57.
68. Ibid, quoting from OECD, Valuing Rural Amenities (OECD: Paris, 2001).
69. See above n. 57 at 92.
70. Ibid, at 93, referring to OECD, Handbook on Incentive Measures for Biodiversity: Design and Implementation
(OECD: Paris, 1999).
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The positive concept views multifunctionality as being a 'characteristic of any economic
activity; but it is particularly prevalent in the agricultural and forestry industries. This concept
examines the 'multiple, interconnected outputs or effects'. These effects can be either positive
or negative, intended or otherwise.78 These outputs are classified as commodity and non-
commodity outputs. Under this model both land and labour are regarded as inputs, with
the 'role of biological processes in production, the close relationship with the environment,
and the impact on the rural economy' all being relevant issues.79 The non-commodity
outputs are deemed to 'exhibit the characteristics of externalities or public goods', amarket
for which either does not exist, or 'functions poorly'.80 An issue arises as to whether the
approach should be to develop a market in public goods, or to protect public goods from
market exploitation. The OECD asks whether alternative strategies for farming, or the
adoption of other technologies, could 'decouple', or alter the degree of 'jointness between
commodity and non-commodity outputs', and if amarket could be created for the provision
of the 'non-commodity outputs', which could operate separately from the existing
commodity outputs of farming.81 The inclusion of issues of 'rural employment and food
security' in the OECD discussion on multifunctionality was highly controversial, and the
taking into consideration of these issues may again become a problem in WTO discussions
on the issue.
It is recognised by the OECD report that multifunctionality may have 'different effects' in
countrieswith different levels of development, but the OECD is of the opinion that its analytical
framework should be operable in all countries. The OECD warns that the use of the concept
of 'multifunctionality could have domestic or international equity, or income distribution
implications',82 and that these 'direct and indirect costs of international spillover effects' need
to be taken into account when utilising the concept of multifunctionality in designing
agricultural policies.83
THE WTO AND THE ENVIRONMENT
While theWTO publicly states on its website that 'commercial interests doNOT take priority
over environmental protection',84 the WTO, in the same document, equally states that it is
'not the WTO's job to set the international rules for environmental protection'. That is
regarded as the task of the environmental agencies and conventions.85 The WTO does
recognise that it is 'concerned with trade measures applied pursuant to MEAs86 which
can affect WTO Members' rights and obligations'.87 Two problems arise from these
statements. One is the relationship between theWTO and existing MEAs, and secondly, the







84. Ten common misunderstandings about the WTO, http://www.wto.org.
85. Ibid.
86. Multilateral environmental agreements.
87. Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Press/TE 014, 14 November 1996, http://
www.wto.org, quoting from PC/SCTE/W/3, 12 October 1994.
88. Such as the Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Press/TE 014, 14 November
1996, http://www.wto.org, quoting from the Decision of 14 April 1994, Ministers meeting on the occasion
of signing the Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade negotiations at
Marrakech on 5 April 1994, which provides 'allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
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any future provisions on multifunctionality. The WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment
(CTE) differs from other WTO committees in that it does not 'administer a formal WTO
agreement'.89 The CTE is of the opinion that the WTO is 'not the forom to decide upon the
appropriateness of environmental criteria' and that its most controversial policy issue is that
of eco-labelling,""within the parameters of the Technical Baniers to Trade (TBT) Agreement,'"
and the examination of the extent to which eco-labelling is Trade distorting'.92 The
possibility of the development of a legal concept of sustainability, and the newer, and less
developed concept of multifunctionality, at a WTO level, in line with the Doha agenda
that 'sustainable development should be the overarching goal' of the current negotiations,91
within the current parameters of the WTO documentation and case law, would appear
therefore to be somewhat stifled.
The WTO's prevailing fear is that 'protectionaiy measures' are enacted in 'the guise of
environmental measures', leading to 'green protectionism'.94While the treaty provisions appear
to give a clear legal environmental protection, this protection, when relied upon at dispute
settlement stage, currently appears to lack rigour. Both the Agreement on Agriculture and
the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures currently provide exemptions for environmental
subsidies; however, these may prove to be too limited to encompass the holistic approach
needed to properly adopt the suslainability and multifunctionality criteria, particularly if the
precaulionaiy principle is to be adopted, as advocated bv the OECD.
The Agreement on Agriculture provides that 'environmental subsidies may be exempt from
commitments to reduce domestic support when certain conditions are met'.98 The Subsidies
and Counteivailing Measures provides similar provisions. These subsidies, if applied within
the parameters of the relevant agreement, are exempt from the WTO's dispute settlement
procedure.9" Article XX of the GATT permits 'countries to take actions to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, and to conserve exhaustible natural resources'.97 This provision
proved to be less robust than would first appear in the Twin Dolphin case.98 While the report
of the dispute settlement panel was not adopted into 'GATT law' by the GATT Council, its
report can be held 'persuasive before subsequent dispute settlement panels'.99 The panel
in this case held, unsurprisingly, that the import restrictions contravened Article XI. The
issue arose as to whether exemptions could be claimed under either Article XX(b)'n<l or
environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs
and concerns at different levels of economic development'. In addition, the preamble of theWTO Agreement
refers to the objective of sustainable development, and to the 'need to protect and preserve the environment,
in a manner consistent with countries' needs and levels 'of economic development'. The Doha agenda
states that sustainable development should be an overarching goal of the negotiations.
89. Environment: Trade and Environment News Bulletins, TE/019—July 1997, http://www.wto.org.
90. Environment: CTE Agenda Part 3, CTE on how environmental taxes and other requirements lit in, http:
//www.wto.org.
91. Ibid.
92. Above n. 89.
93. J. Clarke, 'WTO: Now the Hard Work Really Begins', (2002) 8(2) INTTLR 39-52.
94. H. Ward, 'Trade and the Environment in the Round—and alter' (1994) 6(2) Journal ofEnvironmental Law.
95. Environment: CTE Agenda Part 2, CTE on environmental protection and the trading system, hitp://
www.wto.ora.
96. Ibid.
97. See above n. 84.
98. (1991) ILM 1594.
99. See above n. 94.
100. Article XX(b) provides that measures which are 'not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade' and which are 'necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health' are
exempt.
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(g)i°i exceptions. Controversially, the panel held that neither the protection of life or health
(Article XX(b)) norexhaustible natural resources (ArticleXX(g)) could be relied on. In addition,
an 'extrajurisdictional interpretation' of Article XX(g) was not permitted.102
The Appellate Body in the second Tuna case103 found that 'parties are entitled to protect an
environmental resource situated beyond its territorial jurisdiction'.104 The second Tuna case
found that, in order to rely on the provisions of Article XX exemptions, it was necessary for
there to be a 'direct causal connection between the measure and the environmental objective
pursued'.105 This is a very limited view of environmental protection, and is not compatible
with a holistic approach which would be required in order to further the promotion of
sustainable practices. Scott is of the view that the Tuna II findings would only lead to
environmental protection in the event of 'drifting pollution' emanating from one member
state 'spilling over physically to the territory of the regulating state'.106 The two Tuna cases
both point to very limited circumstances when the Article XX exemptions could be relied on
in order to pursue environmental objectives.
In the more recent Shrimp case107 US environmental protection measures again failed to
meet the Article XX environmental protection exemption test. This time the US legislation
was held to fail WTO tests, in the view of the panel, on the basis that there was 'unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail'.108 The Appellate Body
also attached 'considerable importance to the failure of the United States' to follow the correct
procedures, to include 'across-the-board negotiations' with all the relevant parties before
'enforcing the import prohibition'.109 Itwould appear that international meaningful negotiation
between all relevant countries is required before environmental protection measures will be
permitted under the Article XX provisions. The legal relationship between the WTO and
MEAs therefore becomes relevant.
The legal status of WTO-MEA relationships has also been causing concern among WTO
member states,110 which are concerned not to 'undermine environmental negotiations'. The
WTO sees MEAs as being 'the best way of co-ordinating policy action to tackle global and
transboundary environmental problems co-operatively'."1 While only approximately 20 out
of the 200 MEAs currently in force contain trade provisions,112 it is recognised that 'MEAs
and theWTO both represent different bodies of international law',113 and that conflicts could
101.Article XX(g) provides the measures which are 'not applied in a manner which would constitute a means
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade' and which relate to 'the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if... made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption'.
102. See above n. 90.
103. Tuna/Dolphin II, (1994) 33 ILM 839.
104. J. Scott, 'On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and the WTO' in J.J.
H.Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000).
105.Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. United States—Import Prohibition ofCertain Shrimp and Shrimp Products—Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS69/AB/R.
108. See above n. 104.
109.Ibid.
110. Environment: Trade and Environment News Bulletins, TE/036—6 July 2001, Committee on Trade and
the Environment's (CTE) meeting on 27-28 June 2001, http://www.wto.org.
111. Report of the WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment, Press/TE 014, 14 November 1996, http://
www.wto.org.
112. Environment: CTE Agenda Part 1, CTE on trade rules, environmental agreements and disputes, and PC/
SCTE/W/3, 12 October 1994, http://www.wto.org.
113.See above n. 111.
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arise in the future, given that MEAs as currently drafted 'violate the principles of non¬
discrimination', breaching the 'most-favoured-nation clause' permitting trade with some
countries but not with others, and violate the national treatment provisions bv 'allowing
discrimination between domestic and imported products'."4 In addition, a principle of
international law, lex specialis, throws a spanner in the works for the WTO. Lex specitilis
provides that 'if all parties to a treaty conclude a more specialised treaty, the provisions of the
latter prevail over those of the former'."5 It is therefore highly conceivable that an MEA,
under this principle, would prevail over the WTO agreements. This, according to the WTO
website, is a 'widely held view in the CTE'."6 A concern to the CTE is the trade discrimination
effects against WTO members who have not signed up to a particular MEA."7
Waiver provisions are provided for in Article IX of theWTO, which could possibly be used for
the purpose ofMEA obligation recognition. These waivers are provided for, however, only in
exceptional circumstances, and are 'subject to approval at a minimum by three-quarters of
the WTO membership'."8 The waivers are also time limited. One proposal is to provide for
'multi-year' waivers for the puipose of providing for 'trade measures applied pursuant to
MEAs', with such waivers being per'mi tied only if they 'meet specified criteria',"" presumably
being minimally trade distorting. This whole area of the 'compatibility between good trade
and environmental policies' has yet to be fully explored at a WTO level,12" and presumably
will become an issue at the Doha ministerial.
THE GREEN AND BLUE BOXES
The Agreement on Agriculture provides for exemptions under the green box provisions,121
and exclusions under the blue box provisions.122 The green box provisions perm it122 'payments
under environmental and regional assistance programmes'.124 Payments under' green box
provisions must be generally available to producers within the region125 and cannot be 'related
to, or based on, the type or volume of production',126 with the 'size of the payment related to
the income loss incurred' and not current behaviour,'27 thereby limiting the effectiveness of
developing green box payments as steering mechanisms in the development of more
sustainable agricultural practices.128 In addition, Rude has pointed out that the taxing of
'negative environmental externalities' is possible under the Agreement on Agriculture, but
the provision of'subsidies to encourage the generation of positive environmental externalities
would be a problem' within the parameters of the green box provisions.129
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AGRICULTURE, THE EC AND THE WTO
Blue box payments130 permit payments aimed at certain 'limited agricultural production',131
but again they do not permit steeringmechanisms aimed at encouraging sustainable farming
practices. Safety net provisions132 again 'shall relate solely to income; [they] shall not relate to
the type or volume ofproduction'.133 Payments under environmental programmes are allowed,
provided they are part of 'a clearly defined government environmental or conservation
programme and dependent on the fulfilment ofspecific conditions';134 however, the payments
'cannot exceed the extra costs ofcomplyingwith the government programme', thereby limiting
the attractiveness of such programmes to producers.135 Equally the special safeguards provision
in the Agreement on Agriculture does not provide the necessary mechanism for developing
either the principles of sustainability or multifunctional!ty, as it can only be invoked if 'the
volume of imports of the concerned product in any year exceeds a certain trigger level or, but
not concurrently, the import price falls below a certain trigger price'.136
DOHA AND BEYOND
The WTO agricultural negotiations reopened in early 2000, under Article 20 of the WTO
Agricultural Agreement. The Doha ministerial is ongoing. TheWTO Agricultural Committee
agreed on 26 March 2002 to 'a work programme which would set out by 31 March 2003 the
key negotiating principles for a final comprehensive farm deal',137 with the date of 1 January
2005 being set as the deadline for 'reaching a final agreement on agriculture and all other
areas of negotiations that comprise the Doha Development Agenda'. While the current focus
is on the 'substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing
out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic
support', it will also include 'some rule making'. In the discussions, 'non-trade concerns will
be taken into account'. How the issues of the non-trade concerns of sustainability and
multifunctionality 'will be taken into account' remains to be established, and will be dependent
on the dynamics of the negotiating table. It is hoped that this paper sheds some light on legal
and policy thinking on these issues. The internationally recognised definition of sustainability
of the Brundtland Commission has been adopted by both the OECD and the EC, and has
beenwritten into various policy documents. There is a fear of a lack of robustness of existing
environmental measures at the WTO level, in light of the Appellate Body's jurisprudence in
the two Tuna cases and the Shrimp cases. The issue arises of how, given the possibly weak
adoption of the principle of 'sustainability' as a general environmental principle, the WTO
will be able to address the issue of 'multifunctionality' in the policy area ofagriculture. Should
theWTO, during the current round ofnegotiations, fail to grasp the nettle of 'multifunctionality'
in a tangible way, how will this failure affect the EC Common Agricultural Policy and the
evolving European rural policy, given the legal articulation between the EC and the WTO
discussed earlier? If this scenario arises, what is the likelihood of the EC engaging in future
WTO trading disputes with its global trading partners over agricultural products? We will
have to wait and see. Interesting times may lie ahead, not only for European and global
agricultural lawyers, but also for the farmers of western Europe.
130. Under Annex 2, Art. 6.
131. See above n. 124.
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